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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of personal identity or survival is intimately entwined with a 
whole host of our self- and other- directed beliefs, concerns, and practices. 
We naturally and habitually believe and judge certain people to be the same 
persons over time; identify and reidentify them; trust them; love them; 
punish them; are angry with them; care about them; attribute them certain 
ongoing rights and obligations; ascribe to ourselves and others actions, 
beliefs, intentions, sensations, thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions and 
physical traits; expect to remember directly our own experiences; have a 
special and intense interest in what befalls ourselves; feel remorse, 
embarrassment, guilt, regret, pride, shame; and so on almost ad infinitum. 
Call all these many self- and other-directed beliefs, concerns, attitudes, 
expectations and practices, our person-directed practices. For persons, and their 
continuing existence over time, are the object of all these beliefs, concerns, 
attitudes, expectations and practices. So all these many person-directed 
practices are organized around our concept of personal identity. And it is 
this special and distinctive role which the concept of personal identity plays 
in our social network and in our own concerns that would seem to mark it off 
from concepts like squareness, for example, which do not play this special 
kind of role in subjects' practices and concerns. As J.M. Shorter, for example, 
writes, 
Why is it important to determine the identity of a given person correctly? 
From this point of view the importance of the concept is obviously 
immense. Our views about how we ought (morally speaking and 
otherwise) to behave towards other people depend very largely upon who 
we think those people are. How I think it proper to treat the person before 
me depends upon whether that person is (the same person as) my old 
friend, my employer, my wife, the homicidal maniac who escaped from 
detention last week, my father, my mother, my son, the man who did me a 
good turn yesterday, the Prime Minister, the man who robbed the bank six 
months ago, and so on. There is, therefore, a close connexion between the 
way I treat people and the sentences containing personal identity 
expressions which I believe to express true propositions. For example if I 
think that "Smith is not the person who embezzled the funds" expresses a 
true proposition, I shall not think that Smith should be punished for 
embezzling the funds, for something he did not do. As long as I retain this 
connexion between my attitudes and the sentences to which I assent, any decision 
of a verbal character that I make in a puzzle case will involve the taking up 
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of certain attitudes. If I decide to call A and B the same person I will not 
debar myself from blaming A for what B did. If I call them different people, 
then I shall be so debarred.1 
Given how richly and intimately our concept of personal identity is 
bound up with our person-directed practices it's prima facie somewhat 
surprising that nearly all accounts of personal identity to date, and certainly 
all those which seem to have gained widespread currency, have appeared to 
assume that the concept of personal identity is in exactly the same conceptual 
boat as primary quality concepts like squareness: a concept which is only 
contingently associated with all these manifold person-directed beliefs, 
attitudes, concerns, expectations and practices; a concept which is wholly 
constituted by some or other independently determined set of facts served up 
by nature (or God) alone.2 They have been, what I will call, practice-
independent accounts of personal identity. 
In this thesis I set out to argue for a fundamentally different kind of 
account of personal identity-a practice-dependent account-according to 
which all these person-directed practices are not merely accidentally 
associated with the concept of personal identity, as practice-independent 
theorists have it, but are, in a crucial sense, constitutive of it. Survival, for any 
community, in any world, involves there holding among person-stages some 
relation around which the community in question organizes their person-
directed practices and concerns. 
This sort of view might initially strike some as unlikely. As Eli Hirsch 
writes, 
The ordinary distinction between "me" and "not-me", between that which 
does and that which does not lie within the boundaries of a single self, 
seems at least on first reflection completely inevitable. It is difficult even to 
understand the suggestion that this distinction might be arbitrary, or that it 
might legitimately be redrawn in some other way. Here, if anywhere, a 
"conventionalist" attitude is likely to strike us as intuitively incredible. 3 
lshorter (1970-1), p.166. 
2 Although rarely understood in this way, one of the most famous philosophers of personal 
identity, John Locke, is a notable exception here (as I will explain in Chapter 1). Two 
contemporary exceptions are Steven White (1989) and Mark Johnston (1989c) although their 
accounts differ from the one I shall favour. 
3ttirsch (1982), p.286. 
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However intuitively incredible at first sight it might seem to view personal 
identity as (like the identity of corporations, nations or artefacts) a 
conventional matter, by the end of this thesis, I hope, it will seem incredible 
to think that we might ever have thought otherwise. Of course, there are 
various explanations for why we might have thought otherwise. Perhaps we 
thought that our survival conditions were determined by God, the all-
powerful creator of all things, and so scarcely something which might be 
determined by the cares and concerns of mere mortals. Or perhaps we 
thought that nature played God's role as independent, all-powerful arbiter of 
when we live and die. Or perhaps we thought that something as important 
as the difference between life and death couldn't depend on something as 
apparently comparatively lightweight and dangerously contingent as the 
way in which a community happens to organize their person-directed 
practices. Or perhaps, as the vast majority of discussions about personal 
identity would suggest, we have assumed much, without really having paid 
much thought to the question of in virtue of what a relation earns its right to 
the name 'personal identity' at all. 
For, to date, discussion of the question of personal identity-the 
question of what makes a person identified at one time the numerically same 
person as a person identified at another-has focussed almost exclusively on 
the question of what relation it is to which the term 'personal identity' 
necessarily refers. To this one question, philosophers have offered a 
bewildering array of competing answers. Some insist that the privileged 
relation to which 'personal identity' necessarily refers is sameness of soul; 
others that it is some other irreducible, further fact; others that it is continuity 
of a person's brain and/or body; others that it is continuity of a person's 
psychology; and yet others that it is some or other subtle mixture of the 
above. And so, notoriously, the personal identity debate has raged on with 
philosophers designing more and more sophisticated puzzle cases designed 
to support their preferred answer to the question of what relation it is to 
which 'personal identity' necessarily refers, and engaging in more and more 
elaborate and desperate attempts to explain away the appeal of other 
competing accounts. 
Strangely enough in itself, but all the stranger in light of this 
substantial and ongoing disagreement about exactly what relation it is to 
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which 'personal identity' necessarily refers, scarcely anyone has thought 
explicitly to raise and examine the higher-order question of in virtue of what 
any of these relations (physical continuity, psychological continuity, 
sameness of soul...) earn their right to the name 'personal identity' in the first 
place. Philosophers have debated long and hard about whether 'personal 
identity' refers to physical continuity, or whether it refers rather to 
psychological continuity, or whether it refers instead to sameness of soul, or 
to yet some other relation among person-stages. But rarely has there been 
even a whisper about in virtue of what physical continuity, or psychological 
continuity, or the soul, get to count as candidate relations for personal 
identity in the first place. 
However, although philosophers have been strangely silent on this 
important higher-order conceptual question, lurking surreptitiously but 
influentially in the background to the heated limelight debate seems to be an 
implicit (and, I think, mistaken) assumption about the right answer to this 
higher-order question. Underlying and silently shaping this debate about 
what the referent of 'personal identity' is, is a certain view about the higher-
order question of in virtue of what a relation earns its right to the name 
'personal identity'; a view which has been neither explicitly acknowledged 
nor defended. For, whatever exactly philosophers have insisted is the 
privileged relation to which 'personal identity' necessarily refers, the implicit 
common assumption has been that, for any community, in any world, if there 
is survival in that world there is that privileged relation, and if there is that 
privileged relation there is survival; and that is so, even in worlds where that 
relation is utterly inert as regards the person-directed practices and concerns 
of the community involved. This assumption is practice-independence. And 
the major aim of chapters 1 to 4 is, first, to out this assumption in all of its 
possible guises, and then, having outed it, to show how and why it is wrong 
for the case of personal identity. 
To this deconstructive end, chapter 1 is devoted to explaining exactly 
what the higher-order question is, how it relates to the issue between 
practice-dependence and practice-independence, and how all this relates to 
the case of personal identity. Chapter 2 takes a closer look at the various 
forms practice-independence might take. Despite their methodological 
differences, what all these forms share (and what makes them practice-
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independent) is the assumption that a community's person-directed practices 
are no necessary condition for a relation counting as the relation of personal 
identity for a community. For philosophers of personal identity to date, a 
community's person-directed practices are only contingently associated with 
the concept. This has meant, inter alia, that philosophers of personal identity 
have been faced with the additional task of explaining why it is that personal 
identity matters to us in the way that it is does. In chapter 3, I discuss the 
question of what matters in survival and how practice-independent accounts 
have attempted to close the conceptual gulf left between the question of 
personal identity and the question of what matters in personal identity. 
Having so set the scene, in chapter 4, I argue that practice-independence 
about personal identity is mistaken. 
My aim for the remainder of the thesis is more constructive. The 
considerations that show that practice-independence is the wrong answer to 
the higher-order question also go to show that practice-dependence is the 
right answer. Like practice-independence, however, practice-dependence can 
take a number of more particular forms. In chapter 5, I discuss some of these 
forms and argue for the one I favour. I call this view pluralism (as distinct 
from relativism). Briefly and roughly, according to pluralism, survival for a 
community is whatever (first-order) relation among person-stages it is that 
plays the survival role in the person-directed practices and concerns of that 
community. According to pluralism, a relation earns it right to count as the 
relation of survival for a community in virtue of the fact that that is the 
relation around which a community organize their person-directed practices 
and concerns. 
Practice-dependence seems to make for a radical new possibility in 
survival. If there is nothing served up by nature or God which constrains us 
to think of personal identity in a particular way if we are not to be seriously 
mistaken-if what relation is personal identity is up to us in important 
ways-then it seems as if we have the power to change our survival 
conditions by reorganizing our person-directed practices and concerns in 
terms of some new relation. In chapter 6, I explain the sense in which 
practice-dependence makes for this possibility, and the details of the pluralist 
account of personal identity that I favour. I call this more particular sort of 
pluralist view, temporal-phase pluralism. In chapter 7, I briefly discuss some 
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possible objections to this account and to this general way of analyzing 
personal identity. If pluralism frees us to reorganize our person-directed 
practice in terms of some new relation, the question arises: exactly what 
relations are we free to organize around; what is the range of possible natures 
that survival could have? Chapter 8 explores this question. 
The implications of pluralism, however, are not confined to what we 
say about personal identity in merely possible worlds. Pluralism, I think, has 
substantial and quite radical implications for what we should say about 
personal identity in the actual world as well. These implications are the 
subject matter of chapter 9. Moreover, the recognition that the issue of 
identity and the issue of social practices are more intimately entwined than 
we had originally thought has implications that go well beyond the case of 
personal identity alone. It has, I believe, implications for ongoing debates on 
issues such as nationalism, ethnicity and gendered identity, amongst others. 
Analytic philosophy has found few allies in discussions of these issues 
outside analytic philosophy. Pluralism is a view which emerges from a 
problem which has long preoccupied analytic philosophers, but it has, I 
believe, much to offer non-analytic discussions of these issues. I sketch the 
very bare bones of this potential contribution in a brief, concluding 
afterword. 
1 
SURVIVAL AND PRACTICE-INDEPENDENCE 
1.1 A brief survey of the personal identity debate. 
The question of personal identity is the question of what are the logically 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a person identified at one time 
being the same person as a person identified at another.1 The question of 
personal identity is thus not the (epistemic or evidential) question of how 
do we know or tell that someone is the same person over time. It is the 
question of what personal identity consists in: what it is to be the same 
person over time. 
It is important not to confuse the question of personal identity with 
the different, albeit related, question of what are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something's being a person. The question of 
personal identity is not the question of what it takes for something (a 
foetus, a chimpanzee, a Martian ... ) to be a person, but rather what makes 
something already uncontroversially a person at an earlier time the same 
person as something uncontroversially a person at a later time. When we 
talk about personal identity we are assuming that the thing identified at 
the earlier time and the thing identified at the later time are both already, 
uncontroversially persons. Of course, the two questions, though different, 
are related. Any account of personal identity will presuppose some basic 
things about the nature of persons. Psychological continuity accounts, for 
example, presuppose that persons are the kind of things which are 
capable of having memories, intentions, beliefs and so on, whilst physical 
continuity accounts presuppose that persons are physical or otherwise 
embodied beings. And, of course, both physical and psychological 
continuity accounts presuppose that persons are a causally efficacious 
kind. The account of personal identity I shall argue for presupposes 
1 Derek Parfit puts a different spin on the issue, which we can set aside for the moment. 
According to Parfit, the central issue is what are the logically necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a person's survival over time; where 'survival' leaves it open that the 
properties or relations in which personal identity is taken to consist might take a 
branching form. Survival is just personal identity, without the requirement of 
uniqueness. The different sorts of analyses of personal identity that I will survey in this 
section also hold good as analyses of survival with this simple modification: an analysis 
of survival does not require a clause to rule out branching. 
Chapter 1 Survival and Practice-Independence 
merely the orthodoxy: that persons are self-conscious beings with the 
capacity for reflective mental life; exemplars of which are possessed of 
cognitive faculties like the ability to form beliefs and make judgements, 
and capable of affective or reactive attitudes like desire, concern, love and 
anger. In discussing personal identity, then, we are assuming that the 
thing at the earlier time and the thing at the later time are both already 
persons (in that they meet something like the above criteria), and we are 
asking what makes those two persons at different times the same person. 
There are two sorts of identity over time: numerical identity and 
qualitative identity. Sometimes when people talk about personal identity 
they are talking about qualitative identity. As, for example, when people 
say things of the sort 'She's a different person since having the baby'. 
They do not mean that having the baby literally killed her, rather they 
mean her qualitative identity-the sort of person she is, the beliefs, desires 
and behavioural dispositions that she has-are very different since she 
had the baby. However, the question of personal identity (or, at any rate, 
the question with which philosophers of personal identity have been 
concerned) is the question, not of qualitative identity-what makes a 
person the same sort of person that they are at or over time-but rather 
the question of numerical identity-what makes them one and the same 
person over time. Although a person may be a very different sort of 
person after having a baby, they are still the numerically same person. 
We do not regard having a baby as death. Of course, although different, 
these two questions are not unrelated. Too much qualitative change can 
destroy numerical identity. For example, if I chopped up a table for 
firewood, not only would it cease to be the same sort of thing, plausibly, it 
would cease to be a table altogether. The table would cease to exist. 
Similarly, some accounts of personal identity have it that too much change 
in the physical and/or psychological make-up of a person amounts to that 
person ceasing to exist. After these changes we fail to have numerically 
the same person as we had before. 
Historically, the division between competing positions on personal 
identity has been, broadly speaking, a division between two kinds of 
accounts: what Derek Parfit respectively calls non-reductionist accounts 
and reductionist accounts. The Cartesian view of personal identity, 
according to which personal identity consists in the continued existence of 
the same immaterial entity or ego, is probably the most famous example 
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of a non-reductionist account. In fact, according to Parfit, it is the only 
coherent kind of non-reductionist account. What non-reductionists 
distinctively claim is that personal identity consists in some further fact, 
over and above, and not reducible to, facts about physical and/ or 
psychological connections and continuities among person-stages. In 
contrast, reductionists claim that personal identity just consists in, and is 
reducible to, the holding of certain more particular facts (facts which can 
be impersonally described); most notably, facts about physical and/ or 
psychological connections and continuities among person-stages, when 
these hold in a non-branching form. 
Here, talk of 'person-stages' should be thought of as a convenient, 
shorthand way of talking of how a person is at some particular time. 
Instead of saying 'Is the person who is Ronald Reagan, the actor in 1950, 
the same person as the person who is Ronald Reagan the forgetful, ex-
president in 1995?' we can say 'are the two person-stages stages of the 
same person?' Understood this way, talk of 'person-stages' is agnostic on 
the metaphysical issue as between three-dimensionalism and four-
dimensionalism. Four-dimensionalists will gloss the notion of a 'person-
stage' in terms of temporal parts: a person-stage is a certain temporal part 
of a person. Three-dimensionalists will think of a person-stage as a 
person fully present at a time. For the time being, we can set aside these 
controversial metaphysical issues. Talk of person-stages has no bearing 
on the issue. 
Most philosophers nowadays believe that the non-reductionist 
view of persons as Cartesian egos or souls is, if not incoherent, then 
certainly as a matter of fact false. For, in this world at any rate, there are 
no immaterial entities such as Cartesian egos or souls; and, as Parfit notes, 
it is hard to imagine what other sort of entity could be the non-reducible 
locus of mental life. So in recent times, the personal identity debate has 
chiefly boiled down to a debate between proponents of two different 
kinds of reductionist views: physical continuity theorists and 
psychological continuity theorists. What physical continuity theorists 
maintain is that physical continuity of some sort-typically either 
continuity of the animal, or continuity of enough of a person's body, or 
continuity of enough of a person's brain-is both necessary and sufficient 
for personal identity. According to physical continuity theorists, a person 
Y today is one and the same person as a person X at some past time if, and 
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only if, (i) Y is the same animal as X, and (usually) (ii) this continuity 
holds in a one-one or non-branching form. Or, a person Y today is one 
and the same person as a person X at some past time it and only i( (i) Y 
has enough of X's body, and (usually) (ii) this continuity holds in a one-
one or non-branching form. Or, as Parfit formulates the physical 
continuity thesis, a person Y today is one and the same person as a person 
X at some past time if, and only if, (i) enough of X's brain continued to 
exist for it to be the brain of a living person, and is now Y's brain, and 
(usually) (ii) this continuity holds in a one-one or non-branching form. 
Of course, physical continuity theorists do not maintain that a 
person has to retain exactly the same cell for cell physical make-up over 
time in order to qualify as being the same person over time, for molecules 
in our bodies are constantly being replaced by new ones. Rather, what 
physical continuity theorists require is merely that the arrangement of 
physical matter constituting the person's brain or body at the later time 
has resulted from that constituting the person's brain or body at the 
earlier time by a series of more or less gradual replacements. 
In contrast, for psychological continuity theorists, such physical 
continuity is either not necessary, or else insufficient (or neither or both) 
for personal identity. According to psychological continuity theorists, 
psychological continuity-continuity of memories, intentions, beliefs, 
desires, and other character traits-is a necessary condition for personal 
identity over time. For psychological continuity theorists, then, a person 
X now is the same person as a person Y at some time in the future if, and 
only i( (i) there is sufficient psychological continuity between X now and 
Y at that time in the future, (ii) this continuity has the right kind of cause, 
and (usually) (iii) this continuity takes a one-one or non-branching form. 
It is important to note that four-dimensionalists such as Lewis (1976) and 
Perry (1976) do not require the non-branching clause, (iii). (I will say a bit 
about why they do not require it in Chapter 6.) 
Moreover, within the psychological continuity camp, there has 
been much further debate about what counts as the 'right kind of cause'. 
Some psychological continuity theorists, such as Thomas Naget maintain 
that the 'right kind of cause' of the furthering of a person's psychology 
into the future must be its normal cause i.e. continuity of the same 
functioning brain. Nagel writes, "What I am is whatever is in fact the seat 
of the person TN's experiences and his capacity to identify and reidentify 
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himself and his mental states, in memory, experience and thought. .. "2 (my 
italics). And since, according to Nagel, continuity of the same functioning 
brain is what in fact underlies continuity of a person's mental life, 
continuity of the same functioning brain is what is essential for personal 
identity. According to philosophers like Nagel, then, whilst psychological 
continuity is necessary for personal identity, it is not sufficient; physical 
continuity is also necessary to underpin psychological continuity. Other 
psychological continuity theorists, such as Parfit, however, are not so 
chauvinistic about what counts as the right kind of cause. They maintain 
that the 'right kind of cause' of the furthering of psychological connections 
into the future could be any kind of cause. As Parfit writes, 
The abnormality of the cause seems to me trivial. Reconsider the 
artificial eyes which would restore sight to those who have gone blind. 
Suppose that these eyes would give to these people visual sensations just 
like those involved in normal sight, and that these sensations would 
provide true beliefs about what can be seen. This would surely be as 
good as normal sight. It would not be plausible to reject these eyes 
because they were not the normal cause of human sight. 3 
Just as it would not be plausible to reject artificial eyes as providing 
something just as good as sight so, Parfit thinks, it would not be plausible 
to reject cases where psychological continuity is secured without its 
normal cause as cases of a person's survival.4 
Of course, just as physical continuity theorists do not require that a 
person has to retain exactly the same cell for cell physical make-up over 
time in order to qualify as being the same person over time, so 
psychological continuity theorists do not maintain that a person who loses 
a few memories, or changes a few beliefs or intentions, is no longer the 
same person. Psychological continuity theorists draw a distinction 
between direct psychological connections among person-stages and 
psychological continuity. Direct psychological connections are the 
connections which hold between an intention and the intended-act, 
2Nagel (1986), p.41. 
3Parfit (1984), p.285. 
4Parfit canvasses a third possible option for psychological continuity theorists-a view, 
so far as I know, that no psychological continuity theorist has actually held-namely, 
that the 'right kind of cause' is a reliable cause. A reliable kind of cause need not be a 
normal cause (although the normal cause, continuity of the same functioning brain, is 
invariably reliable), any kind of mechanism that functions reliably (i.e. in over fifty per 
cent of cases) to underpin transmission of a person's psychological characteristics is 
enough for the preservation of personal identity. 
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between a memory and the remembered experience, and between 
different expressions of some persisting character traits, beliefs, and 
desires. So a person X today will be directly connected to a person Y 
twenty years ago if and only if, for example, X can now remember having 
some of the experiences that Y had twenty years ago. But, on a 
psychological continuity account, even if there were no such direct 
memory connections between X now and Y twenty years ago, this does 
not necessarily mean that Xis not the same person as Y.5 For there will be 
continuity of memory between X and Y if there has been an overlapping 
chain of direct memories between X and Y. If, in each day within the last 
twenty years, Y remembered some and enough of his or her experiences 
on the previous day. So psychological continuity involves the holding of 
overlapping chains of strong or enough connectedness. 
But though there are these substantive points of dispute between 
non-reductionists and reductionists, and more recently amongst 
reductionists themselves, over exactly what relations our concept of 
personal identity picks out, there nevertheless remains a unifying and 
overarching point of agreement. What theorists of all these persuasions to 
date have invariably assumed is that what makes it the case that the concept 
of personal identity or survival consists in these relations is entirely 
independent of any concepts of subjects' person-directed practices viz., 
our natural and habitual practices of believing and judging that certain 
people are the same people over time; of identifying and reidentifying 
them; of trusting them; loving them; punishing them; being angry with 
them; caring about them; attributing them certain ongoing rights and 
obligations; ascribing to ourselves and others actions, beliefs, intentions, 
sensations, thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions and physical traits; 
expecting to remember directly our own experiences; having a special and 
intense interest in what befalls ourselves; self-ascribing our own past 
actions and experiences; feeling remorse, embarrassment, guilt, regret, 
pride, shame ... and so on. For nearly all these theorists to date the 
extension of the concept of personal identity is fully determined, in as 
much as it is determined, by some or other single and non-relative set of 
5Parfit suggests that we should reserve the terms 'earlier self' and 'later self' to refer to 
the degree of psychological connectedness within a person's life i.e. within the life of a 
single psychologically continuous person. So, although X and Y here are the same 
person because psychologically continuous, we could say that because the psychological 
connections between X now and Y twenty years ago are so weak, X is an 'earlier self' and 
Y a 'later self'. 
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facts served up by nature or God alone. So that we can say, 
independently of any mention of subjects' person-directed practices and 
concerns, what makes it true that two person-stages X and Y are stages of 
the same person. What Cartesians claim is that what makes two person-
stages X and Y stages of the same person is entirely to do with whether Y 
has X's soul, irrespective of whether or not subjects' organize their person-
directed practices and concerns around the soul. And what reductionists 
have claimed is that whether two person-stages X and Y are stages of the 
same person depends entirely upon whether Y is physically and/ or 
psychologically continuous with X (and, on some accounts, whether Y is 
the later person who is most physically and/ or psychologically 
continuous with X), quite independently of the way in which subjects' 
organize their person-directed practices and concerns. 
And, what both reductionists and non-reductionists have claimed 
is that it is when, and only when, the appointed facts obtain that people 
like us are justified or correct in applying the concept of personal identity. 
People of our biological kind who organized their person-directed 
practices and concerns around the assumption that a person at a later time 
was the same person as a person at an earlier time when the person at the 
later time was not psychologically continuous with the person at the 
earlier time (for psychological continuity practice-independent theorists), 
or not physically continuous with the person at the earlier time (for 
physical continuity practice-independent theorists), or did not continue to 
possess their soul (for Cartesian practice-independent theorists), would 
either be mistaken or would mean something significantly different by 
'personal identity'. Hence, though they differ as to exactly what the facts 
of personal identity are, what nearly all theorists of all these persuasions 
to date have assumed is that there is a single, non-relative answer to the 
question of what makes these set of properties (rather than some other(s)) 
count as the facts of personal identity entirely in terms of some or other 
set of facts served up by nature (or God). For both reductionists and non-
reductionists to date, our person-directed practices are only contingently 
or accidentally connected to the concept of personal identity. They are no 
essential or necessary feature of the concept itself. 
It may help here, in order to get clearer about the precise sense in 
which most accounts of personal identity to date have been, what I am 
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calling, practice-independent, to set out the general issue of practice-
independence in a little more detail. 
1.2 Practice-independence versus practice-dependence. 
Any adequate piece of conceptual analysis must put us in a position to 
answer (at least!) the following three questions. The first of these is a 
question about which things fall under the extension of a given concept: 
for example, which person-stages are stages of the same continuing 
person; which objects are red; which acts are good? The second question 
is a question about what property (or relation) determines which things 
fall under the extension of the concept in question: what property is it in 
virtue of which these objects are red; what property determines which acts 
are good; what relation between person-stages determines that two 
person-stages are stages of the same continuing person? The third 
question is a question about what justifies our answer to the second 
question: in virtue of what does this relation (whatever it is) determine 
that two person-stages are stages of the same person; in virtue of what 
does this property (whatever it is) determine that all and only acts with 
this property count as the good acts; in virtue of what are these properties 
(rather than some other(s)) the red properties? The first question is about 
which things fall under the extension of a given concept; the second, a 
question about what property unites these things under a given concept; 
and the third, a question about what justifies us in maintaining that things 
with that properties (rather than some other(s)) count as the red things, or 
the good things, or stages of the same person. 
Here's a commonplace example of the three questions in action. 
Suppose we want an analysis of middle-eastern cooking: that is, we want 
an answer to the question 'which culinary dishes are middle-eastern?' 
This question-which items of food are middle-eastern-is the first of our 
aforementioned three questions; a question about which things fall under 
the extension of the concept of middle-eastern cooking. However, in 
order to answer this first question, we need first to answer the second of 
our aforementioned three questions: what is the property of dishes in 
virtue of which they count as middle-eastern dishes (as opposed to Asian 
dishes, or western dishes, or some other sort of dish)? What unites certain 
different token dishes under the extension of the type, middle-eastern 
cooking? We cannot know which dishes are middle-eastern until we have 
in place some story about what makes certain dishes count as middle-
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eastern in the first place. Suppose we come up with the following story as 
an answer to this second question: suppose we say 'middle-eastern 
cooking is whatever sort of dishes people who live in the middle-east 
cook'. Now, and only now, are we in a position to say which culinary 
dishes are middle-eastern: a posteriori, they will be all and only those 
culinary dishes that people in the middle-east in fact cook. So, for 
example, falafels count as middle eastern by this definition, but yorkshire 
pudding and Asian noodles do not, since falafels are in fact cooked in the 
middle-east, whilst yorkshire pudding and asian noodles are not. We can 
only get a story about which things our concepts pick out (in this case, 
falafels and the like) by way of first answering the second question of 
what makes it the case that our concepts pick out those things (in this 
case, what property of dishes makes them count as middles-eastern 
dishes). Or, to put matters a slightly different way, we can only get a 
story about which things fall under the extension of a given concept (in 
this case, falafels and the like) after first answering the second question of 
what determines the extension of the concept of middle-eastern cooking 
(what determines the extension of middle-eastern cooking such that 
falafels but not Asian noodles are the things which fall under its 
extension?). 
However, of this answer to the second question, someone might 
ask 'but why is that property of culinary dishes-the property of being 
cooked in the middle-east-the property that determines which items of 
food are middle-eastern?' In virtue of what does that property get to 
determine the extension of middle-eastern cooking? For surely, they 
might go on to argue, the dishes cooked by Arab emigres living in London 
or elsewhere overseas should count as middle-eastern just as well. This 
would be a question of the third kind: a question about what justifies us in 
defining middle-eastern cooking in terms of dishes having the property of 
being cooked in the middle-east, rather than in terms of some other 
property, say, the property of being cooked in the middle-eastern culinary 
tradition. Disputes at this third-level contrast with disputes at the second 
and first levels in that they are typically a priori, not a posteriori, disputes: 
disputes not about matters of fact (for example, whether or not Asian 
noodles are in fact cooked in the middle-east), but about the conceptual 
adequacy of the criteria for determining which dishes are middle-eastern. 
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Of course, sometimes there is no room to ask this third question. 
Consider, for example, what it is for a thing to be a triangle. Which things 
are the triangles? Answer: those things, and only those things, with three 
angles and straight sides. In the case of triangles, to go on to ask 'but why 
does the property of having three angles and straight sides determine 
which things are triangles and which not-why, for example, shouldn't 
things having the property of four angles and straight sides count as 
triangles?' is to ask for too much. For, in the case of triangles, a fair 
answer to this question seems to be 'but that's just what we mean by 
'triangle". There is nothing further to be said about triangles; our 
conceptual spade hits bedrock at this second level.6 Not all of our 
concepts, however, (in fact, very few of them), are like that of triangle. As 
we shall see, for many of our concepts, in particular, our richer ones, there 
is something very important and interesting to be said in answer to this 
third question. 
From hereon in, call this third-question-the question of in virtue 
of what certain properties get to determine the extension of a concept-
the meta-question. Call the second-question-the question of what 
properties of things determine that things with all and only those 
properties fall under the extension of a concept-the object-level question. 
(Since, for reasons I will discuss at the beginning of Chapter 2, I will not 
be directly interested in the first question-the question of what the things 
that fall under the extension of a concept are-I will not bother to give this 
first question a label.) It is important, however, not to let these labels 
confuse us. I have called the second question the 'object-level' question 
because it is a question about properties of objects or relations between 
object-stages. It is important to bear in mind, however, that it is not the 
first question of what the objects are. Similarly, I have called the third 
question the 'meta-question' because it is a higher-order, conceptual 
question about the properties or relations that determine that certain 
objects or object-stages fall under the extension of a concept, even though 
there is a sense in which the second, object-level question is a meta-
question, for it is higher-order question about the first. Perhaps other 
terminology would be better, but none springs readily to mind. And 
61 owe this point to David Braddon-Mitchell. However, some may think that rule-
following considerations show that we can ask this third question of any of our concepts, 
including 'triangle'. 
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these labels should do the job, so long as we bear in mind exactly which 
question they are labels for. 
We are now in a position to formulate more precisely the difference 
between practice-independent and practice-dependent accounts, as I am 
using these terms. What marks off practice-independent accounts from 
practice-dependent accounts is the kind of story told with respect to the 
meta-question; with respect, that is, to the question of what makes it true 
that this property (or relation), rather than some other, makes it the case 
that personal identity (or middle-eastern cooking, or ... ) picks out certain 
things. The dispute between practice-dependent and practice-
independent accounts is a dispute, first and foremost, about what makes it 
true that a certain property (or relation) determines the extension of a 
given concept, not about which things fall under that extension (the first 
question), or what the property in virtue of which they fall under that 
extension is (the object-level question).7 Practice-independent accounts 
tell a story about what makes it the case that personal identity consists in a 
certain relation among person-stages which makes no essential reference 
to subjects' responses, or practices, or concerns; a story in terms of 
independent facts served up by nature or God alone. In contrast, practice-
dependent theorists tell a story about what makes it the case that personal 
identity consists in a certain relation or set of relations among person-
stages essentially in terms of subjects' responses or practices of some sort. 
Practice-dependent theorists regard our practices as determining what 
determines the extension of a given concept; practice-independent 
theorists maintain that what determines what determines the extension of 
a given concept are facts which obtain or fail to obtain essentially 
independently of our practices. 
Now, of course, there is a trivial way of reading these claims: how 
we use our terms or concepts-which words or concepts we use to refer to 
which things, and properties of things, in the world-is up to us. We 
could, after all, have used the word/concept 'schmold' rather than 'gold' 
to refer to things with atomic number 79. And the story about why we 
use the word 'gold' rather than 'schmold' to pick out things with atomic 
number 79 is clearly going to make essential reference to our practices, in 
particular our linguistic ones. On this trivial reading, then, all conceptual 
7 Although, of course, disputes at the meta-level may flow through to, or be reflected in, 
disputes at the object- and first levels as well. 
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analyses will turn out to be practice-dependent. However, conceptual 
analysis in general is not concerned with the question of why we happen 
to use the words we do; and the debate between practice-dependent 
theorists and practice-independent theorists is not a debate about the 
philosophically (though not anthropologically) uninteresting question of 
why we use the words we do in the way we do. What is at issue is much 
more substantial than that. And it is something that might perhaps be 
better captured like this: For any given concept, is there something in the 
world-some natural grouping-which demands that we group those 
things together in the extension of that concept, if we are not to miss 
something very intrinsically important about the way the world is, or, is 
the grouping more or less up to us, our interests, concerns and practices? 
I say 'more or less' because, of course, the world places some constraints 
on the ways in which we can group things. What practice-dependent 
theorists claim is that world constraints alone leave the extension of the 
concept in question crucially underdetermined. 
Take the case of elements, for example. Everyone (that is, everyone 
who believes that there are such things as natural kinds) believes that 
someone who had a conceptual scheme which failed to group elements in 
accordance with their atomic number would miss something very 
important about the way the world is. So that people who went around 
grouping elements together solely in accordance with their atomic weight, 
for example, would be failing to describe something intrinsically 
important and interesting about the way the world is. They would be 
missing a natural joint. However, just as nearly everyone agrees that, as 
regards the case of elements, the world demands that we group things 
together in a certain way, so nearly everyone agrees that, as regards 
concepts such as embarrassing, it is not the intrinsic properties of things in 
the world, but rather our relationship to things in the world-our 
behavioural dispositions-wherein the commonality of interest lies. 
Which things are embarrassing-which properties of things it is in virtue 
of which they count as embarrassing-are whichever properties of things 
it is to which we are normally disposed to respond with embarrassment. 
There is no natural 'embarrassing' joint in the world which independently 
demands that a certain group of things count as embarrassing. Or, at any 
rate, to the extent that there is a natural 'embarrassing' joint, it is a 
behavioural joint: a joint defined by our behavioural dispositions, not by 
the intrinsic properties of things. What it is for a thing to be embarrassing 
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is, first and foremost, for it to be the sort of thing to which normal people 
are disposed to respond with embarrassment. 
Debates between practice-dependent and practice-independent 
accounts of concepts are rife in philosophy, though they go under a 
variety of different names. Consider the debates surrounding the 
following question in meta-ethics: What makes it the case that value 
concepts, such as good, necessarily consist in a certain property of acts, say, 
the property of being courageous? What makes it true that acts with 
certain properties, such as the property of being courageous, fall under 
the extension of the concept good, whilst acts with other properties, say, 
maximising pain, do not? According to Aristotle and some contemporary 
virtue ethicists, for example, good necessarily consists in a certain 
property-in this case, the property of being an act which is courageous-
not because subjects approve of courageous acts, or are motivated to 
pursue acting courageously, or care about acting courageously, but 
because courage is an ultimate human virtues; and would be an ultimate 
human virtue even if it were the case that subjects were not disposed to 
respond to it in any of the aforementioned ways. According to 
Aristotelian virtue ethicists, an act X is good if, and only if, X has, inter alia, 
the property of being a courageous act. Acts which have the property of 
being cowardly do not fall under the extension of the concept good 
because cowardice is not such an ultimate virtue. For Aristotelian virtue 
ethicists, then, what makes it the case that acts which have the property of 
being courageous fall under the extension of the concept good has nothing 
essentially to do with subjects' responses. A complete analysis of what it 
is for an act to be good need make no essential reference to subjects' 
practices. Aristotelian virtue ethics, then, is a practice-independent 
account of good. 
Contrast this Aristotelian story with the following kind of story: 
What makes acts with a certain property or set of properties count as good 
is just that those are the properties which subjects in certain specified 
conditions are disposed to approve of and motivated to pursue: Xis good, 
we might say, if, and only if, subjects in ideal conditions are disposed to 
Bvery crudely, Aristotle's gloss on this was that substances, such as persons, have natural 
ends. These natural ends are the values; and the virtues-courage, generosity, and so 
on-are the means to promote or secure these natural ends. The natural ends, and the 
virtues which promote them, for Aristotle, count as values and virtues, whatever people 
should happen to care about, or approve of, or be motivated to pursue. 
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approve of X. Now, it may turn out, as a matter of contingent fact, that all 
and only those properties of acts that such subjects are disposed to 
approve of, are those of being courageous. In which case, Aristotelians 
and proponents of this latter story will agree about which things are 
actually good, at least in this world. (They will disagree of what to say of 
other worlds in which subjects happen not to approve of courageous acts). 
They will agree, that is, about the answer to the first of our questions. 
Will they also agree about the answer to the object-level question-
the question of what properties of acts in is in virtue of which they count 
as good? The short answer is that they may or they may not, depending 
on the more precise view the practice-dependent theorist takes. This 
marks an important difference between two sorts of practice-dependent 
accounts, and we will come back to it in greater detail in Chapter 5. The 
practice-dependent theorist has two options at this second level: either 
they may (contingently) identify good with the particular property that 
subjects in ideal conditions happen to approve of (in this case, courage), or 
they can identify it with a second-order property viz. the property of 
being a property that subjects in ideal conditions approve of. If the 
practice-dependent theorist takes the first line, they will agree with the 
Aristotelian about what property it is in virtue of which acts count as 
good (although, of course, they will disagree about the modal status of the 
property: Aristotelians will identify good with courage necessarily, 
whereas practice-dependent theorists will identify good with courage 
only contingently). If, however, the practice-dependent theorist takes the 
second option, and views good as the second-order property, they will 
disagree completely with the Aristotelian about the answer to this second 
of our three questions. 
Nonetheless, whether or not the practice-dependent theorist of 
good agrees with the Aristotelian about the properties in virtue of which 
acts count as good, the two sorts of accounts fundamentally disagree 
about the answer to the meta-question of what makes it the case that good 
picks out the property of courage. Aristotelian virtue ethics is a practice-
independent view-it claims that good picks out the property of courage 
because courage is an absolute, fundamental virtue-whereas the latter 
view is a practice-dependent view-it has it that good picks out acts with 
the property of courage (where it does, in fact, pick out acts with that 
property) because that is the property that ideal subjects in ideal 
20 
Chapter 1 Survival and Practice-Independence 
conditions happen to approve of. For practice-dependent theorists of 
good, courage has no claim to constitute the property of goodness 
independent of subjects' dispositions to respond to that property with 
approval. 
Or, for another example altogether, consider the debate over the 
nature of colour concepts.9 A practice-independent account of our colour 
concepts will tell a story about what makes it the case that, say, red 
consists in certain properties that makes no essential mention of observers, 
their colour experiences, or their colour-directed practices; a story entirely 
in terms of certain reflectance properties of objects in the world. As David 
Armstrong, for example, maintains, the concept of colour "does not yield 
any necessary connection between red objects and any sort of perceptual 
experience, such as looking red to normal observers in normal 
conditions."10 According to Armstrong, what it is for a thing to be red is 
just for that thing to have a certain reflectance property: X is red, theorists 
of this ilk will claim if, and only if, X has (for example) reflectance 
property r. The story these philosophers tell about what makes it true that 
red consists in those reflectance properties makes no essential mention of 
observers, their colour experiences, or their colour judgements or 
dispositions to make certain colour judgements. The colour experiences 
or judgements of observers may function instrumentally as a reference-
fixing device in this world, but they are no essential or necessary feature 
of colour concepts. For go to a world in which that property exists but 
does not cause objects to look red to normal observers in normal 
conditions (but, say, blue) and that property counts as red nonetheless. 
For Armstrong and other practice-independent theorists of colour 
concepts, a complete analysis of what it is for a thing to be red need make 
no essential reference to observers' colour experiences or colour 
judgements. 
In contrast, for practice-dependent theorists of colour concepts 
what determines that the extension of colour concepts such as red are 
determined by a certain property of objects is essentially to do with our 
colour experiences, perceptions or judgements. What it is for a thing to be 
red is, first and foremost, for it to be the sort of thing that produces red 
9often this debate, as indeed the debate in meta-ethics, is characterized as a debate 
between subjectivists and objectivists. I am reluctant to use these terms since I think they 
carry with them some misleading connotations for our purposes. 
lOArmstrong (1987), p.11. 
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colour experiences or prompts red colour judgements in normal observers 
in the appropriate viewing conditions. As Jackson and Pargetter put it, 
"the fundamental ground for ascribing a certain colour to something is the 
colour it looks to have".11 For these theorists, an object Xis red if, and 
only if, X looks red to normal observers in normal conditions, or normal 
observers in normal conditions judge X to be red, or there is some 
property which causes X to look red to normal observers in normal 
conditions. On all these accounts, the colour experiences or judgements of 
normal observers in normal conditions are a necessary feature of colour 
concepts. Go to a world in which the same property of objects that causes 
objects in this world to look red to normal observers in normal conditions 
causes them to look blue to normal observers in normal conditions, and 
that property counts as blue in that world. The debate between practice-
dependent and practice-independent theories of colour, then, is a debate 
about whether or not observers, their colour experiences or their colour 
judgements, need figure as an essential part of the answer to the question 
of what it is for a thing to be red. 
1.3 Response-dependence 
The sort of accounts of value and colour that I have called 'practice-
dependent' have elsewhere been called 'response-dependent' accounts.12 
In this complex and rapidly expanding literature, the claim that a concept 
is response-dependent is understood roughly as follows. A concept is 
response-dependent just in case there is a non-trivial, a priori conceptual 
connection between that concept and some relevant human response. 
More precisely, as Mark Johnston puts it, 
If C, the concept associated with the predicate 'is C', is a concept 
interdependent with or dependent upon concepts of certain subjects' 
responses under certain conditions [i.e. a response-dependent concept] 
then something of the following form will hold a priori 
xis C iff in K, S's are disposed to produce x-directed response R 
(or xis such as to produce R in S's under conditions K.)13 
llJackson and Pargetter (1987), p. 132. 
12see, for example, Holton (1991), Johnston (1989b), Pettit (1991), Wright (1992). 
13Johnston (1989b),p.145 
22 
Chapter 1 Survival and Practice-Independence 
So, the claim is, if something like the following biconditional holds 
substantively, a priori true, then the concept in question (in this case, red) is 
a response-dependent concept: 
xis red iff xis disposed to look such and so (ostended) way to 
standard perceivers as they actually are under standard conditions 
as they actually are. 
In contrast, as Richard Holton points out, a similar biconditional equation 
for the concept of square: 
xis square iff in K, S's are disposed to, say, judge x to be square, 
would not hold a priori but, at most, a posteriori true. 
Of course, as Holton points out, one could construct an equation 
for the concept of square which did hold a priori true in virtue of a 
trivialising reading of K, S, or R: 
xis square iff x would be judged to be square by observers who are 
accurate at identifying square things in circumstances which are 
propitious for doing so, 
is just such a trivialising reading. So, in order for a biconditional equation 
to be true to the response-dependent nature of a concept, K, S, and R must 
not be given a trivial, 'whatever-it-takes' reading which either overtly or 
covertly specifies the conditions, subjects, or responses, in whatever way 
is required to make the equation come out true. 
On this way of thinking about these issues, then, the claim that a 
concept is not response-dependent amounts to the claim that such an 
equation only holds a priori true in virtue of a trivial or 'whatever-it-takes' 
formulation of the C-conditions or that such a biconditional, if true at all, 
holds at most a posteriori true. 
'Practice-dependence' and 'response-dependence' are synonyms-
they stand for exactly the same main idea. It is just that I find it easier and 
clearer to frame the idea in terms of the three questions I mentioned at the 
outset. The term 'practice-dependence' signals this difference of 
explanation (and my unwillingness to get involved in the various internal 
debates about response-dependence, which we can set aside). But, for 
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those who are familiar with the literature on 'response-dependence', the 
central idea is the same. 
1.4 Practice-dependence again 
A good way to understand the structure of the debate between practice-
dependent and practice-independent meta-theories in general is to recall 
Plato's Euthyphro.14 Recall, in Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro meet 
at the entrance of the law courts where Euthyphro is prosecuting his own 
father on what even he admits is a very dubious charge of murder. When 
Plato's Socrates discovers this he is astonished: 
SOCRATES: But you, by heaven! Euthyphro, you think that you have 
such an accurate knowledge of things divine, and what is holy and 
unholy, that, in circumstances such as you describe, you can accuse your 
father? You are not afraid that you yourself are doing an unholy deed?15 
Euthyphro replies that, with his special insight into right and wrong, he 
knows that, in prosecuting his own father, he is acting in the spirit of true 
piety. Socrates then challenges Euthyphro to define this true 'piety' which 
he claims justifies him in prosecuting his own father on such a dubious 
charge of murder: 
SOCRATES: Well, then, show me what, precisely, this ideal is, so that, 
with my eye on it, and using it as a standard, I can say that any action 
done by you or anybody else is holy if it resembles this ideal, or, if it 
does not, can deny that it is holy. 
EUTHYPHRO: Well, Socrates, if that is what you want, I certainly can 
tell you. 
SOCRATES: It is precisely what I want. 
EUTHYPHRO: Well, then, what is pleasing to the gods is holy, and what 
is not pleasing to them is unholy.16 
What Euthyphro appears to be claiming is that the gods' loves themselves 
determine the properties of things in virtue of which they are holy or 
pious and the properties of things in virtue of which they are not. 
Socrates doubts this; and he goes on to pose the following question: 
14piato (1961), pp. 169-85. Wright (1992), esp. pp. 108-39, suggests this example. 
15piato (1961), p. 172. 
16ibid., p. 174. 
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SOCRATES: We shall soon know better about that, my friend. Now 
think of this. Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they 
approve it because it is holy? 17 (emphasis added) 
This question is left unresolved in Euthyphro, but its interest for us 
lies in the fact that the structure of the question Socrates poses is precisely 
the structure of the debate between practice-dependent and practice-
independent theorists, here with regard to the concept of piety. The 
dialogue between Plato's Socrates and Euthyphro was a debate over 
precisely the meta-issue of whether the facts about piety were determined 
independently of subjects' practices, in this case the practices of the gods, 
or whether the facts about piety were determined by the gods' practices: Is 
it because certain acts are pious that they are loved by the gods, or, is it 
because they are loved by the gods that certain acts count as pious? 
Plato's Socrates and Euthyphro agreed that an act was pious if, and only 
if, the gods loved it. What they disagreed about was, if you like, the 
direction of determination. Socrates was advancing, or at least suggesting, a 
practice-independent account of piety: it is because certain acts are pious 
that they are loved by the gods. On this, practice-independent view, the 
gods' loves did not determine that a certain group of acts count as pious 
(for that was determined quite independently of what acts the gods 
happen to love), rather, it was that the gods were very good trackers of the 
independently determined facts of piety. And the fact that the act was 
independently pious could figure as part of a (causal) explanation as to 
why the gods loved it. For the gods love pious acts. Euthyphro, however, 
maintained exactly the reverse: it is because they are loved by the gods 
that certain acts are pious. What makes certain acts count as pious is not 
determined by facts independent of gods (the gods do not love pious 
things because they are, independently, pious), rather it was just because 
the gods loved certain acts that they counted as pious. On this, practice-
dependent view, the gods' loves themselves make it the case that certain 
acts are pious, namely, exactly all and only those acts that the gods love. 
Practice-dependent views, then, claim that what makes it the case that a 
thing counts as 'good', or 'pious', or 'red' or the like, is determined by 
certain of the practices-judgements, perceptions, loves or the like-of 
certain subjects in suitably privileged conditions: something is red, good 
or pious because subjects, in suitable conditions, are disposed to see it as 
red, judge it to be good, or love it, for example. Practice-independent 
17ibid., 178. 
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theorists maintain exactly the reverse. For these theorists, insofar as 
subjects in suitably privileged conditions take things to be good, or red or 
pious, it is because those things are good, or red or pious. Just so, we 
might pose the question at issue for the case of personal identity: is what 
is personal identity personal identity because subject's organize their 
person-directed practices around it or do I should subjects organize their 
person-directed practices around it because it is personal identity? 
What, then, is there to choose between these two different kinds of 
meta-stories, practice-dependent and practice-independent? Why should 
we prefer one kind of meta-story to the other in any given case? The 
beginning (though by no means the end) of a very plausible answer goes 
by way of pointing to an intuitive difference amongst certain of our 
concepts. As Philip Pettit puts it, the difference between those concepts 
"that have a tenure in nature" and those concepts "whose tenure is tied to 
our interests and sensibilities" .18 The point is that some of our concepts 
seem to implicate subjects and subjects' practices in a peculiarly intimate, 
seemingly inextricable, way; a way in which other of our concepts do not. 
(We saw this earlier with the contrast between the concept of 
embarrassing and concepts of the elements on the periodic table). Like the 
concept of embarrassing, concepts such as annoying, irritating, boring, 
exciting, humorous, entertaining, smooth, spicy, bland, beautiful, ugly, 
comely and so forth are not somehow served up by nature-there is no 
natural joint in the world which renders certain things intrinsically 
disgusting, annoying, embarrassing and the like-they constitutively 
involve our practices.19 What it is for a thing to be annoying, or 
embarrassing, or irritating or boring or the like, is first and foremost for it 
to be the sort of thing to which subjects' in appropriate conditions are 
disposed to respond to with annoyance, or embarrassment, or irritation, 
or boredom. Other concepts, however, do not seem to implicate subjects 
and their practices in this same intimate way. Concepts such as carbon, 
18Pettit (1991), p.587. 
19To say that what things are annoying, disgusting, irritating embarrassing and so on, 
depends essentially on subject's dispositions to respond to those things with annoyance, 
disgust, irritation, embarrassment and so on, is not necessarily to deny that there is a 
thoroughly objective, reductive story to be told about the properties of things to which 
people are disposed to respond with annoyance, disgust, irritation, embarrassment and 
so on. That is to say, there will be a thoroughly objective story to be told about what are 
the Fs where the Fs are, for example, the annoying things. We can look to the world, 
observe what properties of things cause people in the appropriate conditions to respond 
with annoyance, and things with those properties are the annoying things. 
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squareness, hardness and mass, for example, seem to implicate subjects 
and their practices at best only contingently or accidentally.20 What it is 
for a thing to be square, for example, seems to be determined quite 
independently of subjects' experiences of squareness, or their beliefs and 
judgements about squareness. 
Another way we might get at the distinction between those 
concepts which essentially involve subjects' practices and those that do 
not, is to think of the former as concepts for which Moore's famous open-
question argument has some intuitive force, and the later as concepts for 
which the argument intuitively does not. 21 Recall, the open-question 
argument is that given any (reductive) analysis, Y, of a (normative) term, 
X, it still remains a substantial or 'open' question as to whether Xis Y. So, 
for example, given the following analysis-an act Xis good iff X 
maximizes happiness-it is still possible to ask in a substantial, non-trivial 
way, whether maximising happiness is good. Moore's point is not that 
such reductive analyses of normative terms will always admit of counter-
examples (i.e. cases where something maximises happiness but we are 
reluctant to call it 'good', or vice versa), rather it is that reductive analyses 
of normative concepts in purely descriptive terms seem always to leave 
something absolutely crucial out. On one gloss, what such reductive 
analyses leave out is the normative element which gives us a sense of why 
we should care one way or another about those properties: why should 
we be motivated to pursue those properties; why should we be disposed 
to praise those who pursue those properties and condemn those who do 
not, for example. Why should we care one way or another about 
maximising happiness, or be motivated to maximise happiness, or 
condemn those who act in ways which systematically fail to maximise 
happiness? Why should maximising happiness, rather than some other 
property, say, exercising valour, figure in the extension of the concept 
good? What's so special about maximising happiness? It is not enough 
simply to reply that we should care about those properties because those 
20Jndeed, as Mark Johnston (1989b) suggests, the difference between those concepts that 
seem constitutively to involve subjects' practices and those which seem only contingently 
to involve them is one way of thinking about the intuition which lies at the heart of the 
distinction between primary and secondary quality concepts. 
21Moore (1929), esp. pp.36-58. However, this may be only a rough test. Some, for 
example, think that Moore's open-question argument holds for consciousness but that 
this does not show that consciousness is essentially normative. 
27 
Chapter 1 Survival and Practice-Independence 
are the properties in which good consists. As John Perry writes as regards 
the concept of personal identity, 
That I will be run over by a truck means ... that the person who is run 
over by a truck will remember thinking and doing what I am thinking 
and doing now. But why would I care especially about that? Why 
should a person who is having such memories be of any more concern to 
me than anyone else? One is inclined to respond, "because to have such 
memories is just to be you"; but now the explanation goes the wrong 
way round; isn't it fair to demand that the analysans shed light on why 
the analysandum has the implications for us that it does?22 
Now, Moore himself thought that what the open-question 
argument showed, inter alia, was that good is unanalysable: good is a 
simple, irreducible, non-natural property. But this is a non-sequitur. What 
the open-question argument really shows is not that good is a simple, 
unanalyzable, non-natural property but that no non-normative or 
straightforwardly descriptive analysis will suffice for concepts such as 
good. For no such analysis will be able to capture the ineluctably 
normative nature of the concept. What Moore's argument shows, then, is 
that if our analysis of normative concepts such as good is to capture the 
nature of the concept, we must analyze these concepts in a way which 
accords normative considerations an appropriately central role in the 
analysis. Exactly how conceptual analysis can reconcile descriptive 
reduction with this normative element will, I hope, become apparent in 
Chapter 7 if not before. 
How does all this connect up with the issue of practice-dependence 
and practice-independence? Well, it's a truism that conceptual analysis 
should aim to capture and explicate the nature of the concept in question. 
That's what conceptual analysis, at base, is: an account of the meaning or 
nature of the concept in question. For those concepts which intuitively 
implicate subjects' practices non-accidentally or constitutively, then-
those, as we might call them 'normative' concepts-we should tell a 
practice-dependent meta-story. This, I take it, is the proper upshot of the 
'open-question' argument. For those which do not-for those concepts 
which 'have their tenure in nature' rather than in 'our interests and 
sensibilities'-we should tell a practice-independent meta-story. 
22Perry (1976), p.68. 
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Most philosophers are happy to grant that concepts such as 
nauseating, disgusting, irritating, tasty, embarrassing and the like are 
normative or practice-dependent concepts which should be given a 
correspondingly practice-dependent analysis. These are concepts which, 
as Mark Johnston puts it, "wear their response-dependent nature on their 
face".23 Many, too, are happy to think that an analysis of this sort should 
be extended to secondary quality concepts such as colour and value as 
well. For these concepts are, in sufficiently salient respects, in the same 
conceptual boat as the first.24 But that personal identity too might be such 
a practice-dependent or normative concept might not be so initially 
intuitively obvious. And so it may require a little more philosophical 
work to make it apparent. 
1.5 Locke: An unexpected ally. 
This claim-that the concept of personal identity, unlike concepts of 
squareness and the like, is a normative concept which should be given a 
correspondingly practice-dependent analysis-though rare in the 
contemporary debate about personal identity, is certainly not entirely 
unprecedented. Famously, John Locke claimed that the concept of 
personal identity was above all a 'forensic' concept25, appropriating 
actions and their merits, being, by definition, that which grounds moral 
responsibility: "In this personal identity is founded all the right justice of 
reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which 
everyone is concerned for himself. ... "26 For Locke, this forensic role was 
precisely what marked off the concept of personal identity from concepts 
of the identity over time of 'man' and 'substance'.27 The identity of the 
same man (human being), like the identity of brutes (animals!) over time, 
consists "in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by 
23Johnston (1989b), p.146. 
24And some have even claimed that causation and modal notions such as possibility and 
necessity should be given this kind of analysis. 
25Locke (1961), Book II, Chapter XXVII, 26: 291: "Person .. .is a forensic term, appropriating 
actions and their merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and 
happiness and misery." 
26Locke (1961), Book II, Chapter XXVII, 18: 287. 
27Locke (1961), Book II, Chapter XXVII, 7:278: "it is not... unity of substance that 
comprehends all sorts of identity ... but...we must consider what idea the word it is applied 
to stands for: it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a 
third the same person, if person, man, and substance are three names standing for three 
different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity; 
which if it had been a little more carefully attended to would possibly have prevented a 
great deal of ... confusion ... especially concerning personal identity ... " 
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constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the 
same organized body."28 In contrast, the self is "that conscious thinking 
thing ... which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of 
happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that 
consciousness extends."29 Person, he writes, 
is the name for this self. .. This personality extends itself beyond present 
existence ... only by consciousness: whereby it becomes concerned and 
accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions, just for the same 
ground and for the same reason that it does the present.30 
Locke was, as Alston and Bennett point out, a 'conceptual 
pragmatist' who believed that the extension of our concepts are as they 
are, not because they have some privileged or independent claim to carve 
up nature at its joints, but because it best serves our interests and activities 
to give them the extension we do. Our concepts carve up the world in this 
way, rather than some other out of the multitude of possible carvings, 
because carving up the world this way rather than another best suits our 
concerns and practices. Given Locke's general conceptual pragmatism, 
we can understand his claim that personal identity is a forensic concept as 
the claim that the extension of our concept of personal identity picks out 
the things it does rather than some other set of things not because those 
things have any privileged, independent, natural claim to be the facts of 
personal identity, but because incorporating these things rather than those 
in the extension of the concept of personal identity best suits the interests 
of law and morality.31 
Central to the interests of law and morality is that personal identity 
turns out to consist in a relation that matters to us. Hence, as Harold 
Noonan stresses, one of Locke's chief concerns was to provide an account 
of personal identity which could explain why personal identity matters to 
us: which explained why we can be indifferent as to the punishment or 
reward received by others, but cannot be so indifferent as to our own fate. 
In particular, Locke wanted an account of personal identity which could 
ground and explain why we cannot help but be specially concerned about 
the prospect of punishment or reward for acts which we acknowledge and 
appropriate as our own. Something which, Locke was the first to point 
28Locke (1961): Book II, Chapter XXVII, 5: 277. 
29Locke (1961): Book II, Chapter XXVII, 17: 286. 
30Locke (1961): Book II, Chapter XXVII, 26: 291. 
31Noonan (1989) also suggests this way of understanding Locke's claim. 
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out, a view of personal identity as consisting in continuity of same 
(immaterial or material) substance rendered problematic, indeed, he 
thought, incomprehensible32. He writes 
Let anyone reflect upon himself and conclude that he has in himself an 
immaterial spirit...; let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was 
in Nestor ... at the siege of Troy; but he now having no consciousness of 
any of the actions ... of Nestor ... does or can he conceive himself the same 
person with [him]? Can he be concerned in [his] actions, attribute them 
to himself, or think them his own, more than the actions of any other 
man that ever existed? [N]o more ... than if some of the particles of matter 
that were once a part of Nestor were now a part of this man: the same 
immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more making 
the same person ... than the same particle of matter, without 
consciousness, makes the same person.33 
This Locke took to constitute a reductio of the supposition that 
personal identity could consist in sameness of either material substance or 
immaterial substance. For neither, in the absence of sameness of 
consciousness, could account for the role that personal identity plays in 
our forensic practices, including the special and intense kind of interest 
that we have in our own identity over time. The mere fact that I become 
convinced that I am immaterially or partially materially identical with 
Nestor, Locke thinks, would not make me any more interested in Nestor 
than I would be interested in any other person from the past; nor could it 
cause me to 'own and impute' to myself his past actions: regarding the 
things that he has done with the kind of pride, or shame, or remorse, or 
embarrassment, or the like, that typify my retrospective attitudes to my 
own remembered past. Likewise, if I came to believe that some future 
person was going to be immaterially or materially identical with me now, 
I would not, indeed could not, as a result become specially concerned for 
that future person in the same way that I am ordinarily specially 
concerned for my own future self and what befalls me. I would not, and 
could not, feel towards her future actions and experiences the kind of 
32As the following quote makes apparent, Locke was here assuming that the soul's 
continued existence might be independent of sameness of material substance and 
sameness of consciousness. Indeed Locke (Book II, Chapter XXVII, 14: 284) says as much 
for the case of material substance " ... for souls being, as far as we know anything of them, 
in their nature indifferent to any parcel of matter, the supposition has no apparent 
absurdity in it..." Locke's thought was that any relation, such as sameness of immaterial 
spirit, which could come apart from sameness of consciousness was not an acceptable 
candidate relation for personal identity, for such a relation could not play the forensic 
role definitive of personal identity. I will discuss this issue more fully in Chapter 8. 
33Locke (1961), Book II, Chapter XXVII, 14: 284. 
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future-oriented attitudes of trepidation, anticipation and the like, which 
typically characterize my attitudes to my own future actions and 
experiences. According to Locke, sameness of consciousness is required 
to underpin and make sense of these concerns: 
For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this 
present self be made up of the same or other [material or immaterial] 
substances, I being as much concerned and justly accountable for any action 
that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this 
self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.34 (Later 
emphasis mine) 
So, Locke thought that a necessary condition for sameness of 
person over time was sameness of consciousness. (And this is the Locke 
with which commentators are most familiar.) But, and here's the crucial 
question, why did Locke think that sameness of consciousness was 
necessary for personal identity? Clearly not because, as many 
(psychological continuity) practice-independent theorists have it, 
sameness of consciousness (memory) has any privileged, independent, 
natural claim to be the relation in which personal identity consists. For, in 
insisting that personal identity was above all a forensic concept, Locke 
plainly conceived of our practices of punishment and related person-
directed concerns as an essential defining feature of the concept of 
personal identity, and not something merely accidentally or contingently 
associate with it. For Locke, sameness of consciousness, rather than 
sameness of substance or ... , determines the extension of our concept of 
personal identity, not because sameness of consciousness has any 
independent claim to determine the extension of the concept, but because 
sameness of consciousness, rather than sameness of substance or any 
other of the superabundant array of possible candidates, best suits the 
interests of morality and law. Sameness of consciousness, then, for Locke, 
was certainly necessary for personal identity, but it was clearly not 
sufficient. It was necessary for personal identity, but only because, as 
Locke thought, sameness of consciousness was necessary in order for 
personal identity to play the forensic role definitive of the concept. For Locke, 
then, our moral and forensic practices, not nature or God, determined 
what determined the extension of the concept of personal identity; and 
what determined that extension was necessarily sameness of 
consciousness. 
34Locke (1961), Book II, Chapter XXVII, 16:286. 
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Hence, though many psychological continuity practice-
independent theorists nowadays are happy to call themselves 'Lockeans' 
or 'neo-Lockeans', they have overlooked a crucial aspect of Locke's 
thought. For Locke, though certainly a psychological continuity theorist 
of sorts, was not a practice-independent theorist of personal identity. 
Locke was, quite clearly, offering a sort of practice-dependent account of 
personal identity.35,36 
So, to sum up so far. The debate between practice-independent 
and practice-dependent theorists has usually been couched, where it has 
been explicitly couched at all, as a debate over whether certain of subjects' 
practices (in certain specified conditions) are constitutive of a given 
concept or, at best, only contingently associated with it. And so I couched 
the debate at the outset as well for the case of personal identity. We are 
now in position to see that there is, however, a crucial ambiguity in this 
way of putting things. For there are three levels at which subjects' 
practices might be said to be constitutive of a given concept: the things 
which fall under the extension of a concept may be practices of ours, the 
property in virtue of which things fall under the extension of a concept 
may be practices of ours, or it may be that subjects' practices are what 
determine the property (or relation) that determines what things fall 
under the extension of the concept. As I hope is now clear, the sense in 
which practice-dependent accounts make subjects' practices constitutive 
of a concept is that they claim that subjects practices (in suitably specified 
conditions) are what make it the case that a certain property determines 
the extension of the concept, irrespective of whether that property, or the 
things picked out by that property, are or are not practices of ours. The 
debate between practice-independent theorists and practice-dependent 
theorists is agnostic as to the question of exactly what properties our 
35Though a practice-dependent theorist, Locke was not a pluralist about personal 
identity. For Locke thought that continuity of consciousness was necessary for personal 
identity. 
36 As Harold Noonan (1989, pp.57-63) points out not in so many words, so was Leibniz. 
Like Locke, Leibniz thought that personal identity was a forensic concept. Our moral 
and forensic practices determined the extension of the concept of personal identity. 
Leibniz differed from Locke, however, in maintaining that sameness of substance, as well 
as sameness of consciousness, was necessary for personal identity. In other words, 
although Leibniz agreed that our forensic practices determined the extension of the 
concept of personal identity, he differed as to the object-level question of exactly what 
things our forensic practices demanded be incorporated in the extension. 
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concepts pick out.37 As we shall see, in the case of personal identity, as in 
the case of value, practice-dependent theories and practice-independent 
theories may agree about what properties or relations personal identity 
consists in, but they will nonetheless disagree deeply about what makes it 
the case that personal identity consists in those properties. Practice-
dependent theorists will claim that personal identity consists in a certain 
relation, say the relation of psychological continuity, because that is the 
relation around which subjects organize their person-directed practices 
and concerns; practice-independent theorists will claim that personal 
identity consists in a certain relation because that is the grouping which 
nature (or God, or some other such independent fact) demands that we 
include in the extension of the concept. 
Distinguishing between these two questions in conceptual analysis 
should help, I hope, to clear out of the way a potential confusion in the 
case of personal identity. Psychological continuity accounts, it might be 
thought, cannot be practice-independent because they claim that certain of 
subjects' person-directed practices-viz. beliefs, desires, values, 
intentions, projects ... -are constitutive of personal identity. (In just the 
same way as it might be thought that Aristotelian virtue ethics is not a 
practice-independent account because it claims that good consists in our 
psychological states of courage or dispositions to act courageously). With 
the above distinction between the three levels of conceptual analysis in 
place, however, we can see why most psychological continuity accounts to 
date (like Aristotelian accounts) have nonetheless been practice-
independent. True, they claim that personal identity or survival consists 
in properties which are themselves person-directed practices. But the 
story they invariably tell about what makes it the case that personal 
identity consists in those properties makes no essential or necessary 
reference to those practices. Personal identity consists in those properties, 
viz. psychological continuity and connectedness, not because those are the 
properties around which subjects are disposed to organize their person-
directed practices, but because those are the properties in which personal 
identity independently consists; and would consist even if it were the case 
that subjects were not disposed to organize their person-directed practices 
around those facts. 
37Except, as earlier noted, insofar as different meta-views may naturally lend themselves 
to different object-level views. 
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VARIETIES OF PRACTICE-INDEPENDENCE 
To date, the question of personal identity has been almost exclusively 
conceived as an object-level question. As we saw from our brief survey of 
the personal identity debate, the question of personal identity has 
typically been posed as the question of what are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a person identified at one time being the same 
person (or surviving) as a person identified at another; that is to say, as a 
question about what properties or relations determine the extension of the 
concept of personal identity. For theorists of all persuasions to date, the 
"fundamental question" (in Parfit's wordsl) has been the object-level 
question of what facts determine the extension of personal identity. 
Of course, as we saw in our example of middle-eastern cooking, the 
answer we give to this object-level question will also, and fairly 
straightforwardly, put us in a position to answer the question of which 
person-stages are stages of the same person. They will be all and only 
those person-stages which share the properties or relations which our 
answer to the object-level question tells us determine which person-stages 
are stages of the same person. Just as our answer to the question of what 
determines the extension of middle-eastern cooking (say, being cooked in 
the middle-east) tells us that felafels count as middle-eastern cooking and 
asian noodles do not (on the empirical assumption that felafels are cooked 
in the middle-east and asian noodles are not), so maintaining that, say, 
psychological continuity determines the extension of personal identity, 
makes it true that person-stages related by psychological continuity are 
stages of the same person, but person-stages related only by physical 
continuity are not (on the empirical assumption that two person-stages are 
in fact related by psychological continuity). Because our answer to the 
object-level question (together with some a posteriori information) gives us 
an answer to the first, different answers to the object-level question will 
give us different answers to the first. This is how the first and second 
questions are related. 
lrarfit (1983), p.273. 
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The fact that answering the object-level question (in tandem with 
some a posteriori, empirical investigation) answers the first for us, explains 
why philosophers working on the question of personal identity have been 
so concerned to address the object-level question and, on the whole, not 
particularly concerned directly to address the first. (Indeed, as our earlier 
example of middle-eastern cooking illustrated, it is hard to see how we 
could answer the first question without first answering the object-level 
question.) Similarly, in this thesis, I shall not be interested in the first 
question (at least, not directly). Rather, what I shall be interested in is the 
relationship between the object-level question and the meta-question. In 
particular, I shall be concerned to ask (and answer), what has to date been 
left almost entirely explicitly unasked (and explicitly unanswered): 'In 
virtue of what does a certain property or relation get to determine the 
extension of the concept of personal identity?' And, as we shall see, the 
sort of answer we give to this meta-question may quite dramatically affect 
the answer we give to the object-level question, which has so preoccupied 
personal identity theorists to date. 
In Chapter 1, I distinguished two broad sorts of answers to the 
meta-question: the practice-independent answer, according to which 
certain properties or relations get to count as the extension-determining 
facts of personal identity (or good, or red, or ... ) because those are the facts 
that nature or God demand we use to determine the extension of the 
concept; and the practice-dependent answer, according to which these 
properties or relations earn their right to count as the extension-
determining facts only in virtue of the fact that those are the facts around 
which we organize some or other of our practices. This characterization of 
practice-independence (and practice-dependence, for that matter) is very 
general. However, practice-independence in the case of personal identity, 
as elsewhere, may, and indeed I suspect has, taken a variety of more 
specific forms. In this chapter I want to try to get a little clearer about 
these more specific forms. For if we can better understand exactly what 
meta-level theoretical commitments underlie practice-independence in the 
case of personal identity, we can better understand, not only potentially 
problematic background assumptions at work in the object-level debate, 
but also exactly what assumptions motivate philosophers to practice-
independence in the first place. (It will also give us a clearer target for the 
arguments of Chapter 4!) 
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Giving more precise characterizations of the various forms that 
practice-independence has taken in the particular case of personal 
identity, however, is neither as easy nor as straightforward as it really 
ought to be. As just mentioned, the problem is that most personal identity 
theorists to date have said an awful lot about what relations might 
determine the extension of personal identity, but very little explicitly 
about how and why those relations get to count as the facts of personal 
identity in the first place. As should be apparent, even from our brief 
survey, the personal identity debate to date has been almost entirely a 
debate about exactly what relation determines which person-stages fall 
under the extension of the concept of personal identity (physical 
continuity, psychological continuity, sameness of soul...?), with little, if 
anything, explicitly said about in virtue of what these relations get to 
determine the extension of personal identity in the first place. Cartesians, 
for example, are quite explicit in asserting that personal identity over time 
consists in sameness of an immaterial entity or soul. But they say very 
little about what makes it the case that personal identity consists in 
sameness of soul. Why does personal identity consist in sameness of soul 
and not some other relation among person-stages, say, physical 
continuity? Reductionists too, both physical and psychological continuity 
theorists, have insisted explicitly and at great length that personal identity 
consists in relations of physical continuity or psychological continuity 
respectively. But few have said much at all about what makes it true that 
personal identity necessarily consists in those relations among person-
stages respectively. 
This is a very striking and peculiar oversight, not only because this 
meta-question has loomed so large in debates in nearly all other areas of 
conceptual analysis, but also because, in the face of such substantial, 
sometimes seemingly intractable, object-level disagreement about exactly 
what property or relation determines the extension of personal identity, 
one obvious strategy would be to investigate the meta-level to see exactly 
what is going on there. Indeed, this is exactly what has occurred 
elsewhere in philosophy (in meta-ethics, for example) in response to just 
such object-level disagreement. For, as our earlier discussion of the 
debates surrounding value and colour concepts illustrated, answers to the 
object-level question are often, for a large part, a product of answers to the 
meta-question: view the facts about colour as determined independently 
of our responses, for example, and the natural object-level upshot is to 
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type-identify colours with the particular property of objects that causes 
them to look that colour to us; view the facts about colour as determined 
by our responses, and what turns out to be essential to colour concepts is 
not the particular property of objects that causes them to look a that colour 
to us, but, at best, the fact that there is some property or other of objects 
which causes them to look that colour to us. And some practice-
dependent theorists of colour even deny that colour is to be identified 
with a property of objects at all, rather it is a (dispositional) property of 
observers. So exactly what meta-theory, or meta-theories, have been 
influencing object-level analyses in the case of personal identity? 
2.1 Old-style Cartesianism: The one-phase a priori analysis. 
Let's begin by reconstructing the Cartesian meta-theory. As we have seen, 
Cartesians claim that personal identity consists in a further fact, namely, 
sameness of an immaterial entity or soul. This is the relation which, 
according to Cartesians, determines the extension of the concept of 
personal identity. But how and why, for Cartesians, does sameness of 
soul necessarily determine the extension of personal identity? In 
particular, what, if any, kind of role do our person-directed practices play 
in determining that sameness of soul determines the extension of personal 
identity? 
Old-style Cartesians, such as Reid and Butler, typically believed 
(some, such as Chisholm, still apparently do) that first-person experience, 
in particular introspection, gives us direct and privileged access not 
merely to the meaning or semantics of personal identity, but to the very 
nature or underlying metaphysics of personal identity itself. There are 
two more particular sorts of views that old-style Cartesians take with 
respect to the sort of introspective access that we have to the nature of 
personal identity. One of these is to view our introspective access to the 
soul as quasi-causal or perceptual. In introspection, we perceive-we are 
literally in causal contact with-the soul, just as in perceiving a tree we are 
literally in causal contact with the tree. The second view regards 
introspection as giving us non-causal or logical access to the soul-as if, in 
introspection, we are peering into Plato's heaven. On this second view, 
claims about personal identity are on par with claims about other platonic 
entities, such as mathematical entities. In the abstract this methodology 
may seem obscure, so a geometric analogy may help. Imagine holding a 
picture of a cube before our mind's eye. We can imagine that if we hold it 
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there for long enough, bit by bit, side by side, angle by angle, the whole 
nature of the cube will be revealed to us. When we first begin to hold the 
cube before our mind's eye, for example, we may know only that it is a 
three-dimensional square. But if we hold it in our mind's eye for long 
enough, examining it from different angles and different perspective's, 
eventually it will become transparent that the three-dimensional square 
has six sides. And, we might think, if we keep examining the cube like 
that for long enough, everything there is to know about the nature of the 
cube will be revealed to us. So, for old-style Cartesians who take the 
second view, it is with personal identity. 
But introspection, on either view, although certainly a person-
directed practice, does not determine what determines the nature of 
personal identity, any more than examining a cube before our mind's eye 
determines the nature of a cube. Rather, it is our best means of obtaining 
access to the (independently determined) nature of personal identity. It is 
through introspection that we are best, most reliably and most vividly 
aware of ourselves as a special sort of non-reducible entity (a Cartesian 
ego or soul) continuing through time. 
Later Cartesians, such as Richard Swinburne, have invoked 
additional arguments of a different sort in favour of the Cartesian view. 
According to Swinburne, more recent personal identity puzzle cases, such 
as those of reduplication and fission, and cases which seem to allow (on 
reductionist views) that personal identity may be indeterminate, pose 
problems for reductionist or, as Swinburne calls them, 'empiricist' views 
of personal identity. In response to these cases, Swinburne claims, 
reductionists have to reject as misguided some very strong intuitions we 
seem to have about personal identity. The fact that reductionist accounts 
face these problems and. are forced to deny some of our deeply held 
beliefs about personal identity, Swinburne claims, gives us good reason 
for thinking that these reductionist accounts are wrong. And the fact that 
the non-reductionist view can deal with these problems in a way which 
saves our intuitions, is an argument for thinking that the non-reductionist 
view of personal identity is right. 
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We will discuss the details of some of these cases later2, but for now 
the point to note is the more schematic one about the way in which 
personal identity theorists have gone about answering our second 
question. And, in this context, Swinburne's 'argument by default' in 
favour of the Cartesian view on the basis of intuitions gleaned from 
puzzle cases, not simply introspection alone, seems to represent a 
departure from the one-phase a priori method of theorizing about personal 
identity (i.e. of theorizing about the answer to the second question) which 
typified old-style Cartesianism.3 
2.2 The role of the method of cases. 
Few philosophers nowadays, including non-reductionists like Swinburne, 
seem to believe that introspection alone is sufficient to reveal the whole 
nature of personal identity. Contemporary theorizing about personal 
identity, as elsewhere, has been dominated by what we might call the 
'method of cases'.4 Just as old-style Cartesians believed that introspection 
was our best means of accessing the nature of personal identity, so 
contemporary (and some, like Locke, not so contemporary) personal 
identity theorists believe that plumbing our intuitive responses to actual 
and hypothetical puzzle cases involving questions of personal identity is 
the best means of accessing or elucidating the meaning and nature of 
personal identity. To this end, theorists formulate and present us with a 
vast range of actual and hypothetical personal identity puzzle cases: 
people are destroyed, recreated, duplicated and transported; bodies are 
dismembered, remembered and recombined; brains are thawed, 
unthawed, disintegrated and reintegrated; psychologies are removed, 
switched and halved, and so on. The right account of personal identity 
(i.e. the right answer to the second, object-level question of what relation 
determines the extension of personal identity), it is assumed, will be the 
2For an excellent summary of these puzzle cases and responses to them, see Noonan 
(1989), Chapter 1, esp. pp.14-23. 
3of course, it may not represent such a radical departure. For one possible, though I 
think pretty implausible, way of understanding what is going on in the method of cases 
(shortly to be discussed) is that the method of cases is itself a method of introspecting, or 
at any rate, of activating our introspective access to the nature of personal identity. On 
this view, the method of cases, by prompting our introspective faculties, would give us 
similarly privileged access to the nature of personal identity. Whether Swinburne 
himself takes this view is hard to tell. 
41 borrow this phrase from Johnston (1987). 
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one which best predicts and explains our intuitive reactions (our beliefs 
about who is who) to these puzzle cases. 
But exactly what function are our intuitions about personal identity 
supposed to be playing in our analysis of personal identity? In particular, 
what relation do they bear to the metaphysics of personal identity? Are 
they tracking or discovering the (independently determined) nature of 
personal identity in the same way in which, for example, scientists use an 
electron microscope to discover the (independently determined) facts 
about atoms? Are our intuitions actually determining which relation is 
the relation of personal identity? Are they serving to fix on a natural 
kind? Are they merely helping to make transparent our ordinary beliefs 
about personal identity by revealing when we are disposed to apply the 
concept and when we are not? Are they doing more than one of these 
things? Or are they doing something else entirely? 
Well, as I have stressed, strangely, given the incredible dominance 
of this method of theorizing about personal identity, very few personal 
identity theorists have asked or answered these questions. And thought 
experiments could be playing any one and sometimes more of these 
functions. So it's hard to be sure of exactly what is going on in theorizing 
about personal identity. Rather than second-guess which theorists 
subscribe to exactly which view of the function of the method of cases on 
the basis of scanty evidence, then, I shall simply canvass a few of the more 
plausible options and, where possible, attempt to put a concrete name to 
an option. Let's begin with what would seem to be the most likely option. 
2.2.1Option1: Elucidating ordinary beliefs about personal identity 
I suspect that for most contemporary theorists of personal identity (as, 
indeed, for most theorists who employ the method of cases in general) the 
method of cases is serving as a means to make transparent and 
consistent-to reach reflective equilibrium regarding-our ordinary, 
implicit grasp of the concept of personal identity. Puzzle cases serve 
primarily to elicit information about under exactly what circumstances we 
are disposed to believe that a later person is the same person as an earlier 
one.s We ask respondents, of any given case, whether or not they think 
Spuzzle cases also often test for another belief closely related to our beliefs about 
survival, namely, our beliefs about how it is rational for the people involved in the 
puzzle cases to behave, given the beliefs they are described as holding. These beliefs are, 
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that a later person is the same person as an earlier one, and then we ask: 
exactly what relations among person-stages explain these beliefs about 
personal identity? On this view of the role of the method of cases, then, 
the project of analysing personal identity is, for the most part, the project 
of finding out exactly what relation(s) among person-stages underlie and 
explain our beliefs about who is who in puzzle cases. And the right 
account of the personal identity (that is, the right account of the relations 
which determine the extension of personal identity) is the one which does 
the best job of explaining and predicting these intuitions about who is 
who in the many and varied puzzle cases. 
If this is the role that the method of cases is playing in theorizing 
about personal identity, then it goes some way to explaining why 
personal identity theorists have, on the whole, not thought to ask or 
address the meta-question. For the project of theorizing about personal 
identity just amounts to the project of figuring out and rendering explicit 
exactly what implicit object-level commitments underlie, guide and 
explain our intuitions. The question of personal identity, on this view, is 
just the question of what is the relation among person-stages in virtue of 
which we are disposed to believe that someone is or is not the same 
person. The further question, 'in virtue of what do these relations underpin 
our beliefs about personal identity?' is no part of this project, and so 
simply not a question that naturally arises. Briefly considering the sorts of 
the puzzle cases typically used to elucidate the meaning of personal 
identity (where that, on this view, means making our pre-theoretic object-
level commitments explicit) may help to illustrate. 
As already mentioned, the puzzle cases which have dominated 
contemporary theorizing about personal identity have typically involved 
pulling apart the various relations among person-stages which usually go 
together and asking whether or not a person survives such 
transformations, or, in cases where more than one person is involved, who 
is who. For we want to find out exactly which relation(s) among person-
stages our beliefs about personal identity are tracking. So, for example, 
we are asked to imagine that the brain of a person, Mr Brown, is 
successfully transplanted in the skull of Mr Robinson. The resulting 
in Parfit's famous phrase, beliefs about 'what matters in personal identity', and Chapter 3 
discusses these sorts of beliefs and the role they have played in theorizing about personal 
identity in greater detail. 
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person, call him Brownson, wakes up after the operation with Mr 
Robinson's body, but is, in all psychological respects, indistinguishable 
from Brown. Who is Brownson? Is Brownson the same person as Brown? 
Or is Brownson Robinson? Suppose we answered that Brownson is 
Robinson. Then it would appear that we believe that having the same 
body is required in order to be the same person. Suppose, on the other 
hand, that we answer that Brownson is the same person as Brown. Then 
it would appear that we do not require that a person have the same body 
in order to be the same person. At most, as regards physical continuity, 
we would seem to require that a person have the same brain. Or, for 
another typical example, we are asked to imagine that there is a machine 
which is capable of copying all the psychological information (including 
dispositional information) from the brain of one person, call her Susan, 
and transferring it into the brain of another, call her Carol. So that Carol 
wakes up from the procedure with all of what was Susan's dispositional 
psychology. Who is Carol? Is Carol Susan? If our intuition is that Carol 
is Susan, we would seem to think that psychological continuity is more 
important for personal identity than physical continuity. A person can be 
the same person when they have the same psychology, irrespective of 
whether or not they have the same body. Having the same body is not 
necessary for personal identity. Suppose that we think that Carol is not 
Susan. Then we would seem to be committed to the view that 
psychological continuity, in the absence of physical continuity, does not 
secure personal identity. Physical continuity would then seem to be 
necessary for personal identity. Or, to give another standard sort of 
example, you are asked to suppose that a machine will record all the 
information about your bodily states and psychology, after which your 
brain and body will be destroyed. Simultaneously, the machine will use 
the atomic blueprint to make a qualitatively identical body and brain out 
of different matter. Will you survive this? Is the person after the 
procedure the same person as the person before? If we answer 'yes', it 
appears that we do not regard physical continuity as necessary for 
personal identity. Psychological continuity, even in the absence of 
physical continuity, is sufficient for personal identity. If we answer 'no', it 
appears that we regard physical continuity as necessary for personal 
identity. Or, for another typical sort of variation on the above puzzle case, 
suppose that the machine in the prior example did not make a 
qualitatively identical person from your blueprint straightaway, but 
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waited five years to construct the qualitatively identical person? Would 
the qualitatively identical person still (if it ever was) be you? 
Our intuitive responses to these puzzle cases and a myriad of 
others like them, it is assumed, individually and collectively reveal exactly 
what relation between person-stages underpins and explains our beliefs 
about who is who in puzzle cases or, as I have couched matters, our 
answer to the second, object-level question of what relation determines 
which person-stages are stages of the same person. But they do not tell us 
anything about the sort of answer we would give to third, meta-question 
of in virtue of what does the relation among person-stages, whatever it is, 
(revealed by our intuitive responses to these puzzle cases) get to count as 
the relation of personal identity. The method of possible cases, as 
typically deployed, gives us information about what we use the words 
'survival' or 'personal identity' for, but it does not tell us what governs 
what we use the words for. In order to plumb our intuitions about the 
meta-issue, we need to present people with puzzle cases of a different 
sort: puzzle cases which ask people about their own or other people's 
intuitive reactions about who is who in puzzle cases-puzzle cases, for 
example, which take conflicting opinions whether or not someone is the 
same person in a given puzzle case and ask whether or not these 
disagreements are disagreements about personal identity. If respondents 
answer 'yes' to this question, the obvious further question is 'in virtue of 
what are these people talking about personal identity?' If they answer 
'no', the question is 'why are these disagreements not disagreements 
about personal identity?' In Chapter 4 I will put some flesh on these as 
yet schematic bones. But the point to note for now is that this view of the 
role of the method of cases in theorizing about personal identity-as 
elucidating our pre-theoretic, object-level commitments-is, in itself, 
neither obviously practice-dependent nor obviously practice-independent, 
for it does not explicitly address the meta-issue one way or another. 
However, it might be, not simply and incidentally that the meta-
question has not arisen for theorists employing the method of cases in 
theorizing about personal identity, but that these theorists actively assume 
that there is no such further question to be asked. The method of cases 
serves as a means to find out what we mean by personal identity (i.e. what 
relation among person-stages underpins our personal identity talk), and 
there is no further fact of the matter (except of the anthropological or 
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sociological kind of finding out how we came to mean what we mean by 
the words 'personal identity' or 'is the same person'). This view of the 
further, third or meta-question as simply the anthropological-cum-
sociological question of why we happen to use the words we do to refer to 
things, is the trivial reading of practice-dependence that we noted in 
Chapter 1. But, if theorists of personal identity believe that this trivial 
question is the only further question about personal identity there is to be 
asked, this amounts to a substantive thesis. For, according to these 
theorists, 'personal identity' would be like 'triangle'. A triangle, we might 
say, is a geometric object with three angles and straight sides. But, as we 
earlier noted, it seems a fair response to say to someone who asks the 
further question 'but in virtue of what does that property-the property of 
having three angles and straight sides-determine which objects are 
triangles?', the answer is that's just what we mean by triangle. Plausibly, 
there is no further question to be asked or answered about the meaning of 
'triangle', except the anthropological-cum-sociological question of how we 
came to use the word 'triangle' to refer to geometric objects with the 
property of having three angles and straight sides. 
This may well be what some personal identity theorists think about 
personal identity (and if they do, the arguments of Chapter 4, in 
particular, should, I hope, give them reason to think again). But I suspect 
that, in fact, many theorists employing the method of cases do not take 
this 'no-further-question' view. The structure of the personal identity 
dialectic, and the function the method of cases has served therein, is the 
subject of Chapter 9. But let me briefly pre-empt some of this later 
discussion, for it is relevant here. People's intuitions gleaned from actual 
and hypothetical puzzle cases have proved very problematic for personal 
identity theorists. The problem has been that people's intuitive responses 
to puzzle cases do not seem to converge on any one of the competing 
views about our object-level commitments in personal identity mentioned 
at the outset; and, what is particularly problematic, they seem not to 
converge, even when all is known about person-stages and their inter-
connections and respondents have well-informed, consistent and 
considered opinions about who is who in the various puzzle cases. Of 
course, if we were all Cartesians, we might well have grounds to complain 
that the full information is not given when all is known about person-
stages and their inter-connections. For a crucial detail, what happens to 
the soul, is not settled when we are told everything about the relations 
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which hold between person-stages in puzzle cases. But unless 
philosophers, contrary to their professed views, are closet Cartesians, the 
lack of convergence cannot be explained away as the product of 
ignorance, error or lack of full information. Philosophers such as 
Shoemaker, Parfit, Lewis, Noonan and a host of others on the one hand, 
and Williams, Wiggins, Nagel, Unger and a host of others, on the other, all 
have exceptionally informed and considered opinions about who is the 
same person as who in puzzle cases. But their informed and considered 
opinions do not converge. The former insist that physical continuity is no 
necessary condition for personal identity (psychological continuity is 
necessary and sufficient); whilst the later insist that physical continuity is 
necessary for the preservation of personal identity. 
Now, given this situation, if theorists really held the 'no-further-
question' view of personal identity, what they would say (or what they 
ought to say, at any rate) about this sort of entrenched object-level 
disagreement, is that what it shows is that the meaning of 'personal 
identity' is just vague or indeterminate, and that's all there is to say about 
personal identity. But this is not at all what most theorists of personal 
identity employing the method of cases say in response to such inter-
personal object-level divergence. They go on to formulate and 
reformulate more and more elaborate puzzle cases, the intuitive reactions 
to which, they claim, support their preferred account; and engage in more 
and increasingly desperate attempts to explain away as mistaken or 
irrational intuitive reactions which would seem to support some other 
competing account. The feeling seems to be that if we could just get the 
presentation of puzzle cases quite right, then people's intuitive responses 
will converge, and we will have finally discovered the answer to the 
question of personal identity. 
However, if the no-further-fact view does not explain the 
desperation with which philosophers have sought intuitive convergence 
on the question of personal identity, what does? One explanation that 
springs readily to mind is that, although the method of cases has replaced 
introspection as the chief vehicle for theorizing about personal identity, 
and although few theorists still believe in Cartesian egos or souls, one 
element of Cartesianism-what we might call the 'real-essence' view-has 
remained. The idea that there is a real essence or nature of personal 
identity determined quite independently of whatever we may happen to 
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think about things has carried over from old-style Cartesian thinking; and 
the method of cases has simply replaced introspection as the means best 
to access or discover those facts. On this view, intuitions gleaned from 
puzzle cases play much the same role as an electron microscope plays for 
physicists: they serve as our best means of discovering or gaining access to 
the independently determined facts of the matter. Just as atoms exist out 
in the world waiting to be discovered and revealed by the electron 
microscope, so the facts of personal identity exist out there in the world 
waiting to uncovered via introspection and/ or intuition. And just as 
scientists persisted in refining microscope technology until they 
discovered atoms, so personal identity theorists persist in refining thought 
experiments in the hope that, once they are sufficiently fine-tuned, they 
too will reveal the nature and structure of personal identity.6 
Admittedly, that theorists assume that there is a privileged 
independent fact of personal identity waiting to be discovered like a 
fourth fundamental force is not the only explanation for the desperation 
with which philosophers have sought intuitive convergence on the 
question of personal identity. They might, for example, believe that 
convergence is important, not because convergence will show that we 
have finally discovered the real nature or essence of personal identity, but 
because such convergence around a single relation is somehow 
constitutive of a relation counting as the relation of personal identity. Or, 
and perhaps relatedly, they might believe that there is a deep, but 
presently obscured fact of personal identity implicit in our practice upon 
which we would converge were we in better conditions. This sort of 
meta-view is not practice-independent, it is rather a sort of subjective 
universalism, but it would nonetheless explain the desperation with 
which theorists of personal identity have sought intuitive convergence. 
For, on this sort of view, in the absence of convergence, we have no choice 
but to endorse an error theory about personal identity; and that an error 
theory should be true for the case of personal identity, Hume aside, may 
seem intuitively incredible. Or the explanation might have nothing to do 
with meta-level views or ontological commitments as such. It might just 
be that theorists think that personal identity is semantically determinate 
and/ or that it is intuitively incredible to suppose that personal identity 
6If this is the right reconstruction of what is going on at the meta-level for at least some 
theorists of personal identity-if personal identity is such an independently determined 
fact-then there is a real question as to how personal identity influences our intuitions. 
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might turn out, like baldness, to be semantically indeterminate. Or the 
desire for convergence might just be a brute psychological disposition of 
ours. Although the personal identity dialectic does indicate that few 
involved in it hold the no-further-fact view, then, it does not decisively 
show that theorists are committed to the 'real-essence' view of personal 
identity as consisting in a wholly independently-constituted entity or 
relation best accessed by the method of cases, in just the same way as old-
style Cartesians thought personal identity to consist in an independent 
entity best accessed via introspection. Nonetheless, this 'real-essence' 
view is one sort of practice-independent view and a perfectly possible 
meta-view for a theorist employing the method of cases to have. And, 
especially given the Cartesian origins of much thought about personal 
identity, it is not wildly implausible to suppose that some theorists 
actually hold it. 
However, at least one personal identity theorist who makes 
similarly heavy use of the method of cases takes a different, and 
undeniably practice-independent, view of personal identity. And given 
that, in a symposium on Peter Unger' s book, philosophers such as Parfit, 
Swinburne and Shoemaker never passed comment on his explicitly 
practice-independent approach (choosing rather to debate his object-level 
claims), it would not be particularly surprising to discover that this sort of 
practice-independent meta-assumption has underlain much of the 
contemporary theorising about personal identity. On this view, and in 
contrast to the 'real-essence' view, intuitions gleaned from puzzle cases 
are not taken to discover or reveal the independently determined 
metaphysical facts about personal identity, rather they actually determine, 
or fix, the reference of 'personal identity'. This view may initially sound 
like a practice-dependent view but, as we shall now see, in at least one 
popular incarnation (and the one favoured by Peter Unger), it is 
thoroughly practice-independent. 
2.2.2 Option 2: Practice-independence as rigidification 
It may help to get clear about this third sort of approach to theorizing 
about personal identity by first considering some better known analogues 
from elsewhere in philosophy. Consider, for example, analytic 
functionalist accounts of the nature of mental states. 
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Analytic functionalism is the doctrine that the type-identity 
conditions for mental states are given in terms of their actual causal 
interactions, and dispositions to enter into causal relations, with sensory 
inputs, behavioural outputs, and other mental states. Mental state-types 
are defined by their characteristic causal or functional role in relation to 
inputs, outputs, and other mental states. So, very crudely put, pain is, 
inter alia, the state-type such as typically to be disposed to utter 'ouch', 
and to believe that you are in pain, when pricked by a needle. Less 
crudely (though still over simplistically), to give the Lewis-Ramsey 
sentence for pain: 
Xis in pain =def there are two states (properties) the first of which is 
caused by skin damage and causes, or is disposed to cause, both the 
emission of "ouch" and the second state, and the second state ca,uses, or is 
disposed to cause, brow wrinkling, and X is in the first state. 
Analytic functionalists further draw a distinction between the 
functional role or software definitive of some mental state-type, and the 
occupant or hardware which realizes that functional role, usually (but not 
necessarily) some physical property. A state or property will realize any 
given functional state when it plays the functional or causal role definitive 
of that functional state. Of this much, all analytic functionalists are 
agreed. But here is where agreement ends. 
Some functionalists, call them (following, amongst others, David 
Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson7) 'scientific' or 'empirical' 
functionalists, maintain that each mental state-type name is definable in 
terms of a specific causal role, and that name necessarily denotes 
whatever property happens to occupy that role in the actual world. 
Mental states are type-identified with the neurophysiological state which 
actually plays the functional role definitive of that state-type for us. 
Suppose that, a posteriori, (say) C-fibres firing is the brain-state that plays 
the functional role definitive of pain for human beings in the actual world, 
then pain is necessarily identical to C-fibres firing in all worlds; and so on, 
for all other mental states. 'Pain' rigidly designates whatever actually 
realizes the pain role in humans; and, given that C-fibres firing is what 
actually realizes the pain role in humans, pain is necessarily C-fibres-
7David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, 
forthcoming, Ch. 5. 
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firing. On this view, no C-fibres firing, no pain. It follows from scientific 
or empirical functionalism, then, that beings who are differently 
physically constituted from us-dogs, dolphins, silicon-based Martians 
and computers-have no mental states. For this reason, scientific or 
empirical functionalist accounts have often been accused of chauvinism-
of denying mental states to other differently physically constituted beings, 
no matter how apparently 'intelligent' their behaviour. 
Scientific or empirical functionalists identify pain with the first-
order property that actually plays the pain role in us. In contrast, for 
'second-order' functionalists mental state-types are to be identified with 
functional role or software, not actual realizer or hardware. 'Pain', for 
example, does not rigidly designate the brain-state that actually realizes 
the pain role in humans, namely C-fibres firing; 'pain' refers rather to a 
(second-order) property that the brain-state C-fibres firing has when it 
realizes the pain role: namely, being a typical realizer of the pain role. 
Pain, on this second-order view is not the brain-state C-fibres firing, but 
rather being in some brain-state which typically plays the pain role. Since 
some property other than C-fibres firing might equally well have the 
second-order property-it might equally well be a state which typically 
plays the pain role-different properties can realize the pain role. To use 
some standard functionalist jargon, on the second-order view, mental 
states such as pain are multiply realizable. For different brain-states might 
have the property of being typical realizers of the pain role in different 
subjects; and those states would count as being in pain just as well. 
Sometimes it is thought that these two views are the only two 
options open to functionalist accounts of mental states: either 
functionalists are first-order and chauvinistic or they are second-order and 
mental states are multiply realizable. If they are first-order then they meet 
the pretty powerful objection of chauvinism; if they are second-order, they 
are forced to deny a common and central intuition that there is something 
very important to pain about the hardware that realizes the pain role. For 
it is the brain state-type, not the second-order property of being in a state-
type which typically plays the pain role, which causes pain behaviour. 
However, there is a third-option; a sort of half-way house between the 
first- and second-order views. This option is to be a first-order 
functionalist-that is, to identify mental state-types with first-order 
properties or hardware, not role-but to maintain, nonetheless, that 
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functional roles are multiply realisable. How can this be? The claim is 
that, although pain is identical with the hardware or brain state-type, 
whatever it happens to be, that realizes the pain role in subjects, it is only 
contingently identical with that brain state-type: For us, homo sapiens, say, 
C-fibres firing is the hardware that realizes the pain role, but go to a world 
of Martians in which some other property, say, M-fibres firing, realizes the 
pain role and that property counts as pain round there just as well. Pain 
is, at best, only contingently identical to C-fibres firing. Pain, on this view, 
although a first-order property, may be different first-order properties in 
different worlds (much as the colour of the sky is different colours in 
different worlds). For different first-order properties may play the pain 
role in different subjects and those properties count as pain just as well. 
As Braddon-Mitchell and Jacksons state the view, 
Premiss 1. Pain= occupant of causal role R (Accepted conceptual fact) 
Premiss 2. Occupant of causal role R = brain state B (Empirical 
discovery) 
Conclusion. Pain= brain state B (Transitivity of identity) 
I mention this third option briefly here, for, I think, something very 
similar to this in essential structure is the right analysis of personal 
identity. 
For another example altogether, consider the famous (or perhaps 
better, infamous!) debate over the nature of our concept of water. In an 
influential article 'The meaning of 'meaning"9, Hilary Putnam presents 
the following science-fiction case. Suppose that somewhere in the 
Universe there is a planet pretty much exactly like Earth, call it Twin 
Earth. One of the very few differences between Earth and Twin Earth is 
that the liquid people on Twin Earth call 'water' is not HzO, like it is on 
Earth, but a different liquid, whose chemical configuration we might 
abbreviate as XYZ. XYZ is indistinguishable from water at normal 
temperatures and pressures; it tastes like water and quenches thirst; it fills 
the oceans, lakes and rivers, falls from the sky as rain, and so on. In short, 
XYZ does all the same things on Twin Earth, as HzO does on Earth. Now, 
8ibid., Ch. 6. For other statements of the view see David Armstrong (1968) and David 
Lewis (1983). 
9Putnam (1975), pp. 215-71. 
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do the people on Earth and Twin Earth mean the same thing when they 
utter 'water'? In particular, what settles the reference of the term 'water'? 
What we might call the 'rigidifying view' (the analogue of the 
scientific or empirical functionalist view for the case of water10) has it that 
water is the stuff which actually fills the oceans, falls from the sky, runs 
from taps, gets called 'water' by experts, is essential for life on earth, is 
odourless and colourless, etc.; or it is the stuff which actually does most of 
the foregoing; or it is the stuff which actually comes close to doing most of 
the foregoing (perhaps it isn't completely colourless, for instance); or it is 
the stuff which actually comes close to doing most of the important parts 
of the foregoing, and in any case comes closer than anything else around; 
or ... On this view, the word 'water' functions like an indexical to rigidly 
designate the stuff it picks out in the actual world. Water, in all worlds, is 
what realizes the water role in the actual world. A posteriori, what realizes 
the water role in the actual world is H20. And so the rigidifiers' 
conceptual claim (that 'water' is a rigid designator), combined with some 
empirical information (that what realizes the water role in the actual 
world is H20), delivers the claim that 'water=H20' expresses a necessary 
truth.11 Since 'water' rigidly designates whatever actually realizes the 
water role, and since (a posteriori) what actually realizes the water role is 
H20, water (by transitivity of identity) is necessarily H20. In all worlds, if 
there is any water there is H20, and if there is H20 there is water. And 
this remains true, of course, even in a world such as Twin Earth where 
XYZ, not H20, is the chemical configuration that plays the water role. Just 
as, for scientific functionalists, no C-fibres firing, no pain, so, on the 
rigidifying view of 'water' (combined with information about what 
actually realizes the water role), no H20, no water. So that a person on 
Twin Earth who uttered the word 'water' to refer to XYZ would mean 
something different from what we, here on Earth, mean by it. They 
lOone could be a scientific functionalist without being a rigidifier i.e. one could hold that 
pain is the brain-state that actually plays the pain role without maintaining that 'pain' is a 
rigid designator. Scientific functionalists could think that it is a priori true that pain is the 
brain-state that actually plays the pain role, for example. As a matter of fact, however, 
scientific functionalists are typically also rigidifiers. 
11 This is why those who regard 'water' as a rigid designator typically also believe that 
'Water=H20' expresses a necessary, rather than a contingent, truth. But the two 
questions-whether 'water' is a rigid designator and whether 'Water=H20 expresses a 
necessary truth-are different. You could believe, for example, that 'Water=H20' 
expresses a necessary truth without believing that 'water' is a rigid designator: it just so 
happens that the stuff which plays the water role in every possible world is H20. 
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would be talking about water*. According to this view, then, 'water' 
rigidly designates, not the role that water plays, viz. 'being the stuff 
(whatever it is) that has the property of falling from the sky, running from 
taps ... etc ... ', but the stuff which actually realizes that role here on Earth. 
Since what actually realizes the water role here on earth is H20, water is 
necessarily H20; just as, on scientific functionalist accounts, since 'pain' 
rigidly designates the brain-state that actually plays the pain role in us, 
and (a posteriori) the brain-state which actually plays the pain role in us is 
(say) C-fibres-firing, pain is necessarily C-fibres firing. 
The rigidifying view, which is the analogue of the view about 
personal identity shortly to be discussed, contrasts with a view which 
often goes under the name of the 'definite description' view. Whereas the 
rigidifying view rigidly identifies 'water' with its actual content (namely, 
H20), this view identifies the meaning of the word 'water' with its 
character or role viz. being the stuff that falls from the sky, runs from taps, 
fills the oceans ... etc .. .12 According to the definite description view, then, 
the reference of 'water' is fixed by the role water plays, conceived as the 
definite description: 'the stuff which fills the oceans, falls from the sky, 
runs from taps, gets called 'water' by experts, is essential for life on earth, 
is odourless and colourless, etc.; or it is the stuff which does most of the 
foregoing; or it is the stuff which comes close to doing most of the 
foregoing (perhaps it isn't completely colourless, for instance); or it is the 
stuff which comes close to doing most of the important parts of the 
foregoing, and in any case comes closer than anything else around; or ... 
Both the rigidifying and the definite description views agree that being 
H20 is essential to actual water.13 However, they disagree about whether 
'water' is a rigid designator (i.e. refers in all worlds to the stuff which 
actually plays the water role on Earth) and whether 'water=H20' is 
necessary or contingent. The rigidifier maintains that 'water' is a rigid 
120n another way of putting the point, whereas what I have called the 'rigidifying' view 
has it that 'water' rigidly designates H20 ('water' picks out H20 in all worlds), the 
definite description view has it that 'water' rigidly designates the water role given by the 
definite description. So, in this sense, the definite description view is also a rigidifying 
view. The difference between the two views lies in what they rigidify on-actual realizer 
for what I have called 'rigidifying' theories; role or description for what I have called the 
'definite description' view. So in calling the first view a 'rigidifying' view I do not mean 
to imply that the second is not. The crucial difference between the two views lies in the 
different things that they rigidify on: actual realizer or second-order property (being a 
chemical configuration that has the property of satisfying the definite description). 
13Tuat is, they agree that it is essential de re that water is H20, they disagree about 
whether this is also a de dicta necessity. 
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designator and, typically, that 'water=H20' is necessary. The definite 
description view disagrees on both counts. 'Water' does not rigidly 
designate the actual realizer of the water role, it designates the role itself: 
namely, being the stuff which falls from the sky, runs from taps ... Any 
stuff (H20, XYZ ... ) which falls from the sky, runs from taps etc is properly 
called 'water'. On the assumption that there are possible worlds (such as 
Twin Earth) in which some chemical configuration other than H20 (such 
as XYZ) satisfies the description, then, in such a world, that other chemical 
configuration counts as water just as well. Earth people and Twin Earth 
people, then, mean the same thing by 'water'. For water is defined by its 
role, and XYZ plays the same role on Twin Earth as H20 plays on Earth: 
both H20 and XYZ have the (second-order) property of playing the water 
role in their respective worlds. This definite description view of water is 
analogous to the second-order functionalist account of mental states. 
The third option-contingently identifying water with the first-
order realizer of the water role-is also available here (whether it is right 
for the case of water I leave an open question). On this view, water is 
whatever first-order property it is that plays the water role-whatever 
stuff it is that falls from the sky, runs from taps, fills the oceans ... etc ... 
Earth people and Twin Earth people mean the same thing by 'water'-
they mean 'whatever stuff plays the water role'-it's just that, as a 
contingent matter of fact, different chemical configurations happen to 
realize the water role on Earth and Twin earth. Here on Earth, the water 
role happens to be realized by H20, but go to another world-say, Twin 
Earth-where people use the word 'water' to refer to another property, 
XYZ, and that property counts as water just as well. For that stuff plays 
the water role on Twin Earth. Water, for us on earth, although identical 
with H20, is only contingently identical with H20. For go to Twin Earth, 
and XYZ counts as water round there. On this view, water on Twin Earth 
is (contingently) XYZ; water on Earth is (contingently) H20. 
What unites the two latter views, as against the rigidifying view, is 
their common denial of the related claims that 'water' rigidly designates 
the first-order property that actually realizes the water role on Earth, and 
that 'water=H20' expresses a necessary truth. According to both the 
'second-order' view and the 'contingent-identity' view14 (the view that 
141 will later call this view 'pluralism'. 
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water in any world is contingently identical with the first-order property 
that realizes the water role in that world), in order for some stuff to count 
as water in any world it must play the water role in that world. Any stuff 
which does not play that role (fall from the sky, run from taps etc) is not 
water. What we use the word 'water' to refer to, these two will both have 
it, is not the particular chemical configuration that happens actually to 
satisfy the description, but the functional role (or the first-order property 
that realizes that role) that that chemical configuration plays. (In much 
the same way as 'doorstops' refers not to the messy bunch of actual 
realizers-books, irons, drunks, chairs and a whole host of other 
reasonably heavy, solid, extended objects-but rather, to the common role 
propping doors open that this messy disjunctive group of objects play.) 
Since we use the word 'water' to refer to role (or first-order property that 
happens to realize that role), not actual realizer, we should take the 
reference of 'water' to be fixed by that role, and leave it open that various 
other chemical configurations which played that role might count as 
water just as well. 15 
However, despite their common denial of both of the rigidifier's 
claims, the 'second-order' and 'contingent identity' view differ amongst 
themselves on the question of whether water should be identified with 
that role or whether, rather, it should be (contingently) identified with the 
first-order property (H20 on Earth, XYZ on Twin Earth) that happens to 
realize that role. As with the case of mental states, the question hinges on 
whether it is a sufficiently central intuition that water is causally 
efficacious. If it is-if, for example, we think things of the sort 'It was 
because I left my bike in the rain that it rusted'-the first-order view will 
be right. For it is the first-order property (H20, in this case) which caused 
my bike to rust, not the second-order property of being the stuff which 
falls from the sky, fills the oceans etc. For the second-order property is 
causally inert. If, on the other hand, we do not say things of the above 
sort-if we do not seem to require that water be causally efficacious-the 
second-order view may be right. The 'contingent identity' view, then, 
agrees with the second-order view that what unites different chemical 
configurations under the concept of water is the common role that these 
chemical configurations play, and that, as a consequence, the water role is 
151 suspect that, in the case of 'water' (thought not in the case of 'survival') we probably 
do not use the words in this way, at least not unambiguously. 
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multiply realizable. But it denies that water should be identified with that 
role. Rather, water should be (contingently) identified with the first-order 
property which happens to realize the water role for people in a given 
world. 
If it sounds as if the 'contingent identity' view has to tread a subtle 
line between the rigidifying view (in similarly identifying water with a 
first-order property) and the second-order view (in similarly maintaining 
that it is the role or character of water in virtue of which different first-
order properties earn their right to count as water), that is absolutely 
right. That it is not only possible, but plausible, to tread such a subtle line 
in the case of personal identity is the subject matter of chapters 5 and 6. 
2.3 'Survival' as a rigid designator 
Peter Unger is an example of a contemporary personal identity theorist 
who seems to hold the rigidifying view for the case of personal identity or 
survival. Unger believes that the reference of 'personal identity' or 
'survival' is fixed by a certain (limited) class of our person-directed 
practices: namely our 'deepest beliefs' about our survival conditions. For 
Unger, the character of personal identity (that the conditions of our 
survival are whatever the conditions which jibe with our deepest beliefs 
about our survival conditions are) is given a priori, but the content or 
referent of personal identity is revealed a posteriori by noting people's 
intuitive reactions to puzzle cases, properly presented. For Unger, then, 
the method of cases is a posteriori not a priori theorizing.16 He writes, 
By disclosing our deep beliefs about our survival, I indirectly articulate 
what are, as we most deeply believe, some quite general conditions of 
l61n fact, I suspect that theorizing about the meaning of terms by way of the method of 
cases is invariably a posteriori, rather than a priori, philosophizing. All contemporary 
philosophers of personal identity seem to believe that it's an a priori truth that the right 
account of the relations in which personal identity necessarily consists is the one which 
best accords with and explains people's intuitive response to puzzle cases. The 
difference is that, unlike Unger, they appear to think that what the relations that jibe with 
people's intuitive reactions to puzzle cases are, is also revealed a priori. I think that this 
rests on a mistaken conception of what it is to do a priori as opposed to a posteriori 
philosophizing. But it's easy to see why the mistake might arise. Consider this: Are 
anthropologists, who investigate what other communities mean by certain of their 
words, doing a priori or a posteriori work? Well, what people mean by words is certainly 
ana priori matter. But the work that the anthropologists are doing in observing what 
those communities mean by certain words is surely a posteriori, empirical research. What 
the anthropologists are doing is a posteriori investigation into an a priori matter. But, isn't 
that exactly analogous to what philosophers do when they note and record people's 
intuitive reactions to puzzle cases? 
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our survival. How do I detect these deep beliefs? Doing informal 
psychology, I uncover them by noting people's responses to examples.17 
For Unger, then, theorizing about personal identity proceeds in two 
stages. First, we have an a priori conceptual claim, roughly: our survival 
conditions are those conditions that we most deeply believe our survival 
to require. This fixes the reference of 'personal identity' or 'survival'. 
Second, there is the a posteriori task of finding out what the conditions that 
we most deeply believe our survival requires actually are. The first claim 
is Unger's meta-story: his story about in virtue of what some relation gets 
to count as the relation of personal identity. The second stage is his 
object-level claim: for Unger, an empirical claim about what relation 
actually underpins our 'deepest beliefs'. For Unger, this second stage goes 
by way of the method of cases: by way of actual and hypothetical puzzle 
cases, properly presented18, we elicit our deepest beliefs about what are 
our survival conditions. And then, by transitivity of identity, those are 
our survival conditions. 
Unsurprisingly, given this, Unger's chief argument against both 
Cartesian and psychological continuity theories is that, as our intuitive 
reactions to puzzle cases illustrate, these theories do not cohere with our 
deepest beliefs about our survival conditions. The object-level story 
Unger takes this meta-story to deliver up is a version of a physical 
continuity account of survival: 
Briefly and roughly, as part of his total (dispositional) psychology, each 
of us has a core, or a basic, psychology that, as a matter of fact, he has in 
common with all normal, and most subnormal, human beings. Then, 
also briefly and roughly, one of us will survive from an earlier to a later 
time when whatever physically realizes that person's core psychology 
continuously (enough) realizes that core of basic psychological capacities 
from the earlier time to the later time.19 
Unger's object-level account differs from most psychological 
continuity theories in maintaining that continuity of a person's core, not 
17unger (1992), p. 133. 
18unger places a list of stringent constraints on both the manner of presentation of 
puzzle cases and the sorts of subjects whose intuitions we may take seriously. Unger 
believes that these constraints are required in order for people's intuitive reactions to 
puzzle cases to be truly revelatory of their 'deepest beliefs.' In Chapter 9 we will find 
some reason to doubt that these constraints are principled and, as a result, Unger's 
object-level claim itself. 
19unger (1990), p.14. 
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distinctive, psychology is what is important for personal identity.20 And 
it differs from standard physical continuity accounts in insisting that the 
sort of physical continuity required for our survival is not confined to 
continuity of the same body or brain but to any physical realizer (silicon-
based circuitry, for example) which realizes continuity of a person's core 
psychologically sufficiently continuously (i.e. with no time lags or gaps). 
We need not pursue the detail of Unger's object-level account any further 
here, for what we are interested in is his meta-story. And, as should now 
be apparent his meta-story is this: what makes it true that survival 
requires physical continuity is that physical continuity is the relation that 
we most deeply believe survival to consist in. 
As Stephen White is at pains to point out, prima facie this meta-story 
appears intriguingly different from the meta-stories we have canvassed 
above. In fact, at first glance, it looks as if it might be a practice-dependent 
account of survival (indeed, White goes on to argue, in not so many 
words, that it is): our survival conditions are determined by our deepest 
beliefs about our survival conditions, not by some independent set of facts 
served up by nature or God.21 However, the crucial question to ask Unger 
(or indeed any personal identity theorist) in this regard is the following 
counter-factual question: were our deepest beliefs about our survival 
conditions different-were they not to deliver up physical continuity but, 
say, psychological continuity-would personal identity then consist in 
psychological continuity? Unfortunately, this is a question that Unger 
himself never really directly addresses. He appears to think that our 
deepest beliefs about our survival conditions are not only uniform, but 
also pretty much immutable. And so talk of what we might have most 
deeply believed is not only moot, but is just to change the subject. 
20 A person's core psychology is that part of her dispositional psychology which she 
shares with all normal and many subnormal human beings, notably a capacity for 
conscious experience, a capacity to reason in at least a rudimentary way, and a capacity 
to form some simple intentions. A person's distinctive psychology is that part of their 
psychology that is (more or less) particular to them, for example, my memory of having 
eaten chocolate-chip ice cream at Moomba or of having written the first part of this 
thesis. 
21of course, initial appearances might be misleading. Unger might hold the background 
assumption that our deepest beliefs reliably track the independently determined facts 
about personal identity, in just the same way that Plato's Socrates thought that the Gods 
were very good trackers of the independently determined facts of piety. If this were so, 
Unger would hold the 'real essence' view of personal identity, regarding our intuitions 
from possible cases not as determining the facts about personal identity, but as the best 
means to discover or uncover them. In fact, however, as should become clearer, Unger 
does not appear to hold such a background assumption. 
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When pressed by White22 on a similar point he writes 
In trying to gain wide acceptance for certain of my arguments, I presented 
things in a certain ecumenical way. Just so, in the book I said things like 
this: Suppose that there are people some of whose key concepts, beliefs 
and values are quite different from ours, but whose whole psychology is 
just as coherent as ours. For example, coherent with the rest of their 
mentality, they prefer cheap, quick purely informational "teleportation" 
over expensive, slow, ordinary travel. Seeking wide agreement on some 
matters of rational choice and value, I then granted that, for those people, 
such a preference might be rational. But, as I thus ecumenically argued, 
even if that might be so-and I never said that it actually was so--
nonetheless, for us, such a preference is not rational. For, at the least, 
there is clearly this difference between us and them: By contrast with the 
noted preference that their totality of attitudes might indicate for them, 
our own different total psychology will indicate for us, a quite opposite 
preference as most rational, namely, the preference for the expensive 
and slow, but genuine travel.23 
This sort of 'ecumenism' stands in contrast to many practice-
independent theorists who maintain that people who believe that personal 
identity consists in some relation other than the particular relation in 
which the given theorist claims it does are simply mistaken. For, they 
claim, personal identity necessarily consists in the property in which they 
claim it does, and anyone who thinks it doesn't is simply wrong. 
Moreover, since such a community would be wrong about the conditions 
their survival necessarily requires, it would be irrational of them to 
organize their person-directed practices around those facts. Unger, it 
appears, does not think such a community of people would 
straightforwardly be wrong or, loosely speaking24, irrational, rather he 
thinks that they would mean (though, by their lights, quite acceptably so) 
something different to what we mean by personal identity.25 They would 
22White (1992), pp. 153-8. 
23unger (1992), p. 174. 
24unger does, however, go on to maintain that they may be, strictly speaking, irrational. 
The issue of the relationship between the facts about survival and the organization of 
person-directed practices will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
2Sunger (1990), pp.89-92. As Unger (p. 91.) writes, 
Shoemaker says that the people in radiation-land have a word 'person' that means 
the same thing as does our word 'person'. Given his story, the claim that they have a 
word 'person' cannot be questioned. But, even if expressed by the same sort of 
marks and sounds, it is at least somewhat questionable whether our 'person' means 
the same as a word employed by people whose practices of individuating themselves 
are so markedly different from our own... Shoemaker appears to assume that 
because both societies will agree about which entities are persons, and which are not, 
there will be agreement on all the substantive questions that might ground a 
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mean something different because the predicate 'is the same person' 
would have a different extension in their mouths to the extension it has in 
ours. Whereas they would regard the statement 'A person survives 
informational teleporting' as true, we, because (according to Unger) we 
most deeply believe that a person's survival requires physical continuity, 
regard it as false. 
Although more ecumenical than some of his practice-independent 
counterparts, then, Unger is no less practice-independent for that. For in 
insisting that personal identity necessarily consists in what we now most 
deeply believe it to consist in, Unger rules out that another community 
who most deeply believed that their survival required some other relation 
might have a concept of personal identity like ours. A community of 
people who most deeply believed that personal identity consisted in 
psychological continuity (as opposed to physical continuity) and who 
organized their person-directed practices and values around 
psychological continuity rather than physical continuity would, 
nonetheless, mean something different by personal identity. What turns 
out to be necessary for personal identity, for Unger, then, contrary to 
initial appearances, is not peoples' person-directed practices or their 
deepest beliefs or their values, but the particular property which happens 
to organize a limited class of those practices (viz. deepest beliefs about 
survival conditions) for us now. A community of people just like us 
(perhaps even us a hundred years on) who most deeply believed that 
personal identity consisted in psychological continuity (without its 
normal cause, physical continuity) would have changed the subject. They 
would have ceased to talk about personal identity, for personal identity is 
necessarily what we now most deeply believe it to be. They would be 
talking about something else, personal identity*. According to Unger, 
then, the reference of 'personal identity' is given not by the definite 
description 'the relation (whatever it is) that a community most deeply 
believe their survival conditions to involve' but rather, by the particular 
property that we, as we actually are now, most deeply believe it to involve. 
Like the rigidifying theories of water and mental states just considered, 
then, Unger rigidly identifies 'survival' with the property that we as we 
actually are now most deeply believe it to involve viz. physical continuity 
difference in meaning for their 'person' and our 'person'. But we will disagree with 
them about when a certain situation contains the same person as does a later, or an 
earlier, situation. These substantive differences are not to be ignored. 
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broadly construed. Although, because Unger takes our intuitive reactions 
gleaned from puzzle cases to determine the extension of personal identity, 
he sounds more practice-dependent than philosophers who hold the 'real 
essence' view, in fact he is thoroughly practice-independent. For go to a 
world where physical continuity does not play the survival role, and 
physical continuity counts as survival in that world nonetheless. For the 
rigidifier, that a relation plays the survival role in the person-directed 
practices and concerns of a community is not necessary in order for that 
relation to count as survival. What is necessary for survival for any 
people in any world is that there obtains between person-stages the 
relation that plays the survival role for us. 
2.4 Survival as a natural kind 
On a popular account of natural kind terms, they are terms that refer to 
kinds that figure in the best scientific explanation of some phenomenon, 
that is, the scientific explanation with the best explanatory power and 
completeness. So, for example, 'water' is often thought to be a natural 
kind term, because there is a presupposition that we are referring to 
whatever property or nature of the substance best explains why water 
boils at one-hundred degrees Celsius, causes certain metal objects to rust, 
freezes at zero degrees and exhibits various other behaviours which 
chemical science aims to explain. As it happens, this property is the 
property of being H20. And so, a posteriori, 'water' refers to H20. In the 
case of survival the phenomenon to be explained are our person-directed 
practices. So the claim that 'survival' is a natural kind term will amount to 
the claim that 'survival' refers to the kind which best explains why people 
identify and reidentify people over time in the way in which they do; why 
people normally anticipate the experiences of a future person when and 
only when that person is them; why people normally hold a person 
responsible for a crime when and only they are the same person as the 
person who committed the crime; and so on. 
So stated (and as I shall argue in more detail in Chapter 4) the view 
that something ('water', 'survival' ... ) is a natural kind term (rather than a 
term which names a social or functional kind) is not necessarily at odds 
with practice-dependence; and, indeed, may actually support it. For go to 
a world in which some other chemical configuration best explains why 
water behaves in certain ways, and 'water' will name that kind round 
there. A view of 'survival' as a natural kind term does not, then, in itself, 
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rule out multiple realizability: for different groupings of things or 
properties of things may be explanatorily significant in different worlds. 
The view of 'survival' as a natural kind term will, however, place a 
constraint on multiple realizability: namely that the realizer must be a 
natural kind in order to count as survival. To put the thrust of this 
general point another way: we can be natural kinds' theorists without 
being rigidifiers. We can say that 'survival' names the natural kind that 
plays the survival role in any world, providing that what plays the role in 
any world is a natural kind'. On this view, 'survival' refers to a natural 
kind (obviously), but it may refer to different kinds in different worlds 
(H20 on Earth; XYZ on Twin Earth, for example). The constraint on 
multiple realizability is that where what plays the role in a world is not a 
natural kind we have an error theory-there is no survival in that world. 
For it is a priori true, on this view, that 'survival' refers only to a natural 
kind. (As I hope shall become apparent as we go along, an unfortunate 
consequence of this view is that people do not survive in this world. For 
the relations that play the survival role in this world seem too disjunctive 
and gerrymandered to form a natural kind). 
Insofar as the practice-dependent theorist about survival has a 
quibble with the view of natural kind terms, so (non-rigidly) understood, 
it will be a reasonably marginal quibble-a quibble about whether or not 
it is a priori true that 'survival' non-rigidly refers to a natural kind, rather 
than just to whatever plays the survival role in a world, natural kind or 
not. And this turns on the empirical question of whether we use the word 
'survival' to refer only to a natural kind or whether we are happy to have 
it refer to a reasonably diverse disjunction of relations which play the 
survival role (in the same way in which we are happy to allow 'doorstops' 
to refer to a diverse disjunction of things which prop doors open). In 
short, it turns on the question of whether or not we think that in a world 
(such as our own!) where 'survival' refers to a disjunction of relations 
people do not survive, or whether we are happy, in that case, not to 
embrace an error theory, but to retreat to the view that 'survival' names a 
functional kind. My bet is on the latter. 
However, although it's perfectly possible (and, I think, often 
plausible) to be a non-rigidifying natural kinds' theorist in this way, as 
matter of fact, those who are natural kind theorists are typically also 
rigidifiers. And those who think that 'survival' is a rigid designator are 
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practice-independent. For they think that survival rigidly designates 
whatever it designates in the actual world, even in worlds where what it 
designates does not play the survival role. What underpins this natural 
kind/rigidifying tandem act is, I think, the semantic intuition that if 
survival is a natural kind, then we had better use the word 'survival' 
rigidly to designate that kind. That 'survival' names a natural kind is 
what justifies the chauvinism. In this case, the view that 'survival' names 
a natural kind will be a motivation for rigidifying on actual realizer, rather 
than role. But just as natural kinds' theorists need not be rigidifiers, 
rigidifiers need not be natural kinds' theorists. They might believe that 
'survival' is a rigid designator, not because it names a natural kind, but 
because that is the way we use the word: we use the word 'survival' to 
refer to the relation that actually plays the survival role, not to the role. 
We might think of the difference between what I have called 'non-
rigidifying' natural kind view, and the rigidifying natural kind view in the 
following way. It is perhaps a better way, since calling the non-rigidifying 
natural kind view, 'non-rigidifying', is potentially misleading. For there is 
a sense in which the non-rigidifying view is not non-rigid: it claims that 
'survival' names a natural kind in all worlds (just not necessarily the same 
one). So we might perhaps better put the issue like this. There are two 
views about natural kind terms. One (what I have called the 'non-
rigidifying' view) has it that a natural kind term is a term which refers 
only to a natural kind. The second (what I have called the 'rigidifying' 
natural kind view) has it that a given natural kind term refers only to a 
particular natural kind (most likely, though not necessarily, the kind to 
which it refers in the actual world). 
The dialectical point to bear in mind for what follows is that the 
practice-dependent theorists' main opponent here is the second, not the 
first, view of natural kind terms. As I have pointed out, there are two 
possible motivations for believing the second view: the first is that, as a 
matter of fact, we use the word 'survival' to name a particular natural kind 
(not any natural kind, or a social or functional kind). The second is that 
'survival' is a natural kind term, and so (perhaps even if we did not in fact 
use it in this way) ought to rigidly designate a particular kind, typically 
the kind that it names in the actual world. In one way or another, the 
practice-dependence theorist must deny both these claims. 
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David Wiggins is a philosopher who explicitly states that person is, 
or is "akin to", a natural kind concept. He asks: "Is there some 
scientifically palpable real essence, some nature that is presupposed to a 
kind's being nomologically founded, which not only underlies in fact but 
also must underlie the kind person (must if members of it are to be 
subjects whom we can interpret, and react to in the way in which we react 
to what we recognize as people)?"26 Wiggins' answer to this question is, 
of course, 'yes'. According to Wiggins, the sortal person is a functional 
restriction of the very general natural kind, animal. Persons, for Wiggins, 
are all and only those animals or animal-kinds which satisfy a certain 
functional requirement. Wiggins calls his 'natural kinds' view of persons, 
the 'animal attribute view': 
This sees person as a concept whose defining marks are to be given in 
terms of a natural kind determinable, say animal, plus what may be 
called a functional or (as I shall prefer to say) systemic component. 
Perhaps x is a person if and only if x is an animal falling under the 
extension of a kind whose typical members perceive, feel, remember, 
imagine, desire, make projects, move themselves at will, speak, carry out 
projects, acquire a character as they age, are happy or miserable, are 
susceptible to concern for members of their own or like species ... [note 
carefully these and subsequent dots], conceive of themselves as 
perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, desiring, making projects, 
speaking ... have and conceive of themselves as having, a past accessible 
in experience-memory and a future accessible in intention ... , etc.27 
Wiggins' s analysis proceeds in the familiar two stages. The first 
stage involves the a priori, conceptual claim just enumerated. This, for 
Wiggins, captures the character of 'person'. Just as, in the case of water, 
the a priori, conceptual or reference-fixing component (character) is given 
by 'the stuff that [actually] falls from the sky, runs from taps, fills the 
oceans ... ', so for Wiggins, the reference-fixing component of the definition 
is given by 'animal falling under the extension of a kind whose typical 
26Wiggins (1980), p. 170. 
27wiggins (1980), p.171. Note that, according to this definition, it is a supposed to be an 
a priori, not an a posteriori, truth that all persons must be animals. Wiggins seems to 
oscillate between the strong thesis that there is only one animal kind, namely homo 
sapiens, of which all persons are members, and the weaker thesis (expressed in the above 
definition) that, for any actual or possible person, there is some animal kind of which that 
person is a member. This latter weak thesis does not rule out the possibility that 
dolphins and chimpanzees, were they to meet the functional/ systemic requirements, 
might also count as persons. Even the weak thesis does, however, rule out a priori the 
possibility that sophisticated silicon-based creatures or a brain in a vat (assuming that a 
brain, though part of an animal, is not itself an animal) might count as persons. 
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members perceive, feel, remember ... ' These list, if you like, the respective 
phenomena to be explained. The second stage involves a posteriori 
investigation to discover whether or not a given animal or animal-kind 
(say, a chimpanzee) does in fact satisfy the functional requirement: being a 
member of a kind whose typical members perceive, feel, remember... And 
if it does, and only if it does, that animal then counts as a person. As 
Wiggins writes, 
According to this view, a person is any animal that is such by its kind as 
to have the biological capacity to enjoy fully the psychological attributes 
enumerated; and whether or not a given animal qualifies is left to be a 
strictly empirical matter.28 
Wiggins, then, views 'person' as a natural kind term which names 
any animal that satisfies the functional requirement. Wiggins' account is 
interesting because 'person' does not straightforwardly name a natural 
kind, rather it names a functional kind which necessarily involves a 
natural kind. Persons for Wiggins are a functional kind which, necessarily 
and a priori, only animals can satisfy, rather like doorstops are a functional 
kind which only solid, extended objects can satisfy. And just as different 
solid, extended objects (books, tables, baskets, dogs ... ) can play the role of 
doorstop, so Wiggins leaves it open that different animal-kinds might 
count as persons. In leaving the person role thus nominally multiply 
realizable, then, Wiggins is like the second-order functionalist, definite 
description' or 'contingent identity' theorists. But in maintaining that it is 
an a priori constraint on persons that they be members of some animal-
kind, Wiggins denies that 'person' names anything which is not an animal. 
Elaborating on exactly why Wiggins thinks this would involve a 
substantial reconstruction of his views about identity in general, and I 
shall not attempt such a reconstruction here. It seems enough in this 
context to note that, contra Wiggins, there seems nothing particularly 
intuitively incredible about the thought that, for example, a spiritual 
entity which satisfied the systemic requirement might count as a person 
just as well. Indeed, exactly this view of persons was the orthodoxy for a 
long time (and, I suspect, for many people, still is). Historically, it was the 
thought that persons might be material entities which seemed incredible. 
Wiggins' account is, of course, an account of what it is to be a 
person, not of what it is to be the same person over time. However, 
28wiggins (1980), p. 172. 
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Wiggins' account of what it is to be a person yields an account of what it is 
to be the same person over time: what it is to be the same person over time 
is to continue to exist by whatever conditions are required for the 
continued existence of the animal-kind of which it is a member. The 
identity conditions for persons over time are the identity conditions for 
the particular animal-kind in question, which satisfies the functional 
requirement. So, at the level of what relation determines the extension of 
personal identity, Wiggins can be understood as advocating a sort of 
physical continuity account of personal identity: in order for a person to 
continue exist they must be the same animal. Unlike practice-dependent 
accounts, Wiggins takes being the same animal to be necessary for 
survival: there is no world in which a person survives but is not the same 
animal. But, unlike standard (practice-independent) physical continuity 
accounts, Wiggins will presumably hold that role is also necessary for a 
person's survival: where being the same animal does not meet something 
like the functional or systemic requirement for persons-where it does not 
play the survival role-there is no survival. On Wiggins's view, as I 
understand it, both role and actual realizer are necessary (and jointly 
sufficient) for survival. If either is absent, there is no survival. 
There is one final, possible practice-independent approach to 
analysing personal identity worth mentioning (although I cannot think of 
a particular personal identity theorist who obviously takes it), for it is a 
reasonably popular theory of reference more generally. Whereas almost 
all the theories discussed so far maintain that we need some sort of 
description to fix the reference of terms, according to proponents of the 
causal theory of reference, reference-fixing need not go by way of a 
description. This approach need not, and typically will not, invoke the 
method of cases at all. For according to the causal theorist, what is 
important is not our theory about what properties our words refer to 
(revealed by the method of cases), but rather what property in the world 
in fact causes our utterances, and this is something our theory may get 
wrong. What property causally grounds our utterances is a matter, not 
for thought experiments, but for hard-core scientific investigation. Since 
the causal theory of reference need not go by way of the method of cases, 
the causal theory merits a new category of its own. 
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2.5 The causal/historical theory 
Return to the case of water. The causal theory of reference has it that the 
word 'water' refers to the stuff water, not (or not necessarily) in virtue of 
the fact that the stuff satisfies the description 'falls from the sky, runs from 
taps, gets called 'water' by experts ... etc ... ', but rather because there is some 
property of the stuff water that caused our initial dubbing, designation or 
calling of that stuff 'water' (and a subsequent causal chain linking the 
property of the stuff that caused that initial dubbing to all later utterances 
of the word 'water').29 The substantive (of course, a posteriori) task is that 
of discovering what the property of the stuff, water, causally responsible 
for our utterances of the word 'water', is: is it H20, XYZ, ... etc ... ? 
Applied to the case of personal identity, this view will have it that 
'personal identity' refers to a certain relation among person-stages in 
virtue of the fact that that relation caused the initial dubbing of that 
relation 'personal identity' (and a causal chain linking that relation which 
caused the initial dubbing to all later utterances of 'personal identity' or 'is 
the same person as'). This is the causal theorist's meta-theory about why 
'personal identity' picks out a certain relation among person-stages. The 
remaining task for the case of personal identity, as for the case of water, is 
the task of ascertaining what the relation between person-stages causally 
responsible for utterances of 'personal identity' or 'is the same person' is: 
is it physical continuity, psychological continuity, the property of being a 
relation that plays a certain role in our person-directed practices, ... etc ... ? 
And to find this out we need to investigate the world, in just the same 
way as scientists had to investigate the world to discover that the property 
of the stuff water which was causally responsible for utterances of the 
word 'water' was H20 not XYZ.30 Unlike all the views already 
29 According to proponents of this view, such as Devitt and Sterelny, the causal theory 
of reference is entirely a posteriori. It is supposed to be a thoroughly a posteriori truth that 
reference is a causal relation between things and words. 
30 As Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson op. cit. point out, there is a problem here for the 
causal theorist (like Kim Sterelny and Michael Devitt) who maintains that the causal 
theory need not invoke a description at all in order to fix the reference of terms. The 
problem has two dimensions. First there is what they call the 'width problem'. Identify 
the stuff water at a given (late) stage in its development and there will be numerous 
candidate properties for the nature of water: its mass, weight, chemical configuration, 
liquid, not a fictional object, and so on. Which of these properties constitute the nature of 
water? Second, there is the depth problem: which part of the causal chain between our 
utterances 'water' and properties of the stuff water do we count as the nature of water: 
which of these properties constitute the nature of water? 
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considered, the causal theorist takes her theory, including the reference-
fixing component or meta-theory, to be thoroughly a posteriori. According 
to the causal theorist, not only does science tell us what properties of 
things are causally responsible for our utterances, but moreover, science 
tells us (or will tell us) what reference is. 
The causal theory of reference applied to personal identity is yet 
another sort of practice-independent view. 'Personal identity' picks out 
whatever relation between person-stages it does, not in virtue of the fact 
that that relation plays a certain role in our person-directed practices, but 
because that is the relation which grounds the causal chain.31 According 
to the causal theorist of personal identity, what we mean by 'personal 
identity'-what relation 'personal identity' picks out-is, necessarily, 
whatever the privileged relation is which grounds the causal chain. So 
that someone who used the word 'personal identity' to refer to some 
relation between person-stages other than the privileged one, would 
either be mistaken (if the causal theorist thinks that the causal theory 
actually latches onto the pre-existing, privileged fact of the matter served 
up by nature or God) or (if the causal theorist merely thinks that the 
dubbing rigidly fixes the reference of 'personal identity') would mean 
something different by 'personal identity' from what we mean by it. 
Either way, the causal theorist will be practice-independent. 
This concludes my comparatively broad-brush reconstruction of 
the various ways in which at least some of the most prominent 
philosophers of personal identity to date have been practice-independent. 
Perhaps there is some meta-view that I have overlooked, but I hope to 
have canvassed the most obvious and plausible of the practice-
According to Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, to answer these objections the 
causal theorist must invoke some sort of description: because scientists think that this is 
the most interesting or appropriate property to associate with water and we defer to the 
experts in the scientific community, or some such thing. Then the question is: is water to 
be rigidly identified with HzO (assuming the that is the property taken to be the nature of 
water, rather than some other)? According to Jackson and Braddon-Mitchell, then, the 
causal theory just ends up as a version of the description theories just discussed. 
31of course, there is a sense in which the causal theory of reference has the metaphysics 
of personal identity dependent on our practices: the initial dubbing or naming of a thing 
is up to us. But this is the trivial sense in which all accounts of the meaning of terms will 
be practice-dependent that I distinguished in Chapter 1. The relevant question is rather 
the question of what makes it true that a certain relation counts as the relation of 
personal identity, and to this the causal theorist answers that it is in virtue of the 
thoroughly independent fact that that relation (rather than some other) is the relation 
which grounds the causal chain. 
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independent theories which have silently but influentially dominated the 
personal identity debate to date. 
2.6 Retaxonimizing the personal identity debate 
What we have now is a new way, or perhaps better, a new dimension, 
along which we can taxonomize the personal identity debate. Answering 
the metaphysical-cum-semantic question of personal identity-the 
question of what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person 
identified at one time being the same person as a person identified at 
another-requires answering not one but (at least) two questions. It 
involves answering the meta-question (of what determines what 
determines the extension of personal identity) as well as the object-level 
question (of what are the properties (or relations) in virtue of which 
certain person-stages fall under the extension of personal identity). 
Since, to date, the personal identity debate has been focussed 
almost exclusively on the object-level question, standard taxonomies of 
the personal identity debate have carved up the debate simply in terms of 
the different object-level answers offered. So we have the terrain typically 
carved up as a debate between Non-Reductionists (who claim that 
personal identity picks out a further fact such as an immaterial entity or 
soul) and Reductionists (who claim that personal identity consists in the 
holding of certain more particular facts) and then as a debate amongst 
Reductionist themselves about exactly what more particular facts personal 
identity picks out (physical continuity, psychological continuity, the soul, 
the second-order property of being a property which plays a certain 
role ... ?). 
But we can, and indeed, should, carve up the debate at the meta-
level as well, in terms of the different sorts of answers offered to the meta-
question. Here, I suggest, we might broadly carve it up as debate between 
practice-dependent accounts of personal identity, according to which 
some or other of subjects' person-directed practices make it the case that 
personal identity consists certain relations among person-stages, and 
practice-independent accounts, according to which some independent set 
of facts served up by nature or God make it the case that personal identity 
consists person-stages united by a certain relation; and I have attempted 
to show at least some of the various more plausible forms that practice-
independence might take. Along the way, I shall canvass some of the 
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more specific forms that a practice-dependent account of personal identity 
might take. 
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PRACTICE-INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONTINGENCY OF 
OUR PERSON-DIRECTED PRACTICES 
Because practice-independent accounts of survival, whatever their precise 
form, regard our person-directed practices and concerns as only 
contingently associated with the concept of survival, for practice-
independent theorists, the question of personal identity has been not one, 
but really two, questions. The first, the constitutive question about what 
personal identity or survival necessarily involves or consists in, and the 
second, the evaluative and motivational question about what we care 
about in personal identity or survival. Or, as it's sometimes differently, 
and I think wrongly, put: what it is rational for us to care about in 
personal identity or survival. Put this way, this second question is, in 
Parfit's famous phrase, the question of 'what matters in personal identity'. 
And these two questions have to be two distinct questions given a 
practice-independent analysis of survival. For, on a practice-independent 
analysis of the concept of survival, it is always conceptually possible, for 
all that the analyses themselves tell us, that survival might turn out to 
consist in something that we don't care specially or directly about. So, for 
practice-independent theorists, as well as the challenge of providing an 
account of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for survival, 
there is the additional project of accounting for the significance of the role 
that survival plays in our person-directed practices and concerns; of 
explaining how and why, given any particular account of survival, 
survival matters to us in the way that it does. Why is it that, for example, 
we should be specially and intensely interested in what befalls some 
future self when and only when that future self is physically continuous 
with us; why is it that the fact that a person at a later time is physically 
continuous with a person at an earlier time who committed a crime makes 
it just to punish the person at the later time; why is it that we should 
continue to love a person only when they're physically continuous; and so 
on. As John Perry, a practice-independent theorist himself, puts the 
challenge 
Most of us have a special and intense interest in what will happen to us. 
You learn that someone will be run over by a truck tomorrow; you are 
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saddened, feel pity, and think reflectively about the frailty of life; one bit 
of information is added, that the someone is you, and a whole new set of 
emotions rise in your breast. An analysis of this additional bit of 
information, that the person to be run over is you, is offered by theories 
of personal identity, for to say it is you that will be hit is just to say that 
you and the person who will be hit are one and the same. And so it 
seems that those theories should shed some light on the difference this 
bit of information makes to us. If it gives us more reason to take steps to 
assure that the person is not run over, our theory should help explain 
why that is so. And if this bit of information gives us reasons of a 
different kind than we could have if it were not us to be hit, our theory 
should help explain this too.1 
In a similar vein, Sydney Shoemaker, another practice-independent 
theorist, writes 
A ... source of perplexity about personal identity has to do with the 
special concern persons have for their own continued existence and their 
own future welfare. Imagine that a wizard demonstrates to you his 
ability to reduce any object to a pile of dust by a wave of his hand and 
then, with another wave, to create an exact duplicate of that thing out of 
another pile of dust. If one really believes that he can do this, one 
probably would not be too averse to letting him do it to one's kitchen 
stove. But only a monster would offer his wife or child as a subject for 
the wizard's trick, and only a madman (or a suicide) would offer 
himself. Or so it initially strikes us. Our concern for personal identity, 
the kind of importance it has for us, seems totally different in kind from 
the concern we have for the identity of other sorts of things. And this is 
linked to the special concern each person has for his or her own future 
welfare. It is this that gives point to many of our moral, social and legal 
practices, and explains the significance they attach to considerations of 
personal identity. If a person does an action, it is that same person who 
can later be held responsible for the action, and whom it is appropriate 
to punish or reward for doing it. If someone buys something, it is that 
person who is subsequently entitled to the use of the item purchased. 
These principles, which are constitutive of the institutions of punishment 
and property and the concept of moral responsibility, are intelligible 
only against a background of a conception of human motivation in 
which a central role is played by the special concern each person has for 
his own future well-being... An account of personal identity ... ought to 
make intelligible the special sort of importance personal identity has for 
us.2 
And what Bishop Butler took to be the most serious objection to Locke's 
account of personal identity was that it "rendered the inquiry concerning 
lPerry (1976), p.67. 
2Shoemaker in Shoemaker, S. and Swinburne, R. (1984), pp.70-1. 
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a future life of no consequence."3 From Locke's account of personal 
identity, Butler claimed, it followed "that it is a fallacy upon ourselves to 
charge our present selves with anything we did, or to imagine our present 
selves interested in anything which befell us yesterday, or that our present 
self will be interested in what will befall us tomorrow."4 Why, Butler 
asks, should the fact that some future person will remember thinking and 
doing what I am thinking and doing now make me care one bit about 
what will befall that future self?5 According to Butler, Locke's account of 
personal identity must be mistaken, for there is nothing in his account 
which can explain the special sort of concern that we have for our future 
self. 
Of course, this objection misunderstands the sort of account of 
survival that Locke was offering. For as we saw in chapter 1, Locke took it 
to be constitutive of some relation being the relation of survival that it 
could underpin and explain our forensic practices, including the special 
sorts of attitudes, like non-derivative concern, that we have towards our 
past and future self. So, on Locke's account, it was conceptually impossible 
that personal identity could consist in a relation that rendered us 
indifferent as to what befalls our future self or what befell our past self 
However, despite the fact that his objection was misplaced, Butler, 
nonetheless, like all personal identity theorists, agrees that it is a 
requirement on any adequate account of personal identity that it make 
intelligible and explain our person-directed practices and concerns. 
Unsurprisingly, however, the project of accounting for the 
importance of the role that survival plays in our person-directed practices 
and concerns has proved a daunting and recalcitrant problem for practice-
independent analyses according to which the important role that survival 
plays in these and other of our person-directed concerns and practices is 
something that is only contingently associated with the concept. For 
practice-independent accounts of survival leave a gaping conceptual gulf. 6 
3Butler (1906), p.257. 
4Jbid., pp. 260 ff. 
5Jn criticizing accounts of personal identity in analytic philosophy, Ross Poole (1992, 
p.15) similarly objects that "it is hard to see how a psychological fact such as memory 
could have the enormous social and moral consequences that are supposed to follow 
from personal identity". Why, he asks, "should my being able to recollect having done 
something explain why I should be punished for it?" 
6The same is true of practice-independent accounts in the case of value. Since practice-
independent accounts of value make value concepts conceptually independent of 
concepts of subjects' motivational dispositions, there is the additional project of giving an 
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3.1 Practice-independence and subject's person-directed practices: 
Attempts to close the conceptual gulf. 
In the case of survival, practice-independent theorists have sometimes 
gone to seemingly incredible lengths to attempt to close this gulf. Perry 
himself attempts to account for this special kind of interest that we have 
for our future selves by resorting to the claim that the importance of 
personal identity is really only derivative. We do not, or should not, care 
that we ourselves continue to exist, for what we really do or should care 
about, are our impersonal projects. And these might be realized just as 
well, if not better, by someone who was very like us, though not us. And 
Parfit, for example, claims that on a psychological continuity account it 
follows that we should love types not tokens. In continuing to love 
someone we should not care that the person we love continues to exist. 
For what we should care about in loving someone are the attractive or 
desirable qualitative properties they happen to exhibit, and these would 
obtain if they were killed and replaced by a qualitatively identical replica. 
So, Parfit argues, it should not matter to us if someone we love is killed 
and replaced by someone exactly like them, we should continue to love 
that person's replica just as we would have loved the person had they not 
been killed and replaced. What's more, according to Parfit, it should not 
matter to us if we ourselves are killed and replaced by a qualitatively 
identical replica. For what we really do (or should) care about in our own 
survival, as well as in that of others, is that there be someone 
psychologically connected to, or continuous with, us, no matter if we 
ourselves had to be killed so that they could live. Shoemaker moots a 
similar view .7 
However, despite the lengths to which practice-independent 
theorists have been prepared to go to explain how their account of 
personal identity explains what matters in personal identity, very few of 
these theorists have made it entirely clear exactly what the question of 
'what matters' in survival is. 
account of why it is, given any account of value, that we should care one way or the 
other about that value, so defined. 
7Shoemaker (1970). 
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3.2 Two senses of 'what matters' in survival 
We have many different kinds of concern. Some of these kinds of concern 
do not directly involve questions of our own survival at all. Amongst our 
non-survival-involving concerns, for example, is our altruistic concern: 
concern that the lives of others and the world in general go better, quite 
independently of whether that promotes our own interests and goals. So, 
for example, motivated by such unself-interested concern, some people 
give more than half their income to charity, even though such gifts mean 
that their own lives are lived in less comfort. Since such altruistic concern, 
by definition, has nothing to do with questions of what we care specially 
and non-derivatively about in our own survival over time, concerns of 
this kind are clearly not at all relevant to the question of what matters in 
survival. The kind of concern that is relevant to questions of what matters 
in survival is a particular species of the kind of concern with which 
altruistic concern is often contrasted: egoistic or self-interested concern. 
However, there are (at least) two different kinds of egoistic 
concern, and it is vital to an adequate understanding of the question of 
what matters in survival to distinguish between them. On the one hand, 
in our concern for our own future, we are concerned that the things which 
we care about in life-our projects, aspirations, values, intentions, 
relationships and the like--continue on. That is, in our concern for our 
own future, we are concerned for continuity of the things which give our 
lives meaning or make our lives worth living. However, we also have a 
distinctively different kind of egoistic concern for our future self: a kind of 
concern that we have for our future self and what befalls us quite 
independently of whether or not our relationship to that future self 
preserves continuity of the things which give our lives meaning or make 
our lives worth going on with. 
An example of a situation in which the two kinds of egoistic 
concern come apart might help here. If I were to discover that tomorrow, 
as a result of some terrible accident, I was to become a paraplegic 
amnesiac, my life would not seem to me to be worth going on with. s For 
8Tuis is just a report of my own psychological attitudes given my present values. Since 
being able to play sport, go for bush-walks, be physically independent and remember my 
life history mean an awful lot to me, being deprived of those things would be sufficient 
to rob my life of most of the value and meaning that is has for me. Others may not value 
these things so highly. They may need to construct another example where their 
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very few of the things that give my life meaning would be preserved in 
my relationship to this poor future paraplegic amnesiac. In this 'what 
makes life worth living' sense of 'what matters', my relationship to my 
future self would contain little, if anything at all, of what matters in 
survival. Nonetheless, on any standard account of personal identity, that 
poor future paraplegic amnesiac will be me; and, precisely because she 
would be me, I would care very strongly and deeply about what befell 
that future paraplegic amnesiac. Though my continued existence may 
have negative value for me-I may prefer to die now than continue to live 
under those circumstances-I would be far from indifferent as to what 
befell my future paraplegic amnesiac self. The mere fact that I would be 
prepared to kill myself, rather than continue on to live a life like that, is 
itself proof that, although my relationship to my future self does not 
contain much of what makes life worth living, I nonetheless have some 
sort of deep and strong concern for that future self. In this second sense of 
'what matters', then, what matters is preserved in my relation to my 
future paraplegic, amnesiac self, even though my relationship to that 
future self contains little, if anything at all, of what makes life worth 
living. 
Steven White is one of the very few who have drawn attention to 
this critical ambiguity in uses of 'what matters in survival'. He writes 
The preservation of what matters might mean the preservation of what 
makes life worth living. In this sense, what matters might not be 
preserved in the existence of some future self in whom one would not 
hesitate to say one survived. One might, for example, be tortured at 
some time in the future to such an extent that one would prefer, both 
before the torture and during it, not to go on living. But the preservation 
of what matters might have a stronger sense. It might mean that there 
are future person stages for which one would have (or be justified in 
having) the sort of special concern that one ordinarily has for one's 
future self. In this sense, what matters is preserved in the torture case. 
One would normally make very extreme sacrifices where one's present 
desires were concerned to alleviate some of the pain of the self to be 
tortured. It is this stronger sense in which it is plausible to identify 
survival with the preservation of what matters.9 
Peter Unger is another of the very few who have explicitly noted 
this distinction between the two senses of 'what matters' in survival. 
relationship to a future self, in whom they have no doubt that they continue to exist, 
nonetheless contains very little of the things that make life worth living for them. 
9White (1989), p.305. 
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Unger labels the first, weak sense the desirability use: "what it is that one 
gets out of survival that makes continued survival a desirable thing for 
one, a better thing, at least, than is utter cessation."10 Unger distinguishes 
this desirability use from what he terms the prudential use of 'what 
matters' in survival (White's strong sense of what matters). Roughly, 
From the perspective of a person's concern for herself ... what future 
being is there or, possibly, which future beings there are, for whom the 
person ... should be "intrinsically" concerned. Saying that this ... concern 
is "intrinsic" means, roughly, that, even apart from questions of whether 
or not he might advance the person's present projects, there is this ... 
concern for the welfare of the future being ... 11 
And, he goes on 
It should ... be clear that this prudential use is the motivational use that is 
most closely related to questions of personal identity. It is the prudential 
use, not the desirability use, that is the motivationally relevant 
counterpart of the constitutive use [viz. what it is about a case that 
counts toward the case being one that involves a person who does 
survive ].12 
Unger offers a test to employ in our thinking about whether or not 
some hypothetical process preserves what prudentially matters (as 
distinct from what desirably matters) in survival; a test which is implicit 
in the characterization of the strong sense of what matters offered above 
by White. Unger calls this test, the avoidance of future great pain test; and 
we are instructed to apply it as follows. In any given puzzle case 
involving a question of survival, we should imagine ourself to be in the 
position of the person who is to undergo the hypothetical process which 
the case involves. If we are not already, we should suppose ourselves to 
be self-concerned and not to be masochists. We should also suppose that 
we have no option but to undergo the process. Then we are presented 
with the following choice: 
I may elect to experience, before the process, very considerable pain and, 
as I know full well, thus ensure that the being who emerges will, after 
awakening to consciousness, feel no pain. Alternatively, I may elect to 
endure no pain before the process begins and, as I also know full well, 
thus ensure that the being who emerges from the process will, after 
· awakening, undergo really excruciating tortures for quite some time.13 
lOUnger (1990), p.93. 
nunger, ibid., p.94. 
12Unger, ibid., p.97. 
13Unger, ibid., p.29. 
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If we believe that some hypothetical process preserves what (prudentially) 
matters in personal identity we will take the first option: we will elect to 
endure the early pain so that our future self will not have to endure any. 
We will make sacrifices now to alleviate some of the greater suffering of 
our later self. If, on the contrary, we believe that the process does not 
secure what (prudentially) matters in survival, we will choose the second 
option: because we do not (prudentially) care about what befalls our 
future self, we will choose to endure no pain now before the process and 
thus ensure that our future self undergoes the more prolonged 
excruciating torture. 
Unger and White are onto a crucial and often overlooked 
distinction between two importantly different senses of 'what matters' in 
survival. And, I think, they are right to stress that the relevant sense of 
'what matters' for questions of what matters in survival is not the 
desirability or weak sense of what matters, but something like their strong 
or prudential sense. For although survival is invariably a precondition for 
the weak or desirability sense of what matters-in order for our lives to be 
worth living or to continue to have meaning we need, at the very least, to 
survive-this kind of concern, as we have seen, can and often does come 
apart from clear cases of a person's survival, which is the question that, in 
discussions of personal identity over time, we are interested in. In the 
personal identity debate, we are interested in the question of what matters 
in personal identity or survival, not of what gives our lives meaning or 
makes life, once there, worth going on with. However, the 
characterization both Unger and White offer of the nature of the strong or 
prudential kind of egoistic concern relevant to questions of what matters 
in survival seems to me not quite right. 
Unger and White, rightly, want a sense of 'what matters' in 
personal identity which captures the distinctively self-involving or 
egoistic nature of the special sort of concern which we have for our future 
self, and for our future self alone. But the way they have characterized 
this 'distinctively egoistic' concern leaves it far from distinctively egoistic. 
For their characterization in terms of preparedness to make great 
sacrifices leaves it open that we might have this kind of concern for others. 
Indeed, as they have characterized it, we often do. We are often prepared 
to make extreme sacrifices now for others who we care about deeply-our 
friends, family, culture, even nation, and the like-to avoid their suffering 
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more greatly later. Making extreme sacrifices (even to the extreme of 
killing ourselves), is not something we are prepared to do only for 
ourselves. What is distinctive about the kind of concern that we have only 
for our future self, and for no one else, then, cannot be just that we are 
prepared to make extreme sacrifices to avoid or alleviate greater later 
suffering. 
The distinctive (phenomenological) feature of such egoistic concern 
is, I think, rather this. It is that in our distinctive, non-derivative egoistic 
concern for our future self, we directly anticipate what will befall our own 
future self, in a way in which we do not directly anticipate what will befall 
others, no matter how deeply we may care about their future and what 
will befall them. We anticipate our own sufferings and joys in a way in 
which we do not anticipate the sufferings and joys of others, no matter 
how great a sacrifice we are prepared to make so that they have the 
greater future joy or do not have to undergo the later suffering. If I know 
that tomorrow my child is to have a root-canal operation without 
anaesthetic I may be more concerned and make even greater sacrifices 
than I would if I knew that I was to have the painful operation. But I do 
not fearfully anticipate my child's pain. I do not brace myself, do special 
mouth exercises and mentally rehearse stoic platitudes, as I do when I 
know that I will have to undergo the horribly painful operation. 
In talking about what people care about in personal identity or 
survival, and in thinking about what matters to ourselves in personal 
identity or survival, then, it is important always to bear in mind that the 
relevant sense of 'what matters' for questions of personal identity (though 
not, of course, for questions of the meaning of life) is the second, what we 
might call, anticipatory sense. (For those worried about vicious circularity 
here, chapter 7 is the place to look for reassurance). 
One important reason for bearing this in mind is, of course, that 
this is correct sense of 'what matters' for questions of what matters in 
survival. But there is another important and related reason as well. One 
surprising thing about the contemporary personal identity debate is that 
psychological continuity accounts which have it that physical continuity is 
no necessary condition on a person's survival have been so dominant. 
This is somewhat surprising because physical continuity is so incredibly 
important for survival in our actual lives. Given our present levels of 
medical technology, the only way a person can survive in actual life is for 
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them to be physically continuous. So it is somewhat surprising to find 
that people apparently place so little importance on a condition which is 
so important for survival in people's actual lives. What, then, might 
explain the surprising dominance of the psychological continuity view? 
Unger, who, against this trend, argues for a physical continuity 
account of survival, is, unsurprisingly, particularly concerned to answer 
this question. And he suggests that psychological continuity accounts 
may derive a significant amount of their dominant intuitive appeal by 
illicitly implicitly trading on the desirability sense of what matters in 
survival. For, for many of us, psychological continuity-continuity of our 
particular projects, aspirations, values, interests, intentions, and the like-
is a substantial part of what makes life worth living. 
It is certainly true that few, if any, psychological continuity 
theorists have drawn attention to the ambiguity in the question of 'what 
matters' in survival. And, indeed, some prominent psychological 
continuity theorists have quite explicitly couched the question of what 
matters in survival in the desirability sense, as a question about what 
makes life worth living. Parfit, for example, glosses the question of what 
matters in survival as follows 
What is it rational to care about, in our concern about our own 
future? ... What is the relation that would justify egoistic concern about 
this resulting person? If the rest of this person's life will be well worth 
living, in what way should I want to be related to this person?14 
And Parfit regularly employs this desirability /'what makes life worth 
living' sense of what matters in arguing that psychological connectedness 
and continuity, rather than some other competing candidate relation, 
preserves what matters in survival1s. More ambiguously, but still 
14Parfit (1983), pp. 282-3. Although, in a later piece for popular consumption (Parfit, 
1992), he does distinguish a variety of possible senses of 'what matters', including the 
anticipatory sense. 
lSJnterestingly, however, not always. Parfit himself recognizes that there is a tension, a 
possible trade-off, between the 'what life worth living sense of what matters' and 
survival. For our values may well be better realized in some future person who is a less 
good survivor, that is to say, less, rather than more, psychological connected to us. Thus, 
for example, when discussing whether or not fusion preserves what matters (glossed in 
the 'what makes life worth living' way) he writes, 
Few of us think of ourselves as perfect. Most of us would welcome several 
changes in our physical and mental features. If the changes were improvements, we 
would welcome the partial reduction of both kinds of connectedness. I should avoid 
fusion if it would predictably involve subtracting features that I value, and adding 
features that I find repugnant. Suppose that there are only two things that give my 
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potentially misleadingly, David Lewis glosses the question of what 
matters in survival as follows: 
What is it that matters in survival? ... What do I really care about? If it can 
happen that some features of ordinary everyday survival are present but 
others are missing, then what would it take to make the difference 
between something practically as good as commonplace survival and 
something practically as bad as commonplace death?16 
Unlike Unger, however, who maintains that once this ambiguity is 
cleared up-once people realize that the relevant sense of what matters is 
the 'prudential' sense-they will come unequivocally and univocally to 
believe that physical continuity, not psychological continuity, is what they 
really care about in survival, I am less sanguine about the likelihood of 
such unequivocal convergence. Nonetheless, Unger is quite right to point 
out that the relevant sense of what matters is not the 'desirability' sense, 
but the prudential, or rather, anticipatory sense. And this may be 
especially important to bear in mind in light of the way in which the 
desirability use of 'what matters' may illicitly prejudice us in favour of a 
psychological continuity account of survival. 
Now, this non-derivative, distinctively self-involving anticipatory 
concern is necessarily future-oriented. For, of course, we cannot 
anticipate things that have already happened in the past (at any rate, on 
the plausible assumption that the past is fixed). What, then, is the 
retrospective corollary of anticipatory concern? 
It is interesting, I think, that it is very hard to pinpoint a 
retrospective counterpart of anticipatory concern. It is difficult to find a 
retrospective reactive attitude that applies only to cases of personal 
identity i.e. a reactive attitude that we have only towards the past actions 
and experiences of past person-stages that we regard as stages of us. We 
'self-ascribe' (or, as Locke put it, 'own' to ourselves) past actions and 
experiences-taking them to have been done or experienced by person-
life meaning: my struggle for Socialism and the qualities I find in Wagner. If this is 
so, I should dread fusion with a Wagner-hating Conservative. Since the resulting 
person would be a tone-deaf floating voter, my relationship to him may be nearly 
as bad as death. But another case of fusion, while involving as much change, I 
might regard as better than ordinary survival. I might regard these changes as all 
improvements. They might all be either adding a feature that I welcome, or 
removing a feature that I regret. Fusions, like marriages, could be either great 
successes, or disasters. (Parfit, 1983, p.299. emphasis added). 
16Lewis (1976), p.17. 
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stages which we acknowledge to be our own, in a way in which we do not 
self-ascribe what we take to be the past actions and experiences of others. 
And this 'self-ascription' or 'owning' of past actions or experiences is, by 
definition, distinctively self-involving. But the reactive attitudes which 
typically go along with such retrospective self-ascription-pride, shame, 
remorse, guilt, embarrassment and the like-are attitudes which are not 
distinctively self-involving. For we also have these attitudes towards past 
actions and experiences that we do not self-ascribe, that we do not regard 
as having, literally, been done or had by us. Conversely, some people 
have absolutely no reactive attitudes whatsoever towards past actions or 
experiences which they unhesitatingly self-ascribe. Present-day Germans 
who 'impute' to themselves past Nazi atrocities of which they disapprove, 
feeling shame, remorse, guilt and the like, are examples of the former; 
people who feel indifference (no reactive attitudes whatsoever, except that 
of indifference) towards past experiences which they unhesitatingly self-
ascribe are examples of the latter. Interestingly, self-ascription seems 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the having of any of these sorts of 
retrospective reactive attitudes. 
These attitudes are intimately bound up with issues of identity-
familial identity, national identity, cultural identity, religious identity, 
gendered identity, and so on-but do not restrict themselves to personal 
identity. The present day German who 'owns and imputes' to themselves 
past Nazi atrocities does not literally think of themself as identical with 
the person or persons who committed the atrocities-they do not expect 
to remember directly from the inside the experience of being a prison 
guard marching Jews to their death, for example-nonetheless, they 
regard themselves as members of a continuing national group, Germans, 
who did these things. It is identity of this broader sort, in this case 
national identity, which renders their attitude of identification and 
resulting reactive attitudes-of feeling responsibility, guilt, shame and 
remorse-understandable and justifiable (if it is), in a way in which they 
may not be were these people not to regard themselves as somehow or 
other confederated with, or related to, the people who did these things. 
Identification and corresponding reactive attitudes, although not 
distinctively and non-derivatively self-involving, are, nonetheless, 
invariably derivatively self-involving. 
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If, however, for some reason or another, we wanted a distinctively 
self-involving attitude which had retrospective application we could give 
anticipatory future-oriented concern a retrospective application. For we 
can recast all concern as future-directed concern. For our past self was to 
our current self exactly as our current self is to our future self. All person-
stages are then related to other person-stages by, inter alia, anticipatory 
concern. 
3.3 Whether identity matters distinguished from practice-dependence 
versus practice-independence. 
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, since practice-independent 
theorists believe that subjects' person-directed practices and concerns are 
only contingently associated with the concept of personal identity, 
answering the question of personal identity has involved answering, not 
one, but two, conceptually distinct questions: the first, the question of 
what personal identity necessarily involves or consists in; and the second, 
the question about what we do or should care about (in the 
aforementioned, anticipatory sense) in questions of personal identity. 
A reasonable reaction, however, might be to think that these two 
questions aren't really two distinct questions, but rather two aspects of 
one. For it seems reasonable to suppose that, especially given the 
distinctively self-involving nature of anticipatory concern, we would 
anticipate the experiences of some future person when, and only when, 
that future person will be identical with us. In other words, it's an 
intuitive assumption that I will be specially and directly concerned for 
some future person when and only when that future person is me.17 I 
think, in an important sense, this intuitive reaction is right. An analysis 
which adequately captures the nature of our concept of survival should 
not allow that our survival conditions might come apart from what 
matters to us in survival. 
Famously, however, Parfit has challenged the widely-held tenet of 
common sense: that identity matters. Paradoxically, according to Parfit, 
identity is not what matters in personal identity. At first sight, it might 
appear that a practice-dependent account of personal identity-according 
to which subjects' person-directed practices, including their anticipatory 
17Tuis is not to say that I am indifferent as to what befalls others, but just that I have a 
special, direct and intense interest in what will befall me. 
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concerns, are what make it true that personal identity consists in a certain 
relation-simply rules out Parfit's argument a priori. For, it might be 
thought, such an account makes it constitutive of personal identity that it 
be a relation which matters to us, and so conceptually impossible that 
identity be not what matters. However, although a practice-dependent 
account certainly makes it constitutive of some relation counting as the 
relation of survival (we will appreciate the force of this term in a moment) 
that that relation be one that matters to us, it does not rule out Parfit's 
argument a priori. For, the debate about whether practice-dependence or 
practice-independence is the right meta-story for the case of personal 
identity, is a different debate from the debate about whether or not identity 
matters in personal identity. 
According to Parfit, personal identity (PI) consists in R-relations 
of psychological connectedness and/ or continuity, with the right kind of 
cause-where, and only where, R holds uniquely (U) i.e. where, and only 
where, R holds between one present person and only one future person. 
As Parfit writes, 
The view that I accept can be stated with this formula: PI= R + U.18 
This is what we might call a constitutive claim about the nature or facts of 
personal identity: about what object-level relation personal identity 
consists in, and (although Parfit never explicitly mentions it) about what 
makes it true that personal identity consists in that relation. 
Now, for Parfit, since personal identity (R + U) is determined 
independently of our person-directed practices and concerns, there is the 
second, what we might call, motivational question of what we do, or, for 
Parfit, should, care about in personal identity-that is, a question about 
the motivational significance of the facts of personal identity. (The fact 
that these two questions are distinct for Parfit is itself proof that Parfit is 
practice-independent about personal identity. For the practice-dependent 
theorist regards these two questions as inextricably intertwined: personal 
identity is analysed, inter alia, in terms of our person-directed practices 
and concerns). Parfit's answer to this second, motivational question is 
that what it is rational to care about in personal identity is not uniqueness 
18Parfit (1983), p.263. 
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(U), but R. And, since identity requires uniqueness, identity cannot be 
what matters in personal identity. 
Parfit's main argument for the claim that uniqueness, and so 
identity, doesn't matter in personal identity goes by way of the case of 
fission, and since the conclusion may seem surprising, it may be worth a 
brief, schematic rehearsal. Briefly, in fission, one person stands in a 
relation to two later people which, but for the existence of the second later 
person, we would be happy to call personal identity. Because of the 
existence of two excellent and equally good physical and psychological 
continuers, rather than one, we cannot say that the original person 
continues to exist: given the logic of identity, two numerically different 
people cannot be one and the same person. Nonetheless, Parfit claims, all 
that it is rational for us to care about, in just the way in which we normally 
care about our future selves, is preserved in the original person's relation 
to the two resulting people: it is just preserved twice over. So, Parfit 
concludes, identity cannot be what matters in personal identity. That is, 
uniqueness or our continued existence cannot be what it is rational for us 
to care specially and directly about in our future-directed concern. What 
matters in personal identity, or what is properly the focus of our future-
oriented concern in survival, Parfit positively claims (although not from 
the case of fission alone), are the more particular relations of psychological 
continuity and connectedness, (R), which happen to coincide with 
personal identity (i.e. hold uniquely) in ordinary life only to the extent 
that cases of fission-like branching do not in fact occur. And since, where 
they come apart, the more particular relations and not uniqueness are 
what matter, we ought care about the more particular relations and not 
uniqueness, even in ordinary, everyday life where Rand U happen to 
coincide. 
Having distinguished between the constitutive question of what 
are the facts of personal identity, and the question of the motivational 
significance of the facts of personal identity, we are in a position to see 
why the question as between practice-dependence and practice-
independence is a different question from the question of whether or not 
identity matters. The question of whether identity matters is a question 
about the motivational significance of facts about personal identity, not 
about the constitutive question of what the facts of personal identity are, 
or what determines what determines the facts of personal identity. 
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Whereas, the debate between practice-dependent and practice-
independent theorists is a debate about the constitutive question-about 
what the facts of personal identity are-in particular, about what 
determines that these relations rather than those count as the relations of 
personal identity. 
Unfortunately, however, despite the fact that these are different 
issues, we need to introduce some terminology to separate them, and keep 
them separate. Because the practice-dependent theorist, unlike the 
practice-independent theorist, regards the constitutive and motivational 
questions as inextricably intertwined-the latter determining what 
determines the former-if the practice-dependent theorist couches their 
analysis as an analysis of personal identity, which builds in the requirement 
of uniqueness, the practice-dependent theorist will unwittingly succeed in 
ruling out Parfit's argument a priori: something I, at any rate, do not want 
to do. So, in order to leave the question of whether uniqueness matters an 
open question, we need some terminology for talking about something 
which is just like personal identity-viz. being the relation which 
organizes our person-directed practices-but which does not build in the 
requirement of uniqueness. 
Let us say that personal identity over time consists in the holding 
among person-stages of certain properties or relations (for Parfit, R; for 
physical continuity theorists, physical continuity; for Cartesian dualists, 
the soul19) when, and only when, these relations hold uniquely or in a 
non-branching, one-one form (i.e. when cases of fission-like branching or 
fusion do not occur). Personal identity, then, equals a certain property or 
relation among person-stages plus uniqueness. (This is the standard 
usage). Let us say, less standardly (and here's the technical terminology 
that the practice-dependent theorist needs), that a person's survival over 
time consists in whatever property or relation among person-stages it is in 
which personal identity is taken to consist (be it physical continuity, 
psychological continuity, the soul...), but without or minus the 
requirement of uniqueness. So talk about what makes for a person's 
survival over time is just the same as talk about what makes for personal 
identity over time, it's just that talk about survival leaves it open as to 
19Jn point of fact, of course, since for Cartesian Dualists the soul is necessarily indivisible, 
it is impossible for it to hold among person-stages in anything but a one-one or non-
branching form. 
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whether the relations in which personal identity is taken to consist hold 
uniquely, in a one-one or non-branching form. Since the question of what 
survival consists in is just the question of what personal identity consists 
in, without the requirement of uniqueness, theorists who are practice-
independent about personal identity will therefore, ipso facto, be practice-
independent about survival. 
With this distinction in place, we should simply recast the issue 
between practice-dependence and practice-independence as an issue 
about what determines what determines the extension of survival, in the 
aforementioned technical sense. The practice-independent theorist, then, 
will claim that survival necessarily consists in a certain relation 
(psychological connectedness and/ or continuity, or physical continuity, 
the soul, etc.) in virtue of those being the facts that nature or God demand 
that we incorporate in the extension of survival; the practice-dependent 
theorist will claim that survival consists in a certain relation because that 
is the relation around which subjects' organize their person-directed 
practices and concerns. But this way, the practice-dependent theorist does 
not beg-the-question against Parfit's claim that uniqueness, and so 
identity, does not matter; for survival, unlike personal identity, does not 
require uniqueness. Although the practice-dependent theorist claims that 
survival necessarily matters, then, it is an open and separate question as to 
whether uniqueness also matters in survival. 
One very important point to note. My technical sense of 'survival' 
is not the sense in which the term 'survival' is normally used in the 
personal identity debate. This should be no surprise, since few have 
addressed the issues that I am addressing, and so there has been no need 
for such a technical sense. Perhaps I should have found another term, but 
I want a word that captures the important sense in which what we have 
called 'survival' is similar to personal identity, viz. their both being 
concepts of a relation around which we organize our person-directed 
practices. Most often in the personal identity debate, 'survival' is just 
used interchangeably with 'personal identity', to mean personal identity 
in my aforementioned technical sense. Potentially more confusing in this 
context, however, is Parfit's use of 'survival'. For, Parfit sometimes uses 
the term 'survival', not in my constitutive, technical sense outlined, but in 
the motivational sense of what we do (or should) care about in questions 
of personal identity. That is to say, Parfit sometimes uses the term 
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'survival' just to mean 'the relation that we do or should care about in 
personal identity', namely, for Parfit, R, but not uniqueness. I cannot 
stress strongly enough that this not the sense in which I am using the term 
'survival'. Were Parfit's motivational use of 'survival' my use, Parfit 
would turn out to be practice-dependent about survival, for, on his use, 
survival just is the relation that we do and should care about. But Parfit is 
not practice-dependent about survival in my sense. For Parfit believes 
that the facts about survival in our sense, namely R (with no requirement 
of uniqueness), are determined quite independently of our practices and 
concerns. My constitutive use of the term 'survival' and Parfit's purely 
motivational use will be coextensive-on both uses Parfit's answer will be 
R. But this is not because Parfit is practice-dependent about survival in 
our constitutive sense. Rather it is because Parfit thinks that survival in 
our constitutive sense, and what we do (or should) care about in personal 
identity, happen to coincide. But for Parfit, unlike the practice-dependent 
theorist, there is no conceptual necessity about this coincidence. For, for 
Parfit, like all practice-independent theorists, our person-directed 
practices, including what we care about in survival, are only contingently 
associated with the concept of survival. 
This is despite Peter K. Mclnerney's strange remarks to the 
contrary. Mcinerney appears to think that Parfit departs from the 
orthodoxy in the personal identity debate by being, in my terms, notably 
practice-dependent. He begins by noting, correctly, that 
In memory and psychological connectedness theories, some form of the 
epistemic relation of first-person remembering plus the endurance of 
other psychological characteristics unites later person-stages and earlier 
person-stages into one person; whether one is proud, ashamed, or feels 
responsible for characteristics of earlier person-stages is thought to be 
dependent upon personal identity, but not in any way to constitute it. 
Similarly, John Perry thinks that whatever relations between a present 
person-stage and later person-stages unite these into one person should 
underlie and explain concern for one's own future; concern for (one's 
own) future person-stages does not in any way constitute those future 
person-stages as one's own.20 
But, curiously, in a footnote to this passage, he writes 
20Mclnemey (1983), p.236. 
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Parfit is the major exception; he maintains that valuational attitudes 
towards certain earlier person-stages play some role in making these 
part of one's own past. See 'On "The importance of self-identity"' ... "21 
Mcinerney must have in mind the following passage in 'On "The 
importance of self-identity"', where Parfit writes 
The man who feels remorse can reflect upon the lessening in 
psychological connectedness. If this weakens his remorse, he is to some 
extent deciding what is to be the part of his past with which he 
identifies. He is, to this extent, deciding what is to count, for him, as the 
history of his present self.22 
As should be apparent, however, even from this passage from 
where Mcinerney must have drawn support for his interpretation of Parfit 
(since it is the only paragraph where Parfit sounds even remotely practice-
dependent), Parfit is in fact no exception to the practice-independent 
accounts of survival which have dominated the personal identity debate. 
Note the give-away wording of the second sentence: 'If this weakens his 
remorse, he is to some extent deciding what is to be the part of his past 
with which he identifies.' As should be apparent from his wording, for 
Parfit, what counts as the man's past is determined independently of his 
attitudes of identification; the man is simply reflecting upon what part, if 
any, of that independently determined past he identifies with. That this is 
Parfit's view, and not simply a loose use of words, is blatantly apparent 
from everything else he writes in that article and elsewhere. For example, 
a few pages earlier, he writes 
The man that I described has a divided attitude towards his past. The 
latter part he regards with pride and shame, pleasure and regret; the 
earlier part he regards with indifference. The man's divided attitude has 
the following cause. Between him now and his recent self there are 
strong psychological connections; between him now and his earlier self 
there are only weak connections. If we take the Complex [reductionist] 
View, it will be the strength of these connections that we think important. 
Where the strength differs, we may think it justified to have a different 
attitude.23 (Emphasis mine) 
As this passage should make apparent, Parfit, just like Perry, Swinburne, 
Williams and other practice-independent theorists, believes that what 
underlies, explains and justifies our retrospective (and future-oriented) 
21ibid., p.244 
22parfit (1971), p.688. 
23ibid., p. 686. 
90 
Chapter 3 The contingency of our person-directed practices 
concerns and affective attitudes of pride and shame, pleasure and regret 
are the facts in which survival independently consists: in Parfit' s case, R. 
To put the point the Euthyphro way: we are justified in organizing our 
person-directed practices around some relation because that is the relation 
of survival; R does not count as the relation of survival because we 
organize our person-directed practices around it. For Parfit, our reactive 
attitudes and practices no more constitute past or future person-stages as 
our own, than do electron microscopes make it true that these particles 
(rather than those) are the atoms. 
Parfit' s view that identity does not matter in personal identity may 
give rise to another, related confusion that needs to be cleared out of the 
way. Because Parfit believes that identity does not matter, he sometimes 
says things that may sound deceptively practice-dependent. For instance, 
he frequently writes things of the sort: "we could say that the resulting 
person will be me, or we could say that I shall die and he will be someone 
else"24. How we choose to apply the language of personal identity-
whether we decide to call a future person me or not-is up to us. 
However, we should not let Parfit's way of talking mislead us. 
Parfit is not claiming that our application of the language of personal 
identity itself makes it true that a later person is the same person as an 
earlier person. Quite the contrary. As we have seen, Parfit believes that 
the facts of personal identity are determined independently of us, 
including our use of language. Parfit can afford to be so ecumenical about 
the language of personal identity only because he believes that identity is 
not the motivationally significant feature of personal identity, and so that 
the language of personal identity is neither here nor there in latching onto 
the motivationally significant facts. Parfit's interest is in survival, not 
personal identity; for survival (for Parfit, R), not uniqueness, is what it is 
rational for us to care about in survival. And the facts of survival, for 
Parfit, like the facts of personal identity, are determined quite 
independently of us, our practices and concerns, and our use of language. 
We should think of the debate between practice-dependent and 
practice-independent accounts of personal identity, then, as concerning 
survival, in the aforementioned precise technical sense. In particular, as 
concerning the question of whether or not subject's person-directed 
24Parfit (1992), p.19. 
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practices, including their anticipatory future-oriented concerns, are an 
essential feature of the concept of survival or something only contingently 
associated with it. That way we can avoid some confusion and, for the 
time being, leave aside the separate issue of whether uniqueness matters 
or not. So nothing in practice-dependence as such, rules out Parfit's 
argument that uniqueness doesn't matter a priori. (On the practice-
dependent view I shall advocate, whether uniqueness matters or not (i.e. 
whether a community of people anticipate the future experiences only of 
future selves who are unique continuers of them or not), all depends upon 
whether the community in question happens to care about uniqueness or 
not.) From hereon in, then, I will use the terms 'survival' and 'personal 
identity' in the constitutive, technical senses outlined, unless otherwise 
noted. 
3.4 Exclusive and inclusive justifiers 
All practice-independent theorists, be they Cartesian, causal/historical, 
rigidifying, real-essence or some other, believe that survival necessarily 
consists in the relation in which it consists for us25, so that people, even 
people just like us, who took survival to consist in some other relation 
would either be mistaken (for Cartesians and real-essencers) or, for 
rigidifiers, would mean something different from what we mean by 
'survival'. (It is in this way that practice-independent accounts, whatever 
their precise form, are chauvinistic, parochial or ethnocentric.) All 
practice-independent theorists, too, and relatedly, think that survival has 
nothing essentially to do with subjects' person-directed practices. Because 
they think this, practice independent theorists view the facts of personal 
identity as independent justifiers: insofar as we are justified in organizing 
our person-directed practices and concerns around some relation, it is 
because survival necessarily consists in this relation, not the other way 
round. However, practice-independent theorists appear to divide as to 
the normative and motivational significance of survival. They divide as to 
the question of whether or not the facts of survival are, as we might put it, 
'exclusive justifiers'. We saw this earlier when, in chapter 2, we discussed 
25Some practice-independent theorists may take a different view, according to which 
there is a hierarchy of candidate relations for survival. So, for example, (and I think 
Parfit holds this view) survival consists in psychological continuity in a soulless world, 
otherwise it consists in continuity of the soul. The soul is, as it were, the best candidate 
for survival, but the next best thing is psychological continuity. This view is practice-
independent because the hierarchy is determined by our concept. 
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Unger's relative 'ecumenism' with respect to the community who 
organized their person-directed practices around psychological, not 
physical, continuity. I want now to bring out this difference more 
explicitly. 
According to one group of practice-independent theorists, survival 
is the relation that all people, at all times, should care about. So that 
people (or, at any rate, people sufficiently like us) in this world or any 
other who organized their person-directed practices around some other 
relation would be irrational, mistaken and unjustified. These 
philosophers regard the facts of survival not merely as independent 
justifiers, but as exclusive justifiers: for they, and they alone, are the facts 
which justify a community's person-directed practices, not just for some 
limited group of us, but for everyone everywhere. For these philosophers, 
there is only one thing that people like us can correctly organize their 
person-directed practices and concerns around, and that is the relation 
that we organize (or ought to organize) our person-directed practices 
around. There are no true or acceptable alternative concepts of survival 
for people of our biological kind. So that subjects like us who organized 
their person-directed practices and concerns around some other relation, 
say, survival*, would simply be mistaken. 
However, a second group of practice-independent theorists, Unger 
amongst them, appear to take a different, more ecumenical, view. True 
enough, these philosophers will say, survival is the relation around which 
we organize our person-directed practices, and which independently 
justifies us in organizing our person-directed practices around that 
relation. However, as against the first group, this second group do not 
require that all people everywhere are similarly rationally obliged to 
organize their person-directed practices around the facts of survival just 
as we do. A community who organized their person-directed practices 
around some other relation, survival*, are not necessarily irrational, 
mistaken or unjustified. In contrast with the first group who maintain 
that the facts of survival are exclusive justifiers, these second group of 
philosophers have the facts of survival, as we might put it, as inclusive 
justifiers: facts which justify preferences where they cohere with the views 
and concerns of the people involved. 
On the first, exclusive justifier view, then, survival is the only thing 
that people are justified in organizing their person-directed practices 
93 
Chapter 3 The contingency of our person-directed practices 
around, on the second view, people might quite correctly and rationally 
(or at any rate, not clearly irrationally) organize their person-directed 
practices around some other relation, survival*, or survival**, etc. Both 
these views are practice-independent, for they both maintain that the facts 
of survival are essentially determined by facts which obtain or fail to 
obtain independently of people's person-directed practices, they just differ 
about the motivational status of those facts. 
Parfit is an example of a practice-independent theorist who takes 
the first view. In summing up his central claims about survival, Parfit, for 
example, writes 
.. .I believe that I have now considered those views that, in this debate, 
need to be considered. I may be unaware of some other published view. 
And I have not considered views held in different ages, or civilizations. 
This fact suggests a disturbing possibility. I believe that my claims 
apply to all people, at all times. It would be disturbing to discover that 
they are merely part of one line of thought, in the culture of Modern 
Europe and America ... Fortunately, this is not true. I claim that, when we 
ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, the fundamental 
question is a choice between two views. On one view, we are separately 
existing entities distinct from our brains and bodies and experiences, 
and entities whose existence must be all or nothing. The other view is 
the Reductionist View. And I claim that, of these, the second view is 
true ... Buddha would have agreed. The Reductionist View is not merely part 
of one cultural tradition. It may be, as I have claimed, the true view 
about all people at all times.26 
At first sight, this may appear to be a claim only about the intrinsically 
privileged status of Parfit's claims about survival, not about the evaluative 
or motivational significance of those facts. Parfit believes that his account 
of survival applies to all people at all times. However, implicit in this, is a 
claim about what matters in survival or, as Parfit prefers to put it, what it 
is rational to care about in survival. For, according to Parfit, the 
Reductionist view of survival is inextricably entwined with a particular 
view about what it rational to care about in survival. For, according to 
Parfit, "on a reductionist account, personal identity cannot be what 
matters".27 Reductionism about survival goes hand and hand, for Parfit, 
with 'reductionism about significance': the view that "when one fact just 
consists in certain others, it can only be these other facts which matter."28 
26Parfit (1983), p.273. 
27Parfit (1992), p.19. 
28[oc.cit. 
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Indeed, the reason Buddha would have agreed (conveniently italicized by 
Parfit), is that, according to Parfit, Buddha too believed that, in one's 
concern for one's future, it was irrational to care about identity. Not only 
is it irrational to care about uniqueness, according to Parfit, but people 
who care about physical continuity, or even that their psychology be 
furthered by way of reliable cause, are irrational. He writes, for example, 
... can I rationally care a great deal about whether this [future] person's 
brain and body will be my present brain and body? I believe that, while 
it may not be irrational to care a little, to care a great deal would be 
irrational... Why would it not be irrational to care a little? This could be 
like one's wish to keep the same wedding ring, rather than a new ring 
that is exactly similar. We understand the sentimental wish to keep the 
very ring that was involved in the wedding ceremony. In the same way, 
it may not be irrational to have a mild preference that the [future] 
person ... have my present brain and body.29 
According to Parfit, what it is rational to care about in survival is 
psychological continuity, with any cause, and any person at any time who 
did not care about this relation would be irrational. Why? Good 
question! We will come to that shortly. 
In contrast to Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker takes the second sort of 
view; the view of the facts of survival as inclusive justifiers. Shoemaker 
asks us to imagine the following case (and since the case will be useful in 
illustrating the difference between the views of the facts of survival as 
inclusive and exclusive justifiers, it may be worth presenting it in full). 
Imagine a society living in an environment in which an increase in some 
sort of radiation has made it impossible for a human body to remain 
healthy for more than a few years. Being highly advanced 
technologically, the society has developed the following procedure for 
dealing with this. For each person there is a stock of duplicate bodies, 
cloned from cells taken from that person and grown by an accelerated 
process in a radiation-proof vault, where they are then stored. 
Periodically a person goes into the hospital for a 'body-change'. This 
consists in his total brain-state [all his present mental states or 
psychology] being transferred to the brain of one of his duplicate bodies. 
At the end of the procedure the original body is incinerated. We are to 
imagine that in this society going in for a body-change is as routine an 
occurrence as going to have one's teeth cleaned is in ours. It is taken for 
granted by everyone that the procedure is person-preserving. One 
frequently hears remarks like 'I can't meet you for lunch on Tuesday, 
because that is the day for my body-change; let's make it Wednesday 
29Parfit (1983), p.286. 
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instead.' All of the social practices of the society presuppose that the 
procedure is person-preserving. The brain-state recipient is regarded as 
owning the property of the brain-state donor, as being married to the 
donor's spouse, and as holding whatever offices, responsibilities, rights, 
obligations, etc. the brain-state donor held. If it is found that the brain-
state donor had committed a crime, everyone regards it as just that the 
brain-state recipient should be punished for it.30 
Shoemaker further asks us to grant, for the sake of argument, that 
materialism is true in this world: there are no non-physical entities such as 
souls; and that the members of society know this, and know exactly what 
the brain-state transfer procedure involves, so that "[t]here is no clear 
sense in which they can be said to be mistaken about a matter of fact in 
regarding the procedure as person-preserving."31 Now, Shoemaker says, 
confronted with such a society, there is strong reason to think that 
what they mean by 'person' is such that the BST-procedure is person-
preserving (using 'person' in their sense). And, what goes with this, it 
would be very hard to maintain that they are being irrational when, 
being under no misconception concerning matters of fact, they willingly 
submit themselves to the BST-procedure.32 
Swinburne, however, disagrees. Like Parfit, Swinburne holds the 
first view of the facts of personal identity as exclusive justifiers. He 
writes, 
There may well be, as Shoemaker supposes, some reason for supposing 
that a society, in which BST is common, means by 'person' (pp.109f) 
'what we mean by it'. But in that case there is good reason for anyone 
who reflects on the issue to doubt whether 'the BST procedure is person-
preserving', even if that society unthinkingly supposes that it is. Many 
societies have believed that present persons are their dead ancestors 
reincarnated. The fact that the society does hold that view about 
personal identity has no tendency to show that that view is true and the 
same goes for any society which holds the view that the BST-procedure 
is person-preserving.33 
For Swinburne, whether or not a community is justified in organizing 
their person-directed practices around some relation depends on whether 
they are right about what survival necessarily involves, irrespective of the 
fact that, by their lights, survival* gives the conditions for survival, and 
30Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984), pp.108-9. 
31Ioc.cit. 
32Ioc.cit. 
33ibid., p.133. 
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survival* is what organizes their person-directed practices and concerns. 
For Swinburne, survival is what all people everywhere ought to organize 
their person-directed practices and concerns around, and those who 
organize them around some other relation, survival*, are simply mistaken 
and unjustified in so doing. 
What might underpin or explain this division amongst practice-
independent theorists? I suspect that it has very little to do with views 
about survival as such, and much more to do with views about rationality 
and morality. In particular, it has to do with whether the facts of survival 
are regarded as intrinsically motivating-as being, in and of themselves, the 
sorts of facts that people ought care about-or whether such motivational 
status as the facts of survival have derives from the views and preferences 
of the people involved. Unger implicitly offers this sort of explanation 
when he writes, 
Owing to a certain flexibility in the semantics of "rational", we may 
employ the term to set contexts where the satisfaction of lenient 
conditions suffices for its correct application and, as well, we may employ 
it to set stricter contexts. Properly setting a lenient context, we can have 
it so the satisfaction of certain (quasi-)formal conditions by a person's 
attitudes may suffice, near enough, for his desires, values, choices, etc. 
correctly to be called rational... Though not useful for my ... ecumenical 
presentation, there's also room to use "rational" more strictly, and that 
room is helpful for certain other things. For example, when used more 
strictly, often the terms is employed to get "the authority of reason" 
behind values, etc. that the speaker recognizes to be good ones-or, for 
those less objectively inclined, behind values, etc. that the speaker 
endorses. Two simple examples may clarify my point: (1) At least when 
I'm the one speaking, even on a very strict use, a person's deep basic 
desire for loving relations with others is correctly called rational. (2) But, 
at least when I'm speaking, on such a strict use, someone's basic desire 
to spend his life collecting string is not correctly called rational, no 
matter how well it may cohere with the rest of his psychology.34 
Unger himself does not take a strong stand as between the lenient 
and the strict use of 'rational'. He merely points out that, being lenient or 
ecumenical, a society such as the BSTs can be correctly called rational (or, 
at any rate, cannot properly be called, irrational); being strict and 
chauvinistic, they could not properly be called rational. But, in permitting 
the lenient use as at least a valid one, Unger allows that the facts of 
survival could be inclusive justifiers. (He is not, of course, so ecumenical 
34Unger (1992), pp. 174-5. 
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about the motivational significance of survival for us. For, according to 
Unger, our views and preferences have it that the facts of survival-for 
Unger, physical continuity-and not the facts of the BSTs' survival*, are 
the motivationally significant facts for us.) 
The distinction Unger draws between the lenient and the strict 
sense of 'rationality' is, roughly, the difference between the Humean and 
the non-Humean view of motivational reason or rationality. Famously, 
David Hume maintained that reason is slave to the passions. For Hume, 
non-instrumental brute preferences or desires, unlike beliefs (which aim 
to represent the way the world is and so can represent it truly or falsely), 
cannot be assessed in terms of truth and falsity, and fall outside the sphere 
of rationality-at least, providing that they do not rest on any false beliefs. 
Instrumental desires are those desires which serve to maximise 
satisfaction of our brute desires. For example, if we had a brute, basic or 
non-instrumental desire to drink coffee, an instrumental desire which 
served this brute desire would be the desire to go to a coffee shop. 
Instrumental desires are the means to satisfy our brute desires. 
Instrumental desires can serve our brute desires better or worse-some 
means are better than others for getting to a desired end. As a result, for 
the Humean, instrumental desires, where they do not serve to maximise 
satisfaction of our brute preferences, can, and will, be irrational. But, for 
the Humean, the brute desires that our instrumental desires serve are 
themselves never properly called irrational. For the Humean, such non-
instrumental preferences or brute desires may be immoral-they may 
stand in need of moral justification-but they are not properly called 
irrational. The fact that we have a certain non-instrumental desire (say, a 
basic sentimental desire to keep the very same wedding ring that was 
placed on our finger at the ceremony) is just a brute fact about us, and one 
that, where it is not the product of some other false belief (for example, the 
belief that the wedding ring has a magical power to keep demons away), 
cannot be subjected to rational criticism. 
In contrast, the non-Humean believes that some, although not all, 
such brute desires can be intrinsically irrational. For the non-Humean, 
brute desires, like beliefs, can properly be subjected to rational criticism, 
and not just where or because they rest on false beliefs. In support of her 
case, the non-Humean cites our folk intuitions and practices of saying that 
'so-and-so has such-and-such a "stupid" desire', where the desire in 
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question does not appear to rest on a false belief. The non-Humean takes 
our dispositions to say, for example, that 'the desire to spend one's life 
collecting string is "stupid"', to support a non-Humean, as against a 
Humean, account. To non-instrumentally desire to spend one's life 
collecting string, the non-Humean might say, is intrinsically irrational, so 
that anyone who had such a preference would properly be called 
irrational. (The Humean, in contrast, will say that this desire is not 
properly called irrational, although it may well be called immoral-there 
may be better things we could be doing with our life. From the Humean's 
point of view the folk are disposed to use the word 'irrational' too 
loosely.) However, since our intuitions about whether or not a desire is 
intrinsically irrational vary from case to case-we do not, for example, 
tend to think that the desire to spend one's life having loving relationships 
is irrational-the anti-Humean's claim that certain desires are intrinsically 
irrational must go on our intuitions on a case by case basis. 
Whereas Shoemaker and Unger are, if somewhat tentatively, 
Humean; Swinburne and Parfit, and others who view the facts of survival 
as exclusive justifiers, are non-Humean. They claim that the facts of 
survival-in Swinburne's case, the soul; in Parfit' s, R-are intrinsically 
motivating, so that someone who did not care about those facts would be 
irrational. According to Parfit, it is not irrational to have mild preference 
for one's original wedding ring, but, by implication, it would be irrational 
to care a great deal. It would be irrational to care so much that, for 
example, when one lost the ring, one refused the offer of a qualitatively 
identical replacement. Why would it be irrational? It would be irrational 
because having such a great desire for one's original wedding ring is an 
intrinsically irrational desire. 
The Humean will happily admit that there are circumstances under 
which a person's great desire for their original wedding ring might be 
irrational. It might be irrational, if the person had false beliefs about the 
ring. It might be irrational, too, if what the person really cared brutely 
about in their caring about their wedding ring was the colour, shape or 
feel of the ring. For then their great desire for the original wedding ring 
would be an instrumental desire-they greatly desire the token ring only 
because it happens to instantiate the properties which they really, brutely 
desire-and, what's more, a potentially irrational one: if, for example, 
they were, as a result of this instrumental concern, to turn down the offer 
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of a qualitatively identical replacement ring. For all the things they 
brutely care about in their caring about their original wedding ring would 
be secured by a qualitatively identical replacement. Such an instrumental 
desire would be irrational, because it would not serve, but thwart, 
maximal satisfaction of the person's brute preferences. 
Now, Parfit seems to think that our concern for uniqueness, and so 
identity, in survival is just such an instrumental desire. According to 
Parfit, we think we care non-instrumentally about identity or uniqueness, 
but we are wrong. What we really care non-instrumentally about are the 
more particular facts (R) which, mistakenly, we confuse with a brute 
desire for personal identity, since in everyday life the two things go 
together. Our desire for identity or our own continued existence is then, 
for us, an instrumental desire: we care about identity only because, as 
things actually stand, ensuring that we continue to exist is the only way of 
ensuring that there will be some future person who is R-related to us. 
That such instrumental desires can be irrational is common ground 
between the non-Humean like Parfit and the Humean. The Humean can 
readily agree that, if Parfit is right, and people actually do have a brute 
desire for R rather than uniqueness in questions of survival, then caring 
greatly about uniqueness is rational where, as is the case in our actual 
lives, it is the only way to guarantee satisfaction of the brute desire for R35; 
but irrational where, in cases like fission, it does not best serve to 
maximize satisfaction of the brute desire for R. But, the Humean will 
baulk at Parfit's further claim, that subjects are rationally obliged so 
brutely to care about R so that a community, neither in ignorance or error, 
who had a brute, non-instrumental desire for physical continuity, for 
example, would be irrational. In the case of survival, as we shall see, the 
Humean's case has extra support. For, not only is it doubtful that such 
brute, non-instrumental concern is obviously in the same intuitively 
irrational boat as the desire to devote one's life to collecting bits of string 
(rather than desiring to spend one's life in loving relationships) in the first 
place, but, moreover, there is substantial disagreement about what facts, if 
any, it is in virtue of which they are irrational. 
35Note that this is contra Parfit's claim that, since Rand not uniqueness is what we care 
about where the two come apart, R but not uniqueness is what it is rational to care about 
even in ordinary, everyday life where the two go together. 
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I am Humean about motivational reason. But, and I should stress 
this point, whether one is Humean or non-Humean is a question about 
theories of rationality, not about personal identity: it is a view about the 
motivational status of facts about personal identity, not about what those 
facts are. The view of personal identity I advocate, like any other, is 
compatible with either Humeanism or non-Humeanism, and so one which 
theorists of either persuasion are free to endorse. Unsurprisingly, 
however, since I am Humean, the non-Humean may (and probably will!) 
disagree with some, although by no means all, of the normative and 
motivational upshots I draw from pluralism. But to argue for Humeanism 
is a thesis in itself. 
One final point to note before we move on. Recall Parfit' s claim 
that reductionism about personal identity is inextricably bound up with a 
certain motivational view of those facts, namely, 'reductionism about 
significance'. According to Parfit, reductionists about personal identity 
"cannot defensibly deny" that the more particular facts, not identity or 
uniqueness, are what it is rational to care about in survival. The foregoing 
should give us reason to doubt that views about personal identity and 
particular views about the motivational status of facts about personal 
identity, such as reductionism about significance, are necessarily as 
inextricably entwined as Parfit supposes. Parfit's 'reductionism about 
significance' is a non-Humean doctrine; and the reductionist about the 
facts of personal identity who is also Humean about the motivational 
status of those facts can quite defensibly deny reductionism about 
significance. Here we may have the bones of a new sort of argument 
against the normative and motivational conclusions Parfit draws from 
reductionism about personal identity, including the claim that identity 
does not matter. 
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4 
TOWARDS A PLURALIST ACCOUNT OF SURVIVAL 
As we have seen, practice-independent theorists claim that what makes it the 
case that a certain relation (rather than some other) constitutes the facts of 
survival is wholly determined, in as much as it is determined, by some single 
and independent set of facts served up by nature (or God). What makes these 
relations rather than those count as the relation of survival is wholly 
independent of any concepts of subjects' person-directed practices and 
concerns. And it is when, and (for those who take the facts of survival to be 
exclusive justifiers), only when, the appointed facts served up by nature (or 
God) obtain that people like us are correct or rationally justified in organizing 
their person-directed practices around those facts. 
In this chapter, I want to provide some reason for reconsidering these 
meta-assumptions. There is no independent set of facts served up by nature 
(or God) that demand that we use a certain relation or set of the relations to 
determine the extension of survival if we are not to miss something important 
about the way the world is. What criteria we use to determine what 
determines the extension of survival is mostly up to us; in particular, to the 
way in which we organize our person-directed practices and concerns. 
Before we turn to the case of persons, however, it will be helpful to 
consider this case from the realm of artefacts. 
4.1 The viking ship 
Suppose that an ancient viking ship, a country's prized national emblem, sets 
off on an historic round the world voyage retracing the steps of the first 
voyage of discovery of the country. At each port of call on this voyage, an 
old, rotting ship's plank is replaced by a new one exactly like it so that the 
ship can continue its voyage safely. When the ship finally arrives back at its 
home port in the capital city of the country for the grand centenary 
celebrations, not a single one of its original planks remains, each having been 
gradually replaced, one by one, by a plank of exactly the same sort at each 
port of call on the journey. 
Chapter4 Towards a pluralist account of survival 
When news of this leaks out, many of the citizens of the country are in 
uproar. Their prized national emblem, they claim, has been destroyed. The 
ship that now sits glistening proudly in their harbour is no longer the ship 
that was their prized national emblem, but a completely new and different 
ship which happens to look exactly like their old one. Distraught, these 
citizens claim that they can no longer display the ship at their centenary 
celebrations, for it is no longer the same ship on which the famed explorers 
sailed. 
Other citizens disagree. It is, they claim, simply wrong to think that 
the ship in their harbour now is a new, different ship from the ship that set 
sail a year ago. For, they argue, it looks just the same as the old ship, and is 
spatio-temporally continuous with the ship that left port. And these things, 
they argue, and not whether or not the ship is composed of exactly the same 
token planks, are what are important in determining whether or not the ship 
is the same ship over time. 
But still the debate rages on as the centenary celebrations grow 
nearer ... 
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After a while, certain reflective peacemakers attempt to intervene in 
the argument. What, they ask the warring citizens, could make it true that 
one of them is right and the other wrong? What claim has spatio-temporal 
continuity or strict identity of the very same token planks, respectively, to 
constitute the facts of the ship's identity over time, independent of the 
particular interests and concerns of the people involved? Surely, these 
citizens argue, whether or not strict plank identity or spatio-temporal 
continuity get to determine whether or not this is the same ship, depends 
upon our particular interests in the matter, in particular, on the function the 
ship plays in our interests and concerns. Given that this particular ship is of 
great historical value and interest, they argue, it is understandable to think 
that it may matter a great deal that the ship be composed of the original 
planks. On the other hand, the ship's planks were replaced gradually (the last 
original plank being replaced just before the ship entered port) and, in 
keeping with the historical value of the ship, by planks of exactly the same 
sort as the original planks; and the explorers themselves replaced many of the 
ship's planks on their voyages in it. And, in general, our interest in the 
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identity of ships over time does not seem to require that they retain exactly 
the same token planks over time. Neither group of citizens are wrong, these 
peacemakers argue, for what privileged, independent facts could there be to 
make them wrong? Rather, they just place different amounts of importance 
on different aspects of our interests and concerns regarding the ship. They 
just care about different things in the ship's identity over time. 
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Some may think that the case of survival is very different from the case 
of artefacts in this respect. Whereas what determines the identity of artefacts 
may well be a conventional matter-a matter of our interests and concerns-
what determines the identity of people over time is not such a conventional 
matter. Whether or not a person survives some process is not up to us in the 
way in which whether a ship is the same ship, or a watch the same watch, or 
something annoying, may be up to us. But, as we shall see, surprising though 
it may be, survival is very much like this. Survival is an artefact of our 
person-directed practices. 
4.2 The Teletransporters and the Somataphiles: A challenge for practice-
independent theorists.I 
Imagine two communities of people just like us: communities made up of 
people of our biological kind, Human Beings, living in a world in which there 
are no non-material entities such as Cartesian Egos or souls. One community, 
being highly technologically advanced, has developed a procedure they call 
teletransportation. In teletransportation, a person steps into a booth at one 
location where a machine scans the person's brain and body and beams a 
blueprint of it to a receiving booth where another machine makes a cell for 
cell exact organic replica of that person, while the original person's brain and 
body is destroyed. The person who emerges from the teletransporter booth 
at the receiving end thinks that he or she is the person who entered it, seems 
to remember living the life of the person who entered the teletransporter, has 
all their intentions, beliefs, desires, and other character traits, and looks the 
same. Not only this, but when the teletransporter mechanism constructs the 
blueprint, it rids the person of all disease and disability and regenerates their 
molecular make-up, so that the person who emerges at the receiving booth is 
1 This case is amended from an example of Johnston's (1989c), esp. pp.454-58. 
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young, healthy, and able again. From the Teletransporters' point of view, 
teletransportation provides not only a means of cheap, quick travel, but also, 
barring unexpected accidents, a means of attaining eternal life. 
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Being teletransported is as routine an occurrence in the Teletransporter 
society as boarding a plane or going to the doctor is in ours. It is taken for 
granted by everyone that teletransportation is survival-preserving: everyone 
who enters the teletransportation booth has a special and intense interest in 
what will befall the person who leaves the teletransportation booth at the 
other end; when their spouse and children are teletransported they continue 
to love them, be annoyed with them, or whatever such reactive attitudes they 
had towards them before they were teletransported, and so on. And all the 
broader person-directed practices of the society presuppose that 
teletransportation is survival-preserving: the person who emerges from the 
teletransporter at the receiving end is regarded as owning the property of the 
person who entered it at the initial end, as being married to their spouse, and 
as holding whatever offices, rights, obligations etc. the person who entered 
the booth had. If it is found that the person who entered the booth had 
committed a crime, everyone regards it as just that the person who emerges 
from the teletransportation booth should be punished for it. Let us suppose, 
moreover, that the Teletransporters do not have any false beliefs about the 
operation of the teletransporter mechanism-they don't believe that it 
transfers souls or whatever-they simply take themselves to survive the 
teletransportation procedure. 
But now imagine another community, the Somataphiles, just like the 
society of Teletransporters, except for the fact that the Somataphiles, unlike 
the Teletransporters, regard the teletransportation procedure as 
determinately always failing to secure a person's survival. The Somataphiles, 
having fallen under the sway of certain practice-independent theorists among 
them, regard the Teletransporters as deeply mistaken, indeed absolutely 
insane. From the Somataphiles' point of view, the Teletransporters are 
perfectly prepared to regularly commit suicide without a moment's thought, 
to periodically murder their children, loved ones, and other members of their 
society without reason, have a special and intense interest in what will befall 
people who are mere replicas of them, systematically blame and punish the 
wrong people for misdemeanours, are continuously deluded about exactly 
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who had the experiences they seem to remember, are flippantly and 
superficially prepared to transfer their deep love for their children to new 
people who, though just like them, are nonetheless distinct from them, and 
are slowly but systematically facilitating the extinction of their community. 
Though well aware that the Teletransporters don't view things in this way, 
the Somataphiles just take this to illustrate the true depths of the 
Teletransporters' delusions. And, when the Teletransporters offer the 
Somataphiles the teletransporter technology at bargain basement prices, the 
Somataphiles adamantly turn it down. The Teletransporters, having also 
been convinced by certain practice-independent theorists among them, shake 
their heads in utter disbelief. Here the Somataphiles are, generously offered 
the means of cost-efficient, environmentally friendly, superfast travel and 
eternal life at bargain basement prices, and they turn it down; and not 
because they wouldn't like cheap, superfast travel or eternal life either! 
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Now are there any principled grounds upon which we can claim that 
one community is correct and the other mistaken in taking themselves to 
survive or not to survive the teletransportation procedure? Is there any 
principled way in which we can say, independently of the person-directed 
beliefs, attitudes, concerns, and practices of the people involved, that a person 
survives or fails to survive teletransportation? Practice-independent 
theorists, of course, answer 'yes': if there is a determinate fact of the matter as 
to whether or not persons survive teletransportation, then it is a fact which 
obtains or fails to obtain independently of the cognitive and affective 
responses and practices of the people involved. It is a fact served up by 
nature. But, as we saw in chapters 1 and 2, practice-independent theorists 
differ amongst themselves as to precisely what the fact of the matter is. 
Hence, physical continuity practice-independent theorists (and those 
psychological continuity practice-independent theorists for whom 
psychological continuity must have a normal cause) maintain that the 
Somataphiles were absolutely correct to turn down the offer of the 
teletransporter technology. For physical continuity is a necessary condition 
for a person's survival, and in the teletransportation procedure there is no 
such continuity. For physical continuity practice-independent theorists, the 
Teletransporters are fundamentally mistaken. They are simply wrong about 
the necessary conditions for their survival. For most psychological continuity 
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practice-independent theorists, in contrast, it is not the Teletransporters, but 
the Somataphiles, who are deeply mistaken. For psychological continuity, 
even in the absence of underlying physical continuity, is what is necessary 
and sufficient for a person's survival. And since, in teletransportation, there 
is such psychological continuity, the Somataphiles were deeply mistaken to 
turn down the offer of the teletransporter technology, and the chance of 
cheap, super-fast travel and eternal life which accompanied it. 
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But where are the facts served up by nature to choose between these 
two different object-level answers to the question of survival? In the absence 
of a community's person-directed cognitive and affective responses, how can 
we really say that either the Somataphiles or the Teletransporters have the 
wrong concept of survival? For when challenged to explain and justify their 
person-directed actions, judgements and concerns, both communities point to 
a relation in the world which, though different, constitutes the relation of 
survival for them, and which can serve if needs be to justify these actions, 
judgements, and concerns. The Somataphiles point to a relation in the world, 
the relation of being a Somataphile survivor (where being a Somataphile 
survivor requires physical continuity); a relation which is for them the 
relation of survival, and which marks off the relations in the world that they 
happen to care about in survival. By the same token, the Teletransporters can 
point to a relation in the world, the relation of being a series-person (where 
being a series-person does not require strict physical continuity), a relation 
which for them constitutes the relation of survival, and which marks off the 
relations in the world which they happen to care about in survival. 
And where are the natural facts to make it true that one community is 
right and the other wrong to take themselves to survive or not to survive the 
teletransportation procedure? For both communities are members of our 
biological kind, homo sapiens. The facts of teletransportation are exactly the 
same in both communities. Both communities are aware of all the relevant 
facts. Neither community has false beliefs about the facts. Both communities 
successfully organize their person-directed practices around those facts. Both 
communities can justify the organization of their person-directed practices in 
terms of these facts. It is just that the Teletransporters take themselves to 
survive teletransportation-they track survival with psychological 
continuity-whilst the Somataphiles do not. The Somataphiles track survival 
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with physical continuity. If, as nearly all practice-independent theorists 
nowadays maintain, there is no further fact of survival, and the only facts 
which are conceptually relevant to determining questions of survival are facts 
served up by nature, what natural facts could there be in this in case to make 
one community right and the other wrong? 
Nor, in this case, does it seem right to say, as non-Humean, practice-
independent theorists such as Parfit or Swinburne would do, that either 
community is rationally reprehensible to care about different relations; 
relations which they take to constitute survival? For, ex hypothesi, neither 
community's preferences are based on cognitive ignorance or error-they 
know exactly what teletransportation involves. Nor are their preferences for 
physical and psychological continuity, respectively, instrumental ones-they 
do not care about these relations as a means to some other end. They just care 
about them. Perhaps the Somataphiles care about physical continuity 
because they just care an awful lot about their body's unique causal history: 
that it is the same body that has been with them through trials and 
tribulations, triumphs and joys, sentimental moments and the like. They just 
wouldn't, for example, be specially or intensely interested in what befell some 
future self with whom they were not physically continuous. Nor would they 
continue to love a person who was not physically continuous with the person 
they loved earlier. Nor do they feel it just to punish a person for a crime 
committed by some earlier person who was not physically continuous with 
the later person. Physical continuity just matters an awful lot to them in 
survival. The Teletransporters on the other hand, don't care much at all 
about physical continuity in survival. They care about psychological 
continuity, irrespective of whether or not strict physical continuity is the 
causal mechanism that furthers their psychology. They would be specially 
and intensely interested in what befell some future self who was not 
physically continuous with them, so long as the future person was 
psychologically continuous with them. And they would continue to love a 
person who was not physically continuous with them, so long as the person 
was psychologically continuous. 
Nor do either of the communities have preferences for devoting their 
lives to collecting bits of string, or anything weird like that. Of course, if the 
Teletransporters had the Somataphiles' beliefs about survival-if they 
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believed that survival required physical continuity-then there might well, 
for the non-Humean, be grounds for calling them irrational. For then we 
would be imagining a society who, whilst fully acknowledging that 
teletransportation resulted in a person's certain death, nonetheless persisted 
in allowing themselves and their loved ones to be teletransported, and in 
regarding teletransportation as a convenient means of travel. But neither the 
Teletransporters or the Somataphiles are such a society: the Teletransporters 
believe that they survive teletransportation, for psychological continuity is 
what survival involves; and the Somataphiles turn down the offer of 
teletransportation precisely because they believe that survival involves 
physical continuity and, in teletransportation, there is no such continuity. 
They both desire to survive (by their own lights), and their cognitive and 
reactive attitudes to people and survival are just like our own, were we to 
have-as, indeed, many amongst us may well have-their respective beliefs 
about survival. In virtue of what, then, could their respective concerns be 
irrational? If there are no further metaphysical facts to make one community 
right and the other wrong to take themselves to survive or not to survive the 
teletransportation procedure, what facts could there be to make one 
community right and the other rationally reprehensible to care deeply and 
non-instrumentally, as they do, about the different relations in survival? 
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Nor would it seem right simply to reply, as Unger and other theorists 
of his ilk would do, that the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles simply, 
though (for those who regard the facts of survival as inclusive justifiers) quite 
acceptably2, mean something different by survival. For the first part, the two 
communities clearly have something important in common. For, although 
they differ about exactly what survival involves, we (and they) nonetheless 
know exactly what it is that they disagree about, and moreover, know that 
they are disagreeing about the same thing: namely, survival, and not where is 
the best place to go for a holiday, or what sort of food is nice to eat. What 
they have in common is the role that survival plays in the vast and rich array 
2some rigidifying practice-independent theorists may be less ecumenical than Unger. 
According to these practice-independent theorists, the two communities mean something 
different by personal identity (in virtue of the fact that different properties play the survival 
role in their person-directed practices and concerns), but only one community means the 
right thing. For these theorists, the challenge simply reappears. For what could make it non-
relatively true that one community rather than the other mean the right thing by survival? 
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of their person-directed practices. Indeed, it is this common role which gives 
point to their debate-which explains why they care one way or another 
about which facts are the facts of survival-in the first place. To say simply 
that the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles mean different things by 
survival is to deny this obvious and significant commonality. As Sydney 
Shoemaker writes of the similar case discussed in chapter 3 of the society who 
organize their person-directed practices around the assumption that the 
brain-state transfer procedure is survival-preserving, there is 
a strong reason for saying that what they mean by personal identity is what 
we mean by it; they call the same things persons, offer the same sorts of 
characterizations of what persons are, and attach the same kinds of social 
consequences to judgements of personal identity-i.e., personal identity has 
with them the same connections with moral responsibility, ownership of 
property, etc., as it does with us.3 
For the second part, the debate between the Teletransporters and the 
Somataphiles is just the personal identity debate between physical continuity 
theorists and psychological continuity theorists in this world writ large and 
practically significant. And few, if any, in the personal identity debate have 
been happy to grant that Parfit and Williams, for example, just mean different 
things by 'survival'. Here, again, the obvious explanation for this is that, 
although the realizer of survival for Parfit and Williams is different (in the 
former case, psychological continuity, in the latter case, physical continuity), 
the role that survival plays in their person-directed practices and concerns is 
the same; and it is the role, not the actual realizer, of survival that is its central 
defining feature. For, although survival has a different extension in their 
respective mouths, both Parfit and Williams, like the Teletransporters and the 
Somataphiles, have a special and intense interest in their own future selves 
and what befalls them; expect to remember directly their own experiences; 
ascribe to themselves and others beliefs, actions, thoughts, feelings, physical 
traits, certain ongoing rights and obligations, and so on. So the concept of 
survival plays the same role in their person-directed practices. It is just that, 
as a contingent matter of fact, they take different relations to instantiate that 
role. 
3shoemaker and Swinburne (1984), pp.109-110. 
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If we take 'survival' to rigidly designate the relation that actually 
realizes the survival role for a community, we cannot explain why we think, 
as we do, that the two communities (like Parfit and Williams) have something 
in common, and that the disagreement between them is genuine 
disagreement about survival; disagreement, moreover, in which much is at 
stake. For, if we identity survival with actual realizer (physical continuity on 
the one hand, psychological continuity on the other) not only can we not 
explain what the two communities have in common, but moreover, it turns 
out that there is no point to their disagreement after all. For they simply 
mean different things. (Here we might well feel the same disquiet as we do 
for the meta-ethical relativist's claim that a community who happily assert 
that 'wanton murder is right' and a community who vehemently assert that 
'wanton murder is not right', might nonetheless yet both be right, for, after 
all, they simply mean different things by 'right'). We need an account of 
survival which allows us to give voice to what the two communities (like 
Parfit and Williams) clearly have in common, as well as about what they 
differ. Where they differ, is with respect to what relation they take to play the 
survival role. What they have in common, as we might put it, is that they 
both care about survival, but where, and only where, 'survival' rigidly 
designates, not actual realizer (for then they do not both care about survival, 
one cares about survival*), but the role that physical continuity and 
psychological continuity, respectively, play in their person-directed practices 
and concerns. 
For the third part, to insist, as Unger and other such rigidifying 
theorists do, that all people everywhere should track survival with the 
particular relation that we (or a limited group of us) now happen to track it 
with is unwarrantedly chauvinistic. (It is a lot akin to insisting that, no matter 
how apparently sophisticated and seemingly 'intelligent' the behaviour of 
other, differently neurophysiologically constituted creatures, only creatures 
with our particular carbon-based, neurophysiological make-up could have 
minds.) For what is so important and interesting about the particular relation 
with which we now happen to identify survival? What is so important about 
that relation that demands that all people, at all times, in all worlds 
(sufficiently similar to ours), organize their person-directed practices and 
concerns around the particular relation that we happen to organize ours now, 
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if they are to mean what we mean by survival? What reason have we to be so 
dogmatically parochial about survival? Unger's answer, of course, is that that 
relation is significant because that is the relation in which we now most 
deeply believe survival to consist; that is the relation which presently 
organizes our deepest beliefs, concerns and values. But, granting that we 
now believe in and care deeply about some particular relation, could we not 
have cared deeply-might we not even actually come to care-about some 
different relation? 
As the Somataphiles most deeply believe, survival necessarily requires 
physical continuity, and so they spurn teletransportation. For them, 
teletransportation is a means only to a quick death. But suppose that, having 
watched the teletransporters happily teletransporting themselves quickly and 
efficiently from place to place, in the process ridding themselves of otherwise 
incurable disease, they come to think that teletransportation carries with it 
considerable advantages: quick, easy, cost-effective, environmentally-friendly 
travel (with no jet lag), practical freedom from disease and eternal life. And 
they come to wish that teletransportation could provide such advantages for 
them too. It is not inconceivable that this higher-order desire might transfer 
to a corresponding change in their brute concerns. After all, no matter how 
'deep' a brute belief or desire, it is rarely immutable. (Ask many a reformed 
smoker!) And so it is by no means impossible that, in the course of time, they 
come rationally to believe that they, like the teletransporters, will survive 
teletransportation; and proceed to organize their person-directed practices 
around that belief. 
But perhaps they were wrong to so change their person-directed 
beliefs and concerns? Perhaps there was good reason to spurn 
teletransportation, despite the considerable benefits it brought once they 
came to believe they survived the process? Perhaps 'survival' is or is (in 
Wiggins's words) "akin to" a natural kind term; and physical continuity the 
privileged natural kind? Perhaps, in so changing their person-directed 
practices, the Somataphiles are now failing to take account of something 
intrinsically very important and interesting about the way the world is? 
Perhaps they are now missing a natural joint? 
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There are, I think, good reasons for thinking that 'survival' is not such 
a natural kind term; for thinking that there is no natural joint in the world 
which serves up survival independently of our interests and concerns, but 
rather a whole host of disparate competing natural candidate properties or 
relations, none of which, in the absence of our person-directed practices, have 
any privileged claim to be the relation of survival. Personal identity4 is, as 
Locke and others have stressed, not a natural, but a social, concept. For, in the 
case of personal identity, unlike the case of water or gold or atomic number, 
the phenomena to be explained are social not natural: they are the vast and 
rich array of person-directed practices. Indicative of the social nature of 
personal identity is the fact that, although we happily defer to scientists to tell 
us about what water is, or what gold is, or what atomic weight is, we do not 
so defer to scientists to tell us about who is the same person. Scientists might 
tell us some brute natural facts about what counts as 'clinically' dead, or what 
are the survival conditions for homo sapiens, but not about personal identity: not 
about who should be held responsible for some past crime, who should be 
attributed certain ongoing rights, entitlements and obligations, whose future 
pains I should anticipate, or whose past actions I should self-ascribe. 
However, the critical point to note here is that, even if 'survival' were 
(as I think not) a natural kind term, then this supports a practice-dependent 
account of survival as well. Here's why. On the standard account of what a 
natural kind is, it is the grouping of things, or natures of things, that figures 
in the best scientific explanation of some phenomenon, that is, the scientific 
explanation with the best explanatory power and completeness. So, for 
example, water is a natural kind (H20) because H10 is the grouping which 
best explains why water boils at one hundred degrees Celsius, freezes at zero 
degrees, rusts certain metals etc. What, then, is the phenomenon to be 
explained in the case of survival? Our person-directed practices. Consider, 
first, the Teletransporters. What is the natural grouping that would figure in 
the best explanation of the person-directed practices of the Teletransporters, 
that is, the explanation with the best explanatory power and completeness? 
41n this context, I am especially unhappy about being forced to use the word 'survival', 
instead of 'personal identity'. For the term 'survival', unlike the term 'personal identity' 
carries with it overwhelmingly natural, not social, connotations-' survival of the fittest', for 
example. So, since nothing hinges on it here, for this paragraph I shall simply use the term 
'personal identity'. 
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Answer: psychological continuity.5 Psychological continuity is the grouping 
which best explains why the teletransporters regard it as true that a person 
survives teletransportation; why they regard it as just that the person who 
emerges from the teletransporter should be attributed whatever ongoing 
rights, obligations and entitlements the person who entered the 
teletransporter had; why they are specially concerned for what will befall the 
person who emerges from the teletransporter; why they regard it as a means 
of quick, cost-effective travel, rather than death; and so on. Other groupings, 
such as physical continuity, cannot explain this well or completely. Indeed, 
positing physical continuity as the explanatory undergirdings of these 
practices, makes the teletransporters appear as a society of mad people. 
Consider, however, the Somataphiles. In this case, physical continuity, not 
psychological continuity, is the grouping which best explains their person-
directed practices. Physical continuity is the grouping that best explains why 
the Somataphiles initially turn down the offer of the teletransportation 
technology; why they regard is not as a means of quick, cost-effective, 
environmentally-friendly travel, but as a means of quick death; why they 
regard it as entirely unjust that new people should inherit the rights, 
obligations and entitlements of old, dead people; and so on. For the case of 
the Somataphiles, psychological continuity does a very bad job of explaining 
their person-directed practices. Indeed, again, this grouping would make 
their person-directed practices close to unintelligible. A view of survival as a 
natural kind concept, then, far from being at odds with pluralism, actually 
supports it. For as the case of the Somataphiles and the Teletransporters 
illustrates, different natural groupings are required to figure in the best causal 
explanation of the respective communities' person-directed practices. This, I 
take it, is what Mark Johnston has in mind when he somewhat obliquely 
writes 
... we need not oppose whatever is true in the doctrine that 'human person' 
is or is "akin to" a natural kind term. The import of ... relativism .. .is that 
there may be several more or less natural kinds available to associate with a 
term like 'human person'. Then our patterns of person-directed concern 
and expectation will be crucial.6 
Ssydney Shoemaker (1984) regards psychological continuity as a functional notion. For him, 
the natural grouping would be whatever more basic natural grouping underpinned 
psychological continuity. 
0Johnston (1989c), p.454. 
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But this will not yet completely answer the natural kinds' theorist who 
thinks that 'survival' rigidly names the particular kind that it names in the 
actual world. For, after all, we might say the exactly the same thing for water. 
On Earth H20 is the natural grouping which best explains why water boils at 
one hundred degrees Celsius, freezes at zero degrees, rusts certain metals etc., 
but on Twin Earth XYZ is the nature of the substance that best explains these 
phenomena. Those who believe that 'water' rigidly names the natural kind 
that it names in the actual world can grant all of this. H20 is the natural kind 
to which exemplars of water belong here on earth, but XYZ is the natural 
kind to which they belong on twin earth. But, they will say, 'water' 
nonetheless means something different in the mouths of people on Earth 
from what it means in the mouths of people on Twin Earth. It means 
something different in virtue of the fact that, although the role water plays is 
the same in both worlds, the chemical configuration which people on Twin 
Earth use the word 'water' to refer to is not the chemical configuration that 
'water' names in the actual world. And since 'water' rigidly names the kind 
that it names in the actual world, despite the fact that XYZ plays exactly the 
same role on Twin Earth as H20 plays on Earth, people on Twin Earth are 
talking about something else. 
There is no doubt that the content of their utterances (like those of the 
Teletransporters and the Somataphiles)is different; and taking a term rigidly 
to designate its actual realizer, rather than role, is, in itself, a perfectly 
acceptable theory of reference. But which, if either, of these alternative 
analyses of meaning-rigidifying on actual realizer or rigidifying on role-is 
right or appropriate, will vary from term to term. No one, for example, even 
those who think that rigidifying on the actual realizer is right for the term 
'water', thinks that such a rigidifying account is also right for terms like 
'food'. For what makes rigidifying on actual realizer attractive in the case of 
'water' is notably absent in the case of 'food'. Just so, I think, what makes this 
rigidifying analysis plausible in the case of 'water', is famously and notably 
absent in the case of 'survival' as well. 
A large part of what makes the rigidifying account attractive in the 
case of water is that exemplars of water have a leading candidate-H20-to 
be the natural kind to which they all belong. This is what makes it plausible 
(for those who think that it is plausible) to think that 'water' is a natural kind 
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term which rigidly names the kind that it names in the actual world. 
Famously, however, in the case of 'survival', after centuries of searching by 
very smart philosophers of all ilks we still have not found anything remotely 
similarly resembling a leading candidate. Rather, there are a whole host of 
disparate and competing candidates in the natural world: bodily continuity, 
continuity of the brain, psychological continuity, psychological continuity 
with continuity of the human brain, psychological continuity without strict 
physical continuity, psychological continuity with a reliable cause ... etc., and 
perhaps others yet uncanvassed. 
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The situation in the case of survival is rather like the following 
situation in the case of water. Imagine that the stuff which actually filled the 
oceans, fell from the sky, ran from taps, was colourless, odourless, good for 
drinking etc. was a mixed, disjunctive bag of natural properties, H20 or XYZ 
or QRS or ABC and numerous other chemical properties regularly being 
newly discovered. If this were the case, it would be far less plausible, indeed 
extremely implausible, to maintain that 'water' names in all worlds the messy, 
non-principled disjunction of properties that play the role in the actual world. 
For, in this case, 'water' names no interesting principled natural joint, but a 
gerrymandered disjunction. In this case, then, I think, we would not say that 
'water' named the long, messy, disparate disjunction of H20 or XYZ or QRS 
or ABC. .. in all worlds. Nor, I think, would we embrace an error theory. We 
would say, rather, that 'water' names whatever stuff it is that plays the water 
role. We would give up on the idea that 'water' was a natural kind term 
rigidly to be identified with the long, messy disjunction of properties which 
actually played the water role, and instead treat 'water' as a functional term, 
in just the same way as we presently treat terms like 'food'. When asked to 
define 'food', for example, we do not say that food is apples, or oranges, or 
sausage rolls, or lettuces, or roast chicken, or biscuits, or bread, and the rest of 
the very long disjunction of materials that beings are disposed to eat when 
hungry to sustain themselves. Nor, for shorthand, do we even say that food 
is the carbon-based stuff which realizes the food role in the actual world. For 
go to a world in which beings who are differently physiologically constructed 
are disposed to eat silicon-based material when hungry to sustain themselves, 
and that material surely counts as food just as well. 'Food' rigidly refers, not 
to the messy, gerrymandered bunch of actual and possible, natural (and non-
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natural!) properties that play the food role, but to the common role that this 
messy group of stuffs play. The more disparate, disjunctive and seemingly 
gerrymandered the natural properties to which a term refers in the actual 
world, the less plausible it is to think that the term rigidly names in all worlds 
the properties that it names in the actual world. 
Just so, the fact that a significantly large, messy disjunction of 
properties (including newly discovered ones, such as Unger's) play the 
survival role in the actual world makes it far less plausible, indeed extremely 
implausible, to continue to think that 'survival' rigidly names "some 
scientifically palpable real essence, some nature that is presupposed to a 
kind' s being nomologically founded, which not only underlies in fact but also 
must underlie the kind person [and persons' survival over time]".7 Given the 
absence of a leading candidate to be the natural kind to which exemplars of 
survival in the actual world all belong, it is much more plausible to think that 
the term 'survival', like 'food', names the functional role that the disjuncts 
play in our person-directed practices and concerns, not the messy, 
gerrymandered bunch of relations that actually play the role for us. 
However, all this may still not yet convince some particularly die-hard 
rigidifiers. In desperation, these theorists might maintain that the apparent 
absence of a leading candidate in the case of survival is just that, merely 
apparent. According to these philosophers, the fact that we have not yet 
uncovered the leading candidate to be the natural kind to which exemplars of 
survival belong is not because there is no such leading candidate to be 
uncovered, it is because we haven't yet been sufficiently clever to discover it. 
We have not yet discovered the hidden natural unity beneath the facade of 
apparent disorder. To return to our scientific analogy, it is because we have 
not yet sufficiently fine-tuned our intuitive microscopes. 
But this reply really is clutching at straws. For we know all about 
what the phenomena to be explained are. And we know all about physical 
continuity, psychological continuity and the various other competing natural 
candidates; candidates which, as we have seen, do an excellent job of 
explaining the phenomena. What reason, then, to posit some mystical hidden 
7Wiggins (1980), p.170. 
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natural essence (a haecceity or some such thing) which all these exemplars 
share? To insist on positing such a hidden essence is to render natural kinds 
utterly mysterious. As the case of Teletransporters and the Somataphiles 
illustrates, such unity as these exemplars of survival have, surely derives 
from the common role they play in our person-directed practices. Just as 
functional architecture not realizer is what is interesting as regards minds, so 
it is role not realizer that is the interesting and significant semantic feature in 
the case of 'survival'. 
4.3 A different presentation of the challenge? 
Mark Johnston offers the case of the Teletransporters and the Human Beings 
(my Somataphiles) in similarly arguing for a sort of practice-dependent 
account of survival (exactly what sort, we will discuss in chapter 6). 
However, Johnston makes different use of this case in presenting the 
challenge to practice-independent theorists. There is a reason why I have 
chosen not to follow Johnston here. 
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Johnston's argument runs as follows. As nearly all practice-
independent theorists (Johnston calls them 'absolutists') nowadays will 
happily grants, any plausible candidate relation for survival (i.e. physical 
and/ or psychological continuity and connectedness) will admit of 
indeterminate cases: cases where, even though we know everything there is 
to know about the facts of some process p, the question 'does a person 
survive process, p?' has no determinate 'yes' or 'no' answer. Suppose we 
regard such vague cases as standard cases of semantic indeterminacy: where 
the indeterminacy is then to be explained, not by vagueness in the world, or 
lack of knowledge about the facts of the case, but by vagueness in the term 
'survives'. Suppose that there are ten different but acceptable ways of 
precisifying or sharpening the vague predicate 'survives': survives1, 
survives2, survives3 ... survives10. According to the super-valuationist analysis 
Scartesian Dualists will not, of course, grant this premiss. For Cartesians, personal identity 
consists in the continued existence of the same soul, and the continued existence of the soul 
does not admit of degree or indeterminacy. There are many and famous independent 
arguments against the Cartesian view and few practice-independent theorists nowadays are 
explicitly Cartesian. In any case, the view I shall advocate is perfectly compatible with 
survival (contingently) consisting in the continued existence of the same soul, in a world 
where there are such immaterial entities. My disagreement is with practice-independence, 
the meta-theory, not with object-level views. 
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of indeterminacy, the statement 'X survives p' is super- or determinately true 
just in case, on all ten precisifications of 'survives', the predicate 'survives' 
applies; the statement 'X survives p' is determinately or super-false, just in 
case none of the ten precisifications of the predicate 'survives1 apply; and the 
statement 'X survives p' is indeterminate just in case some of the 
precisifications of 'survives1 (say, survives1 to survivess) apply, and some of 
the precisifications of the vague term 'survives' (say survives6 to survives10) 
do not. 
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It is, Johnston claims, if not actually the case, then certainly 
epistemically possible, that teletransportation be such an indeterminate case 
or process relative to our (or some) concept of survival i.e. a case where the 
concept of survival or survival neither determinately applies nor 
determinately fails to apply. So we can imagine a community, the ur-
community, according to whose concept of survival teletransportation counts 
as an indeterminate case. Assuming a super-valuationist analysis of such 
semantic indeterminacy, there will be some acceptable ways of precisifying 
the term 'survives1 (survives1 to survivess) according to which it comes out 
determinately true that a person survives teletransportation, and other 
acceptable ways of precisifying the term 'survives' (say, survives6 to 
survives10) according to which it will be determinately false that a person 
survives teletransportation. So we can imagine two communities who have 
simply internalized two different sharpenings of the ur-community's vague 
concept, both of which, from the point of view of the ur-community, are 
equally acceptable ways of going. One community, the Teletransporters, 
have internalized a sharpening (say, survives1) according to which a person 
determinately survives teletransportation. The other community, the Human 
Beings, have internalized a different, though equally acceptable, sharpening 
of the concept, (say, survives6) according to which a person determinately 
fails to survive teletransportation. (Super-valuation then gives us a way of 
charting the range of acceptable sharpenings of the concept, the range, that is, 
of acceptable alternative concepts of survival.9) 
9This is one way of understanding what Johnston's 'Protean person' is, discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6. The substance sortal Protean person is the sum of actual and possible 
cryptophase kinds, the boundaries of which are set by the range of possible acceptable 
sharpenings of the concept of personal identity. 
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As most practice-independent theorists should grant, given the 
indeterminacy and a super-valuationist view thereof, either precisification is 
an equally acceptable sharpening. So the practice-independent theorist must 
admit that the two communities have equally acceptable concepts of survival. 
As Johnston writes, 
What most badly damages the absolutist cause is the historical discovery 
that the Teletransporters and the Human Beings had simply internalized 
different stipulations about Teletransportation, stipulations which from the 
point of view of the ur-community and its concept of personal identity were 
equally acceptable ways of going-equally acceptable precisifications. The 
Human Beings find it hard to believe that the accidents of conceptual 
history happened decisively to favour only them. And when they try, on 
the assumption that they are victims of conceptual history and have an 
erroneous concept of personal identity, they are at a loss as to how to 
discover what the error is. But then they see that the Teletransporters are in 
a parallel situation-plausibly taken as neither correct by absolutist 
standards nor incorrect by weaker standards. So certain relativists urge that 
the Teletransporters are just blamelessly different...10 
But exactly how is this supposed to be an argument against practice-
independent theorists or, as Johnston calls them (rather misleadingly, in my 
view, since it suggests that the alternative view is relativism), 'absolutists'? 
How is the fact that their precise concept of survival can be reconstrued as 
just one of a number of possible, acceptable sharpenings of a vague concept 
supposed to undermine their commitment to their precise concept? 
Johnston's answer is that it shows that their particular, precise concept is 
completely arbitrary. They might just as well, but for a twist of conceptual 
fate, have internalized some other sharpening. And, recognizing that there 
but for the grace of a conceptual god go they, ought to conclude first, that 
people who internalize a different sharpening are just blamelessly different, 
and second, that they have no good reason (at least, no good reason 
stemming from considerations of survival) not to go that way themselves. 
However, it is hard to see how, as it stands, this argument will carry 
much force with practice-independent theorists. For the first part, note that 
we could run exactly the same strategic argument for any of our concepts. 
Are we then to conclude that all of our concepts are arbitrary, so that we have 
lOJohnston (1989c), p. 456. 
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no good reason to be committed to any of them? For example, we could tell 
the following story about gold. Imagine a community, the ur-community, 
according to whose concept of gold, what we call 'fools gold' counts as an 
indeterminate case: the predicate 'is gold' neither determinately applies, nor 
determinately fails to apply to the stuff we call 'fools gold'. So we can 
imagine two communities, A and B, living in worlds in all physical respects 
just like our own, who have simply internalized different sharpenings of 
'gold', both of which, from the point of view of the ur-community, are 
equally acceptable ways of going-equally acceptable precisifications. 
According to community A, the predicate 'is gold' determinately applies to 
the stuff we call 'fools gold'; according to community B the predicate 'is gold' 
determinately fails to apply to the stuff we call 'fools gold'. Given the 
indeterminacy, either precisification is equally acceptable, so we ought to 
conclude that the two communities are just blamelessly different-they have 
equally acceptable conceptual schemes. That is to say, we ought to conclude 
that practice-dependence is the right meta-account for gold. We could tell a 
similar story for atomic number too. Imagine a community, the ur-
community, who are organizing the periodic table. They are organizing it in 
accordance with 'atomic number', however their concept of 'atomic number' 
is vague between what we call 'atomic number' and 'atomic weight'. So we 
can imagine two communities, living in worlds just like our own, who have 
simply internalized two different sharpenings of 'atomic number'-
sharpenings which, from the point of view of the ur-community and their 
vague concept, are equally acceptable precisifications. One community, 
community A, have internalized a sharpening according to which 'atomic 
number' determinately means 'number of protons'. According to the other 
community, community B, 'atomic number' determinately means 'number of 
protons and neutrons' (our 'atomic weight'). Given the indeterminacy, either 
precisification is an equally acceptable way of going, so we ought to conclude 
that it is just as right for chemistry to organize the periodic table according to 
atomic weight. And that, moreover, we have no good reason for not 
organizing our periodic table according to atomic weight. That is to say, we 
ought to conclude that the atomic number of atoms is practice-dependent. 
And, having seen how the strategy goes, we can imagine many more similar 
examples (reductios!). 
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For the second part, Johnston's argument will carry no weight with 
those practice-independent theorists who regard the our concept of survival 
as essentially vague with respect to teletransportation. These theorists will 
grant Johnston's premiss-they will grant that given the indeterminacy there 
are a range of possible acceptable sharpenings-but they will deny that the 
concept of survival to which any one of these sharpenings gives rise are 
equally acceptable concepts of survival. For, the concept of survival is vague, 
not precise; and even though there are equally acceptable sharpenings, it is 
not true that any particular sharpening is acceptable. 
For the third part, as it stands, Johnston's argument will not convince 
even those practice-independent theorists who think that the concept of 
survival is precise. For these theorists, as we have already seen, will just 
deny that it is arbitrary and unfounded to go one way rather than the other. 
'Real essence' theorists, for example, will claim that we have good reason to 
employ the precise concept of survival that the theorist in question claims we 
do-it is not true that either precisification, employed as a concrete concept, 
is equally acceptable. For this precisification, and not the other, latches onto 
the intrinsically interesting and important facts of survival in the world. For 
these theorists, recall, the semantics of survival tracks (or ought to track) the 
independently determined metaphysics of the matter. From the point of view 
of these theorists, Johnston's argument will be akin to saying that we might 
just have well have employed a conceptual scheme that grouped elements in 
accordance with their atomic weight rather than atomic number. And, to 
group things in this way, they argue, would be to miss something very 
intrinsically important and interesting about the way the world is. We need a 
different sort of argument to show such 'real essence' theorists that, in the 
case of survival, there is no such intrinsically interesting and important 
natural kind; argument which, I hope, I have already provided. 
Nor will Johnston's argument carry much weight with rigidifying 
theorists, such as Unger. For, as we have already seen, these theorists will 
reply that our precise concept is far from arbitrary, for that sharpening-in 
Unger's case, physical continuity-and not some other possible sharpening, 
captures the relation that we care about. That sharpening, and not some 
other possible sharpening, is the relation that organizes our deepest beliefs, 
concerns and values. That is the principled reason we have for internalizing 
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that sharpening rather some other, and that is what makes our commitment 
to that sharpening entirely non-arbitrary. Moreover, a practice-dependent 
theorist such as Johnston himself, ought to find this a pretty compelling line 
of reply. 
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The objection to practice-independent accounts of survival in all their 
various possible object-level forms, is not that they are arbitrary. For they are 
not. The Somataphiles have pretty compelling reason, by their present lights, 
for not going the way of the Teletransporters, for teletransportation fails to 
preserve the relation that they care about in survival. Likewise, by their 
lights, the Teletransporters have good reason for not going the way of the 
Somataphiles, for teletransportation does preserve everything that they care 
about in survival. The objection to practice-independent accounts of survival 
is not, then that they arbitrary, but rather that, in claiming that 'survival' 
rigidly designates actual realizer, rather than role, they misconstrue the 
nature of survival. 'Survival' rigidly names not a natural, but a social or 
functional kind-a kind determined by subjects' person-directed practices 
and concerns, not by facts served up by nature. 
In any case, as we have seen, the presentation of the challenge to 
practice-independent theorists need not, and, I think, should not, go 
Johnston's way. Some might think this comes at a cost. For Johnston's 
presentation, it might be thought, has an advantage over mine in that, in 
going by way of indeterminacy, something many practice-independent 
theorists are happy to grant, it grants more up front to practice-independent 
theorists and so may prove more congenial. However, Johnston's 
presentation relies on an argument that will, I suspect, convince very few 
practice-independent theorists. And, indeed, my presentation of the 
challenge shares a widely-held practice-independent premiss too-namely, 
that it is a requirement on an adequate account of survival that it explain and 
render intelligible our person-directed practices and concerns. As the case of 
the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles illustrates, practice-independent 
accounts of survival, which rigidly identify 'survival' with actual realizer, not 
role, fall foul of this requirement. 
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4.4 The lesson of the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles 
To sum up. The case of the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles seems to 
me to vividly illustrate two, related things. The first is that, and as against the 
'no-further-question' view, there is indeed the following (meta-) question to 
be asked, and indeed, answered, for the case of survival: in virtue of what 
does some relation count as the relation of survival? The case of the 
Teletransporters and the Somataphiles gives us good reason to doubt that 
practice-independence is the right answer to this question. For facts served 
up by nature leave the concept of survival crucially underdetermined. There 
are just too many relations served up by nature which are candidates for 
being the relation of survival. And, in the absence of a community's person-
directed practices, attitudes, beliefs, and concerns, there just seems no 
principled way of choosing among them. 
But the case of the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles also vividly 
illustrates how, on practice-independent analyses, the concept of survival can 
come apart from what, inter alia, a community cares about in survival. 
Physical continuity practice-independent theorists, for example, insist that 
since a person's survival necessarily involves physical continuity a 
community like the Teletransporters are simply mistaken to believe that they 
survive teletransportation and to organize their person-directed practices and 
concerns around this false belief. But the Teletransporters happen not to care 
about physical continuity. From their point of view, if survival requires 
physical continuity, then survival is not something they care about. If that's 
what survival necessarily involves, they are indifferent as to whether they, 
their loved ones and other members of their community live or die. 
But this seems fundamentally wrong. The intuition that whatever 
survival is, it is something that we care about, seems a particularly central 
one. (Witness the many and varied attempts to save it in the face of Parfit's 
perceived challenge). The thought that we might be indifferent as to whether 
we live or die-that the concept of survival might be utterly inert as regards 
our person-directed practices and concerns-seems absolutely absurd. To 
maintain, as practice-independent theorists do, that the Teletransporters or 
the Somataphiles have the wrong concept of survival, or mean something 
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different by the survival, or do not have a concept of survival at all, in virtue 
of the fact that the relation which they care deeply about and take to 
constitute the concept of survival is not whatever relation it is that the 
particular practice-independent theorist in question take to be the relation of 
survival, is to make survival just such a potentially motivationally anaemic 
and inert notion. And whatever survival is, it is certainly neither anaemic nor 
inert. It plays a rich an integral role in our person-directed practices and 
concerns. An account of survival which so leaves it open that survival might 
turn out to consist in some relation that made us indifferent as to whether we, 
our loved ones, and other members of our community continued to live or 
die, would not only, as practice-independent theorists themselves admit, be 
inadequate, it would not be an account of the relation of survival. It would be 
an account of some other relation. (That is why the thought that physical 
continuity might count as the relation of survival for the Teletransporters 
strikes us as completely wrongheaded). And the only way to ensure that 
survival turns out to be something that a community cares about in the way 
which is definitive of our caring about survival is to incorporate our special 
concern for survival, and the rich role it plays in our practices, as an essential 
feature of the concept, and not something merely accidentally or contingently 
associated with it. 
It is to developing such an account that I now turn. 
5 
A PLURALIST ACCOUNT OF SURVIVAL 
The central lesson of the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles is that 
practice-dependence is the right meta-account of survival. There is no 
meta-fact served up by nature or God that independently demands that 
one socially enactable relation rather than another must determine the 
extension of survival, if we are not to fail to latch onto something 
intrinsically important about the way the world is. Which socially 
workable relation we use to determine our survival conditions is up to us, 
in particular, to the way in which we organize our person-directed 
practices and concerns. Relations in the world earn their right to count as 
the relation of survival for members of a community in virtue of the fact 
that those are the relations around which members of the community 
organize their person-directed practices and concerns. And since different 
communities might, neither in metaphysical nor motivational error, 
organize their person-directed practices and concerns around different 
relations, survival is multiply realizable. Survival for a Teletransporter-
person involves psychological continuity, whilst survival for a member of 
the Somataphile community requires physical continuity. We have no 
reason, then, metaphysical or rational, to be chauvinistic about survival, in 
the way in which practice-independent theories of survival are 
cha u vinistic.1 
What impact will the truth of practice-dependence have on our 
object-level account of survival? What views about the properties of 
person-stages, in virtue of which different person-stages count as stages of 
a surviving person, will a practice-dependent meta-view yield? As we 
saw earlier, when discussing the case of value concepts in chapter 1, the 
practice-dependent theorist has two broad options at the object-level. 
Recall, the question then was whether or not the practice-dependent 
theorist (who thinks that what makes some properties of acts count as 
good depends on whether or not subjects in appropriate conditions are 
disposed to approve of them) will agree with the utilitarian about the 
1 There is, of course, a sense in which a practice-dependent account of survival is 
chauvinistic. It takes the reference of survival to be fixed by the role that survival plays 
for us. But we are, after all, concerned to analyse our concept of survival. 
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answer to the object-level question of what properties of acts are good, in 
circumstances where it turns out that all and only those acts which 
subjects are disposed to approve of are those which have the property of 
maximising happiness. Our answer then was that they may or may not, 
depending on which one of two more precise object-level views the 
practice-dependent theorist chooses to take: either they may 
(contingently) identify good with the particular property that the 
particular group of subjects in ideal conditions happen to approve of (in 
this case, maximising happiness), or they may identify it with a second-
order property viz. the property of being a property that subjects in ideal 
conditions approve of. If the practice-dependent theorist takes the first, 
first-order, option, they will agree with the utilitarian about what property 
it is in virtue of which acts count as good (although, of course, they will 
disagree about the modal status of the property: utilitarians will identify 
good with maximising happiness necessarily, whereas practice-dependent 
theorists will identify good with the property of maximizing happiness 
only contingently). If, however, the practice-dependent theorist takes the 
second option, and views good as the second-order property, they will 
disagree completely with the utilitarian about the answer to this object-
level question, as well as about the answer to the meta-question. 
Practice-dependence about survival-the meta-view that what 
makes some relation count as the relation of survival is, not facts served 
up by nature, but rather that those are the facts around which subjects 
organize their person-directed practices-is itself agnostic as between 
these two sorts of object-level views. It tells us that two person-stages 
earn their right to count as stages of the same surviving person only in 
virtue of the fact that some relation which plays the survival role holds 
between those two stages. But practice-dependence does not tell us 
whether that relation is survival, or whether survival is a property of that 
relation. Practice-dependence tells us that survival is whatever relation 
between person-stages plays the survival role in the person-directed 
practices of the community involved, but it does not tell us whether that 
community's survival conditions-the truth conditions for survival 
claims-are given by the relation that organizes subjects' person-directed 
practices or by a higher-order property which that relation has viz., it 
being a relation which has the property of realizing the survival role. 
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I am more certain that practice-dependence is right for the case of 
survival than I am of exactly which of these two corresponding object-
level analyses is right. Nonetheless, as I see it, there is at least some 
reason for preferring the first sort of view to the second. Before discussing 
these in more detail, however, let me sketch the two options. 
5.1 Survival as a first-order property 
If we view survival as a first-order property, as I shall advocate we do, we 
shall offer something like the following as an analysis of survival: 
'A person-stage X at an earlier time survives as a person-stage Y at a later 
time' as uttered by us2 is true iff 
(i) there is some property or set of properties p which X consistently 
organizes X's person-directed practices around, and 
(ii) X and Y share p. 
(i) is a conceptual claim about the conceptual dependence and 
interdependence of the concept of personal identity on concepts of 
subjects' person-directed practices and concerns. And, as it stands, it is 
non-reductive. But, if we are reductively minded, we also want to know 
what property, as a matter of fact, pis. So add to our conceptual claim, 
the second substantive claim, (ii), that X and Y share p. Though the 
conceptual claim is non-reductive, then, the substantive claim means that 
the analysis as a whole is thoroughly reductive. Survival is whatever 
property it is that causes subjects, consistently, and without involvement in 
empirical error, to organize their person-directed practices around the assumption 
that X survives as Y. Whereas (i) enshrines the lesson of the 
Teletransporters and the Somataphiles in the form of a conceptual claim-
that survival is that relation, whatever it is, which plays the survival role 
in the person-directed practices and concerns of the community 
involved-(ii) is an a posteriori claim about what relation it is which in fact 
realizes that role for a given subject or community. 
A first point to note about this analysis, then, is that (like the 
accounts of water and mental states I considered in Chapter 2) it proceeds 
in two stages. The first stage consists in a priori conceptual analysis to fix 
2Where 'us' refers to subjects or groups of subjects who share common person-directed 
practices. So 'A person survives teletransportation' is true in the mouths of the 
Teletransporters, demarcated by their common person-directed practices, but false in the 
mouths of the Somataphiles, defined in terms of their shared person-directed practices. 
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the role that the concept of survival plays in our network of person-
directed practices; to tease out the conceptual connections between the 
concept of survival, and concepts of punishment, self-concern, self-
ascription, identification and reidentification, moral responsibility, legal 
entitlement, memory, intention, reactive attitudes such as continuing love 
for a particular person over time, and so on. Some of these principles we 
may be able to make explicit just by reflecting on our everyday person-
directed practices and the actual cases which hone them and noting the 
connections among them. But, more often than not, these reflections will 
involve thinking about what we would say of certain counter-factual 
situations. Here, thought experiments will have an important role to play. 
If we want to find out about the conceptual connections between 
punishment and survival, for example, (to simplify matters for the 
moment, supposing that we are deontologists about punishment) we 
might pose ourselves the following sort of thought experiment. Imagine 
two identical twins, X and Y, who are extraordinarily similar in physical 
and psychological make-up and background. X commits a crime, but 
manages to elude capture. Y is captured in his place. Should Y be 
punished for the crime? Intuitively, we answer 'no'. This tells us 
something about the connections between our concepts of survival and 
punishment: it tells us that, ceterus paribus, we do not believe that a person 
who is not the same person as the person who committed a past crime 
should be punished for it. If we further ask ourselves-should X be 
punished for the crime when captured?-and we answer 'yes', then this 
tells us that we think a person should be punished for a crime only when, 
ceterus paribus, they are the same person as the person who committed the 
crime. (And we can design further thought experiments to tell us about 
what the ceterus paribus clause includes. For example, suppose that an evil 
neuro-surgeon had wired up X to a machine which caused X to commit 
the crime against his will, should X then be held responsible and punished 
for the crime?). Similar sorts of thought experiments will tell us about the 
connection between survival and the many other concepts with which it is 
connected. For example, the following thought experiment, mentioned 
earlier, tells us about the connection between survival and anticipatory 
concern. Imagine that your child is to undergo a root canal operation 
tomorrow without anaesthetic would you anticipate your child's future 
pain? If we answer 'no', as I suspect we will, then this tells us that we do 
not anticipate the pain of another person, in this case our child. Imagine 
that we ourselves are to undergo the painful operation, and we do say 
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that we would anticipate the pain. In combination with the first case, this 
tells us that we anticipate a future person's pain when, and only when, 
ceterus paribus, that future person is (a survivor of) us. Parfit's case of 
fission is another thought experiment of this sort. It shows us something 
about the connections between the concept of survival and the concept of 
self-concern; and, if Parfit is right about our intuitive reactions to this 
case-if he is right in thinking that we believe that the correct description 
of the case is that the original person ceases to exist, but that it would be 
irrational of us, were we the original person in the case, to be concerned 
about the impending fission in the same way in which we would be 
fearful about our impending death-what it shows us is that identity 
(where, for Parfit, that means simply uniqueness) and self-concern are not 
as closely connected as we might have thought. Similarly, if we wanted to 
elicit the conceptual connections between survival and memory we could 
consider the following case: suppose you have vivid memories of strolling 
around the Miro museum in Barcelona, are you the same person as the 
person who strolled around the Miro museum in Barcelona? If we say 
'yes', as I suspect we will, this tells us that we believe that, ceterus paribus, 
if we remember some experience we are the same person as the person 
who had that experience. (The ceterus paribus clause here includes such 
things as the memories not having been implanted by an interfering 
neuro-surgeon, not being hallucinations etc). And so on and so forth for 
the manifold connections between survival and other concepts. 
From thought experiments like these, emerge the following sorts of 
platitudes about the connection between survival and other of our 
concepts: 'if a person today looks the same as a person yesterday then, 
normally, they are the same person as the person yesterday'; 'if a person 
today remembers doing the things that a person three days ago did then, 
normally, that person today is the same person as the person who did 
those things three days ago'; 'it is just to punish a person for a crime 
committed by some past person when and only when, ceterus paribus, that 
person is the same person as the person who committed the crime'; 
'normally, I will be specially and directly concerned about my going to the 
dentist tomorrow in a way which I would not be about someone else 
going to the dentist tomorrow'; 'normally, if I love a particular person 
today, then I will love that same person tomorrow'; and so on almost ad 
infinitum. The conjunction of everyday, platitudinous principles like these 
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fix the role that the concept of survival plays in our person-directed 
practices. 
To say that these principles are platitudinous is not, of course, to 
say that subjects, even those who are perfectly competent users of the 
concept, must be able to reel them off explicitly upon demand. For these 
principles are, for the most part, embedded implicitly or unself-
consciously in our person-directed practices. To assemble these 
principles, and to make them explicit, informed and consistent is the job of 
the conceptual analyst, not of those who go about habitually and 
unproblematically employing the concept of survival in their day to day 
lives. Nevertheless, since these principles are supposed to be implicit in 
our practice, we would hope that these are principles that competent, 
informed and consistent users of the concept of survival would assent to 
when explicitly presented them. What these principles aim to articulate, 
then, are the inferential and judgemental dispositions of those who 
employ the concept. To possess and competently use the concept of 
survival is just to be disposed to make the kinds of judgements and 
inferences mentioned above. So that someone who systematically failed 
to be disposed to make these kinds of inferences would not, we would 
say, have mastery of the concept of survival. Someone who was 
systematically disposed to utter enough things of the following sort-'I 
believe that I shall surely be tortured tomorrow, but I see no reason to be 
specially worried about it'-would not have mastery of the concept of 
survival. 
Of course, not all subjects, even when well-informed and 
consistent, will assent to all of the same platitudes about survival. Parfit, 
for example, would not agree with the widely held platitude that, 
normally, I should care specially and directly for some future person 
when and only when that future person will be identical with me. Recall, 
according to Parfit, what we should care about in our future-oriented self-
concern are relations of psychological continuity and connectedness, not 
identity; and we should care about those relations even where, as in 
ordinary, everyday life, they happen to coincide with identity. And many 
consequentialists would not assent to the platitudes linking the concept of 
personal identity with ethical concepts of punishment, moral 
responsibility, attributions of ongoing rights and obligations, and so on. 
For, crudely, according to consequentialists, whether or not a person now 
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ought to be punished for some past crime depends, not upon whether the 
person now is the same person as the past person who committed the 
crime, but upon whether or not punishing the later person will have the 
best all-things-considered consequences. Of course, this is not to say that 
consequentialists will not have reason to employ the concept of survival in 
the context of punishment, for it may well be the case that punishing 
someone when and only when they are the same person as the person 
who committed the crime is the course of action which happens to yield 
the best consequences. But, for consequentialists, this principle, where it 
is an appropriate principle of punishment at all, will have contingent, not 
absolute or deontic, status. 
Nor will all subjects assign all and every platitude equal weight or 
importance. For example, most of us assign very little importance to 
platitudes of the sort: 'if someone owns a car today, typically, they will 
own the same car tomorrow', or, 'if someone has a particular haircut 
today, typically, they will have the same haircut tomorrow'. In contrast, 
we assign much greater weight to the platitudes about punishment, legal 
entitlement, moral responsibility, memory, self-concern, bodily continuity 
and the like. Moreover, even among the platitudes which most of us 
assign greater importance, there will be some variation in weighting. For 
example, physical continuity theorists such as Williams, Wiggins, Nagel 
and Unger (like the Somataphiles), will presumably assign greater weight 
to those platitudes involving physical continuity (for example, 'if someone 
has the same body /brain/ sufficiently continuous physical realizer then, 
normally, they are the same person) than they will to those platitudes 
involving psychological continuity (for example, 'if someone remembers 
doing something earlier, then, normally, they are the same person as the 
person who did that thing'). Whilst psychological continuity theorists 
(like the T eletransporters), on the other hand, will assign less weight to 
those platitudes involving physical continuity and more to those 
involving psychological continuity. 
However, survival, on this way of thinking, is a cluster concept. 
And what is important if people are to have the same concept of survival 
(or, indeed, to have a concept of survival at all), is that they share enough 
of the cluster: that they are disposed to make enough of the inferences and 
judgements regarding survival captured (for a very small part) in the 
aforementioned kinds of platitudes about survival. Exactly how much 
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counts as enough is, of course, going to be a vague matter, depending on 
exactly how we weight the various platitudes, and how many and how 
important we take the missing platitudes to be.3 But all those involved in 
the personal identity debate in this world clearly share enough of the 
cluster. For, though they disagree about what relations survival picks out, 
they nonetheless understand what it is they are disagreeing about, and , 
know that they are disagreeing about the same thing. The obvious 
explanation for this is that the role that survival plays in their person-
directed concerns is sufficiently similar. They share enough of the cluster 
of person-directed practices. What they disagree about is the relative 
importance or ranking of various of these platitudes. 
This first stage of conceptual analysis-of teasing out the 
connections between survival and our person-directed practices, such as 
blame, punishment, self-concern etc.-by fixing the reference of survival, 
puts us in a position to answer the second, substantive question of what 
property or relation in fact underpins subjects' person-directed practices. 
It puts us in a position to answer, that is, the object-level question of what 
property or relation constitutes survival for them. But conceptual analysis 
alone will not answer this second question for us. For, to spell out the role 
that the concept of survival plays in our person-directed practices, is not 
yet to say anything substantial about what property or relations satisfy or 
instantiate that role. Merely teasing out the connections between our 
concept of survival and other concepts tells us very little about what 
relation as a matter of fact plays or realizes that role. It tells us very little 
about what property or properties make these principles come out true for 
a given subject or group of subjects. So we need a second stage of 
analysis: a posteriori investigation to discover what property or set of 
properties as a matter of fact cause members of a community to organize 
their person-directed practices around the assumption that X survives as 
3Richard Swinburne, for example, claims that, if survival turns out not to consist in the 
continued existence of the same soul, he will cease to care about personal identity: he 
will be indifferent as to whether he lives or dies. Leaving aside doubts about the 
psychological plausibility of Swinburne's claim, if Swinburne, true to his word, really 
did cease to care about survival-about what befell him, his loved ones and everyone 
else-would he still have a concept of survival? The answer to this question depends on 
how central we take the platitude connecting survival to self-concern to be to survival. If 
we take it to be extremely important we may think that he no longer has a concept of 
survival; if we think it less important we may think he still has enough of the cluster to 
count as possessing a survival concept; or we may think it simply vague. 
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Y. And then, on this first-order view, that property or relation counts as 
the relation of survival for them. 
In order for a relation to be properly said to play the survival role 
for a community (and so to constitute survival for members of that 
community) the connection between the relation and the person-directed 
practices cannot be merely accidental. The organization of a community's 
person-directed practices around a particular relation among person-
stages must be counter-factually resilient in order for that relation to be 
said to constitute survival for members of that community. That is to say, 
members of the community must be disposed to organize their person-
directed practices around that relation among person-stages, rather than 
any other, in counter-factual situations where they come apart. For 
example, for an immaterial entity to be properly said to play the survival 
role for members of a particular community (and so to constitute survival 
for members of that community) it has to be the case that members of that 
community would organize their person-directed practices around 
sameness of immaterial entity, rather than some other relation such as 
physical continuity or psychological continuity, were sameness of 
immaterial entity to happen not to coincide with relations of physical or 
psychological continuity among person-stages. In counter-factual 
situations where sameness of immaterial entity comes apart from relations 
of physical or psychological continuity among person-stages, members of 
a community must be disposed, for example, to hold the later person who 
possesses the same immaterial entity as an earlier person who did some 
deed responsible for the doing of that deed, not the later person who is 
physically or psychologically continuous with that earlier person. And . 
similarly for enough of the rest of the person-directed practices. Likewise, 
in order for physical continuity to be properly said to play the survival 
role for members of a community (and so to constitute survival for them) 
it has to be the case that the person-directed practices of that community 
systematically covary with physical continuity, rather than some other 
relation. And so on for any other candidate survival relation. Where 
there is not such counter-factual dependence or systematic covariation 
between the organization of a community's person-directed practices and 
a particular relation, then that relation does not play the survival role for 
that community. 
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There are a number of complementary ways of going about the a 
posteriori task of discovering what relation plays the survival role for 
members of a particular community, and so constitutes survival for 
members of that community. We could, for example, simply sit and back 
and observe (a la the anthropologist or sociologist) the way in which a 
subject or group of subjects organize their person-directed practices. The 
conceptual work done at the first stage of the analysis enables us to get a 
fix on what sort of property we are looking for. The conceptual work tells 
us that survival for members of a community will be the relation 
(whatever it is) in accordance with which members of that community 
punish later people for earlier people's crimes; in accordance with which 
earlier people anticipate the experiences of future people; in accordance 
with which they expect to remember experiences had by an earlier person; 
and so on. So, we might note, for example, that all and only those people 
that that group of subjects punish are people who are, say, strongly 
psychologically connected to the person who had earlier committed the 
crime. Similarly, we might note that subjects invariably anticipated the 
future experiences of persons who were strongly psychologically 
connected to them, but did not anticipate those future experiences 
otherwise. So then, we would initially and tentatively conclude that 
strong psychological connectedness was the survival relation for them. 
We would initially conclude so only tentatively, because we must also 
look to the world (a la scientists) to see that there is in fact such a 
property. Upon discovering that there is such a property, and upon 
observing a similar organizational pattern for a wide range of their 
person-directed practices, we could conclude more certainly that strong 
psychological connectedness was the relation which constituted survival 
for them. 
But, unless various different, possible candidate relations for 
survival come apart in ordinary life, simply observing how people 
actually behave will not tell us much about their counter-factual 
dispositions. It will not tell us, for example, whether they would organize 
their person-directed practices around physical continuity, rather than 
psychological continuity, were the two relations to come apart. So here 
again, thought experiments which test for these sorts of counter-factual 
dispositions have an important role to play. We might present subjects 
with a variety of hypothetical puzzle cases, such as the case of 
teletransportation, and note which relation their person-directed 
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judgements and concerns systematically tracked. We would ask them, for 
example, should the post-teletransportation person be punished for 
crimes committed before being beamed up from the planet: if they say 
'yes' we can conclude that they believe that a person survives 
teletransportation: if they say, 'no' we can infer that they believe that a 
person does not survive teletransportation. We are justified in so 
inferring, for the work done at the conceptual level tells us that we think 
that a person should be punished for a past crime, when, and only when, 
ceterus paribus, they are the same person as the person who committed the 
crime. Similarly, we could present them with familiar puzzle cases such 
as the following: a future person, who has your body, but whose 
psychology is very different from your own, will be tortured tomorrow, 
would you anticipate that future torture? If they answer 'yes' we can 
assume that they believe that a person survives loss of psychology, and 
since our conceptual work tells us that a person will anticipate future 
experiences when and only when they survive as that future person, we 
can conclude that physical, not psychological, continuity is the relation 
which underpins their person-directed practices and concerns, and so is 
the relation of survival for them. If, on the other hand, the person answers 
'no' to this case, we can assume that they do not believe that a person 
survives loss of psychology, and so that psychological continuity is a 
necessary part of survival for them. Unger's 'future pain' test, another 
Williams-type case, would be similarly useful here. (Note, however, that, 
whereas Unger cautions that this test is a test for what matters in survival, 
not of what survival consists in, on my view, tests about what matters in 
survival just are tests for what survival consists in.) And so on and so 
forth. 
In order for subjects' responses to puzzle cases to be a reliable 
guide to the relation that is survival for them, subjects need, first, to be 
reasonably informed. If someone, such as Swinburne, claims that survival 
consists in the continued existence of the same soul, in a world such as 
ours where is no such thing, he is simply mistaken about the relation 
which organizes his person-directed practices and concerns. For there is 
no such thing, and so the soul could not be the relation around which he 
has cause to organize his person-directed practices-it must be some other 
relation. Second, subjects' responses need to be internally or intra-
personally consistent-they should not, for example, track survival with 
physical continuity in one case where physical and psychological 
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continuity come apart, but psychological continuity in another 
descriptionally equivalent case. That is to say, they should not think that 
they both survive and do not survive teletransportation, for example. 
Hence the need for these constraints in the definition. These constraints 
should be uncontroversial, for they are standard in the personal identity 
debate. 
An important point to note about this first-order account (and, as 
we shall see, in contrast to the second-order view) is that it is by no means 
at odds with a physical continuity account or a psychological continuity 
account of survival. If the relation among two person-stages X and Y 
which causes certain subjects consistently to organize their person-
directed practices around the assumption that X survives as Y is physical 
continuity, and X and Y are physically continuous, then survival for those 
subjects will consist in physical continuity. Likewise, if the relation 
around which certain subjects have cause consistently to organize their 
person-directed practices is psychological continuity, and X and Y are 
psychologically continuous, then psychological continuity will constitute 
the survival of those subjects. Nor, notably, is this analysis at odds with 
the Cartesian view of personal identity or survival. For, if the Cartesian 
view of persons as immaterial entities is coherent (and I think it is, or 
certainly can be made to be4), then if sameness of immaterial entity is the 
relation which causes a certain group of subjects consistently to organize 
their person-directed practices around the assumption that a person 
survives, and if those subjects are in a world in which there are such 
things as immaterial entities, then the survival of those subjects will 
involve the continued existence of the same immaterial entity. What a 
posteriori investigation tells us, of course, is that in this world survival 
does not consist in sameness of immaterial entity for anyone. For there is 
no such thing. 
But, on this way of analysing the concept of survival, these 
properties or relations earn their right to count as the facts of personal 
identity or survival for members of a community only in virtue of their 
being the facts around which members of the community are disposed to 
organize their person-directed practices; only in virtue of the fact, that is, 
that subjects regard them as the facts of survival. They have no 
independent claim to be the facts of survival. 
4Tuis issue will be discussed more fully in Chapter 8. 
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This sort of analysis enshrines the intuitive lesson of the 
Teletransporters and the Somataphiles. It makes subjects' person-directed 
practices and concerns in specified conditions not just contingently or 
accidentally connected to survival, but constitutive of survival. So 
survival cannot come apart from what members of a community care 
about in survival and the special and distinctive role that it plays in their 
person-directed practices and attitudes.s For the special and distinctive 
role that survival plays in the person-directed concerns of a community is 
definitive of survival for that community. To give this analysis of what 
survival consists in, then, is ipso facto to give an account of what matters in 
survival. 
But for all that subjects' responses are constitutive of the concept of 
survival, they do not float free of facts in the world. There are thoroughly 
objective, absolute properties out there in the world, properties which 
exist and have their character fixed entirely independently of us, it's just 
that which of those properties constitute survival for subjects depends on 
which of those properties cause those subjects consistently and resiliently 
to organize their person-directed practices around the assumption that a 
person survives. 
Perhaps a good way to get absolutely clear about this account of 
survival is briefly to see how it is similar to (and different from) some 
better known accounts of other of our concepts that we discussed earlier. 
First, we can understand it as a particular sort (the 'contingent identity' 
sort) of first-order functionalist account of mental states, applied to the 
case of survival. Recall, analytic functionalism is the doctrine that mental 
state-types (such as pain) are defined in terms of their characteristic causal 
role in relation toinputs, outputs, and other mental states. This is a 
conceptual claim about what it takes for some mental state to count as 
pain. Then there is the a posteriori task of finding out which property 
(physical or non-physical) actually plays the pain role in a subject, and 
then that property counts as pain for them. Since, in us homo sapiens, C 
fibres-firing (say) is the (neurophysiological) property that plays the pain 
role-i.e. which is the brain-state causally responsible for us uttering 
'ouch', and feeling pain, when pricked by a needle-pain is (contingently) 
Sor, more precisely, as we shall see, a particular version of this first-order view, what I 
shall call 'temporal-phase pluralism', enshrines this lesson of the Teletransporters and 
the Somataphiles. 
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identical with C-fibres-firing for us. In a Martian, some other state, say, 
M-fibres-firing, may play the pain role; and then that state-M-fibres-
firing-would count as pain for them. Pain is thus, on this account, 
multiply realizable. For different states may play or realize the pain role 
in different subjects, and those different states are all equally properly 
called 'pain'. 
Similarly, on my account, survival is defined by the role that it 
plays, not in relation to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but in 
relation to subjects' person-directed practices viz., being the relation that 
they care about, in accordance with which they punish later people for 
crimes committed by earlier people, in virtue of the holding of which they 
treat certain people in particular ways and adopt particular reactive 
attitudes to certain people over time, and so on. This is a conceptual claim 
about what it takes for some relation to count as the survival relation for a 
community; and it is practice-dependent because the facts which 
determine which relation is the relation of survival for a community are 
person-directed practices. Then there is the second, a posteriori task of 
finding out what property in fact plays or realizes the survival role for a 
subject or given group of subjects, and then, by transitivity of identity, 
that property then counts as survival for them. But it does so only 
contingently. For, as the case of the Teletransporters and the 
Somataphiles illustrates, different properties may quite acceptably play 
the survival role for different subjects or groups of subjects. The survival 
role is multiply realizable. Survival for a Somataphile consists in physical 
continuity, for that is the relation which plays the survival role for 
members of that community; but the survival of a Teletransporter-person 
involves psychological continuity, for that is the relation that realizes the 
survival role for them. The essential structure of this account of survival 
might be put thus6: 
1. Whatever relation occupies (or realizes) the survival role for 
members of a community C is the relation which everyone 
(whether or not a member of community C) will properly take to 
constitute survival for members of community C (though not to 
constitute the survival of a person who is not a member of 
community C). (Conceptual claim) 
61 borrow this way of putting the point from Jackson, who (following Armstrong and 
Lewis) explains first-order functionalist accounts of mental states analogously. 
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2. What occupies the survival role for C is relation R. (Empirical 
claim) 
3. R is the relation which everyone (whether or not a member of 
community C) will properly take to constitute survival for 
members of community C (though not to constitute the survival of 
a person who is not a member of community C). (Transitivity of 
identity) 
The case of the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles and the arguments 
of chapter 4, should, I hope, have already the plausibility of each of these 
claims, independently, and combined. But perhaps I ought briefly and 
schematically recapitulate. 
In defining survival, as indeed any term or concept, we have a 
choice between two fundamental options: a choice between, as I have put 
it, defining survival in terms of the role that it plays in subjects' person-
directed practices and concerns (or in terms of relations that happen to 
realize that role for a given community of subjects), and defining survival 
rigidly in terms of actual realizer. Practice independent accounts typically 
will, and indeed have, chosen the latter option.7 For, these accounts 
standardly have it, actual realizer, not role, is what is interesting, indeed 
essential, to survival. The arguments of chapter 4 aimed to establish, at 
the very least, that, however interesting actual realizer, the survival role-
the role that survival plays in our person-directed practices and 
concerns-is just, if not more, as interesting and important. It is this role 
which, inter alia, allows us to know that we are still talking about survival, 
even where we may differ radically in our views about what relation 
realizes that role. The Teletransporters and the Somataphiles, like Parfit 
and Williams, are both talking about survival, even though they disagree 
about what survival consists in; and that is because, although different 
relations realize the survival role for them, the different relations are 
nonetheless both realizers of the common (survival) role. They are, as we 
might say, different species of the same genus. And just as genus, by 
specifying interesting and overarching commonalities between different 
7Note that practice-independent accounts do not have to take the latter view. It is an 
unlikely, but perfectly coherent, position simultaneously to maintain that survival 
consists in the survival role (or being a relation that plays the survival role) and that this 
is a practice-independent truth-a fact served up by nature or God. This may indeed be 
Johnston's position when he claims that Protean Person is our substance sortal. 
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species, is important for biological classification, so role is important for 
classifying different realizers as survival concepts. It explains the 
significant commonality between the different species or realizers, in 
virtue of which all these realizers, though different, earn their right 
equally to count as survival relations nonetheless. 
This 'contingent identity' first-order account differs crucially from 
the rigidifying view, also a first-order view. The rigidifier's analysis too, 
proceeds in two stages, a conceptual and an empirical stage, but the 
rigidifier differs in ruling out the possibility of multiple realizability (at 
least, the possibility of multiple realizability without change of meaning), 
a priori. Recall, the rigidifying view has it that pain, for example, is 
(necessarily) what property actually plays or realizes the pain role-pain is 
necessarily C-fibres firing. So that Martians, or some other differently 
physically constituted beings, however well they exhibit pain behaviour 
just like ours, could not be in pain. They will be in pain*. So too, for the 
case of water, the rigidifier has it 'water is the stuff which actually falls 
from the sky, runs from taps ... etc' Since the stuff which actually satisfies 
this description here on earth is H20, water is necessarily identical with 
H20. But people on twin earth would mean something different by 
water, for water is, rigidly, the stuff which actually plays the water role. 
By rigidly identifying the meaning of terms with actual realizer, the 
rigidifying view thus rules out the possibility of multiple realizability 
without change of meaning a priori. 
Recall, from the discussion of chapter 2, Unger is a personal 
identity theorist who fairly explicitly takes this view for the case of 
survival. Unger claims that survival is, rigidly or necessarily, whatever 
relation actually organizes our deepest beliefs about survival. So that a 
community of people who most deeply believed that survival consisted in 
some relation other than the one(s) which we actually most deeply believe 
it to consist in, would mean something different to what we mean by it. 
They would by talking about survival*. There is only one relation around 
which a community of people like us can organize our person-directed 
practices and it be properly called 'survival', and that is the particular 
relation that we as we actually are now most deeply believe to constitute 
survival. For Unger, the survival of all people in all worlds should be 
evaluated by our own present lights, whatever the person-directed 
practices and concerns of the other people in the other worlds. If we were 
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the Somataphiles, for example, we should not regard the Teletransporters 
as surviving teletransportation, even though we know that by their lights 
teletransportation preserves the survival of members of their community. 
For since survival is determined by our own person-directed practices and 
concerns, and we regard teletransportation as resulting in a person's 
certain death, no person survives teletransportation, whatever they may 
happen to think about things. At best, people with the concerns of the 
Teletransporters would survive* teletransportation. 
Whereas Unger rigidly identifies 'survival' with the relation that 
actually organizes our deepest beliefs (thus ruling out the possibility of 
multiple realizability without change of meaning), on my account, 
although survival for a community is identical with the particular relation 
(whatever it happens to be) that realizes the survival role for that 
community, it is only contingently identical with that relation. Another 
relation might play that role for a community and that relation would 
count as survival (and not survival*, or survival**, or ... ) just as well. This 
is the crucial point of difference between a motivationally Humean, 
rigidifying account of survival, such as Unger's and a first-order, 
functionalist account of survival such as mine: it is what makes Unger's 
account practice-independent and mine practice-dependent. For survival, 
for Unger, can come apart from the relation that a community cares 
about-that organizes their person-directed practices and concerns. 
Person-directed practices, for Unger, are no essential part of survival, but 
only contingently associated with it. For go to a community who organize 
around some relation other than Unger's preferred variety of physical 
continuity, and physical continuity counts as survival round there 
nonetheless. (There is another difference between Unger' s account and 
mine. Putting the point in my terms, whereas Unger takes the survival 
role to be fixed chiefly by our deepest beliefs about our survival 
conditions, mine takes it to be fixed by a much wider range-the totality-
of our person-directed practices and concerns). 
Note, before we move on, that there is a third sort of view to be had 
here. And, as I suggested in chapter 2, I suspect that it is the view that 
Wiggins holds. According to (first-order) pluralism, survival for members 
of a community is what plays the survival role for members of that 
community. So that we ought to evaluate the survival of members of 
different communities by their own lights, not by ours. We ought to say 
142 
Chapter 5 A pluralist account of survival 
that a Teletransporter-person survives teletransportation, whilst a 
Somataphile-person would not. On my view, survival for members of a 
given community is whatever relation plays the survival role for members 
of that community. In contrast, according to the rigidifying view, survival 
for members of any community is what plays the survival role in a 
particular community (typically the actual one). If what plays the survival 
role for us in the actual world is physical continuity, then physical 
continuity constitutes survival for all people everywhere. Consequently, 
no person (whether a Teletransporter-person or a Somataphile-person) 
survives teletransportation, for teletransportation fails to preserve the 
particular relation which actually constitutes survival for us. Whereas 
pluralism has it that role (or playing the role) is necessary and sufficient 
for survival, rigidifying views have it that actual realizer is what is 
necessary and sufficient for survival. The third view to be had would 
have it that both role and actual realizer are necessary (and jointly 
sufficient) for survival: survival, for members of any community, is what 
actually realizes the survival role, providing that it realizes the survival 
role for members of the community. Suppose that 'survival' rigidly 
designates physical continuity. Then, according to this third view, 
survival, for members of any community, is physical continuity, 
providing that members of the community organize their person-directed 
practices around physical continuity. If they do not organize around 
physical continuity, then physical continuity is not survival in that 
community. They do not survive, but, providing they organize around 
something else, they may survive*. I think that this 'mixed' view is 
implausible for the same reasons that the rigidifying view is implausible. 
If survival is given by what people care about, and some other community 
of people care about something other than what we care about, why isn't 
that just survival? All the more so, given that what we care about is 
scarcely a non-gerrymandered kind. 
The first-order pluralist view is the sort of practice-dependent 
object-level view that I favour as against the second-order view, for 
reasons that I shall outline shortly. But it is worth noting that, if we take 
this first-order view, we are committed to a certain metaphysics, namely, 
to the existence of contingent property identities. That is to say, we are 
committed to the view that, although survival is identical with a certain 
first-order property (psychological continuity for the Somataphiles, say), it 
is only contingently identical with that property. For go somewhere 
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where a different property plays the survival role, (say, physical 
continuity) and that property counts as survival round there. 
I do not think that being com.m.itted to contingent property 
identities is too great a cost. Indeed, I do not think it any cost at all. For 
the thesis, properly understood, is a pretty innocuous one. Consider the 
following example from. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 
... consider the functional concept of assent. We can m.ake true type-type 
identity statements about the (kind of) gesture that is a sign of assent in 
Western societies, and the (kind of) gesture of assent that is the sign of 
assent in certain Asian societies, despite the fact that the gestures are 
different. In the West nodding the head= the gesture of assent, whereas 
a different head motion-call it wiggling-is used in parts of Asia. So 
wiggling the head= the gesture of assent in parts of Asia.8 
The 'gesture of assent' is thus multiply realisable. Different behaviours 
count as gesturing assent in different places, just as what counts as 
behaving politely i.e. behaving in a conventionally approved manner, 
m.ay vary from. place to place, culture to culture, in virtue of the fact that 
conventions for politeness m.ay vary from. place to place, culture to 
culture. Multiple realizability is thus just innocuous, old-fashioned liberal 
pluralism.. (I will com.e back to this point in m.ore detail shortly). Note 
particularly, in this context, that this view, by specifying the domain (for a 
comm.unity C) avoids intransitivities. Were the contingent identity thesis 
the claim. that survival = psychological continuity and that survival = 
physical continuity we would be led, by transitivity of identity, to the 
claim. that psychological continuity= physical continuity, which is clearly 
false. However, by making survival claims relative to a comm.unity 
(defined in terms of comm.on person-directed practices), the contingent 
identity thesis avoids such false identity claims. For we say, survival for a 
Teletransporter-person= psychological continuity, but survival for a 
Somataphile-person= physical continuity. No intransitivity here. In any 
case, for those who m.ay still baulk at talk of contingent identity, a weaker 
rephrasing would be enough for our purposes. It is enough, for our 
purposes, to say that 'in the West nodding the head is properly called the 
gesture of assent (in virtue of the fact that it serves the function of a sign of 
agreement), whereas in parts of Asia a different head m.otion-wiggling-
is properly called the gesture of assent (for it serves as a sign of agreement 
8Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, forthcoming. 
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round there).' These different gestures are both 'properly called' gestures 
of assent in virtue of the fact that they perform the same function-
namely, gesturing assent-in the respective communities. The gesture of 
assent has the same meaning or character in the two communities. 
Note again that if survival for a Teletransporter-person is 
psychological continuity, and survival for a Somataphile-person is 
physical continuity, then although a Somataphile-person does not survive 
teletransportation, a Teletransporter-person does. Thus the Somataphiles 
in the original case, as I presented it, were wrong to think that the 
Teletransporters did not survive teletransportation. For, if they have 
mastery of the concept of survival, they will realize that although they, the 
Somataphiles, do not survive teletransportation, people with 
appropriately different person-directed practices, such as the 
Teletransporters, do. For teletransportation preserves psychological 
continuity, the relation that is the survival relation for the 
Teletransporters. I will return to this issue in greater detail in chapter 9. 
Perhaps not having noticed that the contingent identity thesis, by 
specifying the relevant domain, is not led to make false identity claims, 
many functionalists about mental states have retreated to the view that 
mental states are second-order properties. On this view, mental states, 
such as pain, are not to be type-identified with brain states (or any other 
realizer of the pain role), but with a second-order property that those 
realizers have, namely, being a state which typically plays the pain role. 
Thus, pain (for homo sapiens) is not C-fibres firing per se, rather it is 
being in a state (C-fibres firing) which typically plays the pain role. 
An analogue of this view is available to practice-dependent 
theorists in the case of survival. Let me briefly sketch this second-order 
option, and then outline the reasons why I do not favour it for the case of 
survival. 
5.2 Survival as a second-order property 
A thought in favour of the second-order view, as against the first, runs as 
follows. Survival is multiply realisable. If we take the first-order view 
and identify survival with the particular, domain specific, realizer of the 
survival role, we will say that survival is physical continuity for the 
Somataphiles; psychological continuity for the Teletransporters. But what 
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is it, contra rigidifiers, that makes these different relations properly called 
survival relations nonetheless? Answer: the second-order property. It is in 
virtue of the fact that these relations are both realizers of the survival role 
for the community in question that unifies them as survival concepts. 
What I earlier called 'genus' and 'family resemblance' is just the survival 
role. So, since it is the second-order property which is doing all the 
unifying work, why not just identify survival with the survival role, rather 
than with the particular, domain specific, realizer(s) of that role? Why not 
just view survival as the second-order property? 
In the case of mental states, there is a very strong reason for 
resisting this move to the second-order. For it is a pretty firm intuition 
there first, that mental states cause behaviour and second, that the brain-
state type, and not the second-order property of having a state playing a 
role in one, is what causes behaviour. It is the pain caused in me by the 
hot potato that causes me to loosen my grip on it, not the second-order 
property of having in me a brain state of the sort that typically causes me 
to loosen my grip. That is to say, it is a fairly central intuition in the case 
of mental states that mental states are brutely causally efficacious. But the 
second-order properties-being in a state such as typically to be disposed 
to drop the hot potato-are causally impotent. 
In the case of survival, however, it is not so clear that the intuition 
that survival, the first-order property, must be causally efficacious, at least 
in this brute sort of way, is such a firm and central one. Of course, the 
belief that survival involves psychological continuity must causally impact 
on other beliefs and behaviour. It is the Somataphiles' belief that 
teletransportation results in their death which causes them to refuse to 
enter a Teletransporter, for example. And, no doubt, there will be some 
sort of causal story to be told about the properties of person-stages in 
virtue of which we judge that a person is the same person. For when we 
judge that someone is the same person we are presumably responding to 
some property that the person-stages share. Nonetheless, the causal 
connection between the properties and our judgements does not seem 
brute in the way that the causal connection between the properties of the 
hot potato and my loosening my grip seem to be. In the case of survival, 
then, prima facie, it does not seem wildly counter-intuitive to suppose that 
what causes subjects' beliefs about survival is not psychological 
continuity, but rather the fact that psychological continuity is the realizer 
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of the survival role. That is to say, there seems nothing particularly 
counter-intuitive about supposing that survival might consist in a second-
order property in the way in which it seems highly counter-intuitive to 
suppose that pain, for example, might consist in such a second-order 
property. This is, of course, in the final analysis, a question for empirical 
psychology. But it is enough to note that the central intuition that mental 
states are brute causes of behaviour which seems to block the move to 
second-order identification in the case of mental states may well be absent 
in the case of survival. 
The second-order analysis of survival will proceed in much the 
same way as the first. However, whereas the first-order analysis identifies 
survival with the particular relation that organizes a community's person-
directed practices, the second-order view will identify survival with a 
higher-order property that these relations have. A person X at an earlier 
time survives as a person Y at a later time, they will say, iff some realizer 
of the survival role holds between the earlier person X and the later 
person Y. Theorists who take this second-order view will regard the first-
order analysis as an analysis, not of survival, but rather, as an analysis of 
what it takes for a certain relation to count as a realizer of survival-as a 
candidate survival concept-for a given community. The first-order 
analysis is an analysis of the particular parochial realizer; not survival, but 
survivals, survivalt, and so on. Survival, on this second-order view, in 
contrast to the first, does not consist in physical continuity or 
psychological continuity or sameness of soul... per se, rather it consists in 
a higher-order property which all these relations share, viz. being realizers 
of the survival role. 
Whereas the first-order view is not necessarily at odds with any 
existing object-level account of survival-it is perfectly compatible with a 
view of survival as consisting in physical continuity, or a view of survival 
as consisting in psychological continuity, or a view of survival as 
consisting in sameness of soul, or a view of survival as consisting in some 
other socially workable relation-the second-order view is at odds with all 
these accounts of survival which have dominated the personal identity 
debate. For, on the second-order view, survival does not consist in any of 
these particular candidate realizers of the survival role. Survival consists, 
rather, in the second-order property that these relations possess when 
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subjects organize their person-directed practices around them: namely, 
being a realizer of the survival role. 
I mention this second-order option, because it is a different sort of 
view to the first-order view, and one which some may find attractive. 
However, although different from the first, the second-order account is 
not as different as one might initially suppose. It differs about the 
metaphysics of survival-about what property survival consists in-but, 
as we shall soon see, the motivational upshots of the two accounts are 
substantially the same. 
5.3 Survival: a first- or a second-order property? 
What, then, is there to choose between the first- and second-order views? 
Which of these views about the metaphysics of survival is right as analysis 
of our concept of survival boils down, in the final analysis, to the question 
of which jibes best with the platitudes about survival. (This is true, of 
course, not just as between the first- and second-order practice-dependent 
views, but for any account of survival, including the various practice-
independent ones.) Which view of survival jibes best with the platitudes 
about survival is really a question for empirical psychology. However, 
there is an important conceptual issue to be cleared up first. For not all of 
the platitudes are pertinent to deciding which view is right. Here's an 
example. Suppose that it turned out that people were disposed to say 
things of the following sort: 'You should care about some future person 
when and only when some realizer of the survival role holds between you 
and that future person'. Would this show that the second-order analysis 
of survival is right? Prima facie, it might seem that it would. But actually, 
depending crucially on the epistemic status of this platitude, it may well 
not. 
To see why, we need to distinguish between three sorts of 
platitudes which, to avoid complicating things, I glossed over in the 
previous discussion. There are, on the one hand, two sorts of what we 
might call 'analytic platitudes'-platitudes about what we mean by 
survival. First, there are meta-analytic platitudes about in virtue of what 
some relation gets to count as the relation of survival; and, I have claimed, 
the platitudes here are practice-dependent ones (this is what, if I am right 
in assuming that my intuitive reactions are typical, the case of the 
Teletransporters and the Somataphiles shows). Second, there are analytic 
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platitudes about which practices are relevant to questions of survival; as 
we might put it, which practices are the person-directed practices? So for 
example, there are the following sorts of platitudes that we discussed at 
length before; platitudes which fix the reference or determine the role of 
survival: 'You should punish someone when and only when the person is 
the same person who committed the crime'; 'You are entitled to hold 
someone to an earlier promise, when and only when they are the same 
person as the person who made the promise'; and so on. On the other 
hand, there are what we might (somewhat tentatively) call 'contingent 
platitudes' about exactly how we fill out the occurrences of 'is the same 
person' in the platitudes that fix the role: that is to say, there are platitudes 
about what relation actually realizes the survival role for us. So, for 
example, there are platitudes of the following sort: 'You should punish 
someone when and only when they are psychologically continuous with 
the person who committed the crime' or 'You should punish someone 
when and only when the are physically continuous with the person who 
committed the crime'; and so on. These are the platitudes which are 
relevant to deciding as between physical continuity accounts, 
psychological continuity accounts, or any other object-level account of 
what relation realizes the survival role for a community. Calling 
platitudes of this third sort 'contingent' is potentially a little misleading 
(hence my tentativeness in using that label), since there is a sense in which 
the analytic platitudes are also contingent-we could have meant 
something different by the word 'survival' or 'personal identity', in just 
the same way as we could have meant something other than unmarried 
man by the word 'bachelor'. However, the sense in which platitudes of 
the second sort are 'contingent' is that, consistent with the analytic platitudes 
remaining exactly as they are, we might have cared about (i.e. organized our 
person-directed practices around) some other property. Just as, for 
example, holding what we mean by 'cream cakes' fixed, we might not 
have found them tasty. 
Now we are in a position to see why certain sorts of platitudes 
which might appear to support the second-order view are actually 
perfectly compatible with the first-order view. Suppose that we think that 
the right analysis of what we mean by 'survival' is the first-order view. 
That is to say, that 'survival is whatever plays the survival role for a 
community' is an analytic truth. Consistent with this, there are a number 
of properties or relations people might, contingently, care about or 
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organize around in survival. Contingently, different properties might 
realize the survival role for different subjects. (We saw this with the 
Teletransporters and the Somataphiles.) So, for example, people might 
say 'survival is whatever property plays the survival role for a 
community, and (contingently) what plays the survival role for me or my 
community is psychological continuity'. A Teletransporter appraised of 
the first-order view would say that. A Somataphile committed to the first-
order view as an analytic truth would say the following: survival is 
whatever plays the survival role for a community, and (contingently) 
what plays the survival role for me or for my community is physical 
continuity. Just so, and obviously similarly consistent with the first-order 
view, someone might say the following: survival is whatever realizes the 
survival role for a community, and what realizes the survival role for me 
or my community is the property of having the property that realizes the 
survival role. The property of being a property that realizes the survival 
role is thus just another candidate realizer of the survival role for a 
community-just another property, like physical continuity or 
psychological continuity, around which a community could organize their 
person-directed practices and concerns. The second-order view is thus a 
first-order view relative to being a relation around which a community 
may organize their person-directed practices and concerns. That is to say, 
relative to the first-order account of survival-viz., being a relation 
around which a community might organize their person-directed 
practices-what we have been calling the second-order view is just 
another competing first-order view. The issue emerges clearly in the 
following sort of case. 
Suppose that you are going to undergo some process X. You don't 
know what X involves: that is to say, you don't know whether the person 
who will emerge from X will still be physically continuous with you, or 
remain psychologically continuous with you, or be related to you-now by 
some other candidate survival realizer about which you might now care. 
But you do know this: before you undergo X you will come to care about 
(i.e. organize your person-directed practices around) the relation 
(whatever it is, for you do not know yet) that obtains between you-now 
and the post-X person. How would you feel about the prospect of X? If 
you feel perturbed, it is probably because you organize your person-
directed practices and concerns around physical continuity, or 
psychological continuity, or some other, what I have been calling 'first-
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order', property. If you feel not in the least perturbed at the prospect of X, 
it is probably because you organize your person-directed practices around 
what I have been calling the 'second-order' property. You do not care that 
physical continuity or psychological continuity or some other socially 
workable relation per se holds between you and a future person, you just 
care that some relation that realizes the survival role for you holds 
between you and a future person. Suppose that some of us were to have 
this latter reaction (this would be equivalent to us being disposed to utter 
the platitude mentioned initially which seemed like it straightforwardly 
supported the second-order view). This would not show that the first-
order view was false. It would simply show that, consistent with the first-
order view (that survival is whatever property plays the survival role), we 
contingently care about the second-order property. The second-order 
property, rather than physical continuity per se, or psychological 
continuity per se, is the property that realizes the survival role for us. If it 
turned out that the 'second-order' view was implicit in these contingent 
platitudes, then, it would not turn out that the first-order view was false. 
It would simply go to show that the property which we (or some of us) 
organize our person-directed practices around is the property of being a 
property which realizes the survival role in a community. That survival is 
reflexive in this way-that role can be its own realizer-is a very 
interesting feature of the case of survival.9 And it means that the first-
order view is not a simple hostage to empirical fortune. For even if it 
turns out that the second-order view is implicit in the platitudes (at least 
the contingent ones), the first-order view can nonetheless remain true. 
(Note that the same manoeuvre is not available to the theorist who takes 
the second-order view-that survival, as an analytic truth, consists in the 
property of being the property that plays the survival role for a 
community. For, if it turns out that the first-order view is the one 
embedded in the contingent platitudes-if it turns out, that is, that people 
do not organize their person-directed practices around the second-order 
property-this second-order view will simply be false). 
9This said, we can notice an interesting difference between the case of water, and the 
case of survival. The case of survival, unlike the case of water, is reflexive: role can be its 
own realizer. In the case of water, recall, the role is 'the stuff that falls from the sky, runs 
from taps, fills the seas ... '. This is the conceptual claim. Then there is the empirical 
question of what stuff (or what properties of stuff) realizes that role. But, in the case of 
case of water, the realizer cannot be 'the stuff that fills the ... ' for that would be an a 
priori, not an a posteriori, truth. Role cannot be its own realizer. 
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Indeed this, I suspect, may go a fair way to explaining the appeal 
(insofar as there is appeal) of the second-order account of survival. For, if 
you organize your person-directed practices around the second-order 
property, it is all too easy to make the mistake of taking the claim 
'survival is the second-order property', ambiguous as it stands, to be an 
analytic, rather than a contingent truth-to be a truth about what survival 
means, rather than a contingent truth about what property realizes the 
survival role for you. The fact that a given community organizes their 
person-directed practices around the second-order property is no reason 
for making survival itself, as a matter of analytic truth, a second-order 
property. Rather, survival is the first-order property, and its particular 
realizer (for those who think this way, anyway) the second-order 
property. Their survival concept is 550. 
However, the first- and second-order views are real competitors, 
and not all sorts of platitudes will necessarily be consistent with the first-
order view. Only the contingent platitudes which support a second-order 
view (or a view of survival as consisting in any other socially workable 
relation) will be compatible with the first-order view. If the analytic 
platitudes-the platitudes about what we mean by survival-support a 
second-order view, this would show that the first-order view was wrong, 
at least as an analysis of what we presently mean by survival. To 
reiterate, I am not particularly fussed about whether or not the first or 
second-order view is right, for both are compatible with practice-
dependence and the morals I wish to draw from it. Nonetheless, as I see 
it, the analytic platitudes support the first order view. 
Return to the case of the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles. 
Here we have two communities who initially thought that they were 
absolutely right about survival-they, and not the other community, had 
latched onto the privileged fact of the matter. Then, however, they look 
more closely at the other community-a community who, although 
having an apparently different concept of survival, don't seem to be 
adversely affected by it in any way. And so, naturally, they ask 
themselves: what entitles us to think that we, and no-one else who differs 
from us, have the right concept of survivaJ? Looking around, they can't 
seem to find the privileged independent facts which would make them 
right and the others wrong. And so they conclude, that practice-
dependence is the right meta-story for survival-person-directed 
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practices, and not a privileged set of facts served up by nature or God, are 
what determine what determines the extension of survival. They 
determine that person-directed practices are what determine what 
determines the extension of survival because it is these practices that 
explain why they identify the other community as still talking about 
survival, despite the fact that the community takes a different view about 
what survival involves. 
This, I take it, is our train of thought when we think about the case 
of the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles. And it tells us something 
about our survival concept-it tells us something about what we mean by 
survival. And, I think, inter alia, what it tells us is that the first-order, and 
not the second-order view, is implicit in the analytic platitudes. For, 
although there is a sense in which the Teletransporters and the 
Somataphiles are both talking about survival (survival plays the same role 
in their respective person-directed practices), there also seems to be a 
sense in which they differ. Survival has a different nature in the two 
communities. For one community take themselves to survive 
teletransportation, whilst the other do not. They seem to differ about their 
survival conditions. However, if the second-order view really were 
implicit in the analytic platitudes, we would not think, as we seem to do, 
that there is a sense in which the two communities have different survival 
concepts. For, on the second-order view, since the role that survival plays 
in their person-directed practice and concerns is exactly the same, and 
since survival is that role, they are talking about exactly the same thing. 
Survival consists in exactly the same thing in the two communities. The 
first-order view does a better (indeed, an excellent) job of explaining our 
intuitive reactions to this case. For the first-order view explains both why 
we think there is something in common between the two communities 
and why we think there is something different. What they have in 
common is that survival plays the same role in their person-directed 
practices and concerns; where they differ is respect to what relation they 
take to realize that role. Since, on the first-order view, survival, is 
identified with realizer, not role, we can say, what seems the right thing to 
say, that the two communities differ about survival. 
Moreover, and perhaps more tellingly, it is a central platitude 
about survival that, whatever survival is, it is something that we value. 
But when we value survival, what we value is the relevant first-order 
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property, not the second-order property of being a property which has the 
property, inter alia, of being valued. What we care about when we care 
about survival is that there be a future person who is related to us by 
physical continuity or psychological continuity or whatever, not that there 
be a future person who has the property of having the property that we 
care about. The second-order property is typically motivationally inert. 
Just as, for example, when we want to do the right thing, what we 
typically care about is a first-order property (saving a life, making 
someone happy, giving to the poor ... ). When we care about some action 
being the right action we do not care that that action has the property of 
being the right action, we care about saving a life. There is something 
pretty strange about someone who does the right thing (say, saves a life), 
not because they care about saving a life, but because saving a life has the 
higher-order property of being a good act. In both cases, the second-order 
property is not typically psychological motivational. Since survival is 
psychologically motivational, we had better identify survival with a first-
order property. 
This is not to suggest that the second-order view is by any means 
incoherent. It seems perfectly possible that someone might care about the 
second-order property, in just the same way as it seems perfectly possible 
that someone might just desire that their desires be fulfilled, irrespective 
of the content of those desires (although it might be practically 
problematic if that were their only desire). But it is to say that the onus of 
proof seems firmly on the side of the second-order theorist who must 
explain how, contrary to these initial appearances, the second-order view 
is somehow really buried deep in the platitudes. 
I, then, shall rest my hand with the first-order view. There are, 
however, number of different ways of understanding or fleshing-out the 
first-order view. I favour a specific one of these. Perhaps the best way of 
understanding the motivation for this more specific first-order view is to 
approach it by way of setting out the metaphysical and motivational 
consequences of another sort of first-order approach to survival. 
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6 
TEMPORAL-PHASE PLURALISM 
Of the those few philosophers who have mooted what I have called a 
'practice-dependent' approach to survival, only one, Mark Johnston, has gone 
on to develop an object-level account of exactly what properties survival 
consists in in any great detail. Johnston does not (or not obviously, at any 
rate) draw the distinction between the first- and second-order views; and his 
own account can be read either way (although, in what follows, I will read it 
as a first-order account). Rather, he draws a distinction between 'cryptophase 
kinds' and 'substance sortals'. Johnston writes, 
A plausible principle drawn from the theory of sortals is that each 
individual is classifiable under one and only one substance sortal. A 
substance sortal is a term for a sort or kind of thing, a term which is the 
substance sortal for a given individual, just in case it is the most specific 
kind of term such that necessarily there is no time at which the individual 
exists without satisfying it at that time. Thus 'person or dog' is not a 
substance sortal for persons, since there is at least the more specific sortal 
'person'. And 'child' is not a substance sortal for individual Human Beings; 
it is a mere phase sortal [cryptophase kind] which applies to a Human Being 
during what need be only a part of his total existence.1 
What Johnston terms a person's 'phase-sortal' or 'cryptophase kind' is 
the first-order view of survival that I have endorsed above. A person's 
cryptophase kind is given by the relation that organizes their person-directed 
practices at a particular time. So, to translate into Johnston-ease, the 
Somataphiles' cryptophase kind is physical continuity; the Teletransporters' 
cryptophase kind is psychological continuity. However, whereas on the first-
order view I have advocated, the first-order or 'cryptophase kind' view 
straightforwardly gives a person's survival conditions, on Johnston's view it 
gives their survival conditions only for a given phase in their continuing 
existence. For, Johnston's central object-level claim is that the substance sortal 
for persons is, not cryptophase kind, but Protean person: "We are inevitably 
and always Protean persons, that is, we are inevitably and always such that 
1 Johnston (1989c), p.462. 
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the cryptophase kinds under which we fall at particular times are determined 
by our concerns and expectations at the respective times."2 Protean person is 
the overarching or, as Johnston puts it, "higher-order", kind in virtue of 
which the different cryptophase kinds which organize an individual's 
person-directed practices at respective times nonetheless count as stages of 
the same persisting person; much as Human Being is the overarching kind 
which unites different chronological phases in a Human Beings' . 
development-childhood, adolescence, middle-age, old-age-into 
developmental phases of a continuing Human Being; phases which human 
beings can live through. Protean person is the disjunction of all the realizers 
that might play the survival role for a subject or community at different times 
in their continuing existence; or, as Johnston would probably prefer to put it, 
the disjunction of all the acceptable sharpenings of the (vague) concept of 
survival.3 That Protean person is our substance sortal is, Johnston thinks, an 
a priori truth, delivered by philosophical reflection on the sort of thing that we 
are. 
6.1 The problem of refiguration. 
Johnston is unhappy with the sort of first-order, 'cryptophase kind' view of 
survival I have advocated because he wants to draw from practice-
dependence a 'radical' and 'revisionary' upshot-"we all now have reason to 
aim to internalize a socially enactable concept of personal identity which 
makes available and contributes to a better life"4; "If Modified Relativism is 
true, then the obvious upshot is that we should all think of ourselves as 
Protean persons and should seek a cryptophase conception of ourselves 
which fits a life which is best or maximally good"5. That is to say, we may all 
now have reason to reorganize our person-directed practices around 
2ibid., p.466. This is also just one example of a claim from Johnston that can equally well, if 
not better, be read as advocating the second-order view-survival is the property which all 
the cryptophase kinds have in common, viz being a realizer of the survival role for a given 
community at a given time. For the overarching property which unifies different cryptophase 
kinds is just the second-order property; and, Johnston seems to be suggesting here, survival 
(Protean person) is that unifying property. 
30n the second-order understanding of Protean person, Protean person is the disjunction of 
all the relations which have the property of realizing the survival role for a given community 
at different times in their continuing existence. 
4ibid., p.468. 
sibid., p.467. 
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whatever relation it is that leaves us able to survive such things as 
teletransportation, which will give us access to such advantages as superfast 
travel and freedom from disease. 
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The motivation for this thought, I take it, is this. When we were 
practice-independent we thought that our survival conditions were carved 
immutably in stone. To organize our person-directed practices and concerns 
in terms of some relation other than the privileged relation served up by 
nature or God would be to make a serious mistake-it would be to miss or 
misdescribe something intrinsically important about the way the world is. 
Once we become practice-dependent, we realize that there is no such 
privileged relation served up by nature or God which demands that we 
organize our person-directed practices and concerns around one socially 
workable relation rather than another if we are not to be seriously mistaken. 
Rather, what makes some relation count as the relation of survival is that that 
is the relation around which subject's organize their person-directed practices 
and concerns. So communities, such as the Teletransporters and the 
Somataphiles, who successfully organize their person-directed practices and 
concerns around different relations, have blamelessly different survival 
concepts. And once we come to think that another community might, quite 
blamelessly, organize their person-directed practices and concerns around a 
relation different from the one around which we organize ours, it looks as if 
we can admit that we ourselves would be blameless had we organized, or 
were we to come to organize, our person-directed practices and concerns 
around a relation different from the one around which we presently organize 
them. By analogy with the inter-communal case, practice-dependence tells us 
something about the intra-communal case. It tells us that, were we to 
organize our person-directed practices around some relation other than the 
one around which we presently organize them (were the Somataphiles to 
become Teletransporters, for example), we would come to have a blamelessly 
different survival concept-we would have a blamelessly different view of 
the sorts of events that we could survive. Once we admit multiple 
realizability for different communities, it looks as if we can similarly admit it 
for our own. 
Practice-dependence thus seems to make for a radical new possibility 
in survival. It seems to pave the way for us to change our survival conditions 
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by refiguring our person-directed practices and concerns in terms of some 
new, more advantageous, relation.6 It seems to pave the way for us to 
internalize a concept of personal identity which best suits our needs and 
wants. It seems to free us to organize our person-directed practices around 
whatever relation it is that makes for the good life. In so doing, practice-
dependence places the question of personal identity firmly in the moral and 
political sphere. 
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But, Johnston thinks, practice-dependence makes for an even more 
revisionary upshot than this. According to Johnston, practice-dependence 
makes for the possibility for the Somataphiles, not merely to view 
teletransportation as providing great benefits for other people with a 
blamelessly different set of person-directed practices and concerns such as the 
Teletransporters, but as able to provide great benefits for them, the 
Somataphiles. Practice-dependence, Johnston thinks, paves the way for the 
Somataphiles to rightly view teletransportation as a means to realize a better 
life for them. It makes for the possibility of surviving events which, by our 
present lights, we determinately fail to survive. This is the revisionary moral 
that Johnston wants to draw from practice-dependence. 
However, my account of survival (in Johnston's terms, a 'cryptophase-
kind' account) poses a problem for Johnston's revisionary aspirations. The 
problem is that, on my view, the statement 'I will survive teletransportation' 
uttered by a Somataphile is simply, straightforwardly false. For 
teletransportation fails to preserve physical continuity, the relation that they 
care about. And so the Somataphiles cannot view teletransportation as 
providing great benefits for them. For they will die upon teletransportation. 
Moreover, even the statement 'Were I to refigure in the appropriate way, I 
would survive teletransportation' is, from their perspective, false as well. For 
they stand to the thoughts and doings of that later refigured self as they 
presently stand to the Teletransporters. Once appraised of pluralism, they 
6 Refiguration is a very interesting issue in itself, and raises many questions. For example, 
might individuals refigure on their own, or must it be a community-wide change of mind and 
concern? Interesting though they are, I shall not address these issues in any detail here. 
Moreover, in what follows, I will speak of 'refiguration' as if it were the easiest and most off-
hand of things to do. But, of course, it may often involve a quite radical re-orienting of 
perspective and practice. Perhaps some individuals could refigure overnight, but I suspect 
that, for most of us, it would be a gradual process. 
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regard the Teletransporters as having a blamelessly different survival 
concept, but as having a different survival concept nonetheless. For whereas 
the Teletransporters regard teletransportation as a quick and efficient means 
of transport, they regard it as certain death. At most, what can be true for a 
Somataphile appraised of pluralism, is that, although they would not now 
survive teletransportation, some future person-stage, were they to have the 
appropriate person-directed practices, would blamelessly regard 
teletransportation as survival-preserving. But such a person-stage, post-
teletransportation, would not be a stage of them. For, by their lights, they 
will not survive such an event. 
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Moreover, on my analysis of survival, the initial act of refiguration (i.e. 
the reorganization of person-directed practices around some new, more 
advantageous relation) is entirely unmotivated from the point of view of the 
participants. For think of things again from the point of view of a 
Somataphile-person convinced of pluralism. They know that their survival 
conditions are not, of natural necessity, carved immutably in stone, but are 
given by the relation that organizes their person-directed practices and 
concerns. However, that relation presently happens to be physical continuity; 
and, from their present point of view, refiguration will result in their doing 
things (such as teletransportation) which, far from bringing them great 
benefits, will simply result in their death. From their present point of view 
refiguration looks like an absolutely crazy, suicidal (or, at any rate, suicide-
inducing) thing to do. And so it looks as if, by their present lights, the 
Somataphiles have pretty compelling reason not to refigure; to self-bind to 
prevent such refiguration which will result in their doing such foolhardy 
things as teletransportation, if needs be. From their point of view, the 
question posed by such refiguration is not the question, 'will 
teletransportation make for a better life for me?' but rather, 'am I prepared to 
die so that some future person very like me in psychological respects (about 
which I don't much care) can reap great benefits?' As Johnston himself 
describes the problem, 
The ... objection is that it is simply not correct for our representative Human 
Being to think that having survived reculturation, he will then survive 
Teletransportation. The objection is that since at the time at which he is 
deliberating his concept of personal identity is the concept of being the same 
human being, he ought to employ that concept in thinking about and 
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evaluating all possible future situations, even possible future situations 
which involve his adopting a different concept of personal identity. 
According to the objector this is a general point about concept use with 
respect to possible situations. We must always clearly distinguish the 
concepts we presently use to describe, think about, and evaluate the 
situation from the concepts used in the situation. Thus it is not correct to 
say that if we come to mean by "green" what we now mean by "blue", then 
the concept green would apply to the sky, so that then the sky would be 
green. The sentence "The concept green applies to the sky" would then be 
taken by us as true, but nevertheless from our present perspective we must 
we must say that the concept green does not apply to the sky. Similarly, our 
representative Human Being at the time of considering the upcoming 
reculturation and Teletransportation should consistently employ his present 
concept of personal identity. From his present perspective he would not 
survive Teletransportation even if he were recultured first. Reculturation 
would simply give him false views about what he could survive. So he has 
no reason to refigure his pattern of concerns and expectations, and hence his 
concept of personal identity. Teletransportation can never provide benefits 
for him ... It is important for my purposes that this objection can be got 
around since the moral I wish to draw from relativism is that we are all in a 
situation in some ways parallel to our representative Human Being. We 
may all have reason to refigure our concerns and expectations.7 
The problem for Johnston, then, who wants to draw from pluralism 
this 'revisionary moral', is how to make it true, and motivationally salient, 
that the Somataphiles can view teletransportation as providing great benefits 
for them, and not just for some other future person or persons distinct from 
them. 
Note that it will not help Johnston here to move to a second-order 
account. This is what I had in mind when I earlier said that, although the first 
and second-order views differ about the metaphysics of survival, they do not 
have substantially different motivational upshots. For teletransportation, 
because it does not preserve physical continuity, does not preserve the 
higher-order property possessed by physical continuity either-namely, 
realizing the survival role for the Somataphiles. 8 For, whether survival is 
7 ibid. pp. 461-2. 
8There is a different sort of second-order view which will allow for the possibility of 
refiguration. It is the view which says that survival consists in the second-order property of 
being a relation that might play the survival role for a community i.e. being a relation around 
which, compatible with their cultural identity, they could organize their person-directed 
practices. No problem about refiguration here, for psychological continuity, just as much as 
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physical continuity or the higher-order property possessed by physical 
continuity (namely, being the realizer of the survival role for the 
Somataphiles), the extension of the concept of survival is exactly the same-a 
person will survive or fail to survive exactly the same set of events in either 
case. 
6.2 Are we Protean People? 
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Johnston's solution to the problem of refiguration is, in effect, just to deny 
that the application conditions for the use of the term 'survival' in a person's 
mouth are given by the relation that presently organizes that person's person-
directed practices and concerns. According to Johnston, our survival 
conditions are given not just by the relation that organizes our person-
directed practices and concerns at the present time, but also by the relations 
that will come to organize them at future times. It turns out that we can 
survive events which by our present lights we determinately fail to survive. 
For, Johnston claims, being a Somataphile-person (regarding 
teletransportation as certain death) is a mere phase sortal, real survival-our 
substance sortal-is Protean person. According to Johnston's Protean person 
view, a person X survives some future event e just in case e is not an event at 
odds with X's cryptophase kind at the time of the event e. That is to say, you 
survive an event just in case, by your lights at the time of that event (not by 
your lights now), you survive that event. By refiguring their person-directed 
practices and concerns in terms of some new relation before an event, a 
person can bring it about that they survive that event, even if, by their 
present, pre-refigured lights, they determinately do not survive that event. 
For, from their perspective then, at the time of that survival-threatening 
event, they would survive that event; and so, according to the Protean person 
view, they would survive it. 
According to the Protean person view, then, a Somataphile-person 
who reorganized their person-directed practices around psychological 
continuity, and was then teletransported, would survive teletransportation, 
despite the fact that, by their present lights, they fail to survive. For the 
Protean person view tells a Somataphile-person that, were they so to refigure 
physical continuity, has the property of being a relation around which a community could 
organize their person-directed practices and concerns. 
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before the event of teletransportation, they would survive teletransportation, 
despite what they happen to think about things now. For, in so reorganizing 
their person-directed practices, they will have changed their cryptophase 
kind: they will have become a Teletransporter-person. And by their lights 
then, at the time of the event, teletransportation would be survival-
preserving. But a Somataphile-person, forcibly teletransported before 
reorganizing their person-directed practices around psychological continuity, 
would not survive teletransportation. For their person-directed practices 
would still be organized around physical continuity-they would still be of 
cryptophase kind, Somataphile-and, by their lights then, as now, 
teletransportation would result in their death. According to the Protean 
person view, then, reorganizing your person-directed practices in terms of a 
relation according to which you survive teletransportation (if you have to), 
before you get into the teletransporter is the difference between life and death. 
(Note that a problem for Johnston here is what to say about a community 
who have a concept according to which refiguration-the initial act of 
reorganizing their person-directed practices around another relation-results 
in their death. It is certainly possible to imagine a community who have a 
concept of survival according to which you do not survive such a change of 
mind. In fact, I think, there are actual communities-various religious sects 
in the United States, for example-who believe something strikingly akin to 
this.) 
If Johnston's account is right, then we must revise our initial opinion 
that the Somataphiles in our original story were just blamelessly different 
from the Teletransporters to regard teletransportation as resulting in their 
certain death. For it turns out that they are not blamelessly different after all. 
They are not blameless to care deeply and non-instrumentally as they do 
about physical continuity in survival; so deeply that they tum down the offer 
of the teletransportation technology with all the benefits it could bring. 
Indeed, if we take Johnston's (apparently non-Humean!) revisionary 
normative claim at face value, not only were they mistaken to regard 
teletransportation as certain death, but moreover, they were defective in 
choosing not to become Teletransporters themselves. They were defective 
not to refigure their person-directed practices and concerns in terms of the 
Teletransporters' concept of survival which, were they so to refigure, could 
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then 'make available and contribute to a better life' for them. As Johnston 
writes, 
The relativist should say that kinds like Human Being and Series Human 
Being are, in fact, cryptophase kinds, associated with phases which persons 
can live through given, but only given, special circumstances that is 
refiguration ... Nonetheless-and this is the crucial point-although these 
concepts were correct concepts of personal identity modulo the restriction 
that no refiguration takes place, they were strictly defective. For they were 
concepts of identity restricted to (unobvious) phase kinds.9 
The Somataphiles were defective not to refigure their person-directed 
practices and concerns in terms of psychological continuity because the 
statement 'I will survive teletransportation, providing I refigure in the 
appropriate way beforehand', uttered by an individual of the cryptophase 
kind Somataphile, is true. It is true because the occurrence of 'I' in this 
statement picks out, not an individual of cryptophase kind Somataphile (for, 
of course, from their perspective as a Somataphile, they will die at 
teletransportation, whatever some later person-stage may think about things) 
but an individual of the overarching kind Protean person-an individual 
who can survive refiguration and, having survived refiguration, will then 
survive teletransportation. For they will then, at the time of that survival-
threatening event, be of cryptophase kind Teletransporter, and from their 
perspective then, teletransportation will be survival-preserving. And, since 
whether or not a person survives an event such as teletransportation is 
determined by their having the appropriate person-directed practices and 
concerns at the time of that event, they will survive that event. As Johnston 
writes, 
Once our representative Human Being is converted to Modified Relativism 
about personal identity, he should think that his previous conviction that he 
could not survive any process, however complex, which brought it about 
that nothing after the process is the same human being as him was a 
mistake, the mistake of taking a phase kind to be a substance kind. He 
should conclude that his substance kind is the kind Protean person. Then 
he will be able to trace himself through the reculturation and even through 
the Teletransportation by thinking, "I will survive reculturation, and then I 
will survive Teletransportation". Both occurrences of "I" in this thought 
pick out an individual of the substance kind Protean person, and so an 
9ibid., p.464. 
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individual which will survive reculturation and then Teletransportation.10 
The Somataphiles were then mistaken to attach so much importance to 
physical continuity in questions of survival. For such concern hinged on a 
false view of the metaphysics of survival. In caring so deeply and non-
instrumentally about physical continuity in survival, the Somataphiles were 
not caring about survival, but instead about a mere phase-sortal; about just 
one parochial possible realizer of the survival role. According to Johnston, to 
think that our survival conditions are straightforwardly given by the relation 
about which we presently care would be to make a big mistake about the 
metaphysics of survival. It would be to confuse our cryptophase kind for our 
substance sortal. Our substance sortal is Protean person; and what is 
important for survival for Protean persons is not what a person presently 
thinks about survival, but what that person will think about survival at future 
times: most saliently, at the future times where they undergo survival-
threatening events. 
But why is it such a mistake for a person to care about surviving by 
their present lights? Why, in Johnston's terms, is our substance sortal Protean 
person rather than 'Cryptophase Kind'? Certainly, nothing in practice-
dependence tells us that our survival conditions are determined by our lights 
at future times (the times of survival-threatening events) rather than by our 
present lights. Nothing in practice-dependence tells us that when we wonder 
now whether we will survive a survival-threatening event in ten years time 
we must predict what a future person in ten years time will think about that 
survival-threatening event. Of course, nothing in practice-dependence 
obviously tells us that our survival conditions are determined by our present 
lights either. Practice-dependence simply tells us that a relation earns its 
right to count as the relation of survival for members of a community in 
virtue of its being the relation about which members of that community care. 
It does not, in itself, tell us which practices at which times determine a 
person's survival conditions in circumstances where a person's person-
directed practices change (although it does tell us that all socially workable 
survival concepts are on a normative par). That is to say, it does not in itself 
lOibid., p.467. 
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tell us whether our practices now determine our survival conditions or 
whether it is our practices at the time of some future survival-threatening 
event (or our practices at any other time for that matter) which determine 
whether or not we survive any given upcoming survival-threatening event. 
But Johnston's way of going comes at some considerable cost. For the 
first part, and I shall come back to this point, it seems completely arbitrary to 
pick on a person's person-directed practices at the time of a survival-
threatening event, rather than their practices at some other time, as the 
privileged perspective that determines whether or not that person survives 
that event. 
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For the second part, on Johnston's account, if you are now wondering 
whether or not you will survive some future survival-threatening event in ten 
years time, what you should be thinking on is not what you think about 
things now, but whether a future person in ten years time will regard that 
event as survival-preserving. In order to know whether the statement 'I will 
survive teletransportation' uttered by you now is true or not, you need to 
predict what the opinions of a future self ten years on just before 
teletransportation will be. If that future self has the Somataphiles' beliefs 
about teletransportation, then you will not survive teletransportation, and the 
statement 'I will survive teletransportation' uttered by you ten years earlier 
will turn out to be false (even if you now think it counts as determinately 
true). If, on the other hand, that future person has the Teletransporters' 
beliefs about survival at the time at which they are teletransported, the 
statement 'I will survive teletransportation' will turn out to be true (even if 
you now think it counts as determinately false). The counter-intuitive thing 
here is not that our predictions about what a future person will think, and so 
whether or not we will survive future events, might be mistaken. For we can 
have mistaken beliefs about what relation underpins our person-directed 
practices at the present time (as, for example, does Swinburne, who believes 
that he organizes his person-directed practices around the soul, when in fact 
there is no such thing) let alone at future times. The counter-intuitive thing 
about Johnston's view is that we have to make predictions at all in order to 
know the application conditions for the term 'survival' in our mouths now. 
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It is no accident that we typically apply aesthetic concepts, value 
concepts, the concept of survival, and the like-concepts which connect up 
with our concerns, sentiments, and dispositions to act in important and 
intimate ways-in accordance with our present lights, rather than our lights 
at other times. For it is our present perspective on these things, not our 
predictions about the perspective of some future self or anyone else, that is 
typically psychologically and motivationally salient for us.11 If we believe 
that we will shortly die, for example, it just doesn't seem to be much 
consolation to be told that at the moment just before our death we will take a 
different view of things. We just don't seem to care much about surviving by 
some future person's lights; we care about surviving by our present lights. 
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A central intuition driving practice-dependence, I earlier argued, is the 
intuition that survival should not be able to come apart from what a 
community cares about. But, on Johnston's account, after all that effort, it yet 
again does. As both I and Johnston set up the case of the Teletransporters 
and the Somataphiles, for example, the Somataphiles care about physical 
continuity. They do not care about surviving Protean-style-that there may 
be some future refigured person who will regard teletransportation as 
survival-preserving just before that event-they care about surviving by their 
own present, situated lights. They realize that this concern may seem 
parochial from the Protean person view of things, but that is their concern. 
They do not care about surviving Protean-style, they care about surviving by 
their present, situated lights. Insofar as a community may care about 
surviving by their present lights, survival, on Johnston's account, comes apart 
from what a community care about. (Note that even on Johnston's account, 
you should care a little about the relation that presently organizes your 
person-directed practices, for if there is no relation that organizes your 
person-directed practices at any given time, you do not survive at all (at least 
by your own lights)! But, if you care about survival, you should not care too 
much about the relation that presently organizes your person-directed 
practices. For the Protean person view tells you that you will survive 
refiguration and, insofar as you care about survival, you must also care about 
llThis is exactly the worry that so many have about 'ideal-observer' theories in meta-ethics: 
theories which say that what you ought to do in a situation is what an ideal observer would 
do. But why, you might well ask, should I care about that; why should I be in any way 
motivated to do what some 'ideal observer' would do? 
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the relations that, post-refiguration, will come to organize your person-
directed practices and concerns.) 
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Of course, the sense in which survival can come apart from what a 
community cares about on Johnston's account is different from the way in 
which, for example, Parfit claims that survival can come apart from what 
matters. Parfit's claim is that, although where you have survival (identity) 
you always have what matters, the reverse is not true-sometimes you can 
have what matters, where you do not have identity. That is to say, for Parfit, 
survival (identity) is sufficient, but not necessary, for the preservation of what 
matters. On Johnston's view, where survival comes apart from what a 
community cares about, it comes apart, not because survival ever fails to 
guarantee the holding of what matters, but because a community may care 
about something else more than they care about survival. They might care 
more about the relation that presently organizes their person-directed 
practices than they do about the relations that will organize their person-
directed practices at future times. They may prefer to die, than to refigure 
and survive. That is to say, whereas on Parfit's view, identity is sufficient, 
but not necessary for the preservation of what matters, on Johnston's account, 
survival is necessary, but not sufficient, for the preservation of what matters. 
Nonetheless, on Johnston's account, to care greatly about the relation 
that presently organizes your person-directed practices and concerns is 
instrumentally irrational, if not irrational simpliciter (for I suspect that 
Johnston is all of a sudden non-Humean when it comes to his revisionary 
upshot). For, insofar as you care about survival, you should care not just 
about the relation that presently organizes your person-directed practices, but 
also about the relations that will organize them at future times. The 
Somataphiles, for example, were instrumentally irrational to care so much 
about physical continuity that they turned down the offer of the 
teletransporter technology. For such concern prevented them from refiguring 
to take advantage of the teletransporter technology which, the Protean person 
view tells them, were they only so to refigure, would provide them with great 
advantages. 
Moreover, on Johnston's account, when a person is confronted with a 
survival-threatening event-an event which, by their present lights, they do 
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not survive-the instrumentally rational thing for that person to do is to 
hasten to refigure in whatever way is required before they undergo the 
survival-threatening event. For, on Johnston's view, then, but only then, will 
that person survive it. We might imagine, for example, that the 
Teletransporters decide that the way to convince the Somataphiles to take up 
the offer of the teletransporter technology is forcibly to teletransport them a 
few times. For then they will come to see that teletransportation does them 
no harm. On Johnston's account, in such a situation, if the Somataphiles care 
about surviving, the instrumentally rational thing for them to do is to refigure 
post-haste before they are teletransported. Suppose, moreover, (as is 
plausible given the depth of the Somataphiles' concern for physical 
continuity), they find that, try as they might, they cannot cease greatly to care 
about physical continuity. Increasingly desperate, they beg the 
Teletransporters not to teletransport them. The Teletransporters try to help 
out. They begin to hold special brain-washing clinics, after which 
Somataphile subjects emerge unharmed, except for the fact that they no 
longer care much about physical continuity in survival. To speed things up 
in time for the impending teletransportations, Teletransporter scientists 
develop a tablet which, when taken, causes the subject to cease to care about 
physical continuity. Signing up for the brainwashing and/ or taking the 
mind-altering tablet doesn't seem like a particularly rational thing to do 
(especially if you now think that it will only lead you happily to later suicide), 
but, on Johnston's account, it is exactly the rational thing to do. If you care 
about surviving, you ought to take the mind-altering tablet. But it just 
doesn't seem that, if you care about surviving, brainwashing and/ or taking 
the mind-altering tablet would be the rational thing to do. Nor would it seem 
much consolation to know, as you raised the tablet to your lips, that although 
(as you now most deeply believe) teletransportation will result in your death, 
as you step into the teletransporter you will have an entirely different view of 
things. Needless to say, it seems as if something has gone wrong here. True 
enough, there are cases where actively seeking brainwashing might be the 
rational thing to do in order to survive-in China during the cultural 
revolution, for example-but that we may all have reason to be such cultural 
fugitives seems hard to believe. 
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But perhaps Johnston takes his account to be revisionary of our 
ordinary way of thinking about survival. Perhaps Johnston's claim is that we 
should cease to think of survival as we do. We should cease to care about 
surviving by our present lights, and instead care about surviving by some 
future person's lights: most notably, by the lights of a future self who will 
undergo some survival-threatening event. But Johnston offers no argument 
as to why we should think of survival in this revised way rather than in the 
way we presently do, except that it allows for his 'revisionary moral'. And, 
moreover, it is hard to see what, compatible with practice-dependence, such 
an argument could be. 
Johnston himself feels the pull of the intuition that our present 
concerns, parochial though they may seem from the Protean person view of 
things, are nonetheless our concerns; and we ought to respect them as such. 
Why, for example, should it be a person's person-directed practices just 
before the survival-threatening event, rather than just after it, that determine 
whether or not they survive that event? Johnston's answer, I take it, would 
be that we need to respect "the basic relativistic idea ... that what a person 
considered at a time can survive depends on his concerns and expectations at 
that time."12 The problem is that, if we respect the perspective of the 
Somataphiles as giving their survival conditions, then pluralism will not 
allow for Johnston's revisionary upshot. But the next best thing-making 
their survival conditions determined, not by their present perspective, but by 
their perspective at the time at which they undergo a survival-threatening 
event-will. The problem is that the next best thing fails to respect the 
Somataphiles' perspective on survival, according to which teletransportation 
will result in their death, whatever they may later come to believe. However, 
as Johnston sees it, it is impossible both to accommodate the intuition that a 
person's survival conditions are straightforwardly determined by the relation 
that presently organizes their person-directed practices and to allow for the 
'revisionary upshot'. And so, in the end, Johnston trades off the intuition that 
a person's survival is determined by their present perspective on the matter 
for the possibility of refiguration. This is what happens in the move from 
cryptophase kind to Protean person. Apparently, for Johnston, the 
revisionary benefits are worth the cost. If I had to choose, I would say that 
12Johnston(1989c), p.464. 
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the benefits were not worth the cost. But, fortunately, I do not have to. For 
there is a way of fleshing out first-order practice-dependence which will 
allow for the sense in which practice-dependence makes for a revisionary 
upshot, without denying that there is an important sense in which, when the 
Somataphiles say 'whether I refigure or not, I will not survive 
teletransportation', they really do utter a truth.13 Call this account 'temporal-
phase' pluralism. Exactly how it is a pluralist, rather than a relativist, view 
will emerge in section 6.5. 
6.3 Temporal-Phase Pluralism14 
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It is perhaps easiest, to begin with, to explain this view in four-dimensionalist 
terms (although there is, I think, a three-dimensionalist paraphrase15). Four-
dimensionalists regard persisting things, including persons, as made up of 
distinct temporal parts. We can think of these parts as like the dots on a join-
the-dots picture, before they have been joined up to form a picture. (Or as 
like the stars in the sky, before they have been joined up into the 
constellations). From the four-dimensionalist's point of view, the question of 
personal identity is the question of how to put the temporal parts or person-
stages (where here 'person-stage' is being used as a synonym for temporal 
part of a person, and thus not agnostic between three- and four-
dimensionalism) together into parts of a single, whole, continuing person. 
Or, to use the join-the-dot analogy, how do we join the dots-through which 
dots do we draw the survival line. Which temporal parts are parts of a single 
continuent person?16 
Practice-dependence gives us an answer to this question or, at least, it 
tells us how to go about finding the answer to this question. It tells us that 
different person-stages count as stages of the same person when, and only 
when, those person-stages are related by the relation (whatever it is) around 
which a person (or set or aggregate of person-stages) organize their person-
13Temporal-phase pluralism is also perfectly compatible with the second-order view, if the 
second-order view turned out to be right after all. 
14Tuis section owes a special debt to many stimulating and helpful conversations with David 
Braddon-Mitchell. 
151 will briefly discuss how such a paraphrase might go in Chapter 7. 
16From the three-dimensionalist's point of view, the question of personal identity is the 
question of what makes a person wholly present at one time the same person as a person 
wholly present at another. 
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directed practices. The problem posed by refiguration is the problem of what 
to do when different person-stages organize their person-directed practices 
around different relations-when there is conflict between the sorts of events 
that an earlier set of person-stages views as survival-preserving and those 
that a later set of person-stages views as survival-preserving. That is to say, 
when the prospective attitudes of an earlier set of person-stages conflict with 
the retrospective attitudes of a later set of person-stages. When an earlier set 
of person-stages views an upcoming event (say, teletransportation) as certain 
death, while a later set of person-stages take themselves to survive it. What 
we are imagining in refiguration is the Somataphiles' and the 
Teletransporters' perspectives on survival rolled up into the perspective of a 
single, deeply conflicted, fragmented self. 
One solution to the problem would be to dissolve the conflict of 
perspectives by abstracting away from the perspectives of person-stages 
altogether and taking a detached, unsituated, god's-eye perspective on the 
conflict. (This is the solution which Johnston adopts. Where refiguration is in 
the offing we should think of our survival conditions in the following 
abstract, schematic way-I will survive an event just in case I have a concept 
according to which I survive that event at the time at which I undergo that 
event). Another would be to resolve the conflict by privileging the situated 
perspective of one set of person-stages over another-to claim that one 
situated perspective rather another is the situated perspective which 
determines a person's survival conditions. The problem is that both of these 
solutions go against the grain of practice-dependence. For, according to 
practice-dependence, and in vivid contrast to practice-independent views, 
survival is importantly perspectival-relative to the perspective and concerns 
of individuals located in time at times. And, according to practice-
dependence, no one (socially enactable) perspective on survival has any more 
privileged claim to give a subject's survival conditions than any other . 
In the spirit of practice-dependence, then, we should claim that 
survival is relative to the perspective of individuals in time at times. But, in 
circumstances where different person-stages have different perspectives, 
which practices at which times? It would seem completely arbitrary to 
privilege the perspective of any one person-stage over another as 
determining whether or not a person survives some event. Strangely enough, 
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Johnston himself notes this point as against the claim that a person's survival 
conditions are determined by a person's present perspective on survival. He 
writes, 
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... [I]f the basic relativistic idea is that what a person considered at a time can 
survive depends on his concerns and expectations at that time, then when 
considering someone who has refigured his core concerns and expectations, 
it will seem arbitrary for the relativist to privilege this person's earlier 
concerns and expectations and say that they alone determine what he can 
survive, so that, for example, a Human Being, even after reculturation as a 
Teletransporter remains able to survive all and only what a Human Being 
can survive. There should be a certain symmetry here.17 
Johnston, I think, is absolutely right: there should be a symmetry here. But if 
privileging the earlier perspective of an individual is arbitrary, so too is 
privileging the later perspective of the individual at the time of a survival-
threatening event. If we go the former route, we arbitrarily privilege the 
earlier perspective; if we go the latter route, we arbitrarily privilege the later 
perspective. But there is one perspective which it is not arbitrary to privilege. 
And that is the perspective of each and every person-stage. According to 
temporal-phase pluralism (TPP), the perspective of each and every person-
stage equally determines a person's survival conditions. How? 
Each and every person-stage regards certain other person-stages as 
related to them in the appropriate way. Practice-dependence tells us what 
that appropriate way is or, at least, it tells us how to find out what that 
appropriate way is. It tells us that a person-stage Al will regard another 
person-stage A2 (or A3 or A4 or ... ) as being related to them in the 
appropriate way when, and only when, A2 (or A3 or A4 or ... ) share the 
relation around which person-stage Al organizes their person-directed 
practices and concerns. Each person-stage constructs a person out of all and 
only those person-stages which are related to them in the appropriate way, 
i.e. by the relation about which that person-stage cares. A person stage, Al 
has a relation Ri which constructs a person out of all and only those person-
stages which are Ri related to Al; a person-stage A2 has a relation Ri which 
constructs a person of all those person-stages which are Ri related to A2; a 
person-stage A3 constructs a person made up of all and only those person-
l7Zoc.cit. 
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stages which are Ri related to A3; and so on for each and every person-stage. 
We can represent the situation diagrammatically like this (Figure 1): 
-------- - -- - .... , \ 
• I • • • I • • • I I 
I J'l.1 A1 A3: A4 As A6 A7 I 
\ , 
... ____________ 
------------ .... , \ 
• • • • I. . . I I I 
: A1 ~ A3: A4 As A6 A7 
\ , 
... ____________ 
------------------
, \ 
• 
I 
• • • • 
I 
• • I I I 
A1 I A1 J'l.3 A4 As I A6 A7 \ I , __________________ , 
e Person Stage 
- - • Person Boundary 
Fig 1. Constructing persons 
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In the first line of the diagram, a person-stage Al constructs a person out of 
two other person-stages, A2 and A3, which are all and only the person-stages 
which are related to Al by the relation around which she cares. A4, AS, A6 
and A7 are not, from Al's perspective, related to her in the appropriate way, 
and so not parts of her, the same whole or continuent person. In the second 
line, A2 constructs a person out of all and only those person-stages which are 
related to A2 by the relation around which she cares, namely, in this case, Al 
and A3. Al and A2, in this case (the first two lines of the diagram), construct 
the same person: both person-stages regard all and only person-stages Al, A2 
and A3 as being related to them in the appropriate way. A3 (the third line in 
Figure 1), however, constructs a different person from the person that person-
stages Al and A2 construct. A3 constructs a person out of person-stages A2, 
(A3), A4 and AS which are all and only those person-stages which, from her 
perspective, are related to her in the appropriate way. In Figure l, although 
Al regards A3 as being related to her (Al) in the appropriate way, A3 does 
not regard Al as being related to her (A3) in the appropriate way. Al regards 
A3 as being a part of her, but A3 regards Al as being a part of a different 
person. For, from A3's perspective, Al is not related to her (A3) in the 
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appropriate way, i.e. by the relation around which she organizes her person-
directed practices and concerns. Perhaps, for example, Al is not related to 
her (A3) by physical continuity, the relation about which she (A3) cares. Al 
cares about some different relation, say, psychological continuity, and 
person-stages A2 and A3 are related to her in that way. Survival is thus 
relative to the perspective of each and every person-stage in time at a time: 
which person-stages are parts of the same person depends on which person-
stages each person-stage regards as being related to them in the appropriate 
way. 
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However, if each and every person-stage constructs a person out of all 
and only those person-stages that are related to them by the relation about 
which that person-stage cares, won't this create too many people? What is 
there to stop the arbitrary generation of more and more people: a new person 
for each and every person-stage? Any two person-stages which have all and 
only the same stages as parts will be the same person. And, although each 
person-stage constructs a person out of other person-stages related to them in 
the appropriate way, many person-stages construct the same person-they 
regard themselves as being identical with exactly the same set or aggregate of 
person-stages. Thus, for example, in Figure l, person-stages Al and A2 
construct the same person-from both of their perspectives all and only 
person-stages Al, A2 and A3 are parts of them, the same whole person. A3 
constructs a different person from the person that Al constructs. For the 
person constructed by Al and the person constructed by A3 have different 
stages as parts. 
What happens when a person-stage refigures their person-directed 
practices and concerns is that they change their view about what counts as 
being related to them in the appropriate way. They change their view about 
exactly which other person-stages are parts of them, the same whole 
continuing person. For they change their view about which relation it is that 
unites different stages into stages of the same person. They thus construct a 
person out of different stages to the stages out of which an earlier person-
stage or set of person-stages constructed a person of which they may be a 
part. That is to say, they construct a new and different person. We saw this is 
Figure 1 where, although person-stage Al constructed a person of which A3 
was a part, A3 constructs a person of which Al is no part. Al and A3 thus 
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differ about which person-stages are parts of them, the same whole 
continuing person. Refiguration, but refiguration alone, thus leads to the 
construction of new people. Insofar as different person-stages take a common 
perspective on survival, insofar as they regard the same set of person-stages 
as being related to them in the appropriate way, they will construct the same 
person. If, on the other hand, every person-stage refigured to take a new 
perspective on which person-stages were related to them in the appropriate 
way, there would be a new person for every person-stage. TPP leaves it open 
that there might be a new person for every person-stage (in the somewhat 
unlikely event that every person-stage refigured), but it gives us what is 
important-a principled practice-dependent principle for counting persons. 
Let me put some flesh on these somewhat schematic bones, by 
considering what TPP has to say of Johnston's case: the case of the 
Somataphile who refigures to come to regard teletransportation as survival 
preserving, and is then teletransported. Every person-stage which has the 
Somataphile perspective on survival regards all and only those person-stages 
which are related to them by physical continuity as being related to them in 
the appropriate way, and so parts of them, the same whole or single 
continuent person. But a person-stage who takes the Teletransporter's 
perspective on survival (a Somataphile post-refiguration) will regard 
different person-stages as related to them in the appropriate way, because 
they take a different view on what the appropriate way is. Whereas a 
Somataphile will regard no post-teletransportation person-stages as parts of 
them (for after teletransportation there will be no person-stages which are 
related to them by physical continuity), a Teletransporter will regard those 
person-stages as related to them in the appropriate way, and so parts of them. 
In short, the two perspectives give rise to two different people. The situation 
can be represented as follows (Figure 2): 
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•• 
TIME 
Shared person-stages 
Fig. 2. Refiguration followed by teletransportation 
The large, filled circles in the diagram (some of which are labelled A,B,C and 
D) are distinct time-slices of persons or four-dimensional person-stages. A is 
the first time-slice, the first person-stage; D the last. B is the person-stage 
who refigures to become a Teletransporter, and C marks the time-slice or part 
of a person who undergoes the potentially survival-threatening event, in this 
case, teletransportation. The person-stages A to B (or just before B) all take 
the Somataphile perspective on survival-they regard all and only person-
stages who are related to them by physical continuity as being parts of them. 
From their perspective, the post-teletransportation person-stages, C to D, are 
not parts of them, because not related them in the appropriate way. From the 
perspective of all those person-stages, who collectively construct a person 
let's call Alpha, they will die at teletransportation. After teletransportation, 
there will be no person-stages who are stages of them, Alpha. Person-stage B, 
however, refigures to take a new and different perspective on survival: she 
regards all and only those person-stages that are related to her by 
psychological continuity as being parts of her. She decides she doesn't much 
care about physical continuity. And, let's say, all person-stages B to D take a 
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similar perspective on matters. Person-stage B thus constructs a new person, 
call her Beta, made up of all and only those parts which are psychologically 
continuous with her. Because person-stages B to Dall take the same 
perspective on matters they too regard themselves as parts of Beta. From 
Beta's perspective, she will survive teletransportation. For teletransportation 
preserves the relation among person-stages that she cares about. 
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As I have described the situation in Figure 2, the person-stages which 
make up Alpha are also parts of Beta. This is because, as I am assuming, the 
person-stages which comprise Beta retrospectively regard the person-stages 
which make up Alpha as equally parts of them. They expect to remember the 
experiences had by those earlier person-stages; they self-ascribe the actions of 
those early, pre-refigured person-stages, feeling remorse, guilt, pride, shame 
etc for things that those earlier person-stages have done; and so on. In short, 
they have retrospective concern for those early person-stages. Suppose, 
however, that Beta did not have this sort of retrospective concern for the 
prerefigured person-stages-that is to say, suppose they regard those pre-
figured person-stages as stages of a different person. If that were so, the 
situation would look like this (Figure 3): 
------ a---~ 
TIME 
Shared person-stages 
Figure 3. Refiguration and teletransportation without retrospective concern 
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The point to note is that even if Beta did not have retrospective concern for 
past person-stages-if the person-stages which collectively comprise Beta did 
not regard the pre-refigured person-stages as stages of them-Alpha and Beta 
would still share stages or parts (though fewer than if Beta did have 
retrospective concern for those pre-figured person-stages). For Beta exists at 
the point of refiguration B-B is the person-stage which first constructs a 
person out of the person-stages which are related by psychological 
continuity-but Alpha does not die at refiguration. For teletransportation 
(C), not refiguration (B), is the event that Alpha does not survive. 
As should be more than apparent, then, (even from Figure 1) TPP 
allows for stage-sharing: the possibility that a person-stage might be a part of 
more than one person. In both Figure 2 and Figure 3 Alpha and Beta share 
parts or person-stages. There are some person-stages which are both a part of 
Alpha and a part of Beta. Some find the idea of stage-sharing counter-
intuitive. And, indeed, conceived (or perhaps misconceived!) in certain ways, 
it probably is-if we think that what is going on is that where we usually 
thought there was only one person there are actually two people 
mysteriously floating round in a person's head with no access to each others 
mental states, for example. But persons can share stages without having 
some sort of Multiple Personality Disorder. Consider the following diagram 
(Figure 4): 
Goulburn Rd 
The Hume 
Highway 
Goulburn Rd I The Hume Highway 
Figure 4. Roads that share parts. 
Goulburn Rd 
The Hume 
Highway 
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The Goulburn Road and the Hume Highway merge for a stretch before 
again diverging and going their spatially separate ways. How should we 
describe what is going on, metaphysically speaking, here? In particular, what 
should we say about the stretch of road in the middle where the Goulburn 
Road and the Hume Highway join up for a stretch?18 One thing we might 
say is that there are two roads which merge to into one road for a bit and then 
become two roads again. This is the way we sometimes do talk, but the 
problem is that, strictly speaking, it is incorrect. For it violates the logic of 
identity. Identity is transitive-if A is identical with B, and Bis identical with 
C, then C is identical with A. But the above way of speaking violates the 
transitive character of identity. Strictly speaking, and the way we sometimes 
actually do talk, we might say that the section of road where the Goulburn 
Road and the Hume Highway merge is a part of more than one road. It is 
part of the Hume Highway and it is a part of the Goulburn Road. The Hume 
Highway and the Goulburn Road have parts in common, namely, the parts in 
the middle where they merge. This latter description is all that the idea of 
stage-sharing amounts to. It is the idea that a part (a part of a road, for 
example) can be part of more than one thing (part of more than one road), or, 
to put it conversely, that two different things can have parts in common. 
This is a description of the case that both three- and four-
dimensionalists about persisting things can agree with. For three 
dimensionalists, like four-dimensionalists, admit that objects have spatial 
parts, they simply deny that objects also have temporal parts. For the three-
dimensionalist, persisting things are not made up of distinct temporal parts 
extended over time, rather things exist wholly or 'fully present' at a time. 
Three-dimensionalists will then grant the explanation of stage-sharing in 
terms of the shared spatial parts of roads, but they will deny that there is any 
analogy to be drawn between the sharing of spatial parts and the sharing of 
temporal parts. For there are no temporal parts to be shared, only things 
wholly present at times. For the three-dimensionalist, a better spatial, stage-
sharing analogy for the temporal case would need to show how two things 
might be wholly present in the same place. For example, where a building 
society and an insurance company are both located in the same building: they 
jointly inhabit, or are both fully present in, one building. For the three-
18David Lewis (1986) also explains the idea of stage-sharing in terms of intersecting roads. 
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dimensionalist, the temporal case will be exactly the same-two things are 
both fully present, not in the same place now, but at the same time. 
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Famously, David Lewis drew on the idea of stage-sharing to save 
common sense from the problem of fission. Recall, Parfit takes the case of 
fission to show that identity does not matter in personal identity. According 
to Parfit, what matters in survival is psychological continuity and 
connectedness. The problem is that identity is a relation with a strict formal 
character it is one-one (a relation that everything bears to itself and nothing 
else) and all-or nothing (it does not admit of degree). But relations of 
psychological continuity and connectedness (relation-R) need not have that 
formal character: they can be one-many (as in the case of fission) or many-one 
(as in the case of fusion), and they can hold to degrees (I may be more or less 
psychological connected to a future person). Lewis agrees with Parfit that 
what matters in survival is psychological continuity and connectedness.19 
But he denies that this can come apart from the identity relation-the relation 
that holds between different person-stages when they are stages of a single 
continuent person. How could this be so? After all, in fission it looks like 
there is one person R-related to two distinct future people. Lewis's solution is 
to say that there were two people there all along: that is to say, two 
continuent persons who shared earlier person-stages, but who, post-fission, 
have become spatially distinct. Let me explain. 
Lewis is a four-dimensionalist. For four-dimensionalists, as we have 
noted, the question of personal identity is the question of what makes 
different temporal-stages stages of a single continuent person. Following 
Lewis, call the relation (whatever it is) that unites different person-stages into 
stages of the same person, the I-relation. The relation which holds between 
person-stages when and only when they are stages of the same person. Any 
two person-stages will be stages of the same person when they have all parts 
in common, no parts distinct, and there is no other person of whom they are a 
part. Now, Lewis has an object-level story about exactly what relation it is 
that unites different person-stages into stages of the same person i.e. what 
19Note that the prima facie problem fission poses for the claim that identity matters is equally 
a problem for physical continuity theorists. For physical continuity does not have the formal 
character of identity either. Indeed, it is a problem which besets anyone who claims that 
what matters is a relation that does not have the formal character of identity. 
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makes different person-stages I-related. Different person-stages will be 
stages of the same person when and only when those person-stages are 
maximally R-related i.e. when the relation of psychological continuity and/ or 
connectedness holds between those person-stages. According to Lewis, then, 
there is a non-contingent conceptual connection between the I-relation and 
the R-relation: wherever you have the I-relation you have a maximally R-
related set of person-stages; wherever you have a maximally R-related set of 
person-stages you have the I-relation holding amongst those person-stages. 
What, however, about the case of fission? For, in fission, isn't there one 
earlier person R-related to two distinct future people (who are not R-related to 
each other)? Counting persons the way Lewis does, the answer is 'no'. If a 
single, continuent person (or an I-related set of person-stages) is a maximally 
R-related aggregate or set of person-stages there were two people prior to 
fission as well. For, in fission, there are two, not one, maximally R-related 
aggregates of person-stages: two people all along, who, pre-fission, shared 
parts. To Lewis's mind, fission looks like this (Figure 5): 
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Time t1 
Time t0 
s 
Fig. 5. Fission (After Lewis) 
In fission, one earlier person-stage Sat t0 is maximally r-related to two future 
person-stages Sl and 52 at ti. (Sl and 52 are not, of course, R-related to each 
other). There are thus two continuent persons (two maximally R-related sets 
of person-stages) in fission, Sand Sl (Cl) and Sand 52 (C2). The pre-fission 
person-stage, S at t0 is thus a part of more than one person: it is a part of Cl 
and it is a part of C2. For Lewis, then, fission does not violate identity (or, 
better, the I-relation) for in fission one person does not become two, rather 
there were two people there all along: two continuent persons, Cl and C2, 
who, at t0 , shared parts, but who, at ti, have become spatially distinct. 
Similarly, on my account people share-stages: a particular time-slice of 
a person or person-stage can be a part of more than one person. The parts A 
to C in Figure 3 are parts of Alpha and parts of Beta. Like Lewis, I make new 
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people-a new person for every refiguration-but, unlike Lewis, I make them 
without fission. 
There is a worry here, however. The worry is what is there to stop 
arbitrary generation of people-as many people as there are members of the 
power set? Lewis too has this worry. And he answers it as follows. 
According to Lewis, a set of person-stages will constitute a single whole 
person just if those stages are maximally I-related. That is to say, when they 
have all parts in common, no parts distinct, and there is no other person of 
which they are a part. My criteria for distinctness, however, is, and must be, 
different from Lewis's. For, in Figure 3, for example, I claim that Alpha is a 
different person from Beta, even though Alpha is wholly contained within 
Beta-even though, that is to say, Alpha has all parts in common with Beta, 
and no parts distinct from Beta. If Lewis's criteria for distinctness were mine, 
then Alpha would not be a distinct person from Beta. Moreover, prima facie, it 
look as if my criteria for distinctness must not merely be different from 
Lewis's, but actively at odds with it. For not only does Alpha have all parts 
in common with Beta and no parts distinct, but it looks as if there is another 
person of whom Alpha is a part, namely Beta. 
My criteria for distinctness is indeed different from Lewis's, but, 
contrary to initial appearances, it is not at odds with it. For Lewis's claim is 
that you cannot have a maximally I-related person wholly contained within 
another maximally I-related person. But that is not the case with Alpha and 
Beta in Figure 3. For there we have, not an I-related person wholly contained 
within another I-related person, but rather an S(Somataphile)-related person, 
wholly contained within a T(Teletransporter)-related person. And although, 
on Lewis's account, you cannot have an I-related person wholly contained 
within another I-related person, you can have an S-related person wholly 
contained within a T-related person. 
So what, then, is the criteria for distinctness I need? What is there on 
my account to stop the arbitrary generation of people? How can I claim, as I 
do, that Alpha and Beta are two distinct people, rather than merely different 
parts of one continuent person? Fortunately, as already noted, such a 
principled criteria for distinctness drops straight out of practice-dependence. 
Practice-dependence gives us a principled criteria for determining which 
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person-stages are part of the same person (and which are not): different 
person-stages will be part of the same person when, and only when, they 
share the property around which the person of whom they are parts 
organizes their person-directed practices and concerns. Alpha is a different 
person from Beta because Alpha organizes her person-directed practices and 
concerns around a different relation from the relation around which Beta 
organizes them. Alpha and Beta differ about which person-stages are stages 
of them, a single continuent person. 
This claim-that wholly contained things can be distinct from the 
things in which they are wholly contained-is, I think, neither difficult to 
understand, nor peculiar to practice-dependence. Return to roads (Figure 6): 
The Alpine Way The Alpine Way 
Kahncoban Rd 
Fig. 6. A wholly contained road. 
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The Kahncoban Road is a section of road which is wholly contained within 
the Alpine Way. Although the Alpine Way has parts which are not contained 
within, or coincident with, the Kahncoban Road, the Kahncoban Road is fully 
contained within the Alpine Way. All parts of the Kahncoban road are 
equally parts of the Alpine Way. There are no parts of the Kahncoban Road 
which are not also parts of the Alpine Way. By Lewis's criteria for 
distinctness, then, the Kahncoban road is not a distinct road from the Alpine 
Way-for it has all parts in common with the Alpine Way and no parts 
distinct. Despite Lewis, locals (and some Australian road maps) talk of the 
Kahncoban Road, although fully contained within the Alpine way, as 
nonetheless a distinct and different road from the Alpine Way. They regard it 
as distinct because it has special historical significance and interest. It was the 
original road along which many famous settlers once travelled and to which, 
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at either end, the Alpine Way was later added. In keeping with its great 
historical significance are various other salient differences: the Kahncoban 
Road has a gravel surface, whereas the Alpine Way (or, more precisely, all the 
parts of it which are not also parts of the Kahncoban Road) is tarmac. Just as 
our interests and concerns make it the case that the Kahncoban Road, 
although wholly contained within the Alpine Way, is nonetheless a distinct 
road, so the interests and concerns of the person-stages which make up Alpha 
make it true that, Alpha, although wholly contained within Beta, is 
nonetheless a distinct person. Just as our interests and concerns make it true 
that for a certain stretch of the Alpine Road there are two roads rather than 
one, so the interests and concerns of person-stages make it true that in Figure 
3 there are two people rather than one. 
6.4 Refiguration revisited. 
How, then, does temporal-phase pluralism allow us to accommodate the 
intuition that there is an important sense in which, when a Somataphile (in 
Figure 3, Alpha) says "even were I to refigure in the appropriate way, I will 
not survive teletransportation", they utter a truth? It does so quite literally. 
For when Alpha says "even if I refigure, I will not survive teletransportation" 
Alpha unambiguously utters a truth. For both occurrences of 'I' in this 
sentence pick out the person Alpha, from whose perspective refiguration will 
result in her doing things, such as teletransportation, which will result in her 
certain death. And, when Alpha speaks, that is absolutely true-Alpha really 
will die at C. For after C there will be no person-stages who are related to 
Alpha in the appropriate way; after C there will be no person-stages who are 
parts of Alpha. Contra Johnston, then, Alpha is not making any mistake in 
thinking that she will not survive an event, such as teletransportation, which 
brings it about that there is a future person who is not physically continuous 
with her. Alpha's life, determined by there holding between person-stages 
the relation which presently organizes her person-directed practices, really 
does end with teletransportation. For teletransportation fails to preserve 
physical continuity, the relation which, from Alpha's perspective, determines 
which person-stages are rightfully part of her. 
If Alpha determinately dies at teletransportation, however, how can 
temporal-phase pluralism allow for the possibility of refiguration and 
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subsequent teletransportation without death? Well, the crucial question is 
death for who? For, when a pre-refiguration (pre-Bin Figure 3) person-stage, 
say A, utters the sentence "I will not survive teletransportation", two people 
speak: one, Alpha, utters a truth; the other, Beta, utters a falsehood.2° For 
person-stage A is, timelessly, a part of two persons. It is a part of Alpha and 
it is a part of Beta. If we're talking about whether or not Alpha can regard 
teletransportation as providing great benefits for her, the answer is 'no'. 
Alpha will die at teletransportation, for the relation which Alpha cares about 
does not hold between the pre- and post-teletransportation person-stages. If 
we're talking about Beta, on the other hand, the answer is 'yes'. For, given 
that the relation that organizes Beta's person-directed practices and concerns 
holds across teletransportation, Beta will survive teletransportation; and so 
rightly view teletransportation as providing great benefits for her. 
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But it might seem that this does not get us all of what Johnston wants 
from the possibility of refiguration. However, it seems to me it is not entirely 
clear exactly what Johnston wants. Sometimes Johnston writes as if what he 
wants is a sense in which a Somataphile, qua Somataphile, can view 
teletransportation as providing great benefits for them, one and the same 
Somataphile. But this cannot be what Johnston wants, even by his own 
lights. For, as Johnston himself points out, there is no way that a 
Somataphile, qua Somataphile, can view teletransportation as survival-
preserving. Only a Somataphile, qua protean person, can view 
teletransportation as survival-preserving. That was the whole point of the 
distinction between phase sortal/ cryptophase kind and substance sortal. 
Only if an individual's substance sortal is protean person, not cryptophase 
kind, can they view teletransportation as providing great benefits for them. 
Johnston doesn't frame things in these terms but, in the light of TPP, 
we can understand his account in this way. When an individual utters the 
word 'I' it is ambiguous: ambiguous as between picking out an individual of 
a certain cryptophase kind and picking out an individual of the overarching 
kind protean person. For individuals are simultaneously members of a 
20we might, if we liked, explain things in another, perhaps less counter-intuitive sounding, 
way. We could say that, strictly speaking, time-slices do not say anything-they just make 
noise. Only persons say things, and the noise made by a time-slice serves as the truth maker 
for the utterances of persons. 
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particular cryptophase kind and members of the overarching kind protean 
person. So, when an individual presently of cryptophase kind Somataphile 
utters the sentence "were I to refigure in the appropriate way I would survive 
teletransportation" the word 'I' in this sentence is ambiguous. 
Disambiguated one way, the statement "were I to refigure, I would survive 
teletransportation" uttered by an individual of cryptophase kind Somataphile 
is false. It is false where the occurrence of 'I' is taken to pick an individual 
qua cryptophase kind Somataphile, whose survival conditions are given by 
the relation that presently organizes her person-directed practices. But an 
individual Somataphile is also and simultaneously a member of the 
overarching kind Protean person. And, when the occurrence of 'I' in "were I 
to refigure, I would survive teletransportation" uttered by a Somataphile 
picks out an individual of the kind Protean person, the statement is true: true, 
at least, on the assumption that the individual refigures before 
teletransportation (false, if they do not). So, that Alpha (individual qua 
cryptophase kind Somataphile) cannot regard teletransportation as survival-
preserving is common ground between me and Johnston. 
I too think that there is a sense in which-a disambiguation according 
to which-when person-stage A utters the statement 'I will survive 
teletransportation' they utter a truth. For when person-stage A speaks for 
Beta, they speak as part of person who survives teletransportation. The 
crucial difference is that what Johnston wants from the possibility of 
refiguration is not merely a sense in which a time-slice of a person is part of 
some person who will survive teletransportation, but a sense in which a 
whole single continuent Somataphile person can survive teletransportation. 
Johnston wants to say that there is a sense in which Alpha can survive 
teletransportation: namely, Alpha qua Protean person can survive 
teletransportation, providing she refigures before that event. I deny that 
there is any sense in which Alpha, the person made up of the person-stages 
who care about physical continuity, can survive teletransportation, whether a 
part of Alpha refigures or not. If a person-stage who is a part of Alpha 
refigures, they construct a new person; a person who will rightly regard 
themselves as surviving teletransportation and who will view parts of Alpha 
as equally parts of them. Such a person would not be Alpha, for from Alpha's 
perspective Alpha will determinately die at teletransportation, but they 
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would regard the person-stages which are parts of Alpha as equally parts of 
them. According to TPP, if a person-stage refigures their person-directed 
practices and concerns, someone can survive teletransportation, but that 
someone is not Alpha. At best, that someone is a different person who 
regards parts of Alpha as parts of them. 
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And this seems exactly to capture the sense in which practice-
dependence makes for a revisionary upshot. Contra Johnston, it seems to me 
no part of practice-dependence that a person can survive a future event that, 
as they now most deeply believe, they determinately fail to survive. To claim 
otherwise fails properly to respect the central practice-dependent tenet that a 
person's survival conditions are determined by their person-directed 
practices and concerns, so that a person cannot survive events which by their 
lights they determinately fail to survive. For if survival is relative to the 
perspective of person-stages, and if the person-stages which collectively 
comprise a Somataphile person view teletransportation as certain death, there 
should not be any sense in which a Somataphile, by whose lights 
teletransportation is certain death, can nonetheless survive teletransportation. 
On the other hand, there does seem to be a sense in which practice-
dependence really does make for a new possibility in survival. For if there is 
nothing served up by nature or God which constrains us to organize our 
person-directed practices and concerns in terms of that privileged natural 
relation if we are not to miss or misdescribe something intrinsically important 
about the way the world is-if survival is determined by our person-directed 
practices and concerns-then there does seem to be a sense in which we are 
free to organize or reorganize those concerns in terms of whatever (socially 
enactable) relation we think best. TPP seems to me exactly to capture the 
sense in which practice-dependence makes that possible, without either 
disrespecting or arbitrarily privileging the perspective of one person-stage or 
set of person-stages over another. It makes for it because, when a person-
stage or set of person-stages reorganize their person-directed practices in 
terms of a new relation, they construct a new person from whose new 
perspective a new and different set of events are survival-preserving. That 
person-the person made up of the parts with that new perspective on 
survival-can then survive all and only those (new) set of events that, by 
their lights, they survive. But there is no reason to impose that new 
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perspective on other (earlier) person-stages who take a different view, and 
claim that it was true all along, despite what those earlier person-stages 
thought, that they would survive all and only those events that, according to 
the 'new' perspective, they survive. 
6.5 Organizing our person-directed concerns to survive 
According to Johnston, if we care about survival, at least where refiguration 
is in the offing we shouldn't care very much about the relation that presently 
organizes our person-directed practices and concerns. For in caring about 
that relation we are not caring about survival, but instead about just one 
parochial realizer of the survival role. On my account, if we care about 
survival we will care a great deal about the relation that presently organizes 
our person-directed practices and concerns; for that relation is survival. 
On Johnston's account, if you care about survival-if you want to 
survive-it doesn't make much difference which relation you presently 
organize around; for you will survive reorganizing your person-directed 
practices in terms of some new relation. On my account, however, if you 
really care about surviving, which relation you presently organize around 
makes a big difference to how easy it is for you to survive. If you presently 
organize around physical continuity, for example, you (the person made up 
of the parts who organize around physical continuity) will not survive some 
future events, such as teletransportation, whether you refigure or not. If you 
refigure, someone else will survive those events; a person who will regard 
parts of you as equally parts of them. But that may not be much consolation. 
For presumably, when you want to survive, you want you, the numerically 
same person, to survive: you want as many future person-stages as possible 
to be stages of you, not merely stages of someone else who regards you as 
part of them. 
Sometimes we can't have everything want we want. But this time we 
can have quite a lot of we want. For, for many of us (those of us who have 
yet to organize their person-directed practices and concerns in terms of any 
particular relation), even if our survival conditions are determined by the 
relation that presently organizes our person-directed practices and concerns, 
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we can get all that Johnston's Protean person view offers in the way of 
survival, and more. It all depends on which relation we organize around. 
If we care a lot about surviving on my account (given that whether we 
refigure or not we will not survive events which by our present lights we do 
not survive) it becomes very tempting (although not, of course, obligatory) to 
organize our person-directed practices and concerns around whatever 
relation it is that makes it easiest for us to survive. That is to say, if we care 
about surviving, the instrumentally rational thing for us do given Temporal-
Phase Pluralism is to become 'minimalists' about survival-to be very 
generous about the sorts of events that we view as survival-preserving. 
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For some of us this news will have come too late. For some (most 
notably, philosophers who have thought a lot about personal identity) have 
already organized their person-directed practices and concerns in terms of 
some or other particular relation which makes it quite hard for them to 
survive. Unfortunately, if you are one of those people, there is nothing that 
you can do: you will die at the events at which by your present lights you die, 
however generous the relation in terms of which a future person of which 
you may be a part organizes their person-directed practices and concerns. 
But, for those many philosophers and lay people who haven't as yet 
organized their person-directed practices and concerns in terms of any 
particular relation, there is still time. On the reasonable assumption that 
these people care about surviving, we ought to encourage them to move 
swiftly to internalize a minimalist conception of survival before they develop 
particular, restrictive commitments. 
Exactly what commitments should we encourage them to take on, 
however? What is the relation that would, were we to organize around it, 
make it easiest for us to survive? Clearly, if you care about surviving, having 
a concept according to which you do not survive being depressed, for 
example, would be a bad idea. For it would probably make it quite difficult 
for you to survive. Organizing your person-directed practices and concerns 
around physical continuity would plausibly make it easier to survive-but 
not all that easy. You wouldn't survive teletransportation-like events. 
Organizing in terms of psychological continuity is better than organizing 
around depression, but not all that much better than organizing around 
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physical continuity. For you won't survive having your psychology wiped 
from your brain or otherwise removed-a possibility which, as things stand, 
is more likely to obtain than teletransportation or such-like events. 
Organizing around the second-order property of there holding between you 
and some future person a relation which has the property of realizing the 
survival role for you (as discussed in Chapter 5) would not fare you much 
better than organizing around a first-order property such as physical or 
psychological continuity. For, as already noted, whether you organize 
around physical continuity or the higher-order property that physical has 
(viz. realizing the survival role for you), the extension of the concept of 
survival will be exactly the same-you will survive or fail to survive exactly 
the same set of events in either case. Just as the second-order property is a 
candidate relation for survival i.e. a relation among person-stages that we 
might organize our person-directed practices and concerns around, so 
Johnston's protean person view is another object-level candidate. Johnston's 
protean person view would tell you that you survive a survival-threatening 
event just in case you have a concept according to which you survive that 
event at the time of that event. However, organizing around Johnston's protean 
person view- thinking that you survive a survival-threatening event just in 
case you have a concept according to which you survive that event at the time 
of that event-won't fare you much better than any other of the above. For 
this concept actually makes it quite hard for you to survive. For if you 
haven't refigured in time (if, unforewarned, you undergo or are made to 
undergo a procedure which, by your lights at the time of that procedure, you 
don't survive) you die, whatever you later think about things. 
Rather, I think, if you care about surviving, you should (instrumental 
rational 'should') organize around the largest possible disjunction of relations 
you can manage: You survive just in case there is a future person or person-
stage who is physical continuous with you or psychological continuous with 
you or ... For if any one of the disjuncts obtain, you survive. Moreover, 
apropos of Johnston's view, were you to organize around such a disjunction 
in the first place, you would probably never need to bother refiguring. For if 
you have chosen the disjuncts carefully enough, you will survive most 
survival-threatening events by your present lights. 
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Choosing to organize around such a disjunction, however, has one 
potential drawback. Suppose a new and radically different sort of survival-
threatening comes along-an event which, although you thought long and 
hard to try to include a disjunct to deal with every survival-threatening event 
you could think of-you hadn't thought of; a survival-threatening event 
which doesn't preserve any one of the disjuncts you organize around. You 
just hadn't thought of this survival-threatening event. Then, on my account, 
you would die. But there is another, perhaps better, object-level candidate 
which doesn't make surviving so dependent on how good we are at thinking 
up possible survival-threatening events and including disjuncts to deal with 
them. I mentioned this view earlier in a footnote, as a second-order view 
which, unlike the second-order view mentioned above and discussed in 
chapter 5, is not extensionally equivalent to the first-order views. This view 
has it that you survive a survival-threatening event just in case there holds 
between you-now and the post-event person-stages a relation which might 
realize the survival role for a community. If you organized around this view 
you would, in effect, be organizing around a disjunction. But a disjunction, 
not merely of all the relations you can presently think of, but of all the 
possible realizers of the survival role. That is to say, a disjunction of all the 
possible survival relations. If you care about surviving, it seems to me, you 
couldn't do better than organizing around this. (In chapter 8, we will get a 
better idea of what the class of possible survival relations for us includes.) 
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For those who have yet to organize their person-directed practices and 
concerns in terms of any particular relation, then, my account offers much 
more in the way of survival than Johnston's. For, although Johnston tells you 
will survive refiguring your person-directed concerns in terms of a relation 
which allows you to survive some upcoming survival-threatening event, you 
have to refigure before that event, otherwise it will be too late. Forewarned is 
certainly forearmed. But if we organize around a minimalist concept-in 
particular, if we organize around this latter second-order concept-we don't 
even need to be forewarned. For we will already have a concept according to 
which we survive all the survival-threatening events it is possible for us to 
survive. That is the radical, revisionary upshot of temporal-phase pluralism. 
Chapter 6 Temporal-phase pluralism 193 
6.6 Pluralism distinguished from relativism 
Johnston calls his account a 'relativist' account of the self. So too, Stephen 
White, labels his view-the view that "the personal facts about a given 
subject do not supervene on any set of facts which does not include facts 
about the attitudes and feelings of others, the conventions and practices of the 
subject's society, and in some cases even the society's level of technological 
development"2l_'metapsychological relativism'. These labels, however, are 
potentially quite misleading, and it is important to avoid confusion. For 
pluralism, as I have explained it at any rate, is a quite different sort of view 
from other views which often also go under the broad heading of 'relativist'. 
Relativists standardly claim that there is no objective, absolute or 
universal fact of the matter. Relativists admit that there are facts of the 
matter. For the relativist, however, these are relative not absolute facts. For 
the relativist, things can be good, true, right, justified or wrong, for example, 
but only relative to particular individual or community standards. The 
relativist then agrees with the absolutist, universalist or objectivist (as against 
the nihilist or the error theorist) in maintaining that there are facts of the 
matter, but disagrees with the absolutist in maintaining that these facts are 
not absolute, but relative facts: facts which obtain or fail to obtain only 
relative to particular individual or community standards. 
However, this broad characterization of relativism obscures a crucial 
distinction within relativism between two importantly different kinds of 
relativism. For there are two conceptual levels at which one might be a 
relativist. One might be a relativist at the meta-level-at the level of what 
makes it the case that a certain property or relation determines the extension 
of a concept-or one might be a relativist at the object-level of what 
properties of things a concept picks out.22 
Meta-ethical relativists, then, count as paradigm (meta-)relativists on 
this way of thinking. Meta-ethical relativists claim that what makes an act 
good or bad, right or wrong, is that that act counts as good or bad, right or 
21White (1989), p.322. 
22one could, of course, be a relativist at both levels or about both kinds of facts. 
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wrong by the moral standards of the particular community making the 
ethical judgement. There is no absolute or non-relative fact of the matter or to 
what makes things good or bad, right or wrong; individual and/ or 
community customs or moral standards determine what is good or bad, right 
or wrong. For meta-ethical relativists, then, what makes the statement 
'abortion is wrong' uttered by X true (if it can be properly called true or false 
at all23) is that, relative to X's moral code, abortion is wrong. 
Meta-ethical relativism comes in a variety of more and less 
sophisticated forms. In it's crudest form, appropriately known as simple 
subjectivism, it is the view that moral attitudes are mere expressions of 
personal tastes. Statements such as 'abortion is wrong' express nothing more 
than the fact that the speaker dislikes abortion and prefers that abortions not 
occur. According to simple subjectivism, there is no fact of the matter as to 
what makes abortion right or wrong, independent of the personal desires or 
feelings of the individual or society concerned. What makes it the case that 
an act is right or wrong is entirely relative to, or determined by, the 
preferences and desires of the individual or society concerned. Moral 
statements are made true or false by, or relative to, the desires and 
preferences of those who express them. Simple subjectivism then has the 
consequence that the two contradictory ethical statements might nonetheless 
both be true. They might both be true in virtue of the fact that both are true, 
because made true, by the (different) moral standards of the two individuals 
or communities making the statement. So, for example, the statement 
'abortion is wrong' uttered by Ronald Reagan is true because, relative to 
Reagan's moral code and the code of the conservative community to which 
he belongs, abortion is wrong. But, according to the simple subjectivist, the 
statement 'abortion is not wrong' uttered by a pro-choicer is also true, 
because true, and made true, relative to the particular moral code of the pro-
choicer making the judgement according to which abortion is not wrong. 
Meta-ethical relativisms, such as simple subjectivism, contrast with the 
broad view that variously goes under the headings of absolutism, 
23For emotivists, for example, moral statements are neither true nor false they are, literally, 
meaningless; expressing no more than the moral sentiments, approval or disapproval, of the 
speaker. 
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universalism or objectivism. Despite their differences24, what unites these 
views is a common denial of relativism at the meta-ethical level. According 
to absolutists, objectivists and universalists moral statements are made true 
or false by facts quite independent of the personal or social preferences and 
moral codes of the people involved. What makes it the case that a moral term 
(say, 'good') picks out acts with a certain property, is not that that is the 
property which counts as good relative to an individual's or community's 
moral code, but because that is the property in which good independently 
and universally consists; and would continue to consist even if it were the 
case that no individual or community regarded it as good. 'Good' picks out 
the property of maximising happiness, for example, because maximising 
happiness is a fundamental, absolute human value. 
However, one might be a relativist of a very different kind. One might 
be a relativist (i.e. maintain that there is no absolute or non-relative fact of the 
matter) not at the meta-level of what makes it the case that a concept picks out 
certain properties, but at the object-level: at the level of what properties of 
things a concept picks out. This kind of relativism I want to call pluralism, to 
signal this important difference from relativisms at the meta-level. The 
pluralist maintains that there is an absolute or non-relative fact of the matter 
at the meta-level, but denies that there is, of conceptual necessity, any 
absolute, non-relative, objective or universal fact of the matter at the object 
level of what properties the concept picks out. Pluralism is, if you like, a 
third option or a half-way house between relativism and absolutism. In the 
spirit of relativism, the pluralist maintains that there is an important sense in 
which morality, for example, at the meta-level is relative to, or, as I prefer to 
put it, dependent upon, a community's moral practices. These practices-
such as approving of things that are good, disapproving of things that are 
bad; being motivated to pursue the good, and being reluctant to pursue the 
bad-are what make it true that certain properties of things (the properties of 
things which organize these practices) get to count as the properties of things 
in virtue of which things with those properties count as good or bad, right or 
wrong, just or unjust. However, although this third option maintains, with 
24For example, in addition to asserting that there is a single, universal and independent fact 
of the matter as to what makes something good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust, 
absolutists often make a further claim with which many objectivists and universalists 
disagree, viz. that some moral rules or duties are absolutely without exception. 
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the relativist that moral truths constitutively involve our practices in this 
way, it denies that this is a relative truth. With the absolutist, this third 
option regards it as an absolute (not a relative) truth that good, for example is 
that property (whatever it is) which subjects approve of, are motivated to 
pursue and praise, and so on. As we have seen, this absolute meta-fact is 
what enables us to know that communities who differ about the object-level 
facts are nonetheless disagreeing about the same thing or concept; that they 
have not changed the subject. 
The pluralist about survival, then, claims that survival is, in an 
important sense, relative to the person-directed practices of individuals 
and/ or communities-survival is whatever relation it is that plays the 
survival role for a given subject or group of subjects. But the pluralist denies 
that this fact-the fact that survival is whatever relation it is around which a 
community organizes their person-directed practices and concerns-is a 
relative fact. The pluralist takes this analysis to be an absolute, a priori truth 
about survival. There is no further question usefully to be asked about in 
virtue of what this is the right analysis of what determines what determines 
the extension of survival, in the same way as there is (plausibly) no further 
question to be asked about in virtue of what things with three angles and 
straight sides get to count as triangles. The buck stops here, for this is just 
what we mean by survival. 
What often goes by the name of 'normative relativism' is a good 
example of such object-level relativism or, what I am calling, pluralism. The 
normative relativist believes that there are absolute normative facts or 
imperatives at the meta-level, it is just that what counts as realizing or 
instantiating these absolute imperatives may vary from moral context to 
context. It is an absolute, non-relative normative imperative, for example, 
that one should always be polite. It is just that what counts as being polite-
the criteria for politeness-may vary from community to community, culture 
to culture. In some middle eastern countries, for example, burping after a 
meal counts as polite behaviour. But burping after a meal in most western 
countries counts as exceedingly impolite. Acting in accordance with the 
absolute norm of always being polite, then, requires burping after a meal 
when eating with middle easterners, but refraining from burping when 
eating with westerners. Always acting politely requires acting in accordance 
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with the criteria for politeness, and this is an absolute imperative. But, given 
that criteria for politeness vary, acting in accordance with the absolute norm 
of always acting politely requires us to act differently in different cultures in 
accordance with their different criteria for politeness. It requires that, when 
in Rome we do as the Romans do, when in the middle east we do as the 
middle easterners do, when in the west we do as the westerners do, and so 
on. 
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As well as the relative innocuousness of the view, there is something 
very important to note about normative relativism. And that is that, though 
it is often characterized as a form of relativism, it is not really a kind of 
relativism at all. For the so-called relativism embodied in normative 
relativism is not apriori or essential. It is not embodied in the normative 
relativist's conceptual claim, for the normative imperative is absolute. Such 
relativism as may be the product of normative relativism, is simply the 
contingent upshot of obeying an absolute apriori normative imperative in 
light of a posteriori information about the criteria for politeness, or whatever, 
in the community in which one happens to find oneself. It is simply a 
contingent matter of fact that different communities have different criteria for 
politeness. Were all communities to have the same criteria for politeness, 
normative relativism would not be a relativism at all: always acting politely 
would require acting in acting in accordance with the universally-shared 
criteria for politeness, and one should act in exactly the same way wherever 
one happened to be. There is nothing, then, intrinsically or essentially 
relativist about normative relativism. That acting politely may require acting 
differently in accordance with the criteria for politeness of the particular 
community in which one finds oneself is simply the upshot of the utterly 
contingent, aposteriori fact that different communities happen to have 
different criteria for politeness. 
The first-order account of survival I have argued for is analogous to 
normative relativism. It, like normative relativism, is a pluralist account. If it 
must be called a kind of relativism at all, it is relativism at the object, not at 
the meta, level. True, the account is practice-dependent in that it claims that, 
within certain constraints (to be further discussed in chapter 7), subjects' 
person-directed practices determine what relation(s) count as the survival 
relation(s). That is to say, subjects' person-directed practices make it the case 
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that one relation rather some other counts as the relation of survival. But this, 
I claim, is a necessary or absolute, not a relative, meta-fact: absolute in the 
sense of being a meta-fact which holds true for all people, at all times, in all 
worlds, irrespective of whether or not they believe it to be true. That survival 
is whatever property it is around which subjects have cause, consistently and 
without involvement in empirical error, to organize their person-directed 
practices, is, on the pluralist account I advocate, an absolute fact. It is just 
that, within certain constraints, different properties may happen to realize 
that role for different subjects. The survival role is, if you like, multiply 
realizable. But that the survival role is, if it is, multiply realized is just the a 
posteriori, contingent upshot of the fact that different subject's organize their 
person-directed practices around different properties. 
I do not want to quibble about names. Call pluralism a sort of 
relativism if you like. But, if you call it a sort of relativism, it is important to 
bear in mind exactly what sort of relativism it is-it is object-level, not meta-
level, relativism. And, as such, is not subject to the sorts of worries and 
difficulties with which the label 'relativism' has (rightly or wrongly) been 
associated. A pluralist account does not admit that two contradictory 
statements about survival might both be true. Nor would it have 
communities who organize their person-directed practices around different 
relations simply talking about different things. On a pluralist account, the 
statement 'A Teletransporter-person survives teletransportation', for 
example, is true, no matter who utters it. And the contrary statement, 'A 
Teletransporter-person do~s not survive teletransportation' is false simpliciter, 
since teletransportation preserves the relation which members of the 
Teletransporter community organize their person-directed practices around. 
A pluralist account is relativist only in the sense that it allows for multiple 
realizability: that what relation counts as the survival relation for 
communities may differ from community to community depending on what 
relation it is that (as a thoroughly a posteriori matter of fact) communities 
organize their person-directed practices and concerns around, just as what 
counts as behaving politely may vary from community to community in 
accordance with the (different) norms governing polite behaviour. 
7 
SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
The preceding discussion has presupposed a number of broader 
methodological issues. To discuss these issues in any great detail is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, in this chapter, I want briefly to 
discuss how these background issues might give rise to three sorts of 
objections to my analysis of survival, and to sketch the lines along which I 
think that these objections can be answered. The first two of these objections, 
in different ways, cluster around the accusation that this sort of account of 
survival is viciously circular. The third objection is that it is at odds with a 
reasonably popular view of identity. 
7.1 The Paradox of Analysis. 
There is a famous worry about the tenability of the whole project of 
conceptual analysis itself. As Simon Blackburn articulates the worry, 
attempts at conceptual analysis face an insoluble dilemma: either conceptual 
analyses are reductionist-they aim to analyse a concept in independent, 
naturalistic terms-and false (Blackburn calls this horn Scylla), or they are 
non-reductionist-the term to be analysed (the analysandum) reappears on the 
right-hand side of the biconditional as part of the analysans-hence circular, 
and therefore trivial (Blackburn calls this horn Charybdis). This is the 
'paradox of analysis'. Since all conceptual analyses are either reductive or 
non-reductive, and so fall prey either to Scylla or Charybdis, Blackburn 
claims, we can, at best, engage only in conceptual explication. (Exactly how 
explication is supposed to differ from analysis is not entirely clear!) 
Scylla is G.E. Moore's famous 'open-question' argument applied more 
broadly than merely to naturalistic or descriptive definitions of the term 
'good'. Recall, the thrust of the open-question argument is that given any 
(reductive) analysis, Y, of a (normative) term, X, it still remains a substantial 
or 'open' question as to whether Xis Y. So, for example, given the following 
analysis-an act Xis good iff X maximizes happiness-it is still possible to 
ask in a substantial, non-trivial way, whether maximising happiness is good. 
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The point is that it is importantly platitudinous that good is motivational. 
That some act has the property of being a good act doesn't just give us a 
reason to pursue it, it motivates us to pursue it. But why would the fact that it 
is an analytic truth that a certain naturalistic property is good motivate us in 
the least? 
The worry behind Charybdis, on the other hand, might be threefold. 
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First, it might be the worry that circular analyses, because circular, are 
unilluminating and uninteresting. They tell us nothing new about the 
concept. The analysis, Xis red iff Xis red, for example, imparts no new 
information about the concept red. Second, the worry might be that circular 
analyses do not enable us to get an independent fix on the concept. Suppose 
we want to know if it is right to call a particular object X square-we want to 
know, that is, whether X is square. Then, we might think, it will be little help 
to be told that X is square iff we judge X to be square. For we need to have 
some independent fix on what square is before we are in a position to know 
whether or not to judge an object square. Third, the worry might be that 
circular analyses are question-begging: that the analysans presupposes a prior 
understanding of the analysandum. Consider the following analysis: X is red 
iff agents think X is red. Clearly, however, not any old agents thoughts will 
do-not the thoughts of people who systematically think that green things 
are red, for example. So we must place constraints on the sorts of subjects 
whose thoughts are allowed to count. However, these constraints cannot be 
things of the sort: the thoughts of people who understand the concept red. 
For that would make the analysis trivially true. (Perhaps this third circularity 
worry is just a more sophisticated version of the first). 
Scylla is the horn that, not in so many words, has worried many 
proponents of the different sorts of practice-independent accounts of survival 
to date. For these accounts typically define survival in straightforwardly 
independent, naturalistic terms. Recall, for example, physical continuity 
theorists offer the following kind of analysis: 
A person X today survives as a person Y at some time in the future if, and 
only if, enough of X's brain/body continues to exist for it to be the 
brain/body of a living person, and is now Y's brain/body. 
Or, for psychological continuity theorists, 
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A person X today survives as a person Y at some time in the future iff 
between X now and Y in the future there is sufficient psychological continuity 
and I or connectedness. 
These accounts of survival makes no mention of our person-directed practices 
and concerns; and so, for accounts of these sort, it has been a further and 
open question why we should care about physical continuity or psychological 
continuity or some other candidate relation. For accounts of this sort leave it 
an open conceptual possibility that survival can come apart from what we 
care about. The attempts to close this conceptual gulf between survival and 
what we care about in survival that I discussed in Chapter 3 were attempts to 
answer Scylla-and pretty desperate ones at that! But there are two points to 
note about Scylla. First, Scylla does not seem to infect all naturalistic 
conceptual analyses. For example, the analysis Xis square iff X has four 
straight sides of equal length doesn't seem to leave any question open. Scylla 
seems to infect only those of analyses of normative terms: terms where there 
is a further question to be asked about in virtue of what do those properties-
in this case, the property of having four straight sides of equal length-get to 
count as the properties in virtue of which a thing counts as square; in 
particular, terms where the answer to this third question seems to require 
reference to our practices and concerns. (It may be that proponents of Scylla 
take rule-following considerations to show that all concepts, including 
squareness, are normative.) Second, and like the case of squareness, it may be a 
quick but fair response to Scylla to say that, given the right analysis of a 
concept X, however naturalistic that analysis, there will simply be no 
question left open. If there is an open question, it simply goes to show that 
we haven't got the analysis quite right yet (not that we never could get the 
analysis right). Nonetheless, despite the availability of these quick responses, 
Scylla has worried practice-independent theorists; and it has worried them 
because they take it to be importantly platitudinous that we care about 
survival-that survival is, in this important sense, a normative concept. 
Scylla might infect my analysis too. For like practice-independent 
accounts, mine too aims at conceptual (and ontological) reduction. I too want 
to reduce survival to quite independent, naturalistic properties and relations 
among person-stages. On the other hand, Charybdis might also seem to be a 
worry. For, unlike practice-independent theorists, I define survival in terms 
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of its being a relation among person-stages which plays a certain role in our 
person-directed practices; and mightn't that be viciously circular or trivially 
true if, for example, our person-directed practices presuppose survival? 
However, I think, my pluralist account of survival avoids both Scylla and 
Charybdis. For survival consists in a quite independent, naturalistic set of 
relations among person-stages (answer to Charybdis), but it consists in those 
relations just because those are the relations that we care about (answer to 
Scylla). But I need to say a bit more. 
7.2 Charting a course between Scylla and Charybdis 
Recall, I defined survival as follows: 
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'A person X at an earlier time survives as a person Y at a later time' as uttered 
by us is true iff (i) there is some property or set of properties p which cause 
us, consistently, and without involvement in empirical error, to organize our 
person-directed practices around the assumption that X survives as Y, and (ii) 
X and Y share p. (Where 'us' refers to subjects or groups of subjects with 
common person-directed practices). 
In other words, survival for a community is whatever property or relation it 
is between two person-stages, X and Y, that plays the survival role in that 
community's person-directed practices. The role that survival plays is fixed 
by the platitudes about the conceptual relationship between survival and the 
various other concepts-punishment, self-concern, moral responsibility, 
agency and the like-with which it is connected. So the first stage in 
analysing survival consists in teasing out the platitudes-in making explicit 
the conceptual dependence and interdependence of survival with the other 
concepts. So, for example, the platitudes listed included 'You should punish 
a person for a past crime when, and only when, ceterus paribus, they are the 
same person as the person who committed the crime'; 'normally, if someone 
remembers some experience, they are the same person as the person who had 
that experience'; 'if the person before you now is the same person as your 
loved partner, then, normally, you will love that person before you now'; 
'hold someone to a prior promise when, and only when, they are the same 
person as the person who made the promise'; and so on and so forth. 
Note that even if the analysis finished at this first stage (and it does 
not) we would have an answer to one of the worries about Charybdis-the 
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worry about how it could be that an analysis, although circular in the sense 
that the term to be analysed appears in the platitudes that form the analysans, 
might yet tell us something new and interesting about the concept of 
survival. For this sort of analysis, by teasing out the connections between 
survival and the concepts with which it is intertwined, makes explicit what 
was previously merely implicit in our use of the concept. It tells us 
something new and interesting about the concept of survival because it 
makes us consciously or explicitly aware of the conceptual dependence and 
inter-dependence of the concept of survival with various other of our 
concepts. It gives us 'knowledge that', where previously we had only 
'knowledge how'l; or, to borrow a distinction from Philip Pettit2, it gives us 
'intellectual' belief where previously we only had 'practical' belief. It is not, 
however, as the term 'intellectual' may misleadingly suggest, that this 
analysis gives us a special new sort of knowledge or belief about survival. 
Rather, it points explicitly to an interesting connection among certain of our 
concepts: a connection which was previously implicit and unnoticed in our 
practice. 
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But the analysis of survival I outlined did not remain conceptually 
non-reductive for long. For, recall, I went on to point out that once we have 
seen how the concept of survival is connected to other concepts-once we 
have fixed the role that survival plays in our person-directed practices-we 
can dispense of talk of 'survival' in our analysis. For this conceptual work at 
the first stage tells us that X at ti and Y at t1 will be stages of the same person 
(or X will survive as Y) for a community, just in case a community punishes Y 
for crimes committed by X; Y is held to promises made by X; Y expects to 
remember the experience of X; Y is the object of certain persisting reactive 
attitudes-trust, love and the like; X anticipates Y's future experiences; and so 
on. This second stage of conceptual analysis thus removes all occurrences of 
the term 'survives as' or 'is the same person as' from the analysans. We can 
get a fix on what relation is the survival relation for a community without 
making any mention of 'survival' on the right-hand side of the analysis. The 
1 This is a slightly unhappy way of putting the point, since some of our person-directed 
practices, however unconsciously embedded in our practice, seem to involve propositional 
knowledge or 'knowledge that'-for example, our practices of making judgements that Xis 
the same person as Y. 
2Pettit, forthcoming. 
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analysis as I described it proceeding in Chapter 5 was thus rendered non-
reductive at the conceptual level.3 (Of course, if the concepts of punishment, 
self-concern and the like which figure on the right-hand analysis themselves 
somehow inextricably presuppose survival then this reduction would fail. 
The next section suggests why this is not the case, and why it might not be so 
bad even if it were). 
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The final stage of the analysis aims at ontological reduction. We want 
to find out what relation survival is for a given community. And we find this 
out by observing communities and/ or presenting them with various puzzle 
cases and a posteriori ascertaining which relation among person-stages their 
person-directed practices track. That is, by noting which relation it is in 
accordance with which they punish Y for crimes committed by X; in 
accordance with which Y is held to promises made by X; in accordance with 
which X and Y are treated in certain ways-trusted, loved and the like; in 
accordance with which X anticipates Y's future experiences; and so on. And 
then that relation counts as survival for them. Survival is psychological 
continuity for the Teletransporters, for that is the relation which their person-
directed practices track; physical continuity for the Somataphiles, for that is 
the relation around which their person-directed practices are organized. 
How, though, does this sort of reduction avoid Scylla? It does so 
because, on this analysis, there simply is no open question about why we 
should care about physical continuity or psychological continuity or 
whatever other relation is the survival relation for us. For there is nothing left 
open. My analysis mentions (or would mention when complete) all of the 
platitudes about survival. What more could there be? So it is, on this 
analysis, conceptually impossible that survival might not be a relation that we 
care about, for it is a priori true that survival is whatever it is that we care 
about. Physical continuity or psychological continuity or some other 
independent relation out there in the world gets to count as the relation of 
survival for a community just because that is the relation that they care about. 
By thus closing the conceptual gulf between survival and what we care about 
in survival, pluralism shuts the door on the open-question argument. 
Survival (whatever property it, a posteriori, turns out to be) is ipso facto what 
3Jn effect, this second stage of the analysis consists in ramsifying over the platitudes. 
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we care about. This normative component is enshrined in the conceptual 
claim. 
However, perhaps I haven't yet fully answered Charybdis. For I 
haven't said much directly to the worry that our person-directed practices 
might themselves presuppose survival-that we cannot get a fix on our 
person-directed practices independently of, or without first having a fix on, 
survival-so that, pluralism, although true, would be trivially so. 
7.3 Do our person-directed practices presuppose survival? 
Charybdis is a worry about the possibility for conceptual reduction. The 
worry is that we cannot understand the various concepts of person-directed 
practices without first understanding the concept of survival. Survival is 
conceptually prior to concepts of our person-directed practices. We cannot 
know whether or not to have self-concern for some future person without 
first knowing whether or not the future person is us. The claim here will be 
that my second-stage of conceptual analysis is not really reductive. This 
amounts to insisting that the direction of conceptual determination goes the 
practice-independent way. It is because someone is the same person as us 
that we anticipate their future experiences. It cannot be that someone is the 
same person as us because we anticipate their future experiences. For 
personal identity is conceptually prior to self-concern. 
It is not clear to me why this sort of conceptual circularity, in itself, 
should be particularly worrisome. If it turned out to be a priori true that the 
concepts of self-concern and personal identity were so inextricably 
interdefined, so that we couldn't understand one without understanding the 
other, why would this be such a problem? It would have just turned that the 
right account of some concept has it conceptually interdependent on others. 
And why would that be so bad? For, as we earlier noted, such analyses, 
though circular, nonetheless tell us something new and interesting about the 
concept in question-they tell us about the conceptual relations between the 
concept to be analysed and various other concepts. They make explicit what 
was previously only implicit in our employment of the concept. Of course, 
conceptual circularity might well be a worry if there were no way to get 
outside the circle. If there were no way, that is, to get some independent fix 
205 
Chapter 7 Pre-empting some possible objections 206 
on the concept. But, in the case of survival, even if it turned out that it was 
impossible to define self-concern independently of survival, there are 
platitudes which lead outside the circle-platitudes, for example, about the 
behavioural dispositions associated with self-concern (bracing yourself, 
rehearsing stoic platitudes, and the like). These platitudes enable us to get an 
independent fix on the concept. Here is an analogy. Suppose we define 
'husband' as follows: a husband is someone who is married to a wife; and a 
wife is someone who is married to a husband. The terms 'husband' and 
'wife' are interdefinable. This is circular, but not viciously so. For we can get 
an independent fix on the meaning of the terms 'husband', 'wife' and 'is 
married to'. A husband is (at least traditionally) a male, a wife is a female, 
and we define marriage in terms of a certain ritual ceremony-two people of 
opposite sexes uttering certain words before an authorized celebrant and 
other witnesses. 
However, for those who think that this sort of conceptual circularity is 
a problem, and who accept the standard response to this worry by 
proponents of psychological continuity accounts of survival in response to 
this sort of objection, an analogous line of response is available in this case: a 
response which ought to prove congenial to those many who accept it in the 
case of memory and the like. 
For, famously, the same objection besets psychological continuity 
accounts of survival which analyse personal identity, inter alia, in terms of 
experiential memory. Of such accounts, Bishop Butler once objected that it is 
"self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and 
therefore cannot constitute personal identity, any more than knowledge in 
any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes."4 Butler's 
objection was that it was a conceptual truth that a person could only 
'remember' past experiences when they were the same person as the person 
who had those experiences. Analysing survival in terms of memory would 
then true, but trivially so, since in order to know whether or not someone 
remembers something we need first to know whether or not they are the 
same person as the person who had the remembered experience, and that is 
exactly the question that the memory criterion was supposed to answer. 
4Butler (1736), p. 100. 
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Following Sydney Shoemaker, psychological continuity theorists have 
typically responded to this objection by defining a wider concept of which 
our ordinary experiential memories are a subset. They think as follows. In 
ordinary, everyday life when we have a genuine memory of some past 
experience i.e. a memory that is causally dependent on the past experience in 
the right kind of way, we just assume that the memory is of something that 
we ourselves experienced. For in ordinary life, we don't, as a matter of fact, 
genuinely remember from the inside the experiences had by others. So in 
ordinary, everyday life memory does, as a matter of fact, presuppose 
personal identity. But it need not do so. We can define a wider concept, 
quasi-memory (q-memory, for short), of which our ordinary memories are a 
subset. Quasi-memory is memory which has exactly the same 
phenomenology as our ordinary memory, it is just that in quasi-remembering 
some experience we cannot automatically assume, as we do in ordinary-
remembering, that the remembered experience is of something that we 
experienced ourselves. Quasi-memory feels exactly like ordinary memory 
from the inside, it is simply that in quasi-remembering things seen or done or 
experienced we cannot assume, as we do ordinarily, that we ourselves saw, 
or did, or experienced, the remembered things. Parfit offers the following 
example. 
Venetian Memories. Jane has agreed to have copied in her brain some of 
Paul's memory-traces. After she recovers consciousness in the post-surgery 
room, she has a new set of vivid apparent memories. She seems to 
remember walking on the marble paving of a square, hearing the flapping 
of flying pigeons and the cries of gulls, and seeing light sparkling on green 
water. One apparent memory is very clear. She seems to remember looking 
across the water to an island, where a white Paladian Church stood out 
brilliantly against a dark thundercloud ... What should Jane believe about 
these apparent memories? Suppose that, because she has seen this church 
in photographs, she knows it to be San Giorgio, in Venice. She also knows 
that she has never been to Italy, while Paul goes to Venice often. Since she 
knows that she has received copies of some of Paul's memory-traces, she 
could justifiably assume that she may be quasi-remembering some of Paul's 
experiences in Venice. s 
Q-memory solves the circularity problem for psychological continuity 
theories by severing the ordinary conceptual connection between memory 
5Parfit (1983), p.220. 
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and personal identity. Ordinary memory thus consists in two, in principle, 
separable components: q-memory and personal identity. Ordinary memory 
is q-memory plus personal identity-memory of things which we happen 
ourselves to have seen or done. But personal identity is defined in terms of q-
memory. According to psychological continuity theorists who adopt this line 
of response (and that is most), there is no necessary or essential 
interdependence between the concept of q-memory and the concept of 
personal identity-we might q-remember from the inside experiences had by 
someone else. 
The pluralist might borrow this leaf from the psychological continuity 
theorist's book in reply to the worry that self-concern presupposes survival. 
Just as it is no necessary part of (q-)memory that we can remember only our 
own experiences, so we may think it is no necessary part of self-concern that 
we can have this concern only for our own future self. The pluralist might 
similarly answer the objection that self-concern presupposes survival by 
defining a wider concept-call it q-concern-which, although it has the same 
distinctive phenomenology as our anticipatory self-concern, does not 
presuppose that only our own future person-stages can be the object of such 
concern. Q-concern, we can say, feels just like the anticipatory concern we 
ordinarily have for our own past and future selves alone-we anticipate a 
person's future actions and experiences-but we cannot automatically 
assume that when we have that sort of concern for some future person-stage 
that future person-stage is our own. Parfit, Shoemaker and others who claim 
that identity is not what matters in personal identity, must themselves believe 
in something like q-concern. For they themselves claim that we can have 
concern for future people who are not us-as, for example, when we are 'self-
concerned' for what befalls both of the two fission products. 
We might even aim for a thoroughgoing ontological reduction of q-
concern: a naturalistic explanation of the special, anticipatory 
phenomenology of q-concern. As John Perry has noted, there is direct 
connection between indexical beliefs (beliefs about ourself) and action; a 
connection which is not there for the connection between non-indexical 
beliefs and action. Perry offers the following as just one example: 
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I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart 
down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, 
seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. 
With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed 
unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was 
trying to catch .. .! believed at the outset that the shopper with the torn sack 
was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn't believe I was making a 
mess. That seemed to be something I came to believe. And when I came to 
believe that, I stopped following the trail around the counter, and 
rearranged the torn sack in the cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain 
my change in behaviour.6 
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Presumably, then, there will be certain distinctive sorts of processes in the 
brain which underlie this peculiarly direct connection between indexical 
belief and action. So, in principle, we could get a thoroughgoing reduction of 
the phenomenology of self-concern to neurophysiological processes in the 
brain. 
However, although q-concern (by characterizing self-concern in terms 
of its distinctive phenomenology) is a fair response to one sort of circularity 
objection-the worry that we cannot get a fix on what self-concern is 
independently of, or without first, having a fix on what survival is-q-
concern may not answer another sort of circularity worry-the objection that 
q-concern is insufficient for self-concern. According to these objectors, self-
concern is not simply q-concern, for, by definition, we may have q-concern 
for future person-stages who are not stages of us. Self-concern, the sort of 
concern that is relevant to survival, is q-concern plus (independently 
determined) personal identity. Call this concept, s-concern. Then a person 
now survives as a future person if and only if subjects have s-concern for that 
future person. But, the objection will go, s-concern presupposes survival, and 
the analysis, though true, is trivially so. (The same objection may equally go 
for the q-memory manoeuvre.) 
But I can agree that q-concern is insufficient for self-concern. I could 
even grant that perhaps self-concern does require for its application the prior 
belief that the future person is us (although in fact I think it does not). For, 
survival is a cluster concept, and although self-concern is part of the cluster, it 
6Perry (1974), p.3. 
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may, on its own, not be enough. On my view, we come to acquire the belief 
that someone is the same person by looking not just at the relation in 
accordance with which whose future experiences we anticipate, but also at 
who gets our legal entitlements, who is identified and reidentified as who, 
who we punish, and so on. Which future person is us is not wholly 
transparent to us a priori, as on the Cartesian view of things. Rather, we come 
to believe that someone is the same person as us when they have the relation 
that our cluster of person-directed practices (or enough of them, anyway) 
collectively track. 
7.4 Identity and personal identity 
For the most part, the personal identity debate has been conducted quite 
independently of debates about the identity of artifacts or things over time in 
general. Most philosophers believe that strict identity is absolute: that the 
identity conditions of an individual are not relative to the sortal under which 
we classify it. The central intuition behind the absolute identity thesis is that 
no matter how we classify an individual, say a table-whether we classify it 
as a table, or a lump of wood, or a middle-sized object-there is still only one 
thing there, and so only one set of identity conditions. The alternative, but 
much less widely-endorsed view, is that identity is sortal-relative. A 
particular table may have different identity conditions qua table, than it does 
qua middle-sized object, or qua lump of wood. A table might be the same 
table, without being the same lump of wood or the same middle-sized object. 
Depending on how we classify it, an individual can have more than one set of 
identity conditions. 
Some may think that the case of personal identity is just a special case 
of identity. Personal identity is in exactly the same conceptual boat as the 
identity of artifacts over time. These philosophers might be bemused by the 
way I have gone about addressing the question of personal identity: 
shouldn't I just have discussed the issue of identity, and then cranked my 
favourite theory of identity through for the case of personal identity? If 
identity is absolute, so is personal identity. If identity is relative, so is 
personal identity relative. Whatever goes for identity, similarly goes for 
personal identity. 
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The reason I have not addressed the question of personal identity in 
this way is because, like many others in the personal identity debate, I think 
that personal identity is not a special case of strict identity. From my point of 
view, the question of personal identity is not the question of what makes two 
different person-stages or temporal-parts identical. For the answer to that 
question is nothing-for different person-stages are not identical. Identity is a 
relation that a thing bears to itself, and to nothing else. Aggregates of person-
stages (or whole persons) can be identical to themselves: one and the same 
aggregate of person-stages. But different temporal parts cannot be identical, 
for they are different-different things cannot be one and the same thing 
(although they can be parts of one and the same thing). The question of 
personal identity is thus, strictly speaking, not the question of identity. 
Although I think that the question of personal identity is not the 
question of what makes different person-stages identical, but rather of what 
unifies different temporal-parts or person-stages into stages of the same 
aggregate person, it is worth noting that often the question of personal 
identity is posed in a way that leaves it ambiguous as to which of these 
questions the question of personal identity is. The question I posed at the 
beginning of Chapter 1-what makes a person identified at one time the same 
person as a person identified at another-was ambiguous in this way. Some 
philosophers who have talked about personal identity, such as Saul Kripke 
and David Wiggins, are clearly interested in the question of identity: in the 
question of what makes two person-stages identical. For them, the answer to 
the question of personal identity drops straight out of a general theory of 
identity. But these philosophers seem to be in a minority. Most philosophers 
in the personal identity debate either explicitly reject the idea that the 
question of personal identity is the question of what makes different person-
stages identical (for personal identity is not identity) or address the question 
of personal identity without making any mention of identity in general, as if 
it were a different sort of question altogether. I take it then that most 
philosophers of personal identity are interested in the question in which I am 
interested: namely, what makes different person-stages stages of the same 
continuing person or, as four-dimensionalists prefer to put it, what makes 
different temporal parts of a person parts of the same whole. And, for the 
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reasons noted, this is not the question of identity, but rather of similarity or 
some such looser relation among person-stages. 
Of course, this is a four-dimensionalist way of thinking about the 
question of personal identity. From the three-dimensionalist's point of view 
the question of personal identity is the question of what makes a person fully 
present at one time the same person as a person fully present at another. But 
three-dimensionalists might similarly think that the question of personal 
identity is not the question of identity. They might think that there is a 
person fully present at one time and a person fully present at another, but 
that the person fully present at one of those times is not, strictly speaking, 
identical with the person fully present at the other time. Identity does not 
hold between these two people fully present at different times, rather some 
sort of similarity or counterpart relation holds between them. 
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However, although, three-dimensionalists can say this, many of them I 
suspect will not. Although there is no necessary connection between being a 
three-dimensionalist and believing that personal identity is a special case of 
identity, those who believe that personal identity is identity are typically 
three-dimensionalists. For, as we have seen, if we are four-dimensionalists 
there is good reason to think that, strictly speaking, personal identity is not 
identity. We think of persons as aggregates of different temporal parts (or as 
different temporal parts linked by a similarity or counterpart relation); and 
different things cannot be identical. On the three-dimensionalist picture there 
is no such simple reason, for there are no different temporal parts, but only 
people wholly present at times. 
Now, nothing in practice-dependence--the thesis that what makes a 
relation among person-stages earn the name 'survival' is that that is the 
relation about which subjects care-is strictly incompatible either with three-
dimensionalism or with thinking of personal identity as a special case of 
absolute identity. The thesis will then be that what makes a person fully 
present at one time strictly identical with a person fully present at another 
time is the person-directed practices of the community involved. Indeed this, 
I think, is exactly Mark Johnston's view. However, although Johnston seems 
happy to embrace this combination of views, it should be noted that practice-
dependence in combination with the view that personal identity is absolute 
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identity commits one to a fairly strong brand of anti-realism that others may 
find less savoury. For then strict numerical identity turns out to be 
determined by cultural practices. 
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What about temporal-phase pluralism (TPP)? Could, contrary to 
initial appearances, an absolute identity theorist about personal identity 
endorse that? The short answer is that they could, but they would have to 
think of person as a phase kind, rather than as a substance sortal. An 
individual's substance sortal gives the unique set of identity conditions for 
that individual. An individual can survive all and only those changes that 
are not at odds with its substance sortal. So, for example, if the substance 
sortal to which persons belong is child, then persons would cease to exist on 
their thirteenth birthday (assuming that is when childhood ends). It seems 
fairly implausible to think that child is the substance sortal to which persons 
belong. We do not think that persons literally cease to exist upon turning 
thirteen (although Johnston claims to be prone to a recurrent scepticism about 
this!) Child then seems not to be a substance-sorta!, but a phase kind. A 
stage in a person's continuing existence which that person can live through. 
Childhood, adolescence, middle-age, old-age and so one are phase sortals, 
changes which, compatible with their substance sortal, a person can live 
through. 
In order to endorse TPP, absolute identity theorists about personal 
identity need some way of understanding stage-sharing-of understanding 
how stages of individuals can overlap. Substance sortals cannot overlap-at 
any given time an individual can be a member of only one substance sortal, 
and that substance sortal gives the unique set of identity conditions for that 
individual. Since, according to TPP, persons overlap, persons cannot be a 
substance sortal. But they can be a phase-kind, for phase-kinds can overlap. 
An individual can simultaneously be a member of more than one phase-kind. 
This might be so, for example, if childhood did not end until age thirteen, and 
adolescence began at age eleven. Then a person aged twelve would 
simultaneously be a member of both the phase-kind, child, and the phase-
kind, adolescent. For absolute-identity theorists to endorse TPP, then, they 
would need to think of person as a phase-sortal (like childhood and 
adolescence). The substance sortal to which persons belong would be 
whatever overarching kind it is that strings persons (or phase-kinds) 
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together; some over-arching property which the different phase-kinds have in 
common which explains how an individual can continue to exist despite 
changing its phase kind. It might, for example, be human animal. Or, more 
in tune with practice dependence, it might be the second-order property 
which I earlier claimed we should all be organizing around: there holding 
between individuals at different times a relation which could play the 
survival role. Whatever exactly our substance sortal should be, however, 
those who think that personal identity is a special case of absolute identity 
can endorse TPP by conceiving of person as a phase-kind. Despite initial 
appearances, then, neither TPP nor practice-dependence about survival are 
necessarily at odds with viewing personal identity as a special case of 
absolute identity. 
8 
A CONSTRAINED PLURALISM? 
On a pluralist account of survival, a central and interesting analytic task 
becomes charting the limits on the kinds of properties or relations which 
could play the survival role; on charting, that is, the boundaries of the range 
of possible natures that survival could have. 
Some may view this task as all the more crucial because, although 
pluralism avoids the worries many have about relativism at the meta-level-
at the level of what makes it the case that survival consists in certain 
properties-some may still have reservations about such 'relativism' as is 
embodied in multiple realizability. For, they may think, if pluralism is to be 
plausible, it cannot allow that the concept of survival might quite correctly 
pick out just any old bizarre property. My crushed and broken body lying 
lifeless at the bottom of a thousand foot cliff, for example, surely does not 
count as my survival, whatever I or anyone else am inclined to belief, or 
judge, or desire about it. 
Indeed, one of Wiggins' chief arguments for conceiving of persons as a 
natural kind is founded on exactly this sort of worry. For, Wiggins thinks, if 
persons are not a natural kind, then they must be a social kind; and this 
would be to pave the way for unacceptably authoritarian and totalitarian 
conceptions of what is and what is not a person. As Wiggins writes, 
Suppose that we dispense with the animal component in the animal 
attribute elucidation of person and assert cheerfully that specification by 
some finite number of attributes, fixed without essential reference to human 
beings just as they are, captures every mark that is essential to the concept 
of person. What we then have to imagine is a state of affairs in which all 
conceptual constraints whatever (including moral or normative constraints 
of conceptual provenance and important discriminations of importance) 
will be founded in the finite systemic specification of person; and a state of 
affairs in which nothing prevents the interpretations of speech, conduct and 
the thoughts that lie behind the desires that lie behind conduct, from being 
founded in a conception of personhood perceptibly narrower and certainly 
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simpler than that implicit in our present (however conservative and 
obscurantist) mode of interpretation of these things.1 
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Wiggins' worry is that if what counts as a person is entirely up to us, 
then there is nothing to stop us developing a set of criteria for personhood 
which arbitrarily excludes certain individuals (Jews, blacks, the old, etc) from 
counting as persons. Wiggins, it seems to me, is wrong about this. For his 
functional or systemic requirement alone (i.e. without the animal component) 
is sufficient to rule out such arbitrary conceptions as acceptable. (Jews, blacks 
and old people 'perceive, feel, remember, imagine, desire, make projects, 
move themselves at will, speak, carry out projects, acquire a character as they 
age, are happy or miserable, are susceptible to concern for members of their 
own or like species ... [note carefully these and subsequent dots], conceive of 
themselves as perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, desiring, making 
projects, speaking ... have and conceive of themselves as having, a past 
accessible in experience-memory and a future accessible in intention ... , etc.'; 
or they do more than enough of these things to count as persons at any rate). 
But even if a pluralist analysis were not to rule out such concepts as 
metaphysically possible person concepts (or, more precisely, in our case, 
survival concepts), how bad would that be for a pluralist analysis? If it 
turned out that pluralism were to allow for some weird and wonderful 
survival concepts as possible survival concepts, would that be so bad? 
Pluralism is a semantic-cum-metaphysical thesis-a thesis about what 
relation survival consists in for a community-not a moral thesis.2 Pluralism 
lwiggins (1980), p.179. 
2of course, what relation counts as survival for a community will typically depend, inter alia, 
on that community's moral theory. For some of the platitudes that fix the reference of 
'survival' in a community are moral ones-platitudes about moral responsibility and the like. 
And it may be that members of one community regard the moral views held by another 
community as mistaken. That is to say, they are practice-independent about morality. 
Compatible with that, however, they may regard the (from their point of view, mistaken) 
moral views held by that other community as nonetheless serving to fix the reference of 
survival for that other community. For example, a community may take it to be an absolute, 
practice-independent moral truth that you should only punish a person for a past crime when 
they are psychologically continuous with the person who committed the crime. Such a 
community will regard another community who punish a person for a past crime only when 
they are physically continuous with the person who committed the crime as having a 
mistaken view about responsibility. Nonetheless, they can admit that that mistaken moral 
view fixes the reference of survival in that other community. What is important as regards 
survival is not that other communities have the right moral view, but what others regard as 
being the moral truth. 
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tells us what survival concepts are possible; moral theory tells us what 
survival concepts are morally permissible. And it may be that pluralism 
allows some survival concepts as possible, which our preferred moral theory 
tells us we ought not organize around. So that pluralism may allow for some 
weird and wonderful, perhaps even morally repellent survival concepts, 
would not be an objection to pluralism. (What would be bad for the pluralist 
is if it were to turn out that there were actual concepts which the pluralist 
said were (metaphysically) unacceptable, but which we thought were 
perfectly valid survival concepts.) In any case, how constrained is pluralism? 
If pluralism is to be an interesting, plausible, and substantive thesis 
about a given area of discourse, the constraints on pluralism must satisfy 
three conditions: they must be non-trivial; they must be able to be fixed upon 
a priori; and they must be principled or non-arbitrary. 
They must be non-trivial because otherwise practice-dependence 
would reveal nothing interesting about the nature of the concept in question. 
For it could be made true of just about any concept, even of those where 
subjects responses seem only contingently, if at all, associated with the 
concept. For example, given a trivial specification of the constraints on 
subjects' responses, we could be practice-dependent about square: X is square 
iff X would be judged to be square by observers who are infallible in 
identifying square things in circumstances which are such that they will 
never fail so to do. But this analysis captures nothing distinctive about the 
concept of squareness. For if the analysis X is 0 iff X ... holds true for 
absolutely any 0, it can scarcely tell us something interesting about any 
particular 0. And indeed, for many, the appeal of practice-dependence for 
certain of our concepts-the idea that certain of subjects' practices are 
constitutive of these concepts-is grounded in precisely the intuition that 
these concepts seem to implicate the subject and subject's responses in a way 
in which primary quality concepts, like squareness, do not. So, if pluralism is 
to be interesting and substantial thesis about a given concept the analysis of 
the concept must implicate subjects in a non-trivial way. 
And the constraining conditions must be principled. They must fall 
directly out of the pluralist's conceptual claim itself. The pluralist can only 
help herself to constraints which drop out of the claim that for a property or 
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relation to be the relation of personal identity or survival for a given group of 
subjects is for it to be the property around which those subjects have cause to 
organize their person-directed practices in the specified conditions. She 
cannot appeal to a view of persons as natural kinds, or any other such 
independent facts. 3 
As it stands, the proffered analysis is already explicitly somewhat 
constrained: on one side, by facts in the world, and on the other, by 
constraints placed on subjects practices. The analysis stipulates that in order 
for some property to count as a property of personal identity it must exist, it 
must (causally) underpin our person-directed practices (in the right kind of 
way), and two person-stages must share it. And it requires that we may only 
take subject's person-directed practices to determine the property which is 
personal identity or survival for them when those subjects have a consistent 
and empirically informed set of beliefs about personal identity. It is also 
constrained by pluralism itself. In order for a property or relation to count as 
an acceptable candidate relation for personal identity it must be one around 
which subjects could organize their person-directed practices. As it stands 
then, the analysis is already constrained. But exactly how constrained is it? 
What sort of concepts are acceptable concepts of personal identity? More to 
the point, what concepts of personal identity are possible concepts for us? If 
we are free to organize our person-directed practices and concerns in terms of 
a relation that makes for a better life, what are the relations in terms of which 
we are free to organize them? 
3 As, for example, Mark Johnston (1989c) appears to do. Johnston stipulates as part of his 
relativist analysis that "The members of a given community C would be correct to take 
identity restricted to K's to be the relation of personal identity for them iff (i) Kisamore or 
less natural person-kind whose non-defective members never exist without the capacity for 
reflective mental life ... " (p.457). According to Johnston, clause (i) is required to ensure "that 
the members of a given community could not be correct in taking personal identity for them 
to be absolute identity restricted to a kind whose instances have periods when they are ants, 
stars, trees, gases, rivers, or any other type of thing without the capacity for reflective mental 
life." (p.457). However, it is not at all clear that this is something that an avowed relativist 
like Johnston is entitled simply to stipulate. Johnston claims that there are no absolute facts 
about personal identity: that the relation of personal identity is just that relation around 
which subjects organize their person-directed practices. 
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8.1 The Contacti 
A good way to begin to explore these possibilities is by way of a case, first 
presented by Hirsch, of an imaginary community, the Contacti, who appear 
to possess what, from our point of view, looks like a completely bizarre 
concept of survival. There are two questions to ask about the Contacti. First, 
is this apparently bizarre concept a possible concept of survival i.e. is it the 
sort of concept around which a community could successfully organize 
enough of their person-directed practices? Second, is this bizarre concept a 
possible concept for us-is it the sort of concept around which we could 
organize our person-directed practices and concerns? 
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The Contacti are a community who have a concept of personal identity 
according to which when two people come into contact the two people, as we 
might describe it, 'swap bodies' for the period of contact. If two people, A 
and B, are touching, the Contacti regard the sentence 'the person A who used 
to be associated with body-A is now associated with body-B, and the person 
B who used to be associated with body-Bis now to be associated with body-
A' as true. When contact is released, the association of people with bodies 
reverts back to the way it was before contact. So, when contact is released, 
the Contacti say 'The person A who was in the A-body before contact and 
who became associated with body-B during contact has now become 
associated with body-A again' and 'the person B who was associated with 
body-B before contact and who became associated with body-A during 
contact is now in body-B again'. (To keep things simple let's imagine that the 
Contacti never touch more than one person at any one time.) The Contacti do 
not believe that touching actually results in the transmission of characteristics 
from one person to the other. Nor, in fact, does it. Upon touching a person, 
although you become that person, and that person you, for the period of 
touching, touching does not actually result in the transmission of 
characteristics. The body that you touch does not inherit your memories, 
character traits, beliefs, desires, physical abilities, appearance, expertise, 
intentions, and so on. Nor do the Contacti believe that people are non-
material entities which mysteriously swap brains or bodies upon contact. 
(Nor, in fact, are there any such non-material entities in the Contacti's world.) 
It is just that the Contacti have a concept of personal identity which, unlike 
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ours, tracks personal identity with touching when two people are in exclusive 
contact, otherwise (when people are not touching anyone) just as we do. In 
general, if A is a person who throughout their life touches two other people B 
and C, then A's life history includes all of A's life during the period when A 
was not touching anyone, plus the part of B's life history for the period when 
A was touching B, and the part of C's life history for the period when A was 
touching C. As we might represent it four-dimensionally: 
Body A 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 
c 
BodyB • • • 0 • • • 
0 - PersonA 
• - PersonB 
C - Period of contact 
But, as Hirsch sets up the example of the Contacti, although the 
Contacti apply the language of personal identity in this strange way, they do 
not actually organize their person-directed concerns and practices around the 
concept of exclusive contact. For their person-directed practices are not at all 
as we would expect them to be were they actually organizing them around 
the relation of exclusive contact. Indeed, as Hirsch describes the case, their 
person-directed practices and concerns are just the same as our own. For 
example, they are not at all reticent to touch a person who is in extreme pain, 
as we would expect them to be were they organizing their attitudes of self-
concern around the Contacti concept. For their Contacti concept would tell 
them that were they to touch a person in pain, they would become the person 
in pain. Nor do they expect to remember directly the experiences had by a 
person they touched during a period of exclusive touching. Nor do they 
possess bizarre expectations about the relations between actions and desert. 
For example, if one of the Contacti, upon deciding to commit murder, grabs 
another Contacti person just before pulling the trigger, the Contacti charge 
the same person as we would for committing murder. Namely, the person 
(physical body) who pulled the trigger. Not the person who, by their 
Contacti concept, is the same person as the person who committed the crime. 
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So, as Hirsch sets up the example, though the Contacti talk as if the Contacti 
concept was their concept of personal identity, in fact it is completely inert as 
regards all their person-directed practices and concerns. 
As Mark Johnston quite rightly points out, then, as it stands the 
Contacti concept, though indeed an alternative concept, is not in fact their 
concept of survival. Johnston writes, 
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In general, the concept of being the same Cp as used by the Contacti does not 
seem to be their concept of personal identity just because they use that 
concept neither to guide their future-oriented and retrospective concerns, 
nor to shape their expectations about the relationship between earlier action 
and later desert of praise and blame, nor to focus their patterns of 
anticipation of experiences and memories of those experiences. 4 
But the pressing question for a pluralist in considering whether or not 
the Contacti relation of touching could count as an acceptable alternative 
relation of survival is not whether or not a community does in fact organize 
their person-directed practices and concerns around the relation of exclusive 
contact, but whether or not a community could successfully organize their 
person-directed practices around the Contacti relation of touching. And here 
both Hirsch and Johnston are united in maintaining that the Contacti concept 
is not the sort of concept around which a community could successfully 
organize their person-directed practice and concerns. As Hirsch writes, 
... such a language must lead to total havoc. For one of the essential 
functions of our concept of the self is to enable us to retain our separate 
identities in the course of complex social interactions, including of course, 
physical contact. In Contacti this would be impossible. People who spoke 
that language would feel impelled to touch each other, or not to touch each 
other, in ways that are completely irrational or even socially harmful. For 
example, if someone were in pain, no one would want to touch him, 
including the doctors. On the other hand, everyone would be anxious to 
touch the rich and successful (which is already something of a problem). The 
whole idea is evidently insanely unworkable ... If we tried to develop the 
Contacti fantasy in the emotive direction, then we imagine people whose 
lives are in countless ways bizarre and grotesque, from our ordinary point 
of view. I am not in fact even confident that we can make the fantasy fully 
intelligible in this direction ... s 
4Johnston (1989c), p.447. 
SHirsch (1982), pp.297-9. 
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And Johnston concurs, 
.. .if things were otherwise and the Contacti had the responses we would 
expect if we took their use of 'person' at face value, then the example of the 
Contacti either would be one of a tribe with our concept of personal identity 
and strange collateral beliefs about the effect of touching or would be 
difficult to develop coherently.6 
Bizarre and grotesque, from our point of view, a community who 
genuinely organized their person-directed practices and concerns around the 
Contacti concept might well seem. But, for the pluralist, this is no good 
reason to rule out such a community as having an acceptable personal 
identity concept. Only if such a concept were not the sort of concept around 
which an informed community could successfully organize their person-
directed practices and concerns would the pluralist have a principled reason 
to rule such a concept out of court. And, contrary to both Johnston and 
Hirsch, I think that the Contacti concept, developed in the emotive direction 
as it must be if we are to imagine it functioning as their concept of personal 
identity, is a potentially socially workable concept. It is not, however, given 
the way we are presently, albeit contingently, psychologically constituted, a 
possible concept for us. This is fortunate if, like Wiggins, you are worried 
that once we abandon constraints served up by nature, there is no principled 
way to render a pluralism suitably constrained-no principled way, that is, to 
rule out bizarre concepts as acceptable concepts for us. Perhaps unfortunate, 
in that it turns out that pluralism does not make for the radical possibility of 
organizing our person-directed practices and concerns in terms of excitingly 
weird and wonderful concepts. 
I want to have two attempts at showing how the Contacti concept 
might be socially workable. The first is to show how it can be made socially 
workable, indeed scarcely at all bizarre, but at the cost of it seeming not to be 
the Contacti's concept of personal identity. This I take to be further grist to 
the pluralist's central claim that personal identity is whatever relation it is 
that organizes our person-directed practices; that a relation that does not play 
this role for a community is not their personal identity relation. The second is 
to make it socially workable as a concept of personal identity and, in the process, 
6Johnston (1989c), p.446. 
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to illustrate why (fortunately or unfortunately) it does not seem to be a 
psychologically possible concept for us. 
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One preliminary. On either of these two stories (or, indeed any story) 
the Contacti relation of exclusive contact could not be the only concept which 
a community employ in organizing their person-directed practices and 
concerns. At least two other concepts-a concept of bodily continuity or 
bodily identity and a concept of informational continuity (roughly, 
psychological continuity) or informational identity-must also do some 
organizing work. As, indeed, both of these concepts do for us. For countless 
of our everyday person-directed practices depend upon our having a concept 
or concepts which enable us to track people's physical and/ or psychological 
characteristics. We identify and reidentify people with specific interests in 
mind. When we go to see a particular surgeon, we want the person with the 
surgeon's physical and psychological expertise. When we go to see a teacher, 
we want the person with the teacher's expertise. When we want to play 
tennis, we want to play with the person who has the tennis-playing abilities. 
When we arrange for someone to help us move house, we want someone 
with the requisite physical strength. When we want to laugh over holiday 
photos with the friend who we went on holiday with, we want the person 
with our friend's holiday memories. And so on and so forth. Successful 
organization of these manifold sorts of everyday person-directed practices 
depends on our employing concepts which enable us to track individual's 
physical and/ or psychological characteristics. 
Indeed this failure to track personal identity with continuity of 
individual's physical and/or mental characteristics is precisely what strikes 
us as so bizarre about Contacti concept in the first place. For, if touching did 
result in the transmission of a person's characteristics, then the case of the 
Contacti* community would be just like the case of a community of 
Teletransporters (except, of course, touching rather than the teletransporter 
mechanism would be the cause of the transmission of a person's 
characteristics). And nothing strikes us as particularly bizarre or grotesque 
about a community who have a concept of survival according to which a 
person survives teletransportation. 
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That the Contacti concept fails to track personal identity with 
individual's physical and/ or psychological characteristics is a prima facie 
reason for thinking that the Contacti concept could not be socially workable 
from the start. For, when two people are in exclusive contact, the Contacti 
concept does not track personal identity with continuity of these 
characteristics so central to, and seemingly necessary for, successful social 
interaction. Imagine, for example, that you, as a member of a Contacti 
community, are very sick and need to find a particular medical specialist. 
When you go to find the specialist you discover that she is touching someone. 
Now, remember that touching does not actually change anything in the brains 
and bodies of the people touching. Upon touching a person, though you 
become that person, and that person you, for the period of touching, touching 
does not result in the transmission of characteristics. The body that you 
touch does not inherit your memories, character traits, beliefs, desires, 
physical abilities, appearance, expertise, intentions, and so on. You want the 
person with the medical specialist's skills, training, memories, beliefs, and 
expertise. And these do not swap bodies with touching. So in order to get 
the person you want, you will actually need to employ another concept-a 
concept of bodily identity-since, although you know the doctor has 
swapped bodies with the other person upon touching, you want the person 
with the doctor's expertise, and (since bodily and informational continuity go 
together in this community) they will be in the body which was the doctor's 
before touching. Similarly, if you want an engineer to build a bridge and go 
to ask the engineer only to discover that he's touching someone who knows 
nothing about bridges, you will have to direct your request to the person who 
has the engineer's beliefs, memories, and expertise, not to the person who is, 
by your Contacti concept, identical with the engineer. For you want the 
person with the engineer's memories, beliefs, and expertise, and these do not 
swap bodies with touching. So too, if you want the strongest person in the 
Contacti community to manhandle a two tonne weight, and you go to find 
them, only to discover that the strongest person is touching a weakling, a 
concept of bodily identity will have to override your concept of touching as 
your concept of survival. For you want the person who has the strongest 
body, not the person who is, by your Contacti concept, identical with them. 
And so on. 
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For purely pragmatic reasons, in. all of these cases and countless more 
like them, in order to get the person with the things that you want, you need 
also to employ a concept of bodily and/ or informational identity; concepts 
which, in all of these sorts of cases, look like they would have to trump the 
Contacti concept as the concept in accordance with which people are 
identified and reidentified in circumstances where two Contacti people are 
touching. For in order to function successfully in countless everyday social 
situations it seems as if the Contacti would have to track personal identity 
with bodily and/ or informational identity, not touching, when two people 
are in exclusive contact. 
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All of this might seem to show that it is no accident that personal 
identity theorists have focussed almost exclusively on relations of physical 
and/ or psychological continuity and connectedness as candidate relations for 
personal identity. For such continuities are indeed necessary for personal 
identity if personal identity is to play the social role definitive of the concept. 
The pluralist's claim would then merely be that these continuities are not 
sufficient for personal identity: that they are necessary for personal identity, 
but they are only necessary for personal identity because a relation that did 
not track these would not be a relation which could play the social role 
definitive of the concept. 
The question posed by the Contacti is exactly the question of whether 
these two other concepts (in terms of one or other of which personal identity 
has typically been defined) are necessary for personal identity, or whether 
they might rather be independent resources on which we contingently draw 
in our application of the concept of personal identity, and personal identity 
can be something apart from them. Physical continuity theorists, for 
example, view psychological continuity as only contingently associated with 
personal identity; for physical continuity theorists, psychological continuity is 
just such an independent resource. Psychological continuity theorists, in 
contrast, view physical continuity as an independent resource, only 
contingently associated with personal identity. The question is, and contrary 
to initial appearances, might both physical and psychological continuity be 
thus only contingently associated with personal identity? This is, of course, 
what non-reductionists such as Cartesians claim (and, as we shall see in 
section 8.5, it gets them into some deep trouble). But survival might be 
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distinct from physical and/ or psychological continuity without it being such 
a mysterious 'further fact'. It might just consist in some more particular 
relation among person-stages other than physical continuity or psychological 
continuity-it might, for example, consist in the relation of exclusive contact. 
To the first story, then: the story of the Contacti*. 
8.2 The Contacti * 
One way of making the Contacti relation socially workable in the face of the 
sort of apparent counter-examples mentioned by Hirsch (in the preceding 
quotation) is to imagine a community who, in addition to employing the 
Contacti concept of 'personal identity', also employ some other concept 
which operates so as to offset or counteract the sorts of potentially socially 
problematic consequences of the Contacti concept to which Hirsch points. So 
we can imagine a community, the Contacti*, who, in addition to organizing 
their person-directed practices and concerns around the Contacti concept of 
touching, also organize their person-directed practices and concerns around 
an altruistic concept to the effect that the lives of others are of equal worth or 
value as their own. An altruistic concept, to put it in familiar Utilitarian 
terms, which yields a moral imperative of the form 'always act to maximise 
utility'. 
So, for example, we can imagine that although the Contacti* are not at 
all reticent to touch a Contacti* person who is in excruciating pain, this is not 
because they do not organize their person-directed concerns and expectations 
around the Contacti concept of touching. On the contrary. It is because they 
also organize their person-directed concerns and expectations around an 
altruistic concept which impels them, even in the knowledge that upon 
touching the person in agony it will be them who feel excruciating pain, to 
touch those who are in pain in order to help, comfort, or cure them. For 
helping, comforting, or curing those in pain, even at the cost of incurring pain 
oneself (literally), will maximise utility. So it is not that the Contacti* do not 
expect to feel excruciating pain when they go to touch another Contacti* in 
excruciating pain in order to help them. They do. After all, upon touching 
the person in pain, it will be them who is in pain. It is simply that they also 
organize their person-directed concerns and expectations around an altruistic 
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concept which impels them, against their own better interests, to help those 
Contacti* in pain. 
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Similarly, we can imagine that the Contacti concept of personal 
identity, in tandem with their altruistic concept, governs their expectations 
about the relations between earlier action and desert of praise or blame. 
Except, of course, in the Contacti* community we are imagining, there would 
be no cause for blame. For in the Contacti community we are imagining, 
there would be no murder, grabbing of innocent hostages to avoid 
punishment for a crime or other such morally deviant behaviour. For in the 
Contacti* community we are imagining the Contacti concept of personal 
identity goes hand in hand with, and is locked in place by, a mutually 
reinforcing altruistic concept of valuing the lives of other Contacti* as much 
as one's own. If the Contacti* modified their altruistic concept, they would 
have also to modify their concept of personal identity. Now, if we define a 
community in terms of shared practices, and the practices that are definitive 
of our Contacti* community are guided by the Contacti concept of personal 
identity and an altruistic concept to the effect that the lives of other Contacti* 
are equally as important as one's own, then selfishly-motivated killing or 
taking of innocent hostages would never occur. A morally deviant person 
who takes a non-utility maximising course of murdering another Contacti* 
would have departed from the Contacti* community. Of course, there might 
be killing in the Contacti* community, if such killing were to increase utility. 
But such killing would not be blameworthy. On the contrary, since it is a 
means to increase utility, it would be praiseworthy. In fact, because all in the 
Contacti* community, by definition, are guided by this altruistic concept, and 
assuming their own death would increase utility, rather than waiting for 
some other Contacti* to kill them they would simply kill themselves. 
As regards Hirsch's last imagined difficulty for the Contacti concept 
developed in the emotive direction, we can suppose that the Contacti* do not 
flock to touch the rich and successful, though they might wish themselves to 
be rich and successful, because touching the rich and successful would not 
make them rich and successful. (That is to say, I think that Hirsch's example 
here is misdescribed). For we are trying to imagine a Contacti community 
who organize their person-directed practices, including their legal and social 
entitlements, around their Contacti concept. And touching a person who is 
Chapter 8 A Constrained Pluralism? 
rich and successful will not make you rich and successful because touching 
will merely make it true that you are now to be identified with the body of 
the person which used to be identified as the body of the person who was 
rich and successful; and things such as wealth and fame go with people, they 
do not stay with bodies. No problem here, then, about social intractability. 
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I could go on developing the story of the Contacti*, but this is far 
enough to make the necessary point. The question to be asked is whether the 
Contacti*, as I have presented them so far, successfully organize (or 
extrapolating out in the same vein, could successfully organize) enough of their 
person-directed practices around the relation of exclusive contact for it to 
count as their concept of personal identity? For, as we noted in Chapter 5, a 
relation does not have to satisfy all of the survival role in order to count as a 
relation of personal identity for a community, it just has to satisfy enough of it. 
Does the relation of exclusive contact play enough of the survival role in the 
Contacti* to count as the relation of survival? Do we, intuitively, think that 
the Contacti concept counts as their concept of personal identity? 
I think it does not (and telling the story further-describing case by 
case how the altruistic concept operates to offset the otherwise socially 
problematic consequences of organizing around the relation of exclusive 
contact-would make little if any difference to this conclusion). Imagine that 
we are watching the Contacti* and wondering what their concept of personal 
identity is. We see that they are not at all reluctant to touch the sick; we see 
that they have no apparent practices of punishment; we see that they do not 
run around grabbing hold of the rich and successful or grabbing persons 
before they rob banks; and so on. In short, although they appear to have less 
crime than us and appear to value their own continued existence less than us, 
they don't seem to behave in any way that would suggest that they have a 
remarkably different concept of personal identity from us. In fact, what 
differences there are seems better explained by their employing a slightly 
different moral concept: by their being impartial utility maximisers. 
Indeed, we might not merely question whether or not the Contacti 
concept counts as the Contacti*'s concept of survival, we might question 
whether or not they have any concept of survival at all. For they are staunch 
universal utilitarians. Their person-directed practices are organized around 
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maximising utility; and doing what maximises utility may not require that 
they employ a survival concept at all. As we have already seen, the Contacti* 
have no need to employ a concept of survival in the context of blame and 
punishment, for since they all always act to maximise utility there is no crime 
or otherwise blameworthy activity to punish. And it may be that they 
similarly have no need to employ a concept of survival in other contexts. 
Their practices of love, attributions of ongoing rights and obligations, and so 
on, may all be governed by the maximising imperative without any need to 
employ a concept in accordance with which people are identified and 
reidentified as the same people over time. On the other hand, it might turn 
out that they do need to employ a concept of survival in aid of maximising 
utility. If it were to turn out that having an ongoing loving relationship with 
a single, same partner will maximize utility better than would engaging in a 
series of relationships with random many, for example. This may be true of 
the Contacti*, or it may not. But either way, if they have a concept of survival 
at all, it is not the Contacti concept. For that concept is entirely 
motivationally inert for them. 
In retrospect, this should not be surprising. For the thought behind 
positing the altruistic concept in the first place was to offset what Hirsch took 
to be the socially unworkable upshots of the Contacti genuinely organizing 
their attitudes of self-concern and other such psychological motivations 
around the relation of exclusive contact. It was, in effect, to try to make them 
psychologically and practically as much like us as possible. For if we 
organize our person-directed practices successfully, and the Contacti are just 
like us, then we must admit that the Contacti too organize their person-
directed practices successfully. But as much as adding the altruistic concept 
made the Contacti* community paradigmatically socially workable, it 
simultaneously makes it much less plausible to think that the Contacti 
concept is their concept of personal identity. For the more like us the Contacti, 
the less plausible it is to think that they are organizing around the relation of 
exclusive contact. For a community who genuinely organized around that 
relation would be very different from us. They would be reluctant to touch 
those in pain. And they would, from our point of view (although not, of 
course, from theirs), punish innocent people for crimes. But why should we 
suppose that the way in which we organize our person-directed practices, is 
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the only way it is possible for a community successfully or coherently to 
organize them? 
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So let's forget about offsetting the Contacti concept of personal identity 
to make it paradigmatically socially workable i.e. to give them person-
directed practices just like our own. For this looks like it was gerrymandered 
in favour of our concept(s) right from the start. Let's start afresh and imagine 
what a community, call them the Contacti**, who really organized their 
person-directed practices and concerns around the Contacti concept would 
look like. Could such a community coherently organize enough of their 
person-directed practices and concerns around the Contacti relation of 
exclusive contact? 
8.3 The Contacti** 
Amongst the platitudes about personal identity in the cluster that I think we 
weight very heavily are the platitudes about self-interest, memory and 
responsibility. Indeed, Johnston defines personal identity solely in terms of 
these practices, taking them alone to be jointly necessary and sufficient for 
personal identity. If Johnston is right about the heavy weight we assign to 
these platitudes (and I think he is), then were the Contacti** able successfully 
to organize these of their person-directed practices around the Contacti 
relation of exclusive contact we might well be prepared to say that the 
Contacti**, although undeniably bizarre, nonetheless employ the Contacti 
concept as their concept of personal identity. Let me describe how the Contacti** 
might successfully organize their practices of punishment and self-concern 
around the relation of exclusive contact by way of just one short story. 
Imagine that a Contacti **bank robber wants to rob a bank. Being self-
interested, he would prefer that he himself not be blamed and punished for it. 
So he decides, rather than risk himself being later caught and punished for 
the crime, the thing to do is to maintain exclusive contact with an innocent 
bystander throughout the course of the robbery so that, after contact is 
released, the innocent bystander, not him, will be punished for the crime. 
Being a well-enculturated Contacti**, he believes that there is nothing unjust 
about this (not that he would be particularly worried even if there were!), for 
the person who is the same person as the person who committed the crime is 
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the person who deserves to be blamed and punished for it. And the innocent 
bystander, not him, will be the person who, if everything goes according to 
plan, commits the crime. Likewise, the innocent bystander will regard it as 
perfectly just that she gets blamed and punished for the crime. For, upon 
being grabbed by the robber for the duration of the robbery, her life history 
will include the stage of the robber for the period in which they were in 
exclusive contact. She (or a stage of her) robbed the bank, and so she 
deserves to be blamed and punished for it. 
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All does go to plan. The robber goes into the bank, gun in hand, grabs 
an innocent bystander and demands the money from the teller. Having 
mastery of the Contacti concept of personal identity, he then starts stuffing 
the money into the pockets of the body who used to be the innocent 
bystander, but who, now, of course, is him. After all, being self-interested, he 
doesn't want to give the money to the innocent bystander (as he would be 
doing were he to stuff the money into the pockets of who we would call the 
robber)! Of course, later, once contact is released, the robber will once again 
be associated with the robber-body. Stuffing the money into the pockets of 
the robber-body would be in the robber's long-term interests i.e. in his or her 
interests after contact is released. But, now, and for the duration of contact, 
the innocent bystander is in the robber-body. And to now put the money in 
the pockets of the robber-body would be to give the money to the innocent 
bystander. Not something that the (short-term) self-interested robber wants 
to do. Similarly, the innocent bystander, we might imagine, disapproving of 
robbery, desperately tries to take the money out of the robber's pockets again 
i.e. out of the pockets of who we would call the innocent bystander. And 
perhaps, wanting to be able to return the money to its rightful owner, 
desperately starts trying to stuff the money into his own pockets i.e. into the 
pockets of the person who we would call the robber. 
The point to glean is that in the Contacti** community, acting self-
interestedly requires acting in the interests of the body touched for the period 
of exclusive contact. For, for the period of exclusive contact, those are your 
interests. Such a pattern of self-concern is certainly very strange from our 
point of view. Not least because, to return to the robbery, when a Contacti** 
robber acts self-interestedly (e.g. stuffs the money into the pockets of the 
person who is now them but who, post-contact, will be the innocent 
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bystander) they bring it about that, once they release contact and run out of 
the bank, the innocent bystander ends up with the money. Psychologically 
bizarre Contacti** robbers undoubtably are, but I don't see any reason to 
suppose that acting in this way is actually incoherent. (I will return to this 
point again shortly.) 
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What of the sorts of practices-practices which require our tracking 
individual's informational and bodily characteristics-that, prima facie, looked 
particularly problematic for the Contacti concept? Suppose that a Contacti** 
person, Susan, comes to see a particular medical specialist, Fran. (Let's say 
that the person who has the medical specialist's expertise, memories etc is 
wearing a white coat.) Upon entering the doctor's room, Susan discovers that 
Fran is touching another body, which, prior to contact, was Caroline's body. 
Unperturbed, and in accordance with her Contacti concept, Susan turns to the 
person in the white coat and says 'Caroline, you must temporarily have the 
doctor's memories and expertise, could you give me a check-up?' Of course, 
as we have already noted, in order to identify the person with the doctor's 
knowledge, Susan will need also to employ a concept of bodily identity (or, in 
a case where bodily and informational identity come apart, a concept of 
informational identity as well). For as we noted, contact does not actually 
result in the transfer of characteristics from body to body. However, this 
does not mean that the Contacti cannot employ their Contacti concept, which 
does not track these things, as their concept of personal identity in these 
cases. As already discussed, like Susan, they believe that Caroline, not Fran, 
is the person who temporarily has the doctor's expertise. 
Of course, where patients are presently experiencing great pain, 
Contacti** doctors may well be reluctant to come into contact with the 
patient. For, for the period of touching, they will be the person in great pain. 
But perhaps Contacti** doctors get androids to deliver large doses of 
morphine to the patient before contact. Or perhaps they feel that the 
exorbitant fees they charge for their services are sufficient to compensate for 
short-term pain. (In that, they may be psychologically not so different from 
some doctors round here!) In any case, where patients are not actually in 
pain prior to contact, Contacti** doctors would most likely have no qualms 
whatsoever about touching sick patients-would it be so bad to have cancer 
for ten minutes? 
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What of memory? Return to the above case of Caroline and the doctor, 
Fran. Let's assume, for simplicity's sake, that Caroline is the first person with 
whom Fran has come into contact. Before contact with Caroline, Fran views 
the memories she has as her own: as memories as of things she herself has 
experienced. When contact occurs, just as other Contacti** (such as Susan) 
view the person with the doctor's memories, expertise etc as Caroline, so Fran 
thinks to herself 'I am now having Caroline's memories'. In retrospect (i.e. 
after contact is released), Fran will think to herself, 'I am now having my own 
memories again, but the memories I have from the period in which I was in 
contact with Caroline are of things that Caroline experienced.' For my life 
history includes a stage of Caroline for the period in which we were in 
exclusive contact. 
If the concept of memory that the Contacti** employ seems familiar, it 
is because it is the psychological continuity theorist's, q-memory (except, of 
course, unlike Parfit's example of Jane and Paul in Venice, Contacti** people 
can have q-memories without there being underlying neurophysiological 
change). On the Contacti concept of personal identity, a person may 
remember things that she herself has not experienced (as, for example, when 
doctor Fran expects to remember Caroline's experiences for the period in 
which they were in exclusive contact). On the assumption that there is 
nothing incoherent about the concept of q-memory (and psychological 
continuity theorists had better hope that there's not!), there is nothing 
incoherent about the Contacti** organizing their expectations about the 
relationship between memories and remembered-experiences in terms of 
their Contacti concept. 
Having seen how the Contacti** seem to manage successfully to 
organize the aforementioned, heavily weighted sorts person-directed 
practices around the Contacti concept of exclusive contact, we can see how 
the story will go for the rest. The question is, is the Contacti concept their 
concept of personal identity: that is to say, do they organize enough of their 
person-directed practices around the Contacti concept in order for it to count 
as their concept of personal identity? And the answer seems to me, 
intuitively, 'yes'. When we look at the Contacti** we see a community who 
systematically act in the interests of the body touched for the period of 
exclusive contact; who punish the person grabbed by a robber during a 
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robbery and who, moreover, regard it as perfectly just that the person 
grabbed should be so blamed and punished; who expect to remember the 
experiences had by the person touched during a period of exclusive contact; 
who identify and reidentify people on the basis of exclusive contact; and so 
on. True, they employ concepts of bodily and/ or informational identity in 
aid of the application of their concept of personal identity. But relations of 
bodily and/ or informational identity are not the relations around which they 
organize their person-directed practices and concerns for periods in which 
they are in exclusive contact. It is the relation of exclusive contact, not the 
relations of bodily and/ or informational identity that are psychologically 
motivational for the Contacti**. Whereas the Contacti* were psychologically 
motivated by the altruistic concept, not the Contacti concept of touching, the 
Contacti** are genuinely motivated by, and act in accordance with, the 
Contacti relation of touching. They act in the interests of the body they touch 
for the period of exclusive contact. If they have to choose who gets tortured 
during a period of contact they will choose that their old body gets the torture 
(in our terms, that their body gets the torture). They do not regard it as in 
any way unjust that they get punished for crimes which were planned by 
somebody then and now distinct from them; crimes, moreover, from which 
they didn't even get any loot. And so on. Unlike Johnston, who defines 
survival summary-style in terms of these three sorts of person-directed, I 
define the survival more widely in terms of the whole cluster of platitudes 
about survival. To describe bit by bit how the Contacti could similarly 
successfully organize all of these in terms of the relation of exclusive contact 
would be to write an entire novel about this strange community, the 
Contacti**. But if Johnston is right in thinking that the person-directed 
practices in terms of which he defines personal identity are jointly necessary 
and sufficient for personal identity, or at least very heavily weighted in the 
cluster (and I think that he is), then it seems that the Contacti concept is the 
Contacti**'s concept of personal identity. And this seems the intuitively right 
thing to say. The Contacti concept of exclusive contact is then a possible 
concept of survival, for it is the sort of relation around which an informed 
community could successfully organize enough of their person-directed 
practices and concerns. 
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However, fortunately or unfortunately, the Contacti concept of 
exclusive touching does not seem to be a possible concept for beings with the 
sort of psychology that we have. For example, acting self-interestedly in the 
Contacti** community requires, first, predicting what would be in the 
interests of the body touched and, second, being disposed to act in 
accordance with those interests for the period of contact, even where those 
interests are at odds with what were your interests prior to contact. For 
example, if an honest policeman is grabbed by a bank-robber during a hold-
up, the policeman must be disposed to change his desires to act in the evil 
interests of the ex robber-body and takeover the hold-up. Likewise, in such a 
situation, the robber must be disposed to change his preferences to act in the 
interests of the body which used to be associated with the honest policeman 
prior to contact. The robber must desperately try to stop the robbery; the 
honest policeman must desperately try to carry it out. 
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As psychological characteristics are not actually transferred upon 
contact, when you are in contact with another, figuring out what is in your 
self-interest requires an enormous effort of empathy. It requires, literally, 
that you put yourself in the shoes of the body touched for the period of 
exclusive contact. For in order to act in your own interests for the period of 
contact, you need to work out what that body's interests are. And since you 
do not have privileged psychological access to those interests (because you 
are not actually psychologically continuous with the person you touch) the 
only way you can work out what is in your interests is by predicting what the 
interests of the body you are touching are-what are the intentions, 
aspirations, projects, values, goals etc. of the body you are touching? What 
would that body want you to do? And that, for the Contacti**, is exactly 
equivalent to asking what is it in my interests to do? For the Contacti**, self-
interest, like memory, is not strictly self-interest, but q-interest. However, not 
only do you have to predict what the interests of the body touched are in 
order to work out what is in your self-interest, you must also be disposed to 
change what were your interests prior to contact in such a way as to do what 
is in the interests of the body touched, even in circumstances (such as the 
robber touching the policeman) where those interests are diametrically 
opposed to what were your interests prior to contact. 
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If incoherence threatens anywhere, for the Contacti**, it is here. But I 
do not think that q-interest of this sort is actually incoherent. It is rather that, 
for beings with our psychology, the Contacti concept of exclusive contact 
would coexist in an extremely unstable alliance with concepts of bodily and 
informational continuity. Given our sort of psychology, I think, it would not 
be long before we would begin to wear metal cages or engage in other 
contact-preventing measures to avoid being grabbed by those too 
psychologically dissimilar from us or of whose interests and values we 
disapprove; or taking bullets for people who, in retrospect, are complete 
strangers (if we were still around to retrospect, that is); or handing over our 
life savings to pay for what, in retrospect, is someone else's debt; or regarding 
it as perfectly just that we should be punished for a crime committed by a 
person who, in retrospect, is someone else. It would not be long, I think, 
before beings with our psychology would begin to act in our long-term 
interests i.e. in the interests of the person who is physically and 
psychologically continuous with us post-contact, rather than in the interests 
of the body touched for the period of contact. For, for example, when people 
with our psychology rob a bank they want to end up with the money. We 
would take great precautions to ensure that we come into contact with only 
those friends and family in whose interests we would want to act anyway. 
We would cease to bother addressing the doctor as 'Caroline'; and, when we 
remember some experience, worrying about whether we could truly say that 
it was of something that we ourselves had experienced, or whether it was 
rather of something that someone else had experienced while we were 
touching them. And so on. In a relatively short time, I think, concepts of 
bodily and informational continuity would win out to replace the Contacti 
concept as the concept around which we organize our person-directed 
practices and concerns. The relation of exclusive contact just does not seem to 
be a relation around which beings with our psychological dispositions, 
interests and motivations could stably care for very long. 
8.4 Two possible lessons 
What conclusions should we draw from the case of the Contacti (and the 
Contacti* and the Contacti**!)? I think there are two possible lessons, either 
of which I find perfectly congenial (although, since I think that the story of 
the Contacti** describes a coherent community wherein the relation of 
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exclusive contact functions successfully as their concept of personal identity, I 
think that the second is most likely the right one). 
The first lesson. If you think, despite my story-telling efforts, that the 
story of Contacti** does not (or could not), in the end, describe a coherent 
community, then there is a good a priori reason for thinking that only 
relations which underpin the transmission of individuals' physical and/ or 
psychological characteristics are candidate relations for survival. For, as 
noted at the outset, where the Contacti relation of exclusive contact will break 
down, if it breaks down at all, will be in its failure to track survival with 
bodily and/or informational continuity. What we will then think is that it is a 
priori true that survival is a disjunction of the relations of physical or 
psychological continuity; and pluralism will simply tell us which of these two 
disjuncts (or some slight variation thereon) is the survival relation for a given 
community. On this view, pluralism will simply tell us which way a 
community precisifies the concept of survival in indeterminate cases; either 
precisification of which is a perfectly acceptable survival concept. (I think 
that this is the way that Mark Johnston thinks of pluralism). This would be a 
less exciting and radical view, but a pluralist view, nonetheless. 
If, on the other hand, we think that the Contacti** does describe a 
coherent community wherein the Contacti concept functions successfully as 
their concept of personal identity (as I tend to), then we will think that 
pluralism has more scope than this. It does not merely decide which of 
physical or psychological continuity-the only acceptable candidate survival 
relations-constitute survival for a community. It is not a priori true that 
survival is either physical and/ or psychological continuity. Survival for any 
community is rather whatever relation among person-stages it is that that 
community organizes their person-directed practices and concerns around. 
And pluralism allows for much greater object-level scope than the 
comparatively narrow range of candidates which have been canvassed in the 
personal identity to date. Whether we ourselves are in a position to avail 
ourselves of some of the weirder and more wonderful possible concepts 
depends only on contingent (although probably well-engrained) facts about 
our psychological constitution. 
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8.5 Is the Cartesian View possible? 
Our discussion of the Contacti concept serves more than merely to illustrate 
the possible object-level scope of pluralism. It also serves to make vivid a 
worry, mentioned only very briefly in passing in chapter 1, about the 
intelligibility of Cartesian views of personal identity, or indeed, of any view 
that similarly leaves relations of physical and/ or psychological continuity 
and connectedness only contingently associated with survival. 
Recall that the Cartesian view is a non-reductionist view: survival 
consists in some further fact (for Cartesians, the continued existence of the 
same immaterial entity or soul), over and above, and not reducible to, facts 
about physical and/or psychological connections and continuities among 
person stages. On the Cartesian view, facts about physical and psychological 
continuity are mere fallible evidence for personal identity (i.e. the continued 
existence of the same soul), they are in no way constitutive of, or necessary 
for, personal identity. As Richard Swinburne writes, 
... although apparent memory and brain continuity are, as they obviously 
are, evidence of personal identity, they are fallible evidence and personal 
identity is something distinct from them. Just as the presence of blood 
stains and fingerprints matching those of a given man are evidence of his 
earlier presence at the scene of the crime, and the discovery of Roman-
looking coins and buildings is evidence that the Romans lived in some 
region, so the similarity of P2's apparent memory to that of P1 and his 
having much of the same brain matter, is evidence that P2 is the same 
person as P1. Yet blood stains and fingerprints are one thing and a man's 
earlier presence at the scene of the crime another. His presence at the scene 
of the crime is not analysable in terms of the later presence of bloodstains 
and fingerprints. The latter is evidence of the former, because you seldom 
get bloodstains and fingerprints at a place matching those of a given man, 
unless he has been there leaving them around. But it might happen. So, the 
suggestion is, personal identity is distinct from, although evidenced by, 
similarity of memory and continuity of brain. 7 (emphasis added). 
This feature of the Cartesian view-that it allows that the soul may exist, 
continue to exist, and even cease to exist quite independently of the physical 
and psychological continuities that are our evidence for it-has lead some to 
7swinbume (1984), p.19. 
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maintain that the view is unintelligible. As Kant explains the worry, the 
Cartesian view is perfectly compatible with the possibility of there being 
a whole series of substances of which the first transmits its state together 
with its consciousness to the second, the second its own state with that of 
the preceding substance to the third, and this in turn the state of all the 
preceding substances together with its own consciousness and with their 
consciousness to another. The last substance would then be conscious of all 
the states of the previously changed substances, as being its own states, 
because they would have been transferred to it together with the 
consciousness of them. 8 
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Assuming Kant's sceptical hypothesis is coherent, what it shows is that 
on the Cartesian view personal identity is unknowable. For nothing in our 
first-person experience or our third-person practices of identifying and 
reidentifying people on the basis of observed physical and/ or psychological 
continuities can rule out the possibility that what we naturally and habitually 
take to be cases of the persistence of the same person over time might in fact 
be a succession of different people or souls, each communicating its 
consciousness to the next. For all that we know through introspection and 
observation, souls might constantly be flitting round from body to body, 
psychology to psychology, even as individual's mental and physical 
characteristics remain entirely unchanged. In making personal identity thus 
unknowable, it is widely argued, the Cartesian view violates a central 
condition on an account of personal identity: that it be able to account for the 
kind of knowledge that we have of our personal identity, including the 
special kind of knowledge that we seem to have of our own continued 
existence over time. 
However, the possibility described by Kant points to a related but 
broader and potentially far more serious difficulty for the Cartesian view; a 
difficulty, as we saw in chapter 1, of which Locke was acutely aware. The 
difficulty is that, in a world where souls systematically fail to underpin 
relations of physical and/ or psychological continuity and connectedness, 
sameness of soul, just like the Contacti relation of exclusive contact, may not 
be an acceptable candidate relation for survival. For, in a world where souls 
are so badly behaved, sameness of soul may not be the sort of relation around 
8Kant (1964), p.343. 
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which a community could successfully organize their person-directed 
practices and concerns. This worry, though more pointed on the account of 
survival I have argued for, is nonetheless a very serious worry on any account 
of personal identity. For, as we saw in chapter 2, in addition to the 
requirement of knowability, a second central and standard condition on an 
acceptable account of personal identity is that the account be able to make 
intelligible the special sort of importance that personal identity has for us. 
Note that Kant's example depends on the assumption that there are 
souls in the actual world, and that they are well-behaved.9 For otherwise 
why should we even begin to entertain the worry that badly behaved souls 
might not count as souls i.e. candidate relations for survival? What is it about 
an immaterial entity that makes it count as a soul or candidate relation for 
survival? It is the supposition that that immaterial entity plays the survival 
role in the actual world.IO Only then does the worry about whether or not an 
immaterial entity which did not behave as it is supposed to behave in the 
actual world would still count as a soul (i.e. a candidate relation for survival) 
get off the ground. 
Objectors to the Cartesian view have divided roughly into two camps. 
The first maintains that, insofar as the Cartesian view allows for the 
possibility that souls might be badly-behaved, the view is unintelligible. 
Others maintain that the Cartesian view is not unintelligible (personal 
identity might have consisted in sameness of soul), it is just as a matter of fact 
false. For there are no immaterial entities in this world. The pluralist agrees 
that in a world, such as ours, where there are no immaterial egos, survival 
will not consist in the continued existence of an immaterial entity. For that 
will not be what we are organizing around. But what will the pluralist say 
about worlds where there are such things? In particular, is the badly behaved 
immaterial entity an acceptable candidate relation for survival? 
91 owe this point to David Braddon-Mitchell. 
lOThis is, of course, the pluralist answer. The practice-independent theorist would give a 
different answer. For example, survival consists in these immaterial entities because God said 
that survival consists in these immaterial entities. I hope that by now these answers will seem 
unsatisfactory. 
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What the pluralist will say here depends on which of the two lesson is 
the lesson to be drawn from the case of the Contacti. Those who believe that 
the first lesson is the right one will have it that only relations of physical 
and/ or psychological continuity are relations around which a community 
could successfully organize their person-directed practices and concerns. So 
that any relation other than these (such as the relation of exclusive contact, or 
sameness of soul in a world where souls do not underpin transmission of 
individual's physical and/or psychological characteristics) is not an 
acceptable candidate relation for survival. If the first lesson is the one to be 
drawn from the case of the Contacti, then the (badly behaved) immaterial 
entity is ruled out a priori as an acceptable candidate relation for personal 
identity. 
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If the second lesson is the right one to be drawn, however, we will take 
a different view. For if the Contacti relation which fails to track personal 
identity with physical and/ or psychological continuity is nonetheless the sort 
of relation around which a community could successfully organize their 
person-directed practices and concerns, then an immaterial entity, even when 
badly behaved, is similarly an acceptable candidate relation for survival. But 
what pluralism of this second genre gives to the Cartesian view with one 
hand, it takes away with the other. For just as the Contacti relation seems an 
impossible survival concept for beings psychologically constituted like us, so 
(in a world where immaterial entities similarly fail to track physical and/ or 
psychological continuities among person-stages) sameness of immaterial 
thing is not a psychologically possible survival concept for us. Either way, 
then, badly behaved immaterial entities seem not to be candidate survival 
relations for us. 
What, however, of a world where immaterial entities do not come 
apart from the physical and/ or psychological continuities among person-
stages that are evidence for them? Is a world in which there are immaterial 
entities, and where subjects organize their person-directed practices around 
those immaterial entities, a world in which survival consists in the continued 
existence of those immaterial entities? The worry here is that such a 
community will be like the Contacti as Hirsch originally described them, or 
like my description of the Contacti*. Both communities talk as if the Contacti 
concept was their survival concept, but in fact it is completely redundant as 
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regards their person-directed practices. They say they organize around the 
Contacti relation of exclusive contact, but in fact they organize around 
something else (in the former case, relations of physical and/ or psychological 
continuity, in the latter, an altruistic concept). An exactly analogous worry 
arises for the case of a community who organize around a well-behaved 
immaterial entity: they say they organize around an immaterial entity whose 
continued existence corresponds exactly to the relations of physical and/ or 
psychological continuity among person-stages which are evidence for it, but 
in fact they just organize around the relations of physical and/ or 
psychological continuity. For, for all intents and purposes, their survival-
oriented behaviour will be indistinguishable from that of a community who 
organizes straightforwardly around relations of physical and/psychological 
continuity. What reason might we have, then, for thinking that the soul is 
doing any organizing work? That is to say, what reason could we have for 
thinking that sameness of immaterial entity, rather than relations of physical 
and/ or psychological continuity, is their survival relation? 
Here is a reason. If they are genuinely organizing around an 
immaterial entity, although their actual survival-oriented practices will be 
practically indistinguishable from a community who organize around 
relations of physical and/ or psychological continuity, their counter-factual 
dispositions will be different. Were the immaterial entity to come apart from 
relations of physical and/ or psychological continuity, they would track (or be 
disposed to track) survival with that immaterial entity rather than with 
physical and/ or psychological continuity. For a community to genuinely 
organize around an immaterial entity will be for them to have these 
distinctive counter-factual dispositions. For it to be true that Swinburne, for 
example, genuinely organizes his person-directed practices around an 
immaterial entity, rather than simply around the relations which are evidence 
for it, it must be the case that (unlike Parfit, Shoemaker, Williams, Unger and 
the like) he is disposed to track survival with an immaterial entity, rather 
than with the relations which are typically evidence for it, in counter-factual 
circumstances where they come apart. That is how pluralism admits the 
well-behaved immaterial entity as a candidate survival relation for us. 
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PLURALISM IN THE ACTUAL WORLD 
Pluralism has important and timely implications for the ongoing personal 
identity debate in this world; a debate which, having been dominated to date 
by competing practice-independent accounts, has taken the form of an 
increasingly desperate search for the single, independent answer to the 
question of survival. 
As we have seen, contemporary conceptual analysis in the case of 
survival, as elsewhere, has gone by way of what we might call the method of 
cases. Theorists formulate putative accounts of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for survival over time; accounts which are evaluated in view of 
how well they accord with our intuitive responses (taken to reflect our prior 
grasp of the concept of survival) gleaned from actual and hypothetical puzzle 
cases. The right account of survival, it is assumed, will be the one which best 
predicts and explains our intuitive reactions to these puzzle cases. 
Notoriously, however, the intuitive deliverances of the method of 
cases have proved incredibly problematic for practice-independent accounts, 
which assume that there is a single, independent answer to the question of 
personal identity. The problem has been that our intuitive reactions to puzzle 
cases do not seem to settle on any particular one of the numerous, competing 
candidate properties that the different practice-independent accounts claim to 
take the honour of instantiating the single, practice-independent truth of the 
matter. And given the assumption that the right account of survival is the 
one which can predict and explain our intuitive reactions to puzzle cases, the 
fact that our intuitive responses appear not to converge on any one of these 
competing accounts, would seem to suggest, given practice-independence, 
that all these accounts are far from adequate by their own lights. 
Somewhat surprisingly though, practice-independent theorists have 
responded to this problem not by reassessing their assumption that the 
question of survival is itself the kind of question which admits of a single, 
independent answer in the first place, but by devising more and more 
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ingenious puzzle cases designed to prompt intuitive reactions which will 
accord with their preferred account, and by engaging in more and 
increasingly elaborate attempts to explain away those recalcitrant intuitions 
which would seem to favour some other competing account. The feeling 
seems to be that if we could just find quite the right way of presenting these 
puzzle cases then people's intuitive responses will converge and we will then 
have hit upon the single, independent answer to the question of survival. 
Of course, even if we did find a way of presenting these puzzle cases 
so our intuitive reactions in fact converged and/ or a principled explanation 
as to why they had not so converged in the past we would not necessarily 
have found the independent answer to the question of personal identity or 
survival. What we would then have found is that in this world, as a matter of 
fact, survival is realized by a single relation (it might be a single disjunctive 
relation). We would not have found that personal identity or survival is 
necessarily instantiated by this particular relation. That is to say, the fact that 
different subjects in this world converge in their opinions about what relation 
survival in fact consists in would not necessarily show that survival for all 
communities in all worlds is whatever relation it is that is survival for us in 
the actual world. This is arguably true, for example, in the case of colour. In 
the case of colour, as a matter of fact, normal observers in normal conditions 
converge in judging that fire engines are red, grass is green and the sky is 
blue. But many doubt that the mere fact that there is this convergence shows 
that 'red' rigidly names the (probably very disjunctive) property that it names 
in the actual world. For colour seems intimately connected to subject's colour 
experience in a way in which squareness, for example, is clearly not to 
subject's experience of square. So we want to leave it open that things might 
still be red for normal observers in normal conditions, even if it were the case 
that a different property caused things to look red. And this is not simply 
because 'red' happens to pick out a particularly messy disjunction in the 
actual world, it is because we think that what fixes the reference of 'red' in 
any world depends on what property (or properties) cause things to look to 
red to observers in that world; and different properties may play that role for 
different subjects in different worlds. All this is simply to say that pluralism 
might still be true-survival might still be multiply realizable-even if 
survival were not actually (as I think it in fact is) multiply realized. Pluralism 
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might still be the right analysis of survival, even if it were the case that 
everyone in the actual world happened to organize their person-directed 
practices around the same relation. That would just tell us that we all agree 
about what survival is in the actual world. It will not, in itself, tell us what 
survival is in all worlds. To answer that, we need to investigate the meta-
issue. 
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But the problem in the case of personal identity, unlike the case of 
colour, has been that, after more than a century of attempting to get the 
presentation of puzzle cases quite right, peoples' intuitive responses in the 
actual world seem no closer to converging around the same relation. The 
problem is not so much that individual subjects have internally inconsistent 
intuitive reactions to puzzle cases (although that may sometimes be the case), 
the problem is that different subjects have different opinions about what 
relation survival consists in. The problem, that is to say, is not the fact of 
intra-personal divergence, it is the fact that there is substantial inter-personal 
divergence. And, what has been particularly troubling for practice-
independent theorists, is that different subjects seem no closer to converging 
even when those subjects have fully informed, considered and consistent 
beliefs about the matter. For, philosophers like Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and 
Lewis, amongst others, on the one hand, and Williams, Wiggins, Nagel, and 
Unger, amongst others, on the other, have an informed, considered, 
consistent and precise grasp of their person-directed beliefs and concerns and 
the property around which they are organized. They are in conditions of 
increasing information and critical reflection if anyone is. But their informed, 
considered and consistent opinions as to the property or properties which 
instantiate personal identity or survival do not converge. The former insist 
that the latter are mistaken, for physical continuity is no necessary condition 
for personal identity, whilst the latter insist that the former are mistaken, for 
physical continuity is necessary for personal identity. And they continue to 
diverge even when they know everything about the connections between 
person-stages which they themselves claim to be the only things they need to 
know in order to decide whether or not a person survives. Yet the search for 
the single, independent truth of the matter has raged on by way of more and 
more ingenious puzzle cases designed to show once and for all how and why 
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members of opposing camps are mistaken, and more and more elaborate 
attempts to explain why it is that they had been led astray in the first place. 
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But if the concept of personal identity is essentially connected to 
concepts of subjects' person-directed practices and concerns in the specified 
conditions then we have an alternative explanation as to why these two 
groups of philosophers so vehemently disagree about the properties which 
instantiate personal identity. It is not, I will argue, that one or other of the 
two groups are fundamentally mistaken about survival, or mean something 
significantly different by survival, it is just that different relations realize the 
survival role for them. They, like the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles, 
just care, and blamelessly so, about different properties in survival; properties 
which, in virtue of the common role they play in their person-directed 
concerns, they take to constitute the concept of survival. Rather than viewing 
one or other of their disparate intuitive responses to puzzle cases as mistaken 
reactions to be explained away, we should see these responses (informed and 
consistent as they are) as revealing what property is it that, as a matter of fact, 
constitutes survival for them; as revealing what they care about in survival. 
That is to say, we should hold pluralism not merely to be possibly true, but 
actually true: true in the actual world. 
In so saying, I am rejecting some of the more standard sorts of 
explanations for this lack of object-level convergence. So I'd better say a little 
more about why. Perhaps the best place to begin is with a famous set of 
puzzle cases first presented by Williamsl. 
Case 1 
Suppose that you and another person, Brown, are reasonably physically 
similar. Now, imagine that your brain is physically altered so that it comes to 
contain the information and have the dispositions of Brown's. Brown's brain 
is similarly altered with the result that it contains the information and 
dispositions yours has now. So the person who wakes up in your (present) 
body after the operation will seem to remember doing all the things that 
Brown now remembers doing and will seem to have all of Brown's beliefs, 
desires, intentions, character traits, and so on. They will think that they are 
1wmiams (1970). 
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Brown, and so will everybody else. Similarly, the person who wakes up in 
Brown's body will seem to have your (present) psychology: they will think 
that they are you, they will seem to remember all the things that you now 
remember doing, have all your character traits, beliefs, desires, intentions, 
and so on. Which, then, of the two resulting persons is you? 
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To make the question more vivid, suppose that you are told the following 
news: one or other of the people (the person in your body or the person in 
Brown's) will, after the alteration, be tortured for twenty-four hours. There is 
no way that you can prevent this. But you are offered the following choice: 
you can choose which body gets the future torture. Which body would you 
choose? 
The widespread intuitive response to this case is (or is supposed to be) 
that the person who inherits your distinctive dispositional psychology-
memories, intentions, aspirations, and other character traits-is you; so that, 
in choosing which person gets the future torture, you choose the person in 
your body. In this case, the possession of a particular body seems less crucial 
for personal identity than the possession of a distinctive sort of psychological 
make-up. The dominant reaction to this case, then, is to track personal 
identity over time with psychological connectedness and continuity where 
psychological and physical continuity so come apart. What philosophers take 
this case to show, then, is that psychological, but not physical, continuity is 
necessary for personal identity. This case, then, seems to support a 
psychological continuity account of personal identity. For that is the 
commitment which explains our intuitive response. But now consider the 
following case. 
Case2 
Suppose that you are given the following news. You are to be tortured in 
twenty-four hours. There is no way you can avoid the impending torture, but 
you are offered the following consolations. Firstly, before the torture is 
administered, you will suffer complete amnesia regarding your present 
experiences. Secondly, you will be given a set of delusive memories about 
your past. Thirdly, you will be given a set of behavioural dispositions which 
are completely at odds with your present character and constitute a basic 
change in your present personality. The question to ask yourself is would 
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you take the consolations. Would they make you any less deeply anxious 
about the impending torture? 
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And the dominant response here is (or is supposed to be) a definitive 
'no'. As Bernard Williams reiterates, none of these changes or so-called 
'consolations' seem to relieve any of the special apprehension and anxiety 
you feel toward the impending torture. These changes would just be adding 
insult to injury. As if it weren't bad enough that you were going to be 
tortured, you would have your psychology fiddled with as well. In this case 
then, we seem to track personal identity with bodily, not psychological, 
continuity where the two come apart. What this case seems to show, then, is 
that physical, not psychological, continuity is necessary for survival. For that 
survival requires physical continuity, but not psychological continuity, seems 
to explain our intuitive response to this case. 
But what has incited so much interest in these two Williams cases is 
not merely that we have disparate intuitive responses to the cases (in one case 
we seem to track survival with psychological continuity, whilst in the other 
we seem to track it with physical continuity, where the two come apart). 
What is particularly interesting about the Williams cases is that we appear to 
have blatantly inconsistent or contradictory intuitive reactions to the very 
same case. For Case 2 is just a redescription of Case 1. The only difference 
between the two being that in Case 1 we are told both sides of the story-we 
are told about what happens to both you and Brown-whilst in Case 2 we are 
told only about what happens to you. So Case 2 and Case 1 are just different 
presentations of the very same case. And, taken together, our intuitive 
reactions to these two presentations of what amounts to the very same case 
seem to show that neither physical nor psychological continuity is a necessary 
condition for personal identity or survival, though each may be sufficient. 
But this seems a very odd conclusion. 
Not surprisingly, much has been made of our apparently inconsistent 
intuitive responses to these two cases. Williams himself takes what he 
assumes is our tendency to revise our response to the first case in light of the 
second to auger strongly in favour of a physical continuity account of 
personal identity. Whilst psychological continuity theorists have engaged in 
elaborate attempts to explain away our intuitive reaction to the second case 
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either as based on misleading features in the presentation of the cases, or by 
amending or supplementing existing psychological accounts so as to be able 
to explain them (or both). And a few philosophers have even taken our 
inconsistent intuitive reactions to these, and related, cases as dealing a telling 
blow to theorizing about survival by way of the method of cases altogether. 
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Robert Nozick advocates one of the best known and widely endorsed 
attempts to explain away our intuitive reaction to the second case-the case 
which appears to support a physical continuity account. According to 
Nozick, our intuitive reactions to these two puzzle cases can be explained by 
recourse to what he calls the 'closest-continuer theory'. Briefly and roughly, 
according to the closest continuer theory, we track the identity of a person 
over time with the closest (and close enough) continuer of that person. The 
closest continuer theory is itself neutral between physical and psychological 
continuity theories, for in itself it says nothing about what relations or 
weighted set of relations determine closeness. But, according to 
psychological continuity theorists, the closest continuer theory, in tandem 
with a psychological continuity construal of closeness, can explain away our 
intuitive reactions to the second presentation of the case. For the closest 
continuer theory enables psychological continuity theorists to point to what 
they claim is an important difference between the first and second 
presentations of the puzzle case. The crucial difference is that in Case 1 we 
are presented with a better continuer (a psychological continuer) of the 
original person than the person (a mere physical continuer) with whom we 
are presented in Case 2. This is the significance of leaving out what happens 
to Brown in Case 2. What our intuitive reactions show here, then, is that 
although a physical continuer is close enough or sufficient for personal 
identity (Case 2), a psychological continuer is better (Case 1). And so, despite 
initial appearances, our intuitive reactions to these cases support a 
psychological continuity account of survival. Unsurprisingly, many 
psychological continuity theorists have been quick to follow Nozick's line of 
response. 
Unfortunately, however, according to many physical continuity 
theorists2, the closest continuer theory cannot save the psychological 
2 And even a few psychological continuity theorists! 
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continuity account as the right account of personal identity (i.e. the account 
upon which our intuitive responses converge). For, they claim, there are 
many other puzzle cases where the closest continuer theory not only appears 
unable to explain our intuitions, but actually yields extremely counter-
intuitive conclusions. Here is one such case they cite in support. Imagine 
again that your brain is physically altered so that it comes to possess the 
memories, intentions, character traits and other psychological dispositions of 
Brown's. You wake up, thinking you are and have always been Brown. But, 
next to you, there is a state-of-the-art machine in the process of physically 
altering the brain of another person, White, so that White too will come to 
possess the psychology of Brown and, since the machine is state-of-the-art, 
will make White a slightly better psychological continuer of Brown than you. 
On the closest continuer view, whether or not you are Brown all depends 
upon whether or not you turn the machine off. If you do, you will be Brown 
(for you will be the best continuer of Brown), if you don't, White will be 
Brown (for White will be a better continuer of Brown than you). Further 
against the closest continuer theory as an explanation of people's intuitive 
reactions to Cases 1 and 2 we might note that, even where what happens to 
the other person (Brown) is included in the description of the case, many 
people's intuitive reactions still seem to favour a physical continuity account 
in Case 2. With these details included the case reads: 
Case 2* 
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Suppose that you are given the following news. You are to be tortured in 
twenty-four hours. There is no way you can avoid the impending torture, but 
you are offered the following consolations. Firstly, before the torture is 
administered, you will suffer complete amnesia regarding your present 
experiences. Secondly, you will be given a set of delusive memories about 
your past. Thirdly, you will be given a set of behavioural dispositions which 
are completely at odds with your present character and constitute a basic 
change in your present personality. As a final consolation, the same kinds of 
psychological changes will be effected in another subject, who, after suffering 
amnesia, will seem to remember the things you remember now and will 
exhibit your personality traits. The question to ask yourself is would you 
take the consolations. Would they make you any less deeply anxious about 
the impending torture? 
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And here again, despite the mention of the purportedly 'closer' 
continuer, the answer is often 'no'. (There is another reason for including the 
details about what happens to the other person in this case. It blocks what 
seems to me a more straightforward response than the closest-continuer 
theory that psychological continuity theorists might make to the second case 
as originally presented-namely, that the reason you are filled with dread in 
Case 2 is that the psychological changes prior to the torture will kill you (you 
will die), not that you will survive the psychological changes and then be 
tortured. Being told that your psychology will be realized in another brain 
and body, blocks this quick response. For then 'you', as glossed by 
psychological continuity theorists, will not die.) 
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Unger is another physical continuity theorist who is concerned to 
explain away the apparent intuitive appeal of psychological continuity 
accounts in cases such as Case 1, and many others like it. This is of 
particularly pressing concern for Unger because, recall, Unger is quite explicit 
in asserting both that the right account of survival is the one which accords 
with our 'deepest beliefs' about our survival conditions revealed in our 
intuitive responses to puzzle cases, and that we all share a 'deep conception' 
of our survival conditions, namely, a version of the physical continuity 
account: "[B]riefly and roughly, one of us will survive from an earlier to a 
later time when whatever physically realizes that person's core psychology 
continuously (enough) realizes that core of basic psychological capacities 
from the earlier time to the later time."3 This seems a very bold claim, 
particularly in light of the well-documented apparent appeal of psychological 
continuity accounts; that is, if our intuitive responses to many puzzle cases 
are anything to go by. Unger's response is that, in fact, our intuitive 
responses to many puzzle cases (unsurprisingly, those which support a 
psychological continuity account) are not much to go by. Our intuitive 
reactions to these puzzle cases fail truly to be revelatory of our 'deepest 
beliefs' because we have been misled by pernicious details in the description 
or presentation of the case, or by our prior intellectual commitments. Those 
puzzle cases which appear to support a psychological continuity account are 
too sparse in background details (leading us to make unwarranted or 
3unger (1990), p.14. 
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sometimes even incoherent assumptions), or are misleadingly and question-
beggingly described (as, for example, when the case of teletransportation is 
described as teletransportation; or when the person emerging from the process 
is called 'you'4); or reflect not the untutored intuitions of common folk, but 
the preconceived and vested intellectual views of philosophers.s 
Unger may be right to caution us about the influence that these sorts of 
presentational details may have on people's intuitive responses. However, 
we need some principled, independent grounds for discounting some of our 
reactions as based on misleading features in the presentation of puzzle cases, 
whilst elevating others as truly revelatory of our deepest beliefs. That is to 
say, we need some principled way of distinguishing between distorting and 
non-distorting features of puzzle cases.6 For psychological continuity 
theorists may (and indeed, often do) explain those of our intuitive reactions 
which seem to support a physical continuity account in exactly the same 
way-by pointing to (different) misleading features in the presentation of the 
case or to the prior intellectual commitments of respondents. 
Moreover, by Unger's criteria, if either of the two cases just presented 
are misleadingly described, it is Case 2-the case which seems to support of 
physical continuity account-wherein the person throughout is described as 
'you', not Case 1. This is not to say that Case 2 could not be redescribed 
'properly' in a way that may similarly support a physical continuity account, 
but it is to express some scepticism about Unger's claim that our intuitive 
reactions to puzzle cases, once properly described, will unanimously support 
a version of the physical continuity account. For Case 1 doesn't seem to 
exhibit any particularly misleading descriptive features; and Unger's account, 
which denies that distinctive psychology is necessary for survival, doesn't 
4Whereas Unger regards such details as irrelevant and pernicious, Stephen White (1989) 
thinks that they are crucially relevant. White's claim, I think, is that what explains our 
intuitions about personal identity (and about what matters in personal identity) are not so 
much the first-order facts about physical continuity or psychological continuity or the like, 
but second-order facts, facts about properties (or relations) having the property of playing a 
certain role in the person-directed practices of the people described in the puzzle cases. 
White, it seems, thinks that our intuitive reactions to puzzle cases can be explained by 
positing the second-order property as the realizer of the survival role for us. 
Sunger (1990), esp. pp.7-15. 
6Presumably the psychological literature is the place to look for this. 
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seem able to explain why we have the intuition in Case 1 that the persons 
swap bodies. Nor does it seem able to explain why so many regard purely-
informational teleporting (often, but not always, misleadingly called 
'teletransportation') as survival-preserving. In short, whilst some have 
intuitive reactions which would seem to support Unger' s account, others do 
not. And it seems that not all of these contrary intuitions can be explained 
away as rooted in pernicious case descriptions or prior commitments and so 
not revelatory of our shared 'deepest beliefs', all the more so in the absence of 
any principled grounds for so doing. 
So far, the evidence for lack of object-level convergence in the actual 
world has come from people's (divergent) intuitive responses to possible 
cases. However, some deny that people's intuitive reactions to possible cases 
are a reliable guide to their actual survival concept at all. Some, such as 
Wittgenstein and Quine, maintain that possible cases cannot tell us anything 
interesting about our actual concepts, but at most about how we predict that 
we would extend them were certain counter-factual situations actually to 
obtain. 
Wittgenstein writes, 
It is as if our concepts involve a scaffolding of facts ... If you imagine certain 
facts otherwise ... then you can no longer imagine the application of certain 
concepts.7 
And, in a similar vein, Quine writes 
The method of science fiction has its uses in philosophy but... I wonder 
whether the limits of the method are properly heeded. To seek what is 
'logically required' for sameness of person under unprecedented 
circumstances is to suggest that our words have some logical force beyond 
what our past needs have invested them with. 8 
Insofar as Quine and Wittgenstein are right, and possible cases tell us, not 
about our prior concept, but about how we guess we would extend it, 
possible cases are not much use in conceptual analysis. For they are 
7Wittgenstein (1967), Proposition 350. 
8Quine (1972), p.490. 
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supposed to tell us about our prior concept, not prompt us to develop a new 
one, a posteriori. 
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Kathleen Wilkes expresses a slightly different reservation. According 
to Wilkes, possible cases present us with the following insoluble dilemma: 
either the background to such cases is the world as we know it (in which case 
many possible cases are impossible because they violate fundamental laws), 
or the background is different from our world, in which case we cannot draw 
any philosophical conclusions from such fantasy cases because, in a world 
indeterminately different from our own, we do not know what we would 
want to say about anything. The first horn of Wilkes' 'dilemma' rests on the 
assumption that the world (physical and social) comes as a big, inseparable 
package deal-we cannot vary the social facts, without varying the rest of the 
package. Suppose we grant Wilkes this horn-given all the physical facts 
about the world (the initial conditions and the physical laws), the world 
(including the social facts) could not be any different from the way they in 
fact are. For possible cases in the case of survival typically do vary some of 
the background in any case. (They are cases in which teletransportation, 
brain-scrubbing and fission occur). Now there is certainly a sense in which 
such cases do leave some things 'indeterminate' (exactly what the laws of 
nature are in a world where fission regularly occurs, for example). But these 
cases do not leave everything indeterminate and mysterious-they tell us, for 
example, everything we seem to need to know about what fission, brain-
scrubbing and teletransportation involve. As a result, we do know what we 
want to say about these cases, even if some of us want to say different things. 
More recently, Johnston too has claimed that we should dispense with 
possible cases in theorizing about survival. According to Johnston, what our 
apparently inconsistent intuitive reactions to Cases 1 and 2 reveal is that the 
concept of personal identity operative in our responses to these cases is a 
conception of ourselves as 'bare loci of mental life', according to which 
neither physical nor psychological continuity is necessary for personal 
identity or survival, though we may typically regard them as evidence for it. 
And, Johnston argues, we should be very suspicious of any method of 
theorizing about personal identity which delivers up and supports a 
demonstrably false view about our nature. 
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Others, however, grant the validity of the use of possible cases in the 
project of conceptual analysis, but downplay the significance of the apparent 
disagreement in the case of survival. Our intuitive reactions to puzzle cases 
are fallible predictions about how we would respond if certain hypothetical 
circumstances were actually to obtain; and we (or some of us) might guess 
wrong. For example, we may guess that we wouldn't get into the 
Teletransporter were we standing in front of one, but were we actually 
standing there we would take a different view. This line of response 
maintains that, contrary to our differing predictions, we would all converge 
in our opinions about whether or not teletransportation is survival-
preserving, were Teletransportation actually available. Some of us just aren't 
very good predictors. 
But dispensing with the use of possible cases, or treating our intuitive 
responses as (very fallible) predictions about how we think we would 
respond were possible cases actually to obtain, will not make the 
disagreement go away. For people disagree about actual cases. Is the born-
again Christian the same person as the sinner who committed the crime? 
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Will I be the same person as the senile old woman (still a person) that I shall 
become? Is Fineas Gage (the unlucky railway foreman who had a steel pole 
blown thorough his left frontal lobe while tamping dynamite and underwent 
radical character transformation from a friendly, capable and efficient man to 
a man who was prone to violent, unprovoked fits of aggression; so changed 
was he that his friends and family insisted that he was no longer the same 
person) after the accident the same person as the person before the accident? 
About all of these actual cases, and quite a few more like them, well-informed 
people with consistent beliefs about the matter just go different ways. They 
diverge along exactly the same lines that philosophers such as Parfit, Perry, 
Shoemaker, Noonan, Unger, Williams, Nagel and others diverge about 
survival in the possible cases. 
Once we concede, as I think we should, that people who are neither in 
ignorance or error simply do not converge in their opinions about exactly 
what relation 'survival' refers to in possible and even actual cases, what 
should we say about survival in the actual world? There are, I think, three 
possible views. 
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The first is that what such disagreement shows is that the concept of 
survival is just vague around the edges. There is a set of core, more or less 
common, cases about which we all agree: cases where physical and 
psychological continuity go together to a reasonably great degree. But, when 
it comes to cases outside this core-cases where physical and psychological 
continuity come apart-the concept of survival starts to go vague; and the 
explanation for intuitive divergence around these indeterminate edges is that 
different people think it ought to be precisified in different ways. 
Unsurprisingly, this is an explanation for the intuitive divergence in the case 
of survival which has received very little attention in the personal identity 
debate. For if you think that the concept of survival is vague around the 
edges, then you think that there is not much more to be said about it than 
that. 
However, the claim that the explanation for the intuitive divergence 
about non-core cases is that the concept is vague around the edges has an 
unhappy consequence. The consequence is that, if this were right, we should 
have to say that very few people have mastery of the concept of survival, 
including many apparently very proficient users of the concept. For, on the 
assumption that the concept of survival is vague in this way, what people 
should be saying is that either way of precisifying it in indeterminate cases is 
an equally acceptable way of going. If it is indeterminate whether or not the 
born-again Christian is the same person as the earlier sinner, then what 
people should say is that the precisification according to which the born-
again is the same person as the sinner and the precisification according to 
which the born-again is not the same person as the sinner, are equally 
acceptable ways of going. Similarly for possible cases, such as the case of 
teletransportation: the precisification according to which a person survives 
teletransportation and the precisification according to which a person 
determinately does not survive teletransportation are equally acceptable 
ways of going. Insofar as people are not ecumenical in this way-and, 
needless to say, many are not-they fail to have mastery of the concept of 
survival. On the plausible assumption that most of us have reasonable 
mastery of our own concepts, it cannot be that the concept is vague. 
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If it seems unlikely that the explanation for the disagreement is that the 
concept of survival is vague, what might the explanation be? According to 
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pluralism, we should say this: the disputing parties mean the same thing by 
'survival' (they mean 'whatever plays the survival role for a community'), it is 
just that that role is multiply realized: different relations realize the survival 
role for different people. However, there is one, last competing explanation. 
The competing view, the rigidifying view, would have it that the two groups 
mean something different by survival-they have diff~rent survival concepts, 
survival and survival*. If survival rigidly picks out physical continuity (as 
Unger, for example, claims it does) then people such as Parfit, Perry, Lewis 
and Shoemaker, who use the word 'survival' to refer to psychological 
continuity, mean something different by survival: they mean survival*9. 
Note that, whichever of these two remaining ways we choose to go 
(rigidifying or pluralist), will signal an end to personal identity debate as we 
know it-namely, as a shoot-out between physical and psychological 
theories, one or other of which must be mistaken. For whether we take 
pluralism or the rigidifying view to be the right moral to draw from the 
debate, the disagreement between physical and psychological continuity 
theorists will be a 'no-fault' disagreement. If pluralism is right, advocates of 
the different views just blamelessly organize their person-directed practices 
and concerns around different relations; if the rigidifying view is right, then 
they just mean different things by 'survival'. 
The dispute between pluralism and the rigidifying view is an 
empirical dispute about what people mean by 'survival'-do they mean 'the 
relation that plays the survival role for a community' or do they mean 'the 
relation that actually plays the survival role for me', a posteriori 'physical 
continuity' (as Unger claims) or (as psychological continuity theorists 
typically claim) 'psychological continuity'? Prima Jacie , the dogmatic 
adversarialism which has characterized the personal identity debate might 
seem to suggest that people are rigidifiers, not pluralists. For pluralism 
requires that people think that, although they would not survive some 
process which by their lights they do not survive, other people, with different 
lights, might. And although few in the debate have actually claimed that 
9unger's meta-theory (that survival is (rigidly) whatever relation we most deeply believe it to 
be) may, in these circumstances, lead Unger to maintain that survival rigidly picks out the 
disjunction of physical or psychological continuity. So that the two groups do not, after all, 
mean different things. Unger would then be a pluralist of the more constrained variety. 
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advocates of opposing views simply mean something different by 'survival', 
they have commonly claimed that advocates of opposing views are 
mistaken-a person's survival (any person's survival, not just their own) 
requires the obtaining of the relation that they care about, and those who 
think otherwise are just wrong. However, as I mentioned in chapter 1, the 
difficulty in resolving this question decisively one way or the other here and 
now is that the standard sorts of puzzle cases employed in the personal 
identity debate are not of a sort which will help us answer this question. But 
the Williams' cases are an exception. For they do test people's intuitions 
about the meta-issue; and, what's more, provide empirical data to suggest 
that people actually are pluralists about survival. For, insofar as people allow 
that the person in Case 2, despite loss of psychological continuity, might 
nonetheless throughout properly be called 'you', they allow that the issue of 
survival can be settled a different way from the way in which it is settled in 
Case 1 where 'you' instead refers to psychological continuity. And this can 
only be explained if people's pre-theoretic semantic intuitions are pluralist, 
not rigidifying. 
Here is an analogy. Many philosophers maintain that water is rigidly 
H20. According to these philosophers, what people mean when they say 
'water' is H20 (not 'the stuff that falls from the sky, runs from taps, is 
drinkable etc'). We might test this claim that what people mean by 'water' is 
H20 by presenting people with a thought experiment which begins 'Imagine 
a world in which water is not H20 .. .' Now, if people are rigidifiers about 
water they ought not know what we mean by 'water' in such a case. What is 
the stuff that is not H20; how is that 'water'? Insofar as people do not have 
this reaction they do not straightforwardly mean H20 by 'water'. Insofar as 
they can make sense of the thought that there might be something properly 
called 'water' in a world devoid of H20 they must mean something more than 
merely H20 by 'water'. They must mean something like 'the stuff that plays 
the water role'. 
Just so in the Williams' case. By describing the person whose 
psychology is wiped as 'you', Case 2 is asking people to imagine a world in 
which the issue of survival is settled in a different way from Case 1; where 
'survival' (or 'you') refers not to psychological continuity among person-
stages but to physical continuity. And insofar as people understand what 
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'you' means in Case 2, they are not rigidifiers. For if they thought that 
'survival' straightforwardly meant psychological continuity (as their reactions 
to Case 1 might suggest), they ought not find coherent the description of Case 
2 wherein 'you' refers instead to physical continuity. Insofar as they can 
understand what it means to call a person who is not psychologically 
continuous 'you', they cannot mean by 'you' simply psychological continuity. 
By the term 'you' they must mean something like 'whatever relation plays the 
survival role'. 
The rigidifier may respond to this as they have responded to similar 
cases elsewhere (in particular, in the case of 'water'). Namely, by granting 
that it is epistemically possible that 'survival' might be used to refer to 
physical rather than psychological continuity, or vice versa. But, they will 
say, although epistemically possible, it is not logically or metaphysically or 
conceptually possible. It is logically necessary that 'survival' refers to 
psychological continuity, or whatever relation it is that the rigidifier claims 
that 'survival' rigidly designates. Now, this might be a valid move where we 
have some independent reason or argument for thinking that 'survival' is a 
rigid designator. For example, that 'survival' names a natural kind. But, in 
the case of survival, our intuitions are the only argument and data there is. 
And, prima fade, these support pluralism . 
Insofar as people are willing to allow that 'survival' might properly (or 
not improperly) be used to refer to a different relation, then, they are 
pluralists, not rigidifiers, about 'survival'. Now, it may be that some people 
(such as Unger) think that they and others are not willing to allow this; that 
survival for any community is what is survival for us and that another 
community who cared about something else would not survive (although, I 
think, our intuitive responses to the Williams cases provide prima facie 
evidence against this). However, the pluralist might, if she wanted, concede 
that Unger is right about this. Perhaps some people do think, wrongly, that 
they use 'survival' in this way. Certainly, the Somataphiles as I originally 
presented them used 'survival' in the way in which Unger, as a rigidifier, 
must claim that we all do. The Somataphiles, recall, thought that no one, not 
even the Teletransporters, survived teletransportation, because 
teletransportation did not preserve the relation that they, the Somataphiles, 
cared about. But, as I went onto argue not in so many words, insofar as the 
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Somataphiles thought this they thought it because they uncritically and 
mistakenly assumed practice-independence: they believed that 'survival' 
latched onto a natural kind, or some other such independently privileged 
thing. Perhaps, in similarly having such false meta-level beliefs, some of us 
are like the Somataphiles. The question then is: would we still be like the 
Somataphiles once we ceased to have such false meta-level semantic and/or 
metaphysical beliefs? Would we still persist in our belief that 'survival' was a 
rigid designator after informed deliberation? 
Imagine that we come to have substantial interaction with a 
community in which fission is a regular occurrence, and who organize their 
person-directed practices around the assumption that only one of the fission 
products is a survivor of the original person (the other being a wholly new 
and different person). In this community, rights, legal entitlements, ongoing 
obligations, personal relationships etc. are inherited by the fission product, 
call him or her, Righty, who emerges first (milliseconds before the other, 
Lefty). What would we think of this community's view of survival? Initially, 
I think, we would try to convince them that they are wrong about survival: 
that is to say, that they are mistaken to treat Righty as the same person as the 
original, and Lefty as a new and different person; that this is arbitrary 
discrimination against another perfectly good successor, and so on. In just 
the same way as, initially, the Somataphiles tried to convince the 
Teletransporters that they were wrong about survival, and vice versa. 
However, suppose that our protests were to no avail-they continue to 
regard Righty as the only legitimate successor of the pre-fission person. In 
our ongoing interactions with them would we conclude, after sufficient and 
informed deliberation, that they're not talking about survival or would we 
conclude that they are talking about survival, it is just that what relation is 
survival for them is not the same as what is survival for us. 
Pluralism, as an analysis of how we use the word 'survival', stakes 
much of its claim on the latter: that, if not immediately, then certainly after a 
little deliberation, we would come to believe that, without having changed 
the subject, they simply and blamelessly settle the issue of survival a different 
way. And the Williams cases provide prima facie support for thinking that we 
are at least willing to entertain that this might be the right thing to say about 
such a community. Insofar as we may be reluctant to allow that this 
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community are still talking about 'survival' it will be because we are 
parochially attached to the particular relation that we care about. There is 
nothing wrong with parochial attachment of this sort, except that, in the case 
of survival, it conflicts with another central intuition: the intuition that 
survival, whatever it is, must be principled. Surely survival for every 
community shouldn't depend on something as utterly psychologically 
contingent as what we happen to care about.10 
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I think that pluralism is right as a theory about how we use the word 
'survival'. And my hope is that, once others reflect upon the meta-issue, they 
will come to realize that they are pluralists too. But I concede that the 
evidence from empirical psychology is far from entirely in as yet. (At least 
now, I hope, having seen the need for such empirical investigation into the 
meta-issue, we can begin it in earnest.) However, suppose that further 
investigations in empirical psychology deliver the conclusion that many of us 
are rigidifiers, not pluralists, about survival; that we refuse to allow that 
'survival' properly refers to any relation other than the one or ones to which 
we use it rigidly to refer. Would the bell then toll for pluralism? 
Well, it would signal the end to pluralism as a piece of descriptive 
conceptual analysis: as an analysis of how we all use the word 'survival'. But 
pluralism may yet retain a vital place in analysing survival. For pluralism 
will then be the theorist's view. The theorist may not, and typically does not, 
care whether their categories coincide with the categories that ordinary folk 
use. For the way ordinary people use words may not carve up the world in 
any particularly theoretically useful or illuminating way. Anthropologists 
investigating the cultural practices of different communities, for example, 
typically do not care greatly about whether the categories that they use to 
10Someone who is unconvinced by this argument will have at least the following take-home 
argument for a watered-down pluralism-that both role and actual realizer are essential for it 
being determinate whether or not a person survives. In the absence of either-where 
something plays the survival role for a community but that relation is not what actually 
realizes the survival role for us, or where there is the relation that actually plays the survival 
role for us but it does not play the survival role for a community-it is simply indeterminate 
whether or not people in that community survive. On this view, as against the rigidifier, that 
something plays the survival role for a community is essential for it that relation counting as 
survival, but (with the rigidifier, as against the pluralist) this view has it that actual realizer is 
also required for it to be determinately true that a community are talking about survival. As 
earlier noted, something along exactly these lines seems to be David Wiggins' view. 
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investigate communities are endorsed by the communities that they are 
investigating. When they are looking with interest into different conceptions 
of the good life for example, they would not abandon the whole project 
simply because they discover in the course of these investigations that the 
members of the communities investigated themselves regard each other as 
meaning different things by 'the good life' (although they may record this as 
an interesting and relevant piece of sociological data in itself). For they are 
interested in the commonalities between the two communities; commonalities 
(such as the common motivational role that different properties play) which 
would be denied and obscured were they to adopt the view taken by the 
communities as their theoretical kind. Just so, I think, if it turns out that 
ordinary people use the word 'survival' to refer only to the relation that they 
themselves care about, then it will turn out that the folk use the word 
'survival' in a theoretically uninteresting way. The theorist who wants to 
understand and explain interesting commonalities between communities 
who organize their person-directed practices and concerns around different 
relations (such as the Teletransporters and the Somataphiles) needs a 
different category to carve up the world in an sociologically or 
anthropologically interesting way; and that category will be pluralism. 
AFTERWORD 
If pluralism is right, then we should revise our beliefs not merely about 
what to say of other communities in other worlds, but also about what to 
say about survival in the actual world. Moreover, we ought (the 'ought' 
of instrumental rationality) to become minimalists about survival. 
However, the implications of pluralism are not confined to the case of 
personal identity or personal survival alone. From pluralism about 
survival, I think, we can draw some more general lessons for issues which 
are of substantial contemporary concern in moral and political 
philosophy. In particular, we can draw some lessons about the 
relationship between individual's attitudes of identification (with nation, 
culture, gender, race and class) and the question of personal identity, with 
which philosophers wanting to explain such phenomena as nationalism, 
gendered identity and ethnicity, amongst others, have been increasingly 
concerned. I want very briefly, in closing, to begin to suggest what some 
of these morals might be. To explore these implications in greater detail is 
a further, future project. 
Many social and political philosophers, most notably (but not 
exclusively) Marxists, communitarians, post-modernists, feminists and 
post-structuralists, have been anxious to insist that 'self-identity' or 
'personal identity' is socially constructed. Indeed, this has become almost 
a truism in most contemporary moral and political philosophy. Insofar as 
these moral and political philosophers have engaged at all with the 
personal identity debate in analytic philosophy, it has typically been with 
an eye to pointing out the utter irrelevance of this debate for the issues-
national identity, ethnicity, gendered identity, racial identity and the 
like-with which they are concerned. The personal identity debate in 
analytic philosophy is, to their mind, not only inanely insular and 
parochial, but completely misguided. 
These objections to analytic discussions of personal identity find 
their clearest (and most sympathetic) expression with Ross Poole, in the 
context of a discussion of nationalism. Poole, unlike many othersl, does 
not despair of the possibility of analytic accounts of personal identity 
contributing something of interest and importance to an understanding of 
nationalism. But he does think that analytic accounts of personal identity 
lsee, for example, Jonathan Ree (1992). 
Afterword 
will not do as they stand. Poole's objection is that, since Locke, analytic 
accounts of personal identity have got the direction of explanation 
between social practices attitudes and personal identity the wrong way 
round. He writes, 
Whilst most subsequent philosophy has rejected Locke's account, it 
has accepted his way of posing the problem ... The Lockean tradition 
assumes that personal identity is a physical or psychological relation 
which underlies and helps explain certain social practices, and has 
sought-unsuccessfully-to discern what that relationship is. 2 
This sort of approach, Poole thinks, is of little use in moral and political 
philosophy because "understanding personal identity is not a matter of 
discerning continuing essence, but of discerning the different social 
practices which construct and sustain it".3 
The sort of account of personal identity that Poole and others think 
we need for an understanding of social and political phenomena such as 
nationalism is an account which Poole himself traces to Hegel, Nietzsche 
and Marx. It is an account which "reverses the direction of explanation: it 
is the social practices which underlie and explain personal identity"4, not 
personal identity which underlies and explains the social practices. In 
short, I think, the account Poole and others want is a practice-dependent 
account of personal identity of just the sort I have advocated. 
At this point, analytic philosophers might well reply that it is no 
surprise that their accounts of personal identity do not serve to shed much 
light on the connection between personal identity and social attitudes of 
identification. For what Poole and others want when they want an 
account of personal identity which explains the social practices which 
construct people's identities is an account of qualitative personal identity; 
an account of how and why people form the various identifications with 
nation, gender, race, class or culture, that they do. And this is a quite 
different and separate question from the question of what makes a person 
one and the same numerical individual persisting through time. When 
Poole and others criticize analytic philosophy for failing to deliver the sort 
2Poole (1992), p.15. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 1, I think that Locke is an 
unfortunate choice of example here. For, if there is one philosopher in the analytic 
tradition who advocates just the sort of account of personal identity Poole wants, it is 
Locke. 
3ibid., p.16. 
4Zoc.cit. 
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of account of personal identity that can shed light on the question of how 
and why people form the identifications they do, they have made an 
elementary confusion: they have simply failed to realize that the question 
of qualitative personal identity is different from the question of numerical 
personal identity; and that it is the latter, not the former, question that 
analytic philosophers have sought to answer in discussions of personal 
identity. They have failed to realize that just because the words 'personal 
identity' are the same, it does not follow that they are being used in the 
same sense or for the same question. Most analytic philosophers, I think, 
even practice-independent ones, would be more than happy to grant that 
a person's qualitative identity-the sort of person that a person is; the 
beliefs, desires and behavioural dispositions that they have-is 
determined, to a significant degree, by social practices. But, they will say, 
although the two sorts of personal identity masquerade under the same 
name, the question of qualitative personal identity is a quite different, and 
independent, question from that of numerical personal identity; and 
numerical identity, unlike qualitative identity, is determined quite 
independently of social practices. 
Between these two different philosophical traditions and questions, 
however, there is some middle ground; but it takes practice-dependence 
about (numerical) personal identity to see it. For, once we are practice-
dependent about (numerical) personal identity, these two questions (the 
question of numerical personal identity and the question of qualitative 
personal identity), though certainly different questions, are not so 
independent as philosophers of personal identity in the analytic tradition 
have typically thought. For on a practice-dependent account, the concept 
of (numerical) personal identity is a cluster concept; and amongst the 
cluster may well figure platitudes about the importance for numerical 
personal identity of continuing identification with a nation, a gender, a 
class, a race or a culture. X identifies as Y just if Y is a member of the 
cluster, a weighted most of which is sufficient for numerical identity. The 
question of numerical identity is then much more closely associated with 
the question of qualitative identity than previously thought. For a 
person's numerical identity is defined, inter alia, in terms of social 
attitudes and practices which were previously thought the unique and 
distinct province of qualitative personal identity. And now, moreover, we 
have an explanation as to why the two different questions are both 
questions about 'personal identity' nonetheless. 
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Exactly how closely entwined the two sorts of personal identity are 
is an interesting question. As I noted at the outset, too much qualitative 
change can destroy numerical identity. Might it be, then, that ceasing to 
identify with a nation, culture, race, class or gender might destroy 
numerical identity? Might it mean, not merely that a later person is a 
very different sort of person to an earlier person, but that, as a result of 
such refiguration, the earlier person literally ceases to exist? Temporal-
phase pluralism certainly happily accommodates this possibility. To pick 
just one topical example, it might be that, in ceasing to identify as a 
lesbian (by, inter alia, becoming attracted to men) a person may cease to 
exist, constructing a new and different person, a person who may (or may 
not) regard earlier lesbian-identifying person-stages as parts of them. This 
would give a literal gloss to the claim that some lesbian-feminists and 
queer-theorists have made, that ceasing to identify as a lesbian means, not 
merely that the lesbian ceases to exist, but that the self itself ceases to exist. 
I must say that it seems to me unlikely that, where the platitude 
about continuing to identify as a lesbian figures amongst the personal 
identity cluster at all, it figures sufficiently heavily weighted so that to 
lose it alone would constitute a person's literal death (although, if 
sufficient other of the platitudes were gone, ceasing to identify as a lesbian 
might be the final straw that makes for a person's death). Whatever the 
plausibility of these claims, however, it is an advantage of temporal-phase 
pluralism, I think, that, alone amongst accounts of personal identity in 
analytic philosophy, it can give rigorous and intelligible expression to 
these popular claims. These further, interesting applications of pluralism 
I leave for another time. 
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